I. Introduction

The term “property” is not a pejorative but a legal descriptor, and its use should not be misconstrued as discounting the emotional attachment that pet owners undeniably feel. Nevertheless, under established legal doctrine, recovery in pet-death cases is, barring legislative reclassification, limited to loss of value, not loss of relationship.

—Strickland v. Medlen[1]

Courts in the United States have long classified nonhuman animals as personal property that have value.[2] Yet humans, more than with almost any other species, have formed the “most special and intimate” relationships with companion animals, specifically dogs.[3] These relationships transcend utilitarian purposes, with “canine companions . . . treated—and treasured—not as mere personal property but as beloved friends and confidants, even family members.”[4] This classification has significant consequences, because it dictates the damages available when a companion animal is wrongfully injured or killed.[5] Courts apply the property-based damages framework not only in negligence and intentional tort cases involving the death or injury of pets but also in related contexts such as veterinary malpractice, boarding and grooming disputes, conversion actions, and even transportation and contract cases.[6] In each of these situations, damages are assessed under the same rules that govern injury to all personal property.[7]

The law’s strict adherence to the property framework for dog ownership has created tension with social realities. Historically, courts have permitted recovery of only a pet’s fair market value or, in rare instances, its “special value” tied to services it provides, such as guarding or hunting.[8] Although the traditional damages rule has treated animals as personal property, reflecting a utilitarian view, it has always been inadequate for providing just compensation for the genuine harms individuals suffer when a companion animal is wrongfully injured or killed, given the high value people place on their dogs.[9]

Despite widespread recognition of pets as family members,[10] some courts are reluctant to revisit the damages paradigm.[11] Most courts refuse to do so.[12] In Strickland, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that noneconomic damages for the death of a dog are unavailable because a dog’s worth is not compensable as a matter of law, and allowance of unlimited emotional injury damages would result in an unbounded and imprecise form of liability.[13] This persistence reflects a broader inertia: Even as scholarship and public opinions have increasingly emphasized the depth of the human–animal bond, most courts continue to apply traditional property-based rules to relationships of profound emotional and social importance.

While legislative reform would provide clarity, courts need not await statutory action to recalibrate the market-value rule, a common law doctrine, which courts are fully empowered to reconsider.[14] A judicially administrable hybrid damages framework—including economic costs, a capped sentimental value, punitive damages for intentional conduct, and limited filial or loss-of-consortium damages—would represent an incremental evolution rather than a radical departure. By extending noneconomic damages and consortium tort principles to these losses, courts can accurately recognize the value of relationships with companion animals, because the harm or loss of a companion animal can have devastating effects on owners who view them as family members. This solution would fairly compensate owners while maintaining predictability and doctrinal coherence.

Part II traces the historical and modern treatment of pets. Historically, pets were treated as property, emphasizing the consequences of this classification in inheritance, creditor, and family law. In modern times, pets are treated as family members, reflected in shifting cultural attitudes; statutory reforms, such as pet custody and trusts; and limited judicial acknowledgments of their special status.

Part III examines the current damages framework, showing how courts rely on market value, intrinsic value, and limited veterinary expenses, while occasionally recognizing narrow statutory exceptions, culminating in the Texas Supreme Court’s refusal to expand recovery in Strickland v. Medlen. Part IV critiques the framework’s inconsistencies and inadequacies, surveys state splits, and analyzes the rationales courts invoke to resist change.

Part V advances a judicially administrable hybrid framework for damages, combining economic, capped-sentimental, punitive, and consortium-style remedies, and proposes a test to guide courts in applying it. It also addresses counterarguments concerning speculation, the floodgates doctrine, and judicial restraint.

Finally, Part VI concludes by urging courts to move beyond the outdated property paradigm and adopt remedies that reflect the true nature of human–animal relationships.

II. Treatment of Pets as Property

For much of Anglo-American legal history, pets have been situated within the law of property.[15] This classification has done more than assign animals a doctrinal label; it has shaped the legal consequences that attach to ownership, transfer, and injury across multiple areas of the law.[16] Treating pets as personal property has informed how courts distribute animals in divorce,[17] transfer ownership through inheritance,[18] subject pets to creditor claims,[19] and calculate remedies when animals are harmed.[20] At the same time, judicial opinions have repeatedly reaffirmed the property paradigm even while acknowledging the unique emotional bonds between humans and companion animals.[21] Together, these historical foundations, doctrinal consequences, and judicial articulations have entrenched the pets-as-property framework and constrained the remedies available to pet owners, setting the stage for the tensions that underlie modern challenges to that framework.

A. Historical Treatment

The modern treatment of pets as property has deep roots in common law doctrine.[22] This Section examines the historical origins of that classification and the early distinctions that influenced how different animals were valued and protected.

1. Pets as Chattel at Common Law

At common law, all animals were classified as chattels personal.[23] Chattels personal were defined as “things moveable” capable of being “carried about with” the owner and “transferred from place to place.”[24] However, even among these categories of chattels personal, animals were treated differently because they “have in themselves a principle and power of motion.”[25] More specifically, animals were categorized either as tame or wild.[26] Tame animals, such as horses, kine, sheep, and poultry, were distinguished at common law from wild animals, such as deer and hawks, whose possession was merely recreational.[27] Because tame animals were deemed to be in the owner’s perpetual possession, a person could hold an absolute property in them.[28] Stealing, forcible abduction of such tame property, was a felony, for these animals “are things of intrinsic value,” which provided for food or use of husbandry.[29] However, man had no absolute property right in animals ferae naturae—wild animals.[30] Instead, this was a special property right known as a “qualified property” right, which a person could claim by taming the animal either by art, industry, or education, and confining them within his own immediate power; this was a defeasible right that would cease if the animal were to escape and be captured by another person.[31]

Although some animals are categorized as personal property, not all animals have equal presence or status under the law, with some receiving greater protection than others.[32] The common law gives the greatest protection to animals it deems useful and the least protection to ferae naturae.[33] Useful animals, such as cattle and sheep, were regarded as having intrinsic value and were given the same protection as goods, but animals of a base nature, such as dogs and cats, were not given the same protection.[34] Thus, although one could bring a civil action for the malicious killing of a pet, one could not bring a criminal action.[35] Even now, the loss of companion animals is still measured by the same property-based framework that governs other forms of personal property.[36]

Treating animals as property carries significant legal consequences that reverberate across doctrines of transfer, inheritance, marital distribution, creditor remedies, and even criminal law.

Transferability. If an animal is considered property, one of the fundamental incidents of ownership is the right to transfer title to another.[37] Under the right to transfer, animals are freely alienable and may be sold, gifted, or otherwise conveyed.[38]

Inheritance. In the context of inheritance, courts traditionally distribute pets, like other items of personal property, through wills and probate proceedings, with ownership passing to the designated heir.[39]

Marital Property. Within the realm of marital property, although the treatment of companion animals has begun to shift, many courts continue to apply traditional property principles.[40] Because pets are legally considered property rather than children, disputes over ownership are not resolved under the best interest determination; instead, pets are awarded according to the established rules of marital or separate property.[41] Yet, emerging pet custody legislation in several states signals a departure from the pure property model, requiring courts to consider the animal’s well-being[42]—a development discussed further in Section II.B.

Creditor Debts. Similarly, a property classification also determines whether pets may be subject to creditors’ claims.[43] In some states, household animals can theoretically be seized to satisfy a debt, though eight states “specifically exempt household pets or domestic animals kept for family use from a creditor’s reach.”[44] However, twenty-six additional states provide broader animal exemptions “that exempt[] any personal property of the debtor’s choice, including pets or other animals.”[45]

Criminal Law. Finally, the property paradigm profoundly shapes criminal law’s treatment of animal mistreatment. Historically, harm against animals was prosecuted not as cruelty against sentient beings but as malicious injury against property, on the theory that the offense injured the owner’s proprietary interests.[46] Between 1800 and 1850, American courts gradually began to recognize animal cruelty statutes as distinct from property offenses, shifting the justification from protecting owners to protecting the animals themselves, regardless of their ownership status.[47] Nonetheless, vestiges of the property framework persist, influencing how animal cruelty laws are enforced and the extent to which they recognize animals as independent subjects of protection.[48]

3. Judicial Language Reinforcing Property Status.

Judicial opinions have long reinforced the classification of pets as personal property; at the same time, courts have also recognized the unique emotional bonds between humans and their animals.[49] This apparent tension between the formal application of property principles and the informal recognition of pets’ distinct status can be seen in more than a century of case law.[50]

In Heiligmann v. Rose, an 1891 case involving the wrongful killing of three trained Newfoundland dogs, the Texas Supreme Court offered one of the earliest judicial acknowledgments that animals possess a “special or pecuniary value” beyond ordinary market evaluation.[51] While the court reaffirmed that dogs are property, it held that when a dog’s market value is inadequate, the owner may recover its intrinsic or special value based on its usefulness or services.[52] Thus, while the court’s holding clearly establishes a basis for recovery based on economic value, the court also seemed to recognize that pets fall into a different category of property—one not wholly captured by market exchange.[53]

More than a century after the Heiligmann decision, modern courts were similarly conflicted. In Strickland v. Medlen, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rule that pets are property and refused recovery for emotional harm or loss of companionship when a family dog was mistakenly euthanized.[54] Although the court acknowledged the profound human–animal bond, it concluded that Texas law limits damages to market or actual value, prioritizing property principles over the emotional harm suffered by the pet owners.[55]

This line of reasoning appears in multiple jurisdictions. For example, in Schriver v. Raptosh, the Idaho Supreme Court held that economic damages for the destruction of a pet may include the animal’s unique traits or pedigree but exclude sentimental or companionship value.[56] Likewise, in Barking Hound Village, the Georgia Supreme Court limited recovery for a dog’s injury to fair market value and reasonable veterinary expenses, again reaffirming the chattel framework.[57]

Courts in other states have echoed this line of reasoning with minor variations. In Liddle v. Clark, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that sentimental value cannot be included in damage calculations because pets are legally treated as personal property; thus, recovery was limited to market value.[58] In a similar manner, in Kaufman v. Langhofer, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied recovery for emotional distress or loss of companionship when a pet is negligently killed or injured.[59] Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals followed suit in Carbasho v. Musulin, refusing damages for the emotional pain of losing a companion animal.[60]

As societal attitudes continue to evolve and legislatures pass legislation expanding the legal rights of companion animals, the property paradigm persists. Strickland exemplifies this enduring logic; even as the court expressed sympathy for the Medlens’ loss, it emphasized that any shift toward recognizing pets as more than property should come from the Legislature, not the Judiciary.[61] Consequently, we find ourselves in a doctrinal impasse: Tort law continues to frame pets as nothing more than chattel, treating them solely in economic terms, even as society increasingly treats them as family members. This historical throughline has entrenched the pets-as-property doctrine, assuring its continued citation and influence well into the twenty-first century. However, the courts’ conflicting language—simultaneously humanizing pets and classifying them as property—makes clear that reform is neither novel nor unexpected. Ultimately, the modern approach will bring clarity to the centuries-old tension in the doctrine.

B. Modern Approach: Treatment of Pets as Family

The unresolved friction in judicial language, oscillating between describing pets as sentimental property and acknowledging their unique emotional importance, has prompted a modern reexamination of the legal treatment of companion animals.[62] While the law has historically relied on property classifications, the lived experiences of pet owners and the evolving bond between owners and pets have made it increasingly untenable to treat pets as interchangeable chattel.[63] The modern approach, as illustrated by the development of social, legislative, and judicial approaches, acknowledges that companion animals occupy a hybrid status: neither full legal persons nor mere property, but rather, family members whose interests deserve meaningful protection.[64]

1. Beyond Property: Sentience and Companionship

Courts, legislatures, and scholars increasingly acknowledge that companion animals are not merely fungible objects but sentient beings with intrinsic worth capable of forming meaningful relationships with humans.[65] This recognition reflects growing discomfort with traditional property frameworks that treat animals as interchangeable goods valued primarily for their market worth.[66] Advances in scientific research documenting animals’ cognitive and emotional capacities have reinforced this shift, contributing to advocacy efforts to expand legal recognition of animal interests, including proposals to secure legal personhood for animals, which would afford them legal rights akin to those of people.[67]

It is this very sentience that differentiates animals from other forms of property, such as heirlooms, because, in addition to their sentimental value, companion animals provide companionship that cannot be reduced to the mere value of ownership.[68] Pets provide companionship, emotional support, and social benefits that cannot be adequately captured by “fair market” valuation alone.[69] Social and cultural practices increasingly reflect this understanding, with dogs commonly described as “man’s best friend,” in recognition of their loyalty and nonjudgmental support.[70] These human–animal relationships more closely resemble familial bonds than conventional property relationships, demonstrating the limitations of a purely economic framework for evaluating harms to companion animals.[71]

2. Societal Recognition of Pets as Family Members

Public attitudes towards pets have shifted substantially from the eighteenth-century conception of pets as chattel personal.[72] The number of pet-owning households reflects this transformation, with dog-owning households increasing from 31.3 million in 1996 to 59.8 million in 2024.[73]

Surveys consistently show that most Americans consider their pets family members.[74] Many owners refer to themselves as “pet parents” and integrate their animals into family rituals, making financial and emotional investments that mirror parental responsibilities.[75] As birth rates continue to fall in nearly every country, some scholars have noted the increasing centrality of companion animals within household life, with many child-free owners finding raising pets “just as meaningful as raising children.”[76] Pet owners buy their pets holiday gifts, schedule play dates with other dogs, and provide health insurance and daycare.[77] This cultural transformation pushes the law to reckon with a reality that most of society already accepts: Pets function as integral members of the family unit.[78]

3. Legislative Recognition of Pets as More Than Property

Unsurprisingly, the modern legal landscape reflects a clear, though incremental, movement toward formal recognition of companion animals’ special status. Legislatures across the country have begun enacting measures that move beyond the strict property framework, acknowledging both the welfare and the importance of companion animals through custody statutes, trusts, creditor exemptions, and judicial acknowledgment.[79]

Custody Statutes. Several states, including Alaska, Illinois, and California, have enacted statutes requiring courts to consider an animal’s well-being when allocating ownership in divorce proceedings that are akin to child custody requirements.[80] This marks a significant departure from the traditional approach that treats pets like furniture or vehicles, distributing them purely by title or contribution.[81] By invoking a best interests standard, these statutes align companion animals more closely with children than with chattel.[82]

Trusts. Although courts historically treated pet trusts as unenforceable honorary trusts due to the absence of a human beneficiary,[83] every state now recognizes enforceable pet trusts, enabling owners to set aside funds to provide for the animal’s care in the event of the owner’s death.[84] This reform represents a legal acknowledgment that pets function as dependents whose welfare deserves ongoing protection.[85] Enforcement of such trusts by courts and fiduciaries reflects the law’s willingness to impose obligations towards animals, something incompatible with a purely property-based framework.[86] Pet trusts thus operate as a formal recognition that pets occupy a unique category of valued relationships rather than fungible goods.

Creditor Exemptions. Classifying pets as property carries a legal implication that allows them to be seized or used as liens to satisfy debts.[87] Yet, many states now provide exemptions that prevent creditors from seizing companion animals in the event of the owner’s bankruptcy or foreclosure, distinguishing them from other forms of personal property.[88] These exemptions recognize that, unlike financial assets or consumer goods, animals serve irreplaceable emotional and familial functions and are “not just property.”[89] By exempting animals from collection, legislatures implicitly reject the notion that pets’ value is purely economic.

4. Judicial Acknowledgment of Pets’ Unique Role

Judicial developments mirror these legislative shifts. Some states permit capped damages for the negligent or intentional harm to pets, reflecting discomfort with the pure property paradigm.[90] For example, in Anne Arundel County v. Reeves, the Maryland Court of Appeals interpreted a Maryland statute that “allow[ed] pet owners to recover certain capped damages for the death or injury of their pet as a result of a tort.”[91] The statute allowed for recovery of the pet’s fair market value before death, as well as the reasonable and necessary veterinary expenses incurred.[92] While the court interpreted the statute in line with the pets-as-property framework, it emphasized that any expansion of pet-related damages should come from the Legislature rather than the Judiciary, reasoning that economic damages are more easily ascertainable in terms of fair market value and veterinary expenses than emotional pain and suffering.[93]

III. Current Damage Framework

Currently, the tort law framework for recovering damages for companion animals remains rooted in common law property principles developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which value pets not as family members but rather as chattel recoverable only for their economic worth.[94] Despite societal and legislative shifts toward recognizing animals as sentient companions, tort law continues to treat their loss under the same rubric as the destruction of inanimate property.[95]

A. Origins of Damage Framework

The modern rule governing damages for the loss or harm of companion animals finds its origins in the common law treatment of animals as personal property, recoverable only for their economic value as discussed in Section II.A.[96] As articulated in Heiligmann v. Rose[97] and reaffirmed in Strickland v. Medlen, Texas courts have continued to limit recovery for harm to companion animals to remedies traditionally available for the damage or destruction of personal property.[98]

At its core, the framework permits recovery of an animal’s fair market value at the time of loss.[99] However, when market value is unavailable or insufficient, courts may also consider the dog’s special or intrinsic value to the owner when calculating damages.[100] Strickland narrowed the valuation calculation, defining “special value” solely as the usefulness and services of the dogs, referring to their economic rather than sentimental or emotional value.[101]

While this structure appears to offer flexibility when market value is unavailable, it ultimately remains tethered to economic metrics and does not allow for recovery for the relational harms most commonly associated with companion animals.[102] The result is a damages framework that systematically undercompensates owners whose losses cannot be meaningfully expressed in market terms, a failure explored in Part IV.[103]

B. Types of Damages

Courts today generally adhere to three limited categories of recoverable damages for the wrongful injury or death of a companion animal: fair market value, intrinsic or special value, and veterinary expenses limited to those that are reasonable and necessary, with a small but growing number of jurisdictions creating statutory exemptions to this traditional framework.[104]

1. Fair Market Value

The default measure of damages is fair market value, which is to say, what the animal would sell for in an open market transaction.[105] This approach aligns with traditional property principles, but it can produce inequitable results in practice, particularly for mixed-breed or rescued animals, which typically lack discernible market value.[106] Courts applying this standard often award nominal sums that bear little relation to the emotional harm and social loss experienced by pet owners.[107]

2. Intrinsic or Special Value

When no market value exists, courts may consider the animal’s “pecuniary” or “special” value to the owner.[108] However, even in these situations, the courts tend to define “special value” very narrowly.[109] “[S]pecial value” is usually defined as the animal’s economic usefulness, such as guarding, hunting, or breeding, rather than the animal’s companionship or sentimental worth.[110]

3. Limited Vet Expenses

Some jurisdictions permit recovery of veterinary costs incurred in treating an injured pet, but the total amount of recovery is often capped at or near the animal’s market value.[111] Courts justify this limitation on the grounds that allowing full recovery of medical costs would create “excessive” awards disproportionate to the pet’s objective worth.[112] This reasoning once again highlights the inconsistency of applying market-based valuation to sentient beings whose value transcends economics. Unlike human plaintiffs, whose medical expenses are compensable and routinely determined in human malpractice cases to restore bodily integrity, injured animals are evaluated through a property lens that treats veterinary care as an optional expense rather than a necessary response to physical harm.[113]

4. Statutory Exemptions

However, states are also free to set their own statutory damages framework. Tennessee, for example, has enacted a statutory departure from this limitation through the “T-Bo Act.”[114] The T-Bo Act authorizes capped noneconomic damages for the death of a pet dog or cat caused by the negligent act of another.[115] This law recognizes that pets occupy a unique position between property and family; although owners do not have unlimited recovery, the statute implicitly validates the emotional and familial importance of companion animals by providing an additional $5,000 of noneconomic damages for the loss of the society, companionship, and love and affection of the pet.[116]

C. Strickland’s Refusal to Expand

The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland epitomizes the Judiciary’s reluctance to expand damages for the injury or loss of companion animals.[117] The case arose after an animal shelter mistakenly euthanized Avery, a mixed-breed family dog with little market value.[118] The owners sought to recover for the dog’s sentimental and emotional value, arguing that Heiligmann should be read to include such noneconomic considerations.[119] The court rejected this argument, reaffirming that, under Texas law, pets are personal property and that recovery is limited to market value or special value tied to services, not companionship.[120]

Justice Willett, writing for a unanimous court, warned that allowing sentimental damages would expose defendants to limitless liability and create unpredictability.[121] Similar concerns once accompanied judicial resistance to loss-of-consortium damages, which courts initially limited to economic loss tied to services before gradually expanding recovery to include intangible relational harms, such as companionship and affection.[122] Although courts recognized the potential for speculative verdicts and valuation difficulties in recognizing consortium claims, they ultimately concluded that such concerns could be managed through doctrinal safeguards including evidentiary standards, jury instructions, and appellate review.[123]

Strickland, however, declined to move past these concerns. Rather than engaging the historical evolution of relational damages, the court emphasized that Texas precedent had long confined recovery for the loss of personal property to its economic value, and expanding remedies for pet loss was a matter of public policy for the Legislature, not the Judiciary.[124] In doing so, the court reaffirmed the traditional property-based framework, expressly declining to extend tort recovery to the emotional dimension of pet ownership.[125] The decision places Texas firmly within the common law position and exemplifies the judicial inertia this Note critiques.[126]

IV. Inconsistencies and Inadequacies in the Current Damage Framework

Despite near-universal recognition that companion animals occupy a unique role in human lives, the legal framework governing damages for their injury or death remains fragmented and underdeveloped.[127] Jurisdictions throughout the country employ markedly different rules, often reaching divergent outcomes based on geography rather than principle.[128] Even where courts acknowledge the emotional and relational significance of pets, damages are frequently constrained by property-based valuation methods ill-suited to capture the nature of the loss.[129] This Part provides an overview of the resulting doctrinal inconsistencies, examines the practical inadequacies of property-only valuation, and evaluates the rationales courts invoke to resist doctrinal evolution.

A. Survey of State Splits

The failure to develop a uniform method for evaluating damages for harm to companion animals has created significant disparities across jurisdictions, especially regarding the ability to recover veterinary expenses and noneconomic harms.

First, courts are divided on the question of whether veterinary expenses may exceed an animal’s fair market value. Some jurisdictions allow for recovery of reasonable veterinary costs even when those costs surpass the animal’s market price, reasoning that medical treatment is a foreseeable and rational response to injury.[130] Other courts, however, cap veterinary expenses at or near market value, characterizing any additional costs as economically irrational investments in property.[131] Consequently, similarly situated plaintiffs may receive dramatically different recovery amounts depending on the jurisdiction in which they suffer the harm.

Second, a small but growing minority of jurisdictions have begun to recognize noneconomic damages for the injury or death of a companion animal. In some states, such recognition has come through legislation.[132] Tennessee, for example, authorizes capped noneconomic damages for the negligent or intentional killing of a pet.[133] In other jurisdictions, limited recognition has emerged through case law.[134] Courts in states such as Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington have, in narrow circumstances, permitted recovery beyond strict market valuation, often emphasizing the special role animals place in family life.[135] These cases remain exceptions rather than the rule, but they signal judicial discomfort with rigid property-based approaches.

Finally, a handful of jurisdictions have taken it a step further.[136] Florida, for instance, recognizes emotional distress damages arising from the malicious killing of companion animals, circumventing traditional intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) principles.[137] Similarly, Hawaii has also extended a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) when a plaintiff’s companion animal is negligently killed.[138] In acknowledging these causes of action, courts recognize that the harm to a companion animal creates a legally cognizable emotional injury distinct from property loss.[139]

B. Inadequacy of “Property-Only” Valuation in Practice

Even in jurisdictions that adhere strictly to property-based valuation, the application of market-value principles in practice often produces outcomes that do not reflect lived experience.

Market value fails to capture the relational harm experienced by pet owners when their companion animal is injured or killed.[140] Unlike ordinary chattels, pets are not acquired or retained for resale, and their worth to their owners is not reflected in open-market transactions.[141] However, the loss suffered is relational rather than economic, based on companionship, emotional support, and shared daily life, none of which can be measured by market value criteria.[142]

Courts’ refusal to recognize sentimental or consortium-style damages exacerbates this disconnect.[143] By limiting recovery to economic metrics, courts effectively deny compensation for the aspects of loss that are most meaningful to companion-animal owners.[144] This denial often leads to unjust outcomes, especially when courts acknowledge the strength of the human–animal bond yet provide no remedy for its loss.[145]

These shortcomings are most pronounced for owners of mixed-breed or adopted animals.[146] Because such animals typically possess little to no ascertainable market value, recovery is frequently nominal, despite the fact that owners invest considerable sums of money in veterinary care, training, and long-term companionship.[147] The result is a damages framework that privileges commercially valuable animals while systematically undervaluing those animals most commonly kept as family pets.[148]

C. Judicial Rationales for Stagnation

Courts resisting expansion of companion-animal damages frequently invoke a familiar set of rationales grounded in administrative concerns, institutional competency, and judicial restraint.[149]

One of the frequently cited concerns is the fear of speculative damages.[150] Courts worry that emotional harms stemming from the loss of a companion animal are inherently subjective and difficult to quantify, thus creating a risk of unpredictable or inconsistent awards.[151] Judges have expressed concern that juries lack meaningful, objective standards for valuing companionship or emotional distress, particularly in the absence of statutory guidance, leading to inconsistent awards across similarly situated plaintiffs.[152]

Closely related to this concern is the “floodgates” argument. Courts fear that if they were to recognize sentimental damages for the loss of a companion animal, this would create the potential for unlimited liability for damage to personal property more broadly.[153] Under this theory, the expansion of pet-loss damages threatens to blur the boundary between property and personhood in ways courts are hesitant or unwilling to police.[154]

Finally, many courts invoke the separation-of-powers principles, reasoning that an expansion of recoverable damages constitutes a policy judgment better left to legislatures.[155] By framing the issue as a matter of public policy rather than a developing aspect of the common law, courts can continue to follow established precedent without acknowledging its inadequacies.[156]

These rationales, while frequently repeated, are not insurmountable.[157] Courts can mitigate concerns about speculation through caps, guideposts, and evidentiary requirements, all familiar tools in tort law.[158] Courts routinely address intangible harms, such as loss of consortium, emotional distress, and pain and suffering, without abandoning adjudication altogether.[159]

Similarly, floodgates fears appear overstated. Floodgate concerns rest largely on judicial speculation, because courts routinely invoke the risk of excessive or unpredictable liability without citing empirical evidence that expanded recovery for companion-animal loss increases litigation.[160] Moreover, companion animals occupy a legally and socially distinct category, making doctrinal spillover to other forms of property unlikely.[161]

Finally, legislative deference is not an absolute constraint.[162] Courts have long played a central role in evolving tort doctrines in response to changing social understandings, particularly where existing rules no longer serve their purposes.[163] Recognizing the inadequacy of property-only valuation does not require judicial overreach; it requires acknowledging that common law principles have always been subject to refinement.[164]

V. Proposed National Hybrid Framework for Damages

The deficiencies identified in the existing property-only damages framework do not require courts to abandon age-old tort principles. Instead, they call for a refined framework that maintains administrability while aligning remedies with the nature of the harm suffered. Drawing on established doctrines governing personal injury,[165] property loss,[166] and relational harms,[167] this Note proposes a national hybrid framework that distinguishes between economic, sentimental, punitive, and relational harm. Such a framework would allow courts to fully compensate owners for companion-animal losses without opening the door to unlimited liability.[168]

A. Economic Damages

Under this hybrid framework, courts should fully compensate reasonable economic losses resulting from the injury or death of a companion animal, including veterinary expenses, training, and replacement costs, without arbitrary caps tied to market value.[169] Seeking veterinary care is a foreseeable and rational response to an injured animal, not a voluntary luxury, and limiting recovery to market value effectively penalizes owners for seeking medical treatment to restore their companion animal’s health.[170]

Courts routinely permit recovery of medical expenses for human plaintiffs without reference to the individual’s objective worth, instead focusing on reasonableness and causation.[171] A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for “[t]ime losses,” “[e]xpenses incurred by reason of the injury,” including medical expenses, and “[p]ain and suffering” as long as a plaintiff can adequately prove their damages.[172] Applying a similar approach to veterinary expenses would align companion-animal cases with broader tort principles and eliminate the perverse incentive to forego treatment when costs exceed an animal’s nominal market value.[173] Reasonableness standards, already familiar to courts, provide a workable limiting principle without resorting to categorical caps.[174]

B. Capped Sentimental Damages

In addition to economic losses, courts should permit recovery for sentimental harm resulting from the loss of a companion animal, subject to modest statutory[175] or judicially imposed caps.[176] Sentimental damages recognize the emotional distress and loss of companionship experienced by pet owners when their pets die or are seriously injured, severing the human–animal bond,[177] while addressing judicial concerns about unpredictability and excessive awards.[178]

Capped damages are not foreign to tort law.[179] Legislatures routinely impose limits on noneconomic damages in wrongful death, professional malpractice, and emotional distress contexts, balancing meaningful compensation while maintaining systemic restraint.[180] A similar approach in companion-animal cases would acknowledge the legitimacy of emotional harm without transforming pets into legal persons or creating open-ended liability.[181] By setting a defined ceiling, courts can ensure consistency across cases while avoiding speculative jury awards.[182]

Moreover, a modest cap on emotional damages, modeled on the wrongful death statutes, would ensure meaningful compensation while limiting runaway awards.[183]

C. Punitive Damages for Intentional or Reckless Harm

Where a companion animal is intentionally or recklessly harmed, courts should permit punitive damages consistent with traditional tort principles.[184] Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, serve a distinct purpose of punishment and deterrence and are awarded when a plaintiff has “suffered legally recognized harm” as a result of the tortfeasor’s serious misconduct.[185]

Intentional harm to a companion animal often inflicts emotional injury on the owner that far exceeds economic loss, particularly where the conduct is malicious or egregious.[186] Allowing punitive damages in such cases reinforces societal norms by holding tortfeasors accountable for their cruelty and aligns companion-animal cases with broader doctrines governing intentional torts.[187] Existing standards governing punitive damages provide sufficient safeguards against excessive awards.[188]

D. Consortium-Style Damages

Courts should also recognize a limited form of consortium damages to account for the relational harm of losing a companion animal. The loss-of-consortium doctrine has long compensated plaintiffs for the deprivation of companionship, affection, and emotional support resulting from injury to a spouse or child.[189] This doctrine demonstrates the law’s capacity to adapt to a changing understanding of relational harm.[190]

Companion animals, while not legal persons, occupy a relational role that is meaningfully distinct from inanimate property.[191] In limited cases, such as when an owner demonstrates extraordinary dependence, caregiving responsibility, or emotional reliance, consortium-style damages would provide an appropriate mechanism for recognizing relational loss without erasing the distinction between pets and people.[192]

E. Judicial Test

To promote predictability and ease of application, courts adopting this proposed framework should apply a structured, sequential test to adjudicate claims. First, courts should award full economic damages upon proof of causation and reasonableness.[193] Second, courts may consider capping sentimental damages upon a showing of a meaningful relationship between the owner and the animal.[194] Third, punitive damages should be considered if the defendant engaged in intentional or reckless conduct that resulted in harm to a companion animal.[195] Finally, consortium-style damages should be allowed in extremely limited circumstances when there has been a proven extraordinary dependency on the animal and a demonstrated relational loss supported by specific evidence.[196] Although no damages framework can completely eliminate all difficult decisions in complex cases, the boundaries imposed by each stage of the framework limit the courts’ discretionary authority and decrease the likelihood of arbitrary or unpredictable awards.[197]

This test provides clear guidance for judges and juries while allowing flexibility to accommodate the various roles that companion animals play in human lives. By basing the recovery of damages on well-established tort principles, the framework provides courts with a clear and acceptable path forward without awaiting legislative intervention.[198]

VI. Conclusion

For more than a century, courts have applied a property-only framework to companion-animal damages.[199] This doctrine undervalues the genuine harms suffered by owners and creates incoherent and unfair results.[200] Courts need not wait for legislative action; they can adopt a judicially administrable hybrid framework now. Doing so would recognize that pets are not fungible property but companions whose loss warrants meaningful compensation.

Graciela Rodriguez-Lee


  1. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. 2013).

  2. Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation, 8 Animal L. 199, 209, 211 (2002).

  3. Id. at 207–08 (establishing that out of 4,000 mammal species, only dogs and cats are considered to be companion animals). This Note limits its analysis to dogs as companion animals given the emphasis of existing scholarship, although other species are suitable to be companion animals. See Species Suitable to Be Companion Animals, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/about-us/aspca-policy-and-position-statements/species-suitable-be-companion-animals [https://perma.cc/T8E5-BJWE\] (last visited July 31, 2026) (“Species suitable to be companion animals include dogs, cats, horses, rabbits, ferrets, birds . . . , guinea pigs and select other small mammals, small reptiles and fish.”).

  4. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 185.

  5. Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking up the Wrong Tree: Companion Animals, Emotional Damages and the Judiciary’s Failure to Keep Pace, 32 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 237, 246 (2012).

  6. See, e.g., McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 558–59, 566–68 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding no noneconomic damages when dog died after alleged negligence by veterinarian) Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 154, 158, 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (limiting recovery for lost dog during transport to property damages); Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1143, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (finding that dog’s death after alleged negligence at grooming facility was recoverable only under property damages); Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690–92 (Iowa 1996) (limiting damages to property valuation after kennel negligence).

  7. McMahon, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 568; Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158, 163; Harabes, 791 A.2d at 1146; Nichols, 555 N.W.2d at 692.

  8. William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 423, 426–27 (2002); see Duckler, supra note 2, at 214.

  9. See Root, supra note 8, at 428–29.

  10. Anna Brown, About Half of U.S. Pet Owners Say Their Pets Are as Much a Part of Their Family as a Human Member, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (July 7, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/07/about-half-us-of-pet-owners-say-their-pets-are-as-much-a-part-of-their-family-as-a-human-member/ [https://perma.cc/P43C-6FYD\].

  11. See, e.g., Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891) (recognizing “special value” of dogs and holding that pet owners may recover the special or intrinsic value of dogs when market value is inadequate in the context of the dog’s usefulness or services); Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 198 (Tex. 2013) (recognizing special value of dogs, but reaffirming limits to market/intrinsic value despite emotional harm suffered); Schriver v. Raptosh, 557 P.3d 398, 416 (Idaho 2024) (holding that economic damages for a destroyed pet include pet’s unique characteristics, such as pedigree or traits, but exclude sentimental value and companionship lost).

  12. See Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 197 (Ga. 2016) (recognizing recoverable damages for a dog’s injury or death include its fair market value and reasonable medical costs incurred); Liddle v. Clark, 107 N.E.3d 478, 483–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that sentimental value cannot be included in damages calculations since animals are considered personal property and damages are limited to fair market value); Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 278–79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that pet owner cannot recover damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship for pet negligently injured or killed); Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 2005) (holding that owner could not recover damages for the loss of companionship she suffered).

  13. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 193, 195–96 (recognizing that while a dog’s “value is a legal determination,” a dog’s worth to a family is an emotional determination and is not compensable as a matter of law).

  14. See id. at 188 (explaining that limitations on damages for injury to companion animals are grounded in traditional property principles, including market value and pecuniary usefulness).

  15. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the Second (1766) *244 (Lonang Inst. 2005), https://lonang.com/wp-content/download/Blackstone-CommentariesBk2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUQ3-K5NH\].

  16. David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1021, 1053–55 (2010).

  17. Mary Evelyn McNamara, Pets in Family Law: Who Gets the Dog in a Divorce?, State Bar of Tex. (Oct. 2021), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=articles&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=54791 [https://perma.cc/DZL6-X28Z\].

  18. What to Do if You Inherit Someone Else’s Dog, Am. Kennel Club (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/home-living/inherit-someone-elses-dog/ [https://perma.cc/5ZV4-DT9Y\].

  19. Sande L. Buhai, Pets as Property: Signs of Change in the Law of Judgment Collections, 26 Animal L. 171, 186–87 (2020).

  20. Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891).

  21. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.

  22. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 15, at *244.

  23. Id. at *243–44 (categorizing things moveable as “animals, household-stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments, and every thing else that can properly be put in motion, and transferred from place to place”).

  24. Id. at *244.

  25. Id. at *246.

  26. Id.

  27. Id. at *14, *246–47.

  28. Tame animals included “horses, kine, sheep, poultry, and the like.” See id. at *246.

  29. Id.

  30. Id. at *246–47.

  31. Animals ferae naturae included animals such as deer, hares, rabbits, doves, pheasants, hawks, and fish. See id. at *247–48.

  32. Favre, supra note 16, at 1026.

  33. Frank Hall Childs, Principles of the Law of Personal Property, Chattels and Choses 35–36 (1914).

  34. Id. (defining “useful” animals as food-producing or laboring animals and classifying animals kept for “whim or pleasure” as of a “base nature”).

  35. Id. at 36.

  36. Rachel Hartigan, Q&A: Pets Are Becoming People, Legally Speaking, Nat’l Geographic (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/140406-pets-cats-dogs-animal-rights-citizen-canine [https://perma.cc/33YH-MHA9\].

  37. Favre, supra note 16, at 1055.

  38. Id.

  39. What to Do if You Inherit Someone Else’s Dog, supra note 18 (“In the absence of a pet trust, the original owner may leave a will that designates who should care for the dog. In that case, the person specified will inherit the dog automatically.”).

  40. McNamara, supra note 17.

  41. Id.

  42. Id.

  43. See Buhai, supra note 19, at 186–87.

  44. Id. at 186.

  45. Id. at 186–87.

  46. David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 1800’s, 1993 Det. C. L. Rev. 1, 7–8.

  47. See id. at 5, 7–8.

  48. See Hartigan, supra note 36. Although modern cruelty statutes reflect an emerging recognition of animals as independent subjects of protection, civil damages actions remain owner-centered remedies. Buhai, supra note 19, at 180, 182–83 (outlining cases where owners recovered damages for the loss of their animals). This Note does not advocate recognizing animals as rights-bearing plaintiffs; instead, it argues that the owner’s compensable injury should better reflect the relational and emotional dimensions of companion-animal loss.

  49. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.

  50. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 193, 195–96 (Tex. 2013) (recognizing that while a dog’s “value is a legal determination,” a dog’s worth to a family is an emotional determination and is not compensable as a matter of law).

  51. Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891).

  52. Id.

  53. Id. (providing no articulated valuation framework and allowing the jury to infer value from evidence of the dog’s usefulness such as its breed, training, and tasks).

  54. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 185, 198.

  55. Id. at 198.

  56. Schriver v. Raptosh, 557 P.3d 398, 417 (Idaho 2024).

  57. Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 197 (Ga. 2016).

  58. Liddle v. Clark, 107 N.E.3d 478, 483–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

  59. Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).

  60. Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 2005).

  61. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 197 (Tex. 2013).

  62. See id.

  63. Hartigan, supra note 36.

  64. See infra Section II.B.

  65. See Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059, 1066–68 (1995).

  66. Id. at 1077.

  67. Michelle C. Pardo, Commentary, Legal Personhood for Animals: Has Science Made Its Case?, 13 Animals 2339 (2023), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10376032/ [https://perma.cc/PCE7-PCAT\] (identifying legal rights to include bodily liberty, protection through the writ of habeas corpus, and the capacity to sue).

  68. Buhai, supra note 19, at 181, 188–89.

  69. Root, supra note 8, at 426–27.

  70. See Cydney Livingston, Man’s Best Friend, Our Relationship to Dogs, Duke Rsch. Blog (Feb. 15, 2020), http://researchblog.duke.edu/2020/02/15/mans-best-friend-our-relationship-to-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/7ZQW-Z4AY\].

  71. Root, supra note 8, at 435–37.

  72. See supra Section II.A.1; supra Section II.B (discussing the shift in public attitudes towards pets in response to increased recognition of animal sentience, the strengthening of human–animal bonds, and pets’ integration into family life).

  73. See Malinda Larkin, Pet Population Continues to Increase While Pet Spending Declines, Am. Veterinary Med. Ass’n: News (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.avma.org/news/pet-population-continues-increase-while-pet-spending-declines [https://perma.cc/396G-3U89\].

  74. Brown, supra note 10 (reporting that 97% of pet owners consider their pets to be a part of their family, and that 51% regard their pets as equal to human family members).

  75. DeFabritiis, supra note 5, at 240–42.

  76. Mark Travers, Are Pets Replacing Children in Today’s Families? A Psychologist Explains, Forbes (June 6, 2025, at 12:30 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/traversmark/2025/06/06/are-pets-replacing-children-in-todays-families-a-psychologist-explains/ [https://perma.cc/U484-HYLS\] (describing psychological research indicating that many dog owners form attachment bonds with their pets comparable to parental relationships and adopt caregiving patterns similar to those of parents).

  77. DeFabritiis, supra note 5, at 241–42.

  78. See Brown, supra note 10.

  79. See infra Sections II.B.3–4.

  80. Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(5) (2017); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/503(n) (2018); Cal. Fam. Code § 2605 (2019).

  81. See McNamara, supra note 17 (explaining that, under the traditional approach, a pet is treated as personal property and awarded to one spouse as community or separate property based on how the pet was acquired, rather than under a best interest standard).

  82. Id.

  83. See In re Searight’s Est., 95 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (stating that “the absence of a beneficiary having a legal standing in court and capable of demanding an accounting of the trustee is fatal and the trust fails”).

  84. Unif. Prob. Code § 2-907 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2019); see also Pet Trust Laws, ASPCA (Sep. 2023), https://www.aspca.org/pet-care/pet-planning/pet-trust-laws [https://perma.cc/6HDE-ASW4\] (noting that every state has adopted some form of enforceable pet trust).

  85. See Pet Trust Laws, supra note 84 (every state has a statute that legally recognizes pets as beneficiaries of trusts for their care).

  86. This the Author’s opinion inferred from the creation and enforcement of fiduciary relationships with pets via trusts.

  87. See supra Section II.A.2.

  88. Buhai, supra note 19, at 188.

  89. Id.

  90. See Anne Arundel County v. Reeves, 252 A.3d 921, 924 (Md. 2021) (the State of Maryland allowed for pet owners to recover certain capped damages for the death or injury of their pet).

  91. Id.

  92. Id. at 930.

  93. Id. at 931–32, 934.

  94. See Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891).

  95. See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Tex. 2013).

  96. 2 Blackstone, supra note 15, at *244.

  97. Heiligmann, 16 S.W. at 932.

  98. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 198.

  99. Id.

  100. Root, supra note 8, at 427–28.

  101. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 189, 196–97 (rejecting sentimental damages on the ground that expanding recovery would raise broad policy and separation-of-powers concerns).

  102. Peter Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages from the Negligent or Intentional Killing of Your Pet Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 411, 411–12 (1989).

  103. Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 Neb. L. Rev. 783, 816–17 (2004).

  104. See infra Sections III.B.1–3.

  105. Barton & Hill, supra note 102, at 411–13.

  106. Angie Vega, Detailed Discussion of Damages for Death or Injury of Companion Animals, Animal Legal & Hist. Ctr. (2022), https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-damages-death-or-injury-companion-animals [https://perma.cc/7BVX-BAZM\] (“[T]he majority of companion animals in the United States are of mixed breed and have little or no economic value.”); see Kaelee Nelson, How Much Does a Puppy Cost? Here’s Everything You Need to Know, Pawlicy Advisor (Sep. 15, 2026), https://www.pawlicy.com/blog/how-much-does-a-puppy-cost/ [https://perma.cc/5F35-2WWF\] (noting that adoption fees for dogs typically range between $50 and $300, while the purchase price of purebred dogs commonly ranges from $500 to $3,000).

  107. Vega, supra note 106; Livingston, supra note 103, at 816–17 (arguing that fair market value fails to reflect owners’ true valuation of companion animals given that deeply attached owners would not sell their animals at any price and that market prices are depressed by excess supply of unwanted animals).

  108. Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891).

  109. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. 2013).

  110. See id. This list is not exhaustive and may include animals with other useful skills, such as service animals or medical alert dogs, whose specialized training reflects heightened economic usefulness under traditional property principles.

  111. See, e.g., Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 195–98 (Ga. 2016) (rejecting sentimental damages while allowing evidence relevant to market value and reasonable veterinary expenses).

  112. Livingston, supra note 103, at 827; see Vega, supra note 106.

  113. Steve Barghusen, Noneconomic Damage Awards in Veterinary Malpractice: Using the Human Medical Experience as a Model to Predict the Effect of Noneconomic Damage Awards on the Practice of Companion Animal Veterinary Medicine, 17 Animal L. 13, 16–18, 44–45 (2010).

  114. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (2007); West’s Tennessee Code Annotated. Title 44. Animals and Animal Husbandry. Chapter 17. Dogs and Cats. Part 4. Miscellaneous Provisions. § 44-17-403. Liability for Death of Pet; Damages; Exemptions, Animal Legal & Hist. Ctr. (Jan. 2026), https://www.animallaw.info/statute/tn-pet-damages-§-44-17-403-liability-death-pet-damages-exemptions [https://perma.cc/UU8G-J8MA\].

  115. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403; see, e.g., DeLany v. Kriger, 671 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (discussing the statutory limitations of the T-Bo Act). Few reported Tennessee cases have applied the T-Bo Act. Given the statute’s $5,000 cap on noneconomic damages, the modest ceiling may limit the viability of extensive litigation and incentivize settlement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (including only nine cases in citing references of the statute).

  116. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403(a)(1), (d).

  117. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Tex. 2013).

  118. Id. at 185–86.

  119. Id. at 188–89.

  120. Id. at 185, 189.

  121. Id. at 195–96.

  122. Ashmore v. Hartford Hosp., 208 A.3d 256, 264 (Conn. 2019).

  123. Id. at 265.

  124. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 192, 197.

  125. Id.

  126. Id. at 185.

  127. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 47, 103–04 (2002).

  128. Id. at 89–91, 94–96 (noting that the calculation of damages varies by state based on case law and statutory provisions regarding actual value versus sentimental value and damages for emotional distress).

  129. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 188–89.

  130. Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1249–52 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that owner’s bills to repair dog’s hip were reasonable and customary despite exceeding the market value of dog’s purchase price by over $1,000).

  131. Barton & Hill, supra note 102, at 414.

  132. See Huss, supra note 127, at 98.

  133. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (2007).

  134. See Huss, supra note 127, at 90–91, 94, 96.

  135. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (allowing $1,000 among five people in emotional distress damages for dog’s death in quarantine); Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001) (allowing conversion claim and determination of damages when dog’s market value was zero); Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 543, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that emotional distress damages of $5,000 were recoverable when three boys maliciously doused a pet with gasoline and set it on fire, resulting in the animal’s euthanasia).

  136. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1078 (noting that Florida and Hawaii have allowed “recovery for emotional damages resulting from the tortious killing of a companion animal”).

  137. Id.

  138. Id. at 1079–80.

  139. Id. at 1080.

  140. Root, supra note 8, at 427.

  141. See id.

  142. Livingston, supra note 103, at 805–06.

  143. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1082–83.

  144. Id.

  145. Id.

  146. Barton & Hill, supra note 102, at 416–17.

  147. Id.

  148. See id.

  149. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 195–97 (Tex. 2013).

  150. Livingston, supra note 103, at 842.

  151. Barton & Hill, supra note 102, at 415.

  152. Id.; see, e.g., Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 483 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

  153. Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 194.

  154. Id. at 195 (noting that the Legislature, and not the Judiciary, is more well-suited to change the social and civil policy surrounding damages recovery in companion-animal cases).

  155. See, e.g., id. at 196.

  156. Id. at 197.

  157. See supra Section IV.A (showing how several jurisdictions have surmounted the challenges judges repeat).

  158. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 481 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing when to cap damages on property damage recovery, guideposts such as the diminished value rule and cost rule that help guide damage calculation, and evidentiary requirements).

  159. See Huss, supra note 127, at 92–94, 97.

  160. Livingston, supra note 103, at 826–27 (noting that pet owners have little incentive to sue presently because limited recovery is not sufficient to cover litigation costs, and proposing that increased recovery may presumably increase litigation claims, but these may be limited by proposing cap on noneconomic damages).

  161. Duckler, supra note 2, at 204, 208.

  162. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 18 (noting that appellate judges consider logic, public policy, and justice and may deviate from and overrule precedent as social values change over time).

  163. Id.

  164. Id.

  165. See id. § 479 (compensatory damages for personal injury).

  166. Id. § 481 (damages for harms to property).

  167. Id. § 392 (loss of consortium).

  168. Livingston, supra note 103, at 827–28.

  169. Root, supra note 8, at 446–47.

  170. See Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).

  171. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 479.

  172. Id.

  173. Livingston, supra note 103, at 827.

  174. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 479 (“The injured plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable medical . . . charges . . . including reasonable charges for diagnostic tests, drugs, medical devices.”).

  175. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (2007) (highlighting an example of a modest statutory cap already in place in Tennessee that courts could build off); Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 486 (discussing tort reform statutes that “put a limit or cap on recovery of compensatory damages” as a form of limiting juries from awarding excessive damages).

  176. Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 486. While these tort reform statutes aren’t a direct judicially imposed cap, judges and juries play a role in determining damages and tend to “balloon the award to the cap level” to attempt to compensate injured plaintiffs. Id. Moreover, judges have reversed cap’s small effects and deviated from the cap when the cases deviate “from the more common experience of victims,” which show the feasibility of a judicially imposed cap. Id.

  177. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1096 (noting that some jurisdictions have considered sentimental value when calculating a “fair and just damage award”).

  178. Livingston, supra note 103, at 827.

  179. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 486 (discussing capped damages).

  180. Id.

  181. Livingston, supra note 103, at 827–29.

  182. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1095.

  183. . Ctr. for Just. & Democracy, Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary 1–2 (2025), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-summary [https://perma.cc/9EY5-LQ8Z\] (outlining capped damages on personal injury, medical malpractice, and wrongful death cases).

  184. DeFabritiis, supra note 5, at 246, 257–58, 262, 265–66.

  185. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 483 (discussing punitive damages and their bases).

  186. See Livingston, supra note 103, at 791–93 (discussing “[t]he emotional distress the owner feels upon the death of a companion animal”).

  187. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 483 (discussing punitive damages and their bases).

  188. Id. § 484 (noting that punitive damage assessments create reasonable safeguards against excessive awards by restricting punitive damages based on six factors: “(1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the defendant’s wealth, (3) the profitability of the misconduct, (4) litigation costs, (5) the aggregate of all civil and criminal sanctions against the defendant and (6) the ratio between the harm caused or potentially caused by the defendant’s misconduct and the losses suffered by the plaintiff”).

  189. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666–67 (Tex. 1978) (spousal consortium); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990) (parent–child consortium); see Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 392 (discussing loss of consortium damages as a type of emotional harm resulting from the injury or death of a family member).

  190. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, supra note 158, § 392.

  191. See Livingston, supra note 103, at 837 (analogizing the relationship between human and companion animals, on one hand, and spouses and parents and children, on the other).

  192. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1082–83 (noting that tort law is willing to accept compensation when relational harms are affected through consortium claims when there’s a loss of companionship and affection); Livingston, supra note 103, at 837 (“[O]ne may assume that most pet owners experience . . . loss of companionship upon the death of a pet. The law presumes that the severance of a close familial relationship . . . produces grief, sadness, and a loss of the relationship’s positive attributes.”).

  193. See supra Section V.A.

  194. See supra Section V.B.

  195. See supra Section V.C.

  196. See supra Section V.D.

  197. Squires-Lee, supra note 65, at 1095–96 (acknowledging that noneconomic damages are difficult to monetize consistently and are perceived as capricious, yet noting that solutions such as damage-award schedules can allow for fairer and more practical methods of determining awards).

  198. See supra Sections V.A–D.

  199. See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Tex. 2013).

  200. Root, supra note 8, at 438–41.