I. Introduction

In 2025, the Trump Administration (Administration) undertook a series of initiatives aimed at curbing the rise and spread of antisemitism and antisemitic incidents in the United States.[1] The Administration identified universities as a particular area of concern, concluding that antisemitism posed a significant threat to students on university campuses.[2] Thus, it directed many of its actions to curb antisemitism against institutions of higher education.[3] One of the most visible examples involved Columbia University (Columbia), whose back-and-forth with the Administration over antisemitism attracted substantial public attention and debate.[4] The dispute reached a critical juncture, a type of “drawing a line in the sand” moment, when the Administration froze Columbia’s federal funds.[5] This freezing of funds shifted discourse and spurred judicial action from groups outraged at the Administration’s actions (although most suits were dismissed for lack of standing because claimants were not Columbia itself).[6]

Academic freedom is a core value of the United States.[7] Given its importance, a spotlight was affixed to the events surrounding Columbia and the Administration, which raised broader questions about the future of academic-freedom jurisprudence. Specifically, the Columbia controversy prompts inquiry into how courts should evaluate funding conditions imposed on universities and whether the U.S. Supreme Court may eventually revisit the constitutional limits of federal spending power when those conditions implicate academic expression. More broadly, the controversy raises the question whether the U.S. Supreme Court should revise existing legal standards governing the application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine (UCD) to First Amendment claims arising in the academic sphere when the government acts pursuant to its Spending Clause power.

This Comment argues that when a university’s federal funding is conditioned on the adoption of speech-policing measures targeting disfavored viewpoints on campus, the condition fails the Spending Clause’s relatedness and clear notice requirements and violates the UCD—especially where the asserted Title VI rationale for withholding of funds is invalid and pretextual. Using the recent and ongoing events at Columbia as a case study, this Comment contends that courts should adopt and apply a heightened viewpoint-sensitivity test to spending conditions that target campus expression and limit academic freedom.

In Part II, this Comment provides a brief summary of the most salient legal topics for analyzing the legality and constitutionality of the Administration’s actions in freezing Columbia’s federal funds, including the Spending Clause, the UCD, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This background outlines the history, requirements, and application of these legal topics within spending-conditions jurisprudence. Next, Part III establishes the factual foundation for the case study by presenting a timeline of the key events and actions between the Administration and Columbia. Then, Part IV applies the legal standards discussed in Part II to the facts set forth in Part III, testing whether the conditions and the Administration’s actions were within the scope of the government’s spending power. Finally, Part V considers the broader legal and policy implications that this case study raises before returning to the overarching topic of academic freedom in this Comment.

Before analyzing or making determinations about the validity of aspects of the Columbia case study, grounding this Comment in the legal history that has shaped issues surrounding conditions attached to federal funds is necessary to enable a better understanding of the dynamics at play. The basics of the statutory texts, legal tests, and doctrines that control are enumerated below.

A. Spending Clause

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”[8]

The Spending Clause, quoted above, falls within Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which outlines the powers of the Legislative Branch.[9] This clause enables Congress to condition spending—such as placing certain requirements on the granting of federal funds—to achieve specific economic, health and safety, or policy goals of an administration.[10] The Spending Clause is unique because it enables the federal government to regulate issues that it could not directly; rather than imposing regulations outright, Congress may regulate indirectly by conditioning the receipt of federal funds upon compliance with requirements aligned with what it wishes to regulate directly.[11] The government may selectively choose to give funds to certain entities that help promote, steward, and realize its goals.[12] In effect, the government may subsidize certain programs and activities that advance federal objectives while declining to fund alternatives that do not.[13] Below, this Comment gives a brief rundown of the clause’s power and limits through two seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases in Spending Clause jurisprudence.

1. The Four-Element Test of South Dakota v. Dole.[14]

South Dakota v. Dole is a seminal case supplying the legal standard of the Spending Clause and producing the four-element test framework for evaluating whether a specific spending expenditure is within the power of the Spending Clause. In Dole, the U.S. Supreme Court held that conditioning South Dakota’s federal highway funds on the requirement that it raise its drinking age was a valid use and exercise of Congress’s spending power.[15] To determine whether Congress’s actions were valid, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, articulated four general requirements that an expenditure under the Spending Clause must satisfy to withstand constitutional scrutiny.[16] The exercise of the spending power and conditioning of federal funds must (a) “be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare,’” (b) give clear notice of the conditions, (c) be related to a federal interest, and (d) not be barred by another, independent constitutional provision.[17]

General Welfare—When analyzing general welfare, the first requirement of the Dole test, Congress’s judgment is given substantial deference in the court’s determination of “whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.”[18] Under this requirement, the means employed—the conditions on spending—must be reasonably calculated to advance general welfare.[19]

Clear Notice—The purpose of the clear notice requirement is to ensure that recipients are aware of the strings attached to federal funds before accepting them, so that they are making an informed decision.[20] Therefore, if conditions will apply to certain federal funds, Congress must condition them “unambiguously” so that recipients may “exercise their choice [to accept] knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”[21]

Relatedness to Federal Interest—The third requirement demands a connection between the specific spending conditions and the purported federal interest underlying the funded program, such that the conditions must relate to the federal goals and purposes of funds expensed.[22] A condition on federal funds is related to the federal interest when it is reasonably calculated to address a particular impediment to the purpose of the funds.[23]

No Independent Constitutional Bar—Finally, a funding condition must comply not only with the Spending Clause itself but also with the U.S. Constitution as a whole and its other provisions.[24] For example, in instances of federal funds to a state, the Tenth Amendment is often raised as an independent bar to conditions; however, the bar can also be raised if funds are conditioned on invidious discrimination or cruel and unusual punishment, which conditions would violate the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, respectively.[25]


Although not part of the primary four-element test, the Court in Dole recognized coercion as another possible limitation to Spending Clause power: “[U.S. Supreme Court] decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”[26] The Court in Dole determined that the given facts of the case did not rise to coercion and declined to perform an in-depth analysis of it as a limitation to the Spending Clause.[27] However, coercion may still be a bar to the Spending Clause, and the Court later addressed the issue directly in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.

2. Past the Point of No Return—When You Have Gone Too Far Under National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).[28]

“In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”[29]

In NFIB, the U.S. Supreme Court held in part that the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act, which required states to provide specified healthcare to all citizens below a certain income level in order to receive future federal Medicaid funds and not risk their current funds, was unconstitutional.[30] NFIB marks an instance where the Court finally did find Congress’s spending condition to be so coercive as to make the exercise of the spending power unconstitutional.[31] The decision elaborates on the anti-leveraging principle and clarifies when federal inducement crosses the constitutional line into compulsion.[32]

Anti-Leveraging: How Much Do You Really Want It? In general, the anti-leveraging principle prohibits and it is unconstitutional for the government to use a state’s existing funds, programs, or other systems and leverage their continued existence and availability to compel a state’s conformance with a federal policy or interest. The Court identified several factors that may indicate coercion in spending conditions, including: (i) significant changes in an existing program; (ii) threats to terminate current and future program funding; (iii) threats to terminate other unrelated federal programs’ funding; and (iv) threatened funds being a large percentage of a budget, thus acting as financial inducement to the states.[33] It is well established that the Spending Clause grants broad power to Congress to condition federal funds as incentives for states to accept and act in accordance with federal policies, but “when ‘[incentive] turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”[34] The danger of coercion is particularly acute under the Spending Clause because Congress may use spending conditions to achieve federal policy objectives that it could not impose directly under its enumerated powers.[35]

The Medicaid expansion provision crossed that line. In NFIB, the recipients did not just stand to lose some of their funding, as was the case in Dole, but to lose all of their funding.[36] This aspect of the condition to federal funds was crucial for the Court’s determination of whether the provision rose to the level of coercion.[37] Along with the nature of the threat—complete loss of federal funds—and given the nature of the programs at issue in this case—healthcare—the Court was alert and sensitive to the fact that where “conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the [s]tates to accept policy changes.”[38] Moreover, because Medicaid funding accounted for more than ten percent of a state’s budget, the threatened loss—the Court reasoned—left “the [s]tates with no real option but to acquiesce”—unlike in Dole, where less than half of one percent of the state’s budget was threatened, and no coercion was found.[39] Because of the facts surrounding the conditions to funding in the Medicaid expansion provision, such as the threatened termination of current funds, inability to receive future funds, and substantial decrease in the recipient’s overall budget, the Court therefore concluded that the provision passed the line from constitutional encouragement to unconstitutional coercion. The provision unlawfully attempted to leverage funds to achieve policy goals.


As noted above, one element of a valid spending condition is that it not violate an independent constitutional provision.[40] Although this principle is part of Dole’s four-element test and within the Spending Clause framework, it has also developed into a distinct body of constitutional law known as the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. This doctrine and the Spending Clause are intertwined because of its inclusion in Dole, but this doctrine’s legal standards regarding spending conditions have been developed by other case law.

B. When Possible First Amendment Violations Trigger the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”[41]

Simply, the UCD provides that the government may not accomplish indirectly what is unconstitutional directly.[42] In general, if a recipient objects to a condition of federal funds, “its recourse is to decline the funds,” even if the objection is in regard to effects on its First Amendment rights.[43] However, the U.S. Supreme Court has concurrently held that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected [rights like] . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”[44]

Case law analyzing UCD has produced a more detailed understanding of what makes a condition unconstitutional or not. To make this determination, “the relevant distinction . . . is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”[45] The former being constitutional and the latter unconstitutional. A condition becomes constitutionally suspect when the government’s condition is placed on the recipient of the funds rather than on the program of the recipient being funded, “thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.”[46] The following decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court developed the UCD’s jurisprudence and help illustrate how it may apply in certain circumstances.

1. Rust v. Sullivan.[47]

In Rust, the Court held that regulations limiting the “ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities” were constitutional.[48] The Court emphasized the fact that the condition did not force the fund recipient to give up abortion-related speech, but “merely require[d] that the . . . [recipient] keep such activities separate and distinct from” the funded program’s activities.[49] This distinction kept the condition from becoming invalid under the UCD.[50] On these facts, the Court did not find this to be an instance of the government “‘suppressing a dangerous idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee . . . from engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope.”[51] The challenged regulations merely ensured that federal funds were spent for the authorized purpose.[52] Because recipients remained free to engage in abortion-related speech and activities outside the federally funded program, the regulations did not burden or affect protected conduct, like free speech, beyond the contours of the funded program itself and “did not run afoul of the First Amendment.”[53]

Rust thus stands for the principle that the government may define the scope of a program it chooses to subsidize, provided that fund recipients remain free to engage in protected expression outside the federally funded activity.

2. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights.[54]

“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.”[55]

In Rumsfeld, the Court held that the Solomon Amendment (Amendment), which required institutions of higher education to provide military recruiters equal access to that afforded to other recruiters or risk losing certain federal funds, was constitutional and did not violate First Amendment rights.[56] Opposition to military recruiters on campus stemmed from universities’ differing opinions on homosexuality.[57] The Court reasoned the Amendment was constitutional because it neither limited the universities’ speech nor forced them to endorse the military’s message—institutions remained free to make whatever statement about the military without risking loss of federal funds.[58] Instead, the Court found that the Amendment generally regulated conduct, not speech.[59] Services required by the Amendment, such as posting informational flyers and posters to a bulletin board or e-mailing about events, were not compelled speech and a “far cry from” it because the Amendment did not “dictate the content of the speech at all.”[60] Any compelled speech universities pointed to was “plainly incidental” to regulating conduct.[61]

At the same time, the Court identified circumstances in which compelled speech violations would arise: when the fund recipient’s “own message [is] affected by the speech it [is] forced to accommodate”; when the recipient cannot “disassociate” itself from the imposed speech; or when it is “compelled to affirm [a] belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view.”[62]

3. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI).[63]

In AOSI, the Court struck down a regulation of the Leadership Act—aimed to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS—that conditioned the availability of federal funds only to organizations with a policy “explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”[64] The Court concluded it was unconstitutional in violation of the recipient’s First Amendment rights.[65] The regulation would have been plainly unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment if enacted directly, but the Court here needed to determine whether the government could still impose it in another form as a condition on funding.[66]

The Court’s determination was heavily fact driven, using previous cases and their facts to shape the decision.[67] Comparing two cases where one condition was constitutional and the other not, the Court found the determinative difference was that one recipient could limit its use of federal funds exclusively to the program and still remain free to use private funds “to make known its views on matters of public importance,” while the other could not.[68] The Court reasoned that a condition may subsidize and limit a program the government wishes to fund, but a condition may not be leveraged to police speech outside the program’s scope.[69]

AOSI holds that the government does not have the ability to compel “a grant recipient to adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding.”[70] Regarding the specific, challenged regulation in AOSI, the Court found the spending condition unconstitutional because beyond its effect on selection criteria and defining the limits of the federal program—both acceptable characteristics of a spending condition—it was “an ongoing condition on recipients’ speech and activities” and defined the recipient, which allowed grant termination after initial selection.[71]

This condition would require recipients to pledge allegiance to the government’s message even if against their own—crossing the constitutional line separating permissible program definition from impermissible viewpoint compulsion.[72] Simply, the government may not use funding conditions to compel the adoption of ideas it approves.


The UCD may be invoked to invalidate the government’s conditioning of federal funds on the surrender of First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes between conditions that define the scope of a funded program and conditions that regulate—compelling or silencing certain speech—outside the program’s contours.[73] The former being constitutionally permissible and the latter impermissible.[74] While the Court has upheld program-scope-limited conditions, it has invalidated funding requirements that compel recipients of federal funds to adopt or affirm the government’s viewpoint.[75] This judicial framework governs the constitutional limits on the government’s power to condition expenditures under the Spending Clause. However, there is another limitation to federal funds, not created by case law, but enforced by statute that, without exception, requires recipients of federal funds to not discriminate against a protected class.[76]

C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—A Prerequisite to All Federal Funds

Title VI regulations state that “no person in the United States shall; on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”[77]

Violations of Title VI and liability for those violations can be treated the same as determinations under Title IX.[78] Thus, determining a Title VI violation for harassment uses the same standard set in Davis v. Monroe.[79] Davis holds that recipients are liable for harassment in violation of Title IX “only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities . . . [, which] harassment . . . is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”[80] A recipient is deemed to act with deliberate indifference “only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”[81] The Court’s clearly unreasonable standard for liability aims to protect the discretion schools should be given in their disciplinary authority because “courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”[82]

The Court in Davis made this standard so that it is “sufficiently flexible” for the fund recipient’s disciplinary authority mentioned above and also flexible enough to account for the “potential liability [of a school] arising from certain forms of disciplinary action.”[83] A need for this flexibility can be illustrated by the fact that universities are not expected to control their students to the same degree as that of a grade school, and that a school would reasonably avoid taking disciplinary actions that lead to constitutional or statutory claims against them.[84]


Looking to the legal standards set out above, this Comment will apply them to the facts and circumstances of the Columbia case study and evaluate the possible constitutional or unconstitutional actions taken by the Administration. Before the analysis, Part III of this Comment provides a succinct timeline of the most important events that occurred between Columbia and the Administration.

III. Columbia Case Study Timeline

The following timeline summarizes the events most salient to this Comment’s examination of the dispute between the Administration and Columbia. Although it does not capture every interaction between the parties, the timeline provides a concise overview of the core conflicts that form the basis of the constitutional and statutory analysis that follows.

Date Event/Action
12.11.2019 EO 13899—Combating Antisemitism.[85] President Trump issues an executive order stating the government’s goal to combat “the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic incidents in the United States and around the world,” which have increased, with a particular focus on “anti-Semitic harassment in schools and on university and college campuses” against students.[86]
01.29.2025 EO 14188—Additional Measures to Combat Antisemitism.[87] President Trump issues an executive order reaffirming EO 13899 and directing additional measures because of the “unrelenting barrage of discrimination; denial of access to campus common areas and facilities . . . ; and intimidation, harassment, and physical threats and assault” to Jewish students.[88]
02.03.2025 Department of Education (DOE) Announces Investigation into Columbia.[89] Pursuant to EO 14188, the DOE announces investigations into “five institutions of higher education where widespread antisemitic harassment has been reported.”[90] The DOE’s Office for Civil Rights opens an investigation under Title VI into Columbia.[91]
03.07.2025 $400 Million of Columbia’s Funds Frozen.[92] A Joint Task Force composed of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the DOE, and the General Services Administration (GSA) announces the immediate cancellation of $400 million of Columbia’s federal grants and contracts “due to the school’s continued inaction in the face of persistent harassment of Jewish students.”[93]
03.13.2025 Joint Task Force Sends Demand Letter.[94] The Joint Task Force sends Columbia a letter asserting that the school “has fundamentally failed to protect” students from antisemitic harassment in violation of Title VI and outlining the requirements for the possible restoration of funds, including:
  • Enforce existing disciplinary policies against protestors through suspension or expulsion.
  • Abolish Columbia’s disciplinary board and centralize all disciplinary processes under Columbia’s president.
  • Implement time, place, and manner rules designed to prevent education disruption.
  • Ban masks intended to conceal identity or intimidate others.
  • Deliver plan to hold all student groups accountable for policy violations.
  • Formalize, adopt, and promulgate International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism used in EO 13899; address anti-Zionist discrimination.
  • Empower internal law enforcement for campus safety.
  • Place the Middle East, South Asian, and African Studies departments under academic receivership.
  • Deliver plan for comprehensive admissions reform.[95]
03.21.2025 Columbia Responds to Demand Letter.[96] Columbia publishes its initial response and agrees to comply with the Administration’s required conditions to combat antisemitism; however, Columbia does not adopt the IHRA’s antisemitism definition but instead its own definition recommended by the Columbia Antisemitism Taskforce.[97]
04.23.2025 EO 14279—Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education.[98] President Trump issues an executive order directing/ordering reforms for the accreditation system for institutions of higher education, citing concerns that accreditors are allowing unlawful discrimination and voicing his displeasure.[99]
05.22.2025 Joint Notice of Violation to Columbia University.[100] The HHS and DOE issue an official joint notice of violation to Columbia for violation of Title VI.[101] The joint notice sets forth factual findings from the agencies’ investigation into antisemitic harassment at Columbia.[102]
06.04.2025 Accreditor Notified of Violation.[103] The DOE notifies Columbia’s accreditor of Columbia’s Title VI violation and resulting failure to meet accreditation standards.[104]
07.15.2025 Columbia Adopts More Measures to Combat Antisemitism.[105] Columbia announces that it is adopting additional commitments to combat antisemitism, including the adoption of the IHRA’s definition of antisemitism.[106]
07.23.2025 Resolution Agreement.[107] Columbia and the Administration enter into a Resolution Agreement that restores Columbia’s federal funds.[108] Pursuant to this agreement, Columbia will pay the federal government $221 million.[109]

The events summarized above provide the factual foundation for evaluating the constitutionality of the Administration’s actions under the Spending Clause, the UCD, and Title VI. Part IV applies those legal standards to the Columbia dispute and assesses whether the conditions imposed on federal funding, the suspension of funding, and the subsequent Resolution Agreement comported with constitutional and statutory requirements.

IV. Analysis of the Columbia Case Study

This Part of the Comment evaluates the constitutionality of the Administration’s actions towards Columbia. Specifically, it considers: (1) whether there was a valid expenditure under the Spending Clause, (2) whether there was a violation of the UCD, and (3) whether proper Title VI procedures were followed.

A. Spending Clause Violation

1. Did the Conditions for the Return of Federal Funds Satisfy the Relatedness Requirement?

Spending Clause jurisprudence dictates that the conditions attached to federal funds must be related to the federal interest of the funded program.[110] For the Administration’s conditions to be valid they must meet the relatedness requirement set forth in Dole.[111]

The Administration cited pervasive antisemitic harassment against students at Columbia for its justification of freezing Columbia’s federal funds.[112] Yet the majority of funds frozen and the type of funds that might possibly be returned through compliance were National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants.[113] Over $250 million in federal funds from over 400 NIH grants were canceled in the unexpected freezing of $400 million of Columbia’s funds on March 7, 2025.[114] In its policy guidelines, NIH describes itself as “the steward of medical and behavioral research for the Nation.”[115] The purpose and aim of NIH grants are “to seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability.”[116]

Some of the conditions attached to Columbia’s funds can be squared away and accepted as valid because they relate to safety measures and school policy—such as “time, place, and manner rules to prevent disruption of” education, disciplinary rules to respond to policy violations, or law enforcement to maintain safety.[117] Having a stable and safe research environment at the school for those working with the NIH grants is likely to pass the relatedness test.[118] However, certain conditions like adopting the IHRA’s definition of antisemitism, placing the school’s Middle East Studies department on academic receivership, and promoting the Tel Aviv Center are not related and likely fail the test.[119] Sometimes the line between what is and is not related can be hazy, but in this instance the obstacle is avoided because of the obvious unrelated goals of the conditions.

Some of the canceled NIH grants included programs researching Alzheimer’s and cancer.[120] Adopting a specific definition to combat antisemitism does not align with or help the funded program get closer to a medical research breakthrough in curing cancer or Alzheimer’s. The same is true with auditing Columbia’s Middle East Studies, a department that is not even a part of the Columbia University Irving Medical Center (CUIMC), which is the recipient of NIH program funds.[121] The same is true with the promotion of the Tel Aviv Center, which is not related to the federal interest of stewarding medical research. None of these conditions pass the relatedness requirement. But even without the analysis of specific conditions, the Administration’s own statement that Columbia’s termination of federal funds was explicitly a result of its failure to curb antisemitism makes them fail relatedness from the start.[122] Curbing antisemitism is not related to the federal interest of advancing medical research.

2. Did the Conditions for the Return of Federal Funds Satisfy the Clear Notice Requirement?

When Columbia accepted the federal funds and NIH grants subject to conditions, it was not given clear notice that some strings attached included speech-policing measures. Columbia was given clear notice of the requirement to comply with Title VI; however, that condition would not let an institution of higher education readily know that its future and current funding is dependent on adopting specific measures aimed at combating antisemitism on campus.[123] These conditions attached to the receipt of funds after the fact, which supports the determination that Columbia was not aware.[124] When Columbia accepted NIH grants in hope of finding cures for Alzheimer’s or cancer, it did not know it would be conditioned upon its adoption of the Administration’s combating antisemitism measures.

3. Were the Funding Conditions and the Administration’s Actions Coercive?

The Administration’s actions against Columbia rose to the level of coercion, invalidating its use of the spending power, because Columbia was given no choice but to accept the conditions. The Administration threatened present and future funds, funds unrelated to its policy goal, and funds making up the majority of Columbia’s research grants’ budget. The Administration also used Columbia’s accreditor as an intermediary to coerce compliance or risk losing accreditation.

a. Canceled NIH Grants—Leveraging Medical Research Funds.

The facts from the Columbia case study when compared with legal standards set out in NFIB lead to the conclusion that the conditions attached to the funds were an unconstitutional use of the spending power because they rose to the level of coercion. The Administration immediately canceled $400 million of Columbia’s federal funds on March 7, 2025, with the caveat that these cancellations were only the first round of fund terminations, and that if Columbia did not comply, it would face ineligibility for future funds.[125] Comparing Columbia with the facts from NFIB, where coercion was found, creates a strong case for finding coercion in the Columbia case study.

In NFIB, recipients stood to lose all their current Medicaid funds and possibly any future ones, which funds generally made up over ten percent of their budget.[126] Here, Columbia was faced with a similar threat, except worse. Columbia did not stand to lose its current funds if it refused to acquiesce, but had already lost them—terminated in an instant and locked away until the Administration’s demands were met.[127] And NIH grants made up about eighty percent of all Columbia research grants.[128] If the Court found the possible termination of around fifty to eighty percent of a state’s Medicaid budget to be considerable, as it did in NFIB, then it follows that the actual termination of eighty percent of a budget must be enough to find coercion.[129] Columbia is dependent on federal grants to pay for much of its research programs; without such funds, the medical research cannot continue.[130] These facts are a clear example of coercion. This is especially true because the Administration is conditioning funds and threatening termination of funds for programs unrelated to the Administration’s policy goals related to antisemitism.[131]

b. Institution of Higher Education Status—Using Accreditors as Intermediaries.

The Administration’s actions with Columbia’s accreditor also evidence coercion and violate anti-leveraging principles. President Trump warned accreditors for institutions of higher education in his executive order that he was disappointed in their performance and that the accreditation system needed reform.[132] The Administration would not continue to provide federal recognition to accreditors engaging in unlawful discrimination.[133] This executive order put the accreditors on alert that their status may be in jeopardy if they would not implement the same combating-antisemitism conditions against their universities to maintain accreditation that President Trump wanted. Moreover, President Trump stated that if a university is in violation of accreditation standards, there must be action by the accreditor.[134]

Having a Title VI violation is a violation of accreditation standards, meaning the Administration’s June 4, 2025 notification to Columbia’s accreditor of such violation was more than a notification—it was instead a call to action that Columbia lose its accreditation.[135] Both the executive order and notification to Columbia’s accreditor can be viewed as coercion by using the accreditor as an intermediary to achieve the Administration’s goals. By using the accreditor and threatening accreditation indirectly, the Administration is coercing Columbia to comply with its combating-antisemitism policy because a university must be an accredited institution of higher education to be eligible for federal funds and NIH grants.[136] The use of the accreditor will likely fail as a government-coerced condition and an unconstitutional evasion where it tried to sidestep its inability to control Columbia directly.


Also, it is worth noting that the Administration mentioned possible legal action—referral of the matter to the DOJ—if Columbia did not comply, and that the Administration wanted to refer the matter to the DOJ “as soon as allowed . . . absent voluntary compliance.”[137] This inclusion of referring the matter to the DOJ in the May 22, 2025 joint notice of Title VI violations could be seen as a threat and another element of coercion.

Coercion and anti-leveraging come into play when the government is conditioning funds and taking actions such that the recipient is, in reality, given no choice but to accept.[138] Coercing a recipient and using spending conditions to leverage the adoption of something that is unconstitutional directly is when the UCD rears its head.

B. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Violation

The conditions the Administration placed on Columbia for reinstatement of and future eligibility for federal funds went beyond defining the limits of the federally funded NIH grant programs; instead, the Administration sought to leverage federal funds and NIH grants to regulate speech outside of the programs’ scopes. Under the UCD, the government may not accomplish indirectly what it cannot constitutionally accomplish directly.[139] Although recipients’ usual remedy is to decline federal funds that have conditions the recipients find disagreeable, the government may not condition those funds on a violation of First Amendment rights.[140] U.S. Supreme Court precedent distinguishes between permissible conditions that define the scope of the funded program and impermissible conditions that have the effect of regulating the individual recipient and not the federally funded program. The government may not compel an individual to adopt its specific viewpoint or policy goal as a condition to federal funds.[141]

The conditions in the Columbia case study went beyond just prohibiting the NIH grant recipient programs from acting outside the funded program’s scope. The conditions prohibited the entire institution of Columbia—as opposed to just CUIMC, the NIH grant recipient—from certain antisemitic speech as the Administration outlined and required specific speech regarding antisemitism by requiring the adoption of the IHRA’s antisemitism definition.[142] For restoration of funds, the Administration also required certain student groups, which did not align with the Administration’s viewpoint, to be de-recognized by Columbia.[143] It also required certain academic departments at Columbia—none of which were a part of the CUIMC, the actual recipient of funds—either be placed on academic receivership, like Middle East Studies (which is an unrelated topic to the scope of NIH grants encompassing medical research), or promoted, like the Tel Aviv Center.[144]

The Administration requiring the adoption of IHRA’s definition for antisemitism would fail the UCD. If the Administration were to require the adoption of this definition directly as opposed to through a condition to funding, the adoption would be plainly unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment right to free speech. Here the Administration is forcing the endorsement of viewpoint-skewed speech—speech Columbia explicitly chose not to adopt multiple times before it finally did after the Administration cut off its federal funds and threatened its accreditation as an institution of higher education.[145] The definition of antisemitism that the Administration requires includes disciplinary teeth for anti-Zionism. The condition that Columbia adopt IHRA’s definition of antisemitism will likely fail as a valid use of the spending power because it is viewpoint-based, not sufficiently related to the funded programs, and chills protected speech.

The Administration requiring certain departments, including Middle East Studies, to be placed immediately in academic receivership for five years would fail the UCD.[146] The government is attempting to control the speech of Columbia and its departments and limit its academic freedom protected under the First Amendment. Middle East Studies is not inside the scope of the federally funded program. The federally funded programs in question are NIH grant programs whose purpose and scope are medical research to advance health.[147] Regulating the speech and conduct of the Middle East Studies department is outside of the contours of NIH grant programs and is instead an unconstitutional attempt to regulate protected speech indirectly through the Spending Clause.

However, the conditions relating to campus safety regulations, such as allowing internal law enforcement, maintaining additional safety officers, and providing Title VI discrimination information, would likely be held constitutional because they are content-neutral and related to strong federal interests in safety and access to education.[148] The condition to implement viewpoint-neutral protest time and place rules so as to prevent another episode of a university building occupation, like Hamilton Hall, and general disruption to the university and its academics will likely pass because there is no viewpoint targeted and it is strongly related to safety and operations interests.[149]

The Administration’s conditions to funding aim to stop the rise and spread of antisemitic harassment and discrimination against students on university campuses, which is a permissible use of the spending power because true harassment is not protected speech and may be regulated. However, the line between true harassment and protected speech is not always clear, so even though antisemitic violence, true threats of violence, or true harassment is not protected by the First Amendment, deeply offensive speech that most people would find wrong, like anti-Israel and even antisemitic advocacy, is protected.[150] Because it can be hard to distinguish, funding cuts or threatened funding cuts leveraged to suppress certain viewpoints on campus will have a dangerous chilling effect that infringes on free speech.[151]

C. Title VI Violation

In the task force’s announcement on March 7, 2025, proclaiming the immediate cancellation of $400 million in funds, it stated that Columbia did not respond to its March 3, 2025 notice, which informed Columbia that the task force “would conduct a comprehensive review of the university’s federal contracts and grants in light of ongoing [Title VI] investigations.”[152] There were only four days between the notice and cancellation of funds. The Administration’s actions make it seem as though four days was too long for Columbia to take to respond. But is it reasonable to think that any institution of higher education could take action to completely remedy a Title VI violation in that short period of time? No.[153]

1. Was Columbia Deliberately Indifferent to Harassment?

The joint notice sent to Columbia by the HHS and the DOE stated the university was deliberately indifferent to antisemitic harassment of students.[154] Taking the statement that there was harassment on Columbia’s campus so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to prevent students access to education as a fact, the question still remains whether Columbia acted such that it was deliberately indifferent to aforementioned harassment, giving rise to Title VI liability: “If a funding recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference ‘subject[s]’ its students to harassment.”[155] For Columbia to not be deliberately indifferent and maintain its disciplinary authority as school administrator, Columbia “must merely” respond not clearly unreasonably to the known harassment.[156] Furthermore, its response and decision-making are given deference.[157]

Before the HHS and the DOE named Columbia deliberately indifferent, Columbia took many actions in response to known harassment; it is a challenge to make the argument that Columbia was clearly unreasonable. Columbia created an antisemitism task force that conducted investigations, produced findings, and advised the school on what steps to take to curb antisemitism on campus.[158] Columbia implemented the conditions the Administration required in its March 13 demand letter, which included changing and updating its policies regarding demonstrations and campus safety.[159] Columbia conducted disciplinary proceedings for, suspended, or revoked the degrees of many students that were involved in demonstrations and the occupation of Hamilton Hall.[160] Columbia derecognized certain student groups as school organizations.[161] Columbia allowed NYPD to enter its private campus to arrest protesting students for the first time in years.[162]

In no situation is it easy to claim someone acted and responded perfectly, but here Columbia did not need to be perfect. It just needed to be not clearly unreasonable. Columbia took actions—while not exactly what the Administration wanted—that were likely aimed to minimize and prevent physical harm to its students and maintain academic freedom from an encroachment on students’ First Amendment rights. These actions would likely allow Columbia to pass the clearly unreasonable standard, meaning it would retain its authority and autonomy to make its own decisions and not be forced to kneel to the Administration.

2. Were Title VI Procedures Properly Followed?

Terminating NIH grants for a Title VI violation has specific statutory procedures that must be followed. Determining whether there is a Title VI violation for discriminatory harassment or just an instance of protected speech is not a clear line and is hard to do. Because of this difficulty, it is even more important that terminations of universities’ federal funds follow the prescribed procedural rules.[163] The rules that govern Title VI violations in NIH grants are codified in 45 C.F.R. Part 80.[164] Under those rules, the government may not terminate funds "until it has:

(i) conducted a program-by-program evaluation of the alleged violations;

(ii) provided recipients with notice and ‘an opportunity for hearing’;

(iii) limited any funding cutoff ‘to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found’; and

(iv) submitted a report explaining its actions to the relevant committees in Congress at least thirty days before any funds can be stopped."[165]

Still, the above procedures for termination only apply when compliance cannot be achieved first by voluntary means.[166] In the case of Columbia’s terminated funds, these procedural safeguards were not followed.[167] Before the immediate cancellation of its funds on March 7, 2025, the Administration had made no official finding (so it is unclear whether a program-by-program evaluation was completed), provided no opportunity for a hearing, and had not limited the terminations to particular programs where the specific violation had been found.[168] The Administration did not comply with Title VI statutory procedures, and the termination of Columbia’s funds was improper.


The Administration’s actions and conditions to federal funds are likely to fail multiple constitutional and statutory constraints on spending power. Certain conditions of the funds were unrelated to the federal interest underlying NIH medical research grants and imposed without clear notice.[169] And a favorable reading of the facts for the universities may provide that the Administration’s actions were a figurative gun to the head such that it operated in a coercive manner by terminating some funds immediately and threatening the future loss of essential funding and accreditation.[170] If true, these determinations would likely lead to an invalid expenditure under the Spending Clause. Moreover, certain conditions appear to regulate speech and conduct beyond the scope of the federally funded programs, implicating the possibility of the Administration’s conditions failing an attack under the UCD.[171] Independently, the freezing of funds on March 7, 2025, likely did not satisfy the required statutory procedural steps to terminate federal funds under Title VI.[172] For these reasons, the Administration’s conditions and actions are legally vulnerable on multiple grounds.

What happened to Columbia is not limited to the university itself. The Administration has been clear that no university is safe from funding freezes if they find antisemitic harassment of students. The DOE in the announcement of Columbia’s immediate termination of funds said, “President Trump has been clear that any college or university that allows illegal protests and repeatedly fails to protect students from anti-Semitic harassment on campus will be subject to the loss of federal funding.”[173] What happened to Columbia is also not limited to universities. Title VI, under which the Administration cites its power to act, defines the limits and regulates all recipients of federal funds under the Act, including grade schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and businesses. The Administration’s failure to follow Title VI procedures in the Columbia case study is a pattern of actions that threatens every recipient of federal financial assistance.[174]

In the aftermath of the Columbia case study, what options are available to other institutions of higher education should they face similar scrutiny? In the future, should universities faced with circumstances like Columbia follow the route Columbia took—comply and cut a deal? For Columbia, that might have been the smart move because it recognized how time-consuming and costly litigation might be, all while its funds stay terminated and its programs halted. Thus, adopting some speech-policing measures from the Administration while preserving most of its academic freedom and paying $221 million to keep billions in funds had merit. But this route is dangerous, and regulation by deal “is a deadly threat to the rule of law.”[175] This route enables Trump to run “the same play against higher education that he has run against law firms and news organizations: . . . frivolous lawsuits and . . . preposterous executive orders knowing . . . targets will likely capitulate because . . . they do not have the resources to wait for . . . justice.”[176] A good analogy for why regulation by deal is dangerous is that complying with the regulation is like paying a ransom, which provides short-term relief but only incentivizes the kidnapper—the Administration—into taking more hostages.[177]

Maybe a solution, instead, could be that the recent events create enough impetus for the legal standards and scrutiny afforded to academic freedom under the First Amendment so that they are updated to include a heightened viewpoint-sensitivity when challenges involve funding conditions in universities. Whether the recipient of funds is a university or a nonprofit does not matter for the legal standard used when determining whether or not funding conditions are constitutional.[178] If a university brought suit and challenged a funding condition as an unconstitutional infringement of its First Amendment right, case law from AOSI would still apply and be determinative even though the recipient in AOSI was a nonprofit.[179] The U.S. Supreme Court, while not having held a heightened standard or special protection for academic freedom in the First Amendment, has not firmly denied that there ever could be one.[180]

VI. Conclusion

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”[181]

The Columbia case study illustrates how the Administration’s aggressive use of spending conditions to combat antisemitism—particularly when those conditions regulate campus expression and academic governance—pushes the Spending Clause and UCD to their constitutional limits. As applied here, the freezing and leveraging of federal funds failed the relatedness and clear-notice requirements, crossed the line into coercion, and impermissibly sought to regulate protected speech outside the scope of federally funded programs, all while bypassing Title VI’s procedural safeguards.[182]

More troubling still, these actions reveal how easily funding mechanisms can be weaponized to impose viewpoint-based beliefs on universities, chilling speech and undermining academic freedom without direct regulation. If left unchecked, this model of regulation-by-deal threatens not only higher education but all recipients of federal assistance. The Columbia episode therefore presents a compelling vehicle for judicial intervention and invites the Supreme Court to reconsider whether existing First Amendment doctrines sufficiently protect academic freedom when funding conditions are used as leverage. In this context, heightened scrutiny—sensitive to viewpoint discrimination and the unique role of universities as marketplaces of ideas—may be necessary to ensure that the government’s pursuit of legitimate interests does not erode the constitutional foundations of academic inquiry and free expression.

Kennedy Sholeen


  1. See infra Part III (timeline of events).

  2. Exec. Order No. 14188, 90 Fed. Reg. 8847 (Feb. 3, 2025).

  3. Id.

  4. E.g., Elissa Nadworny & Jordan Owens, What We Know About Columbia’s $221 Million Settlement with the Trump Administration, NPR (July 25, 2025, at 05:00 ET), https://www.npr.org/2025/07/25/nx-s1-5479240/columbia-trump-administration-settlement-details [https://perma.cc/E6LE-UP3K\]; Alexis Hernandez Lopez, Columbia, Trump, and $400 Million: 25 Years Ago and Now, Colum. Daily Spectator (Mar. 31, 2025, at 09:10 CT), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2025/03/31/columbia-trump-and-400-million-25-years-ago-and-now/ [https://perma.cc/RCR8-YDFC\]; Sara Shibata, Columbia University Protests and Conflicts with Trump Administration: 2025 Timeline, Fox 5 N.Y. (Aug. 4, 2025, at 13:22 ET), https://www.fox5ny.com/news/columbia-university-trump-administration-demands-conflict-protest-timeline [https://perma.cc/LZT5-V597\]; Carolyn Thompson, Columbia University Makes Deal with Trump Administration, Agrees to Pay More than $220 Million to Restore Federal Funding, PBS News (July 24, 2025, at 10:04 ET), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/columbia-university-makes-deal-with-trump-administration-agrees-to-pay-more-than-220-million-to-restore-federal-funding [https://perma.cc/PC22-9Q8A\].

  5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., DOJ, HHS, ED, and GSA Announce Initial Cancelation of Grants and Contracts to Columbia University Worth $400 Million (Mar. 7, 2025) [hereinafter Funds Frozen], https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/doj-hhs-ed-and-gsa-announce-initial-cancelation-of-grants-and-contracts-columbia-university-worth-400-million [https://perma.cc/PN3E-LXRF\].

  6. E.g., Emily Brill, Unions Say Trump Administration Illegally Targeted Columbia, Law360 (Mar. 25, 2025, at 16:30 ET), https://www.law360.com/articles/2315322/unions-say-trump-administration-illegally-targeted-columbia [https://perma.cc/3L9T-WQJQ\]; Michael C. Dorf, AAUP Fills the Void the Columbia Administration Opened, Dorf on L. (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2025/03/aaup-fills-void-columbia-administration.html [https://perma.cc/V3EV-DYB5\]; Tim Ryan, Unions Can’t Sue over Canceled Columbia Funds, Judge Says, Law360 (June 16, 2025, at 19:10 ET), https://www.law360.com/articles/2353967?scroll=1&related=1 [https://perma.cc/ZY4Z-WAPP\].

  7. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

  8. . U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

  9. . U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. This Comment’s scope does not include analysis of the Trump Administration’s ability to cancel federal funds under the Separation of Power doctrine, but Michael Dorf, a Cornell Law professor, gives a brief rundown of this issue. See Michael C. Dorf, Conditional Funding Can Raise Difficult Legal Questions. Trump’s Freezes Don’t, Dorf on L. (May 22, 2025), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2025/05/conditional-funding-can-raise-difficult.html [https://perma.cc/TWX4-CC2W\].

  10. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).

  11. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012).

  12. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).

  13. Id.

  14. Dole, 483 U.S. 203.

  15. Id. at 211–12.

  16. Id. at 205, 207–11.

  17. Id. at 207–08 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).

  18. Id. at 207.

  19. Id. at 208.

  20. Id. at 207.

  21. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).

  22. Id.

  23. See id. at 209.

  24. However, make note that the independent constitutional bar is not “a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.” Id. at 210.

  25. Id. at 208, 210–11.

  26. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

  27. See id.

  28. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

  29. Id. at 581 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).

  30. Id. at 531, 579–80, 588.

  31. Id. at 580–81.

  32. See infra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.

  33. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 580–83.

  34. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

  35. Id. at 578.

  36. Id. at 579–80.

  37. Id.

  38. Id. at 580.

  39. Id. at 582.

  40. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).

  41. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

  42. See Thomas R. McCoy, Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, Middle Tenn. State Univ.: Free Speech Ctr. (Apr. 4, 2025), https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/unconstitutional-conditions-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/YFY4-JBFJ\].

  43. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013).

  44. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)).

  45. Id. at 214–15.

  46. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991).

  47. Rust, 500 U.S. 173.

  48. Id. at 177–78.

  49. Id. at 196.

  50. Id.

  51. Id. at 194.

  52. Id. at 196.

  53. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 217 (2013) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 197).

  54. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).

  55. Id. at 61.

  56. Id. at 51, 70.

  57. Id. at 51.

  58. Id. at 60.

  59. Id.

  60. Id. at 61–62 (“There is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse.”).

  61. Id. at 62.

  62. Id. at 63–65 (alteration in original) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)).

  63. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013).

  64. Id. at 208, 221 (quoting Leadership Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f)).

  65. Id.

  66. Id. at 213.

  67. See id. at 214–16.

  68. Id. at 215–16 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984)).

  69. Id.

  70. Id. at 218.

  71. Id. at 218–19.

  72. Id. at 220–21.

  73. See supra notes 47–53, 63–72 and accompanying text.

  74. See supra notes 47–53, 63–72 and accompanying text.

  75. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text.

  76. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(a) (2025).

  77. Id. § 80.1.

  78. Vengalattore v. Cornell Univ., 36 F.4th 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[C]ases brought under Title IX are generally to be analyzed in the same way as cases under Title VI.”).

  79. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1999) (holding student-on-student harassment can give rise to Title IX liability).

  80. Id. at 633.

  81. Id. at 648.

  82. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342–43 n.9 (1985)).

  83. Id. at 649.

  84. Id.

  85. Exec. Order No. 13899, 84 Fed. Reg. 68779 (Dec. 11, 2019).

  86. Id.

  87. Exec. Order No. 14188, 90 Fed. Reg. 8847 (Feb. 3, 2025)

  88. Id.

  89. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Probes Cases
    of Antisemitism at Five Universities (Feb. 3, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/us-department-of-education-probes-cases-of-antisemitism-five-universities [https://perma.cc/79VT-AK68\].

  90. Id.

  91. Id.

  92. Funds Frozen, supra note 5.

  93. Id.

  94. Letter from Josh Gruenbaum, Comm’r, Fed. Acquisition Serv., U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., Sean R. Keveney, Acting Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., & Thomas E. Wheeler, Acting Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Dr. Katrina Armstrong, Interim President, Colum. Univ. (Mar. 13, 2025) [hereinafter Demand Letter], https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/6d3c124d8e20212d/85dec154-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4H5-85G3\].

  95. Id.

  96. Columbia Univ., Advancing Our Work to Combat Discrimination, Harassment, and Antisemitism at Columbia 1 (2025) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO DEMAND], <https://president.columbia.edu/sites/president.columbia.edu/files/content/03.21.
    2025%20Columbia%20-%20FINAL.pdf> [https://perma.cc/YV46-LMBH\].

  97. Id.

  98. Exec. Order No. 14279, 90 Fed. Reg. 17529 (Apr. 28, 2025)

  99. Id.

  100. Anthony F. Archeval, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., & Craig W. Trainor,
    U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Joint Notice of Violation to Columbia University (May 22, 2025) [hereinafter Joint Notice], <https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-providers/compliance-enfor cement/examples/national-origin/ocr-joint-notice-of-violation-to-columbia/index.html> [http s://perma.cc/2EFM-FKCD].

  101. Id.

  102. Id.

  103. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Notifies
    Columbia University’s Accreditor of Columbia’s Title VI Violation (June 4, 2025) [hereinafter Accreditor Notice], <https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/us-departme nt-of-education-notifies-columbia-universitys-accreditor-of-columbias-title-vi-violation> [https://perma.cc/E2CM-Y8V7\].

  104. Id.

  105. Claire Shipman, Our Additional Commitments to Combatting Antisemitism, Colum.
    Univ.: Off. of the President
    (July 15, 2025) [hereinafter Additional Measures], <https://preside nt.columbia.edu/news/our-additional-commitments-combatting-antisemitism> [https://perma.cc/ 2TTA-PV2M].

  106. Id.

  107. Resolution Agreement Between the United States of America and Columbia University (2025) [hereinafter RESOLUTION AGREEMENT], <https://president.colum bia.edu/sites/president.columbia.edu/files/content/July 2025 Announcement/Columbi a%20University%20Resolution%20Agreement.pdf> [https://perma.cc/GR4Y-VUL4\].

  108. Id. at 3.

  109. Id. at 5.

  110. See supra Section II.A.1.

  111. See supra Section II.A.1.

  112. Funds Frozen, supra note 5.

  113. Jocelyn Kaiser, After Columbia’s ‘Nightmare,’ Dozens More Universities Brace for Trump NIH Cuts, Sci.: ScienceInsider (Mar. 18, 2025, at 15:40 ET), https://www.science.org/content/article/after-columbia-s-nightmare-dozens-more-universities-brace-trump-nih-cuts [https://perma.cc/3VML-VL6Z\]; Resolution Agreement Frequently Asked Questions, Colum. Univ., https://president.columbia.edu/content/resolution-agreement-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/TL6U-2VVB\] (last visited July 18, 2026).

  114. Kaiser, supra note 113.

  115. Nat’l Insts. of Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., NIH Grants Policy Statement I-48 (Mar. 2026) [hereinafter NIH Policy], https://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/nihgps.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3M-C2QH\].

  116. Id.

  117. See Demand Letter, supra note 94.

  118. See supra Section II.A.1.

  119. See Demand Letter, supra note 94; Response to Demand, supra note 96.

  120. See Kaiser, supra note 113.

  121. A-Z Listing, Colum. Univ. Irving Med. Ctr., https://www.cuimc.columbia.edu/about-us/explore-cuimc/z-listing [https://perma.cc/YQN3-88HQ\] (last visited Aug. 3, 2026).

  122. NIH (@NIH), X (Mar. 10, 2025, at 15:32 CT), https://x.com/NIH/status/1899196680270238173 [https://perma.cc/T8HC-RDR4\] (“Today #NIH is terminating more than $250 million in funding—including more than 400 grants—to Columbia University following directives from the Trump Administration’s Joint Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism. The cancellations are due to Columbia University’s continued inaction in the face of persistent harassment of Jewish students.”).

  123. NIH Policy, supra note 115, at IIA-14.

  124. Demand Letter, supra note 94.

  125. Funds Frozen, supra note 5.

  126. See supra Section II.A.2.

  127. Funds Frozen, supra note 5; Demand Letter, supra note 94.

  128. . Resolution Agreement Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 113.

  129. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581–82 (2012).

  130. See Kaiser, supra note 113.

  131. See supra Section IV.A.1.

  132. Exec. Order No. 14279, 90 Fed. Reg. 17529 (Apr. 28, 2025).

  133. Id.

  134. Accreditor Notice, supra note 103.

  135. Id.

  136. NIH Policy, supra note 115, at I-54.

  137. Joint Notice, supra note 100.

  138. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.

  139. See supra Section II.B.

  140. See supra Section II.B.

  141. See supra Section II.B.

  142. See Demand Letter, supra note 94; Additional Measures, supra note 105.

  143. See Demand Letter, supra note 94; Resolution Agreement, supra note 107.

  144. See Joint Notice, supra note 100; Demand Letter, supra note 94; Response to Demand, supra note 96.

  145. Task Force on Antisemitism, Columbia Univ., Report #2: Columbia University Student Experiences of Antisemitism and Recommendations for Promoting Shared Values and Inclusion 44 (Aug. 30, 2024), https://president.columbia.edu/sites/president.columbia.edu/files/content/Announcements/Report-2-Task-Force-on-Antisemitism.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UDP-HDAS\] (adopting an antisemitism definition that is not IHRA’s after conducting its own research); Demand Letter, supra note 94 (the Administration requires IHRA’s definition); Response to Demand, supra note 96 (choosing to not adopt IHRA’s definition); Funds Frozen, supra note 5 (the Administration freezes funds); Accreditor Notice, supra note 103 (threatening accreditor to apply more force to Columbia’s accreditation status); Additional Measures, supra note 105 (adopting IHRA’s definition).

  146. See Demand Letter, supra note 94.

  147. See supra Section IV.A.1.

  148. See Demand Letter, supra note 94; Resolution Agreement, supra note 107.

  149. Joint Notice, supra note 100 (occupation of Hamilton Hall).

  150. Eugene Volokh et al., A Statement from Constitutional Law Scholars on Columbia, N.Y. Rev. (Mar. 20, 2025), https://www.nybooks.com/online/2025/03/20/a-statement-from-constitutional-law-scholars-on-columbia/ [https://perma.cc/5S8W-3HMW\].

  151. Id.

  152. Funds Frozen, supra note 5.

  153. Michael C. Dorf, Wait, Can He Actually Do That? Part 8: Trump Cancels Columbia, Dorf on L. (Mar. 10, 2025), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2025/03/wait-can-he-actually-do-that-part-8.html [https://perma.cc/2PF2-ZAPB\].

  154. Joint Notice, supra note 100.

  155. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–45 (1999) (alteration in original).

  156. Id. at 648–49.

  157. Id. at 648.

  158. See generally Task Force on Antisemitism, supra note 145, at 11, 38–39 (detailing the research, analysis, and findings made by Columbia’s task force regarding student experiences of antisemitism and recommendations for promoting inclusion).

  159. Response to Demand, supra note 96.

  160. Joint Notice, supra note 100.

  161. Id.

  162. Id.; Maya Stahl, Sarah Huddleston & Shea Vance, Shafik Authorizes NYPD to Sweep ‘Gaza Solidarity Encampment,’ Officers in Riot Gear Arrest Over 100, Colum. Daily Spectator (Apr. 19, 2024, at 01:25 CT), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2024/04/18/shafik-authorizes-nypd-to-sweep-gaza-solidarity-encampment-officers-in-riot-gear-arrest-over-100/ [https://perma.cc/DX2J-6GPT\]; Columbia University, Britannica (Oct. 5, 2026), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Columbia-University [https://perma.cc/2KFK-P5UU\].

  163. Volokh et al., supra note 150.

  164. 45 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2025); NIH Policy, supra note 115, at IIA-14.

  165. Volokh et al., supra note 150; 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(c).

  166. 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(c)(1).

  167. Volokh et al., supra note 150.

  168. Id.

  169. See supra Sections IV.A.1–2.

  170. See supra Section IV.A.3; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (“In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”).

  171. See supra Section IV.B.

  172. See supra Section IV.C.

  173. Funds Frozen, supra note 5.

  174. Volokh et al., supra note 150.

  175. Michael C. Dorf, How Bad Is the Columbia Settlement Agreement?, Dorf on L. (July 24, 2025), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2025/07/how-bad-is-columbia-settlement-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/HCV9-JR4J\].

  176. Id.

  177. Id.

  178. Dorf, supra note 9.

  179. Id.

  180. Id. (“[T]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.” (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006))).

  181. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); then quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).

  182. See supra Part IV.