- I. Introduction
- II. Origins of NEPA and Environmental Review
- III. Three Key Developments That Gutted NEPA
- IV. Consequences of Gutting NEPA
- A. Accelerated Project Timelines
- B. Uncertainty in Litigation
- C. Changes to Project Costs and the Value of Predictability
- D. Changes to Due Diligence for Liability and Environmental Insurance
- E. Changes to Due Diligence Infrastructure in Private Lending
- F. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms
- G. Diminished Public Engagement and Transparency
- V. Conclusion
I. Introduction
“A 1970 legislative acorn has grown over the years into a judicial oak that has hindered infrastructure development ‘under the guise’ of just a little more process.”
—Justice Brett Kavanaugh in Seven County.[1]
For over fifty years, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has shaped how federal agencies are required to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.[2] NEPA “stands out among peer environmental statutes” because it does not dictate federal agency decision-making through specific metrics and environmental goals, but instead provides the procedures on how to make those decisions: through careful evaluation of environmental impacts and public disclosure before starting a project.[3] In practice, NEPA forces federal agencies to “look before they leap” into a new project, even when environmental protection is not a primary policy goal.[4]
The text of NEPA also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).[5] The CEQ, via a President Carter Executive Order, in return gave NEPA its “teeth” by translating NEPA’s broad statutory language into binding regulations, providing procedures to agencies on their environmental decision-making, and reviewing their NEPA implementation.[6] While CEQ was tasked with increasing the predictability and uniformity for implementing NEPA via these regulations, it also increased the number of bureaucratic hurdles federal agencies must jump through for any action that requires NEPA review.[7]
In recent years, mounting pressure from the Trump Administration to shorten the lengthy NEPA review process, along with a strong push for deregulation,[8] has dismantled the CEQ regulations—NEPA’s framework.[9] Beyond regulation from the Executive, the scope of NEPA review has also been subject to legislative revision, recent decisions by the federal Judiciary, and several areas of administrative law.[10] This Comment aims to address those implications and the ultimate impacts on the NEPA system of environmental review.
This Comment proceeds in four parts following this introduction. Part II traces the origins of NEPA, the creation of the CEQ, and the development of environmental review for federal agency actions.[11] Part III examines the legal and administrative developments that have reframed NEPA’s implementation, focusing on three tenets of change: (1) the rescission of CEQ’s implementing regulations; (2) the judicial rejection of CEQ’s asserted rulemaking authority and the Seven County decision; and (3) the Supreme Court’s repudiation of Chevron deference in Loper Bright.[12] Part IV explores the implications of these changes for NEPA review and evaluates lasting effects on federal agencies and projects.[13] Part V concludes the preceding material.[14]
II. Origins of NEPA and Environmental Review
A. America’s Environmental Awakening and the Birth of NEPA
In the 1960s, there was mounting evidence that rapid industrial and economic growth had come at a steep environmental cost.[15] One of the most visible symbols of this crisis was the 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, when oil that pooled on the surface of the river caught on fire.[16] The decade was marred by environmental disasters like the Cuyahoga River fire, and public outrage over visible environmental decline sparked a growing environmental consciousness both across the country and in Congress itself, setting the stage for a wave of federal environmental legislation.[17] Put another way, between 1965 and 1970, the nation’s appetite for conservation and environmental preservation had grown substantially: so much so that there was “only one word, hysteria, to describe the Washington mood on the environment issue in the fall of 1969.”[18]
President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970, marking the opening legislative act of a decade christened with the name the “Decade of the Environment.”[19] NEPA was just one of several pieces of legislation that emerged in the wake of America’s environmental awakening as a procedural reform designed to inform the environmental framework of federal agency projects.[20] NEPA was unique from the other statutes passed during that era because rather than establishing substantive environmental standards, Congress, via NEPA, required federal agencies to assess the environmental consequences of their actions and disclose those findings to the public before proceeding with major projects.[21]
One way to conceptualize NEPA is as a pause button that requires federal agencies to freeze in time and consider the consequences of their actions before proceeding.[22] In drafting NEPA, Congress was explicit about the purpose of the legislation, and it is fourfold:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.[23]
In line with the purposes set out in the statute by Congress, NEPA embedded environmental consideration into the core of federal decision-making and captured the environmental moment of the country by ensuring that large-scale projects would not proceed without meaningful examination of environmental impacts.[24]
Given how short the text of NEPA is, it logically follows that the statute is broad in its scope and applicability.[25] NEPA applies to a substantially wide category of actions, including issuing regulations, permitting for private actions, funding for private actions, any action involving public land, and any action that involves federal funding.[26] As of 2025, NEPA applies to more than 100,000 federal actions each year.[27] To illustrate, some examples of federal actions that require NEPA review include the Federal Highway Administration’s creation of a new bridge over federal land[28] or the National Park Service building a new road in Olympic National Park.[29] The NEPA review process must be complete “before an agency makes a final decision on a proposed action,” with the hope that federal agencies are engaging in informed decision-making that forces them to consider the environmental effects of their actions.[30]
That said, a common misconception about NEPA is that it is only used by environmental plaintiffs to block projects that are traditionally categorized as environmentally degrading, such as projects that involve the extraction of fossil fuels.[31] That is not true, because in recent years NEPA review has been used to block numerous renewable energy projects such as the development of wind and solar farms.[32]
B. The CEQ and NEPA’s Institutional Framework
Congress also determined that a purpose of NEPA would be to create the CEQ.[33] The CEQ is housed within the Executive Office of the President,[34] and it is responsible for the implementation of NEPA “through issuance and interpretation of NEPA regulations that implement the procedural requirements of NEPA.”[35]
The CEQ’s ability to issue binding regulation over NEPA’s procedural provisions is not derived from the text of NEPA itself, but rather from a 1977 President Carter Executive Order that was issued with the hope of promoting consistency in NEPA’s procedural mandate.[36] The Executive Order required that federal agencies “comply with the regulations issued by the Council.”[37] From this authority, the CEQ issues binding regulations that concern, for example, developing a project’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA),[38] streamlining the NEPA review process by reducing excessive paperwork and procedural delays, and ensuring informed decision-making while upholding environmental protections.[39] Through this Executive Order, CEQ’s implementing regulations had become a de facto procedural law of NEPA.[40]
In many ways, the creation of the CEQ was seen as somewhat of a success because the promulgated regulations helped stabilize the administrative process by minimizing interagency conflict and reducing uncertainty over NEPA’s broad procedural demands.[41] Historically, courts generally treated these regulations as authoritative interpretations of NEPA and afforded them deference.[42] Combined with judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), this arrangement produced a process where NEPA’s procedural requirements were both predictable and enforceable.[43] Federal courts reinforced this framework by requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences before proceeding with major federal actions, which ensured that NEPA’s procedural safeguards carried practical force.[44] In practice, the “hard look” doctrine means that if an agency ignores a significant environmental risk or fails to consider a viable alternative, the court can send it back to the drawing board, effectively stopping the project in its tracks.[45] So, by way of both the Judiciary and the Executive, NEPA’s procedural mandate acquired practical force in the years following its enactment.
C. NEPA in the Courts: Early Judicial Enforcement and the “Hard Look” Doctrine
The Judiciary quickly emerged as a central guardian of NEPA’s procedural mandate.[46] First, in 1971 in Calvert Cliffs’, the D.C. Circuit made it clear that federal agencies could not treat NEPA’s requirements as mere formalities.[47] Rejecting the notion that environmental review could be reduced to a “pro forma ritual,” the court held that agencies are required to consider environmental consequences in their decision-making process to fulfill the “grand congressional purposes underlying NEPA.”[48] Calvert Cliffs’ established that NEPA wasn’t simply an aspirational statement of environmental values, but an enforceable procedural charter subject to meaningful judicial oversight, which made it seem like NEPA had some substantive component to it.[49]
Following the Calvert Cliffs’ decision, some federal courts at the time were largely in favor of the expansion and demands of NEPA review, that is, “Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger,” rooting their thinking in the idea that information disclosure about environmental effects of federal projects was categorically a good thing.[50] Some argue that the courts were responsible for creating a “common law of NEPA” that functions as the “source of NEPA’s success,” which may very well be true given how short and broad the text of NEPA is itself.[51]
In contrast with the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of NEPA, the Supreme Court maintained a more tempered attitude toward NEPA and found it to be merely procedural. A few years after Calvert Cliffs’, the Supreme Court in Andrus v. Sierra Club held that the “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.”[52] Despite the growth of the requirements of NEPA due to the expansion of CEQ regulations, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Court confirmed that NEPA is solely procedural and should not dictate substantive outcomes, and the Court held the same in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council.[53] While NEPA requires agencies to consider and disclose environmental consequences, it does not mandate particular outcomes, nor does it require agencies to adopt specific mitigation measures or include a fully developed mitigation plan in an environmental impact statement.[54] The Court emphasized that NEPA ensures informed decision-making and public participation, not judicial substitution of environmental policy judgments.[55] Despite this, the Court was well aware that the procedural requirements of NEPA were certain to affect the substantive components of agency decision-making.[56]
The 2004 decision of Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen continued the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the scope of NEPA.[57] In Public Citizen, the Court addressed how far down the chain of effects an agency must look when doing its “hard look” analysis.[58] Analogizing to proximate cause from tort law, the Court came to the conclusion that “NEPA requires ‘a reasonably close causal relationship’ between the environmental effect” and the agency project itself.[59] The ability for plaintiffs to get injunctive relief was narrowed by the Court in Winter v. NRDC, and the Court in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms emphasized that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy even for environmental injuries.[60] These decisions substantially increased the requirement that environmental plaintiffs must suffer some irreparable harm when seeking to halt projects under NEPA, which made it difficult for plaintiffs to halt major projects on NEPA grounds.[61]
In sum, since the late twentieth century, the Court has consistently held that under NEPA, federal agencies are required to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences; at the same time, the Court has maintained that NEPA does not dictate substantive outcomes.[62] If an agency’s “hard look” wasn’t enough, that is, the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” the decision must be set aside under the APA.[63] Agencies are responsible for conducting a discussion of relevant issues as well as meaningful statements regarding the actual impact of proposed projects to demonstrate that they have genuinely considered the environmental consequences of their actions.[64] Even where agencies ultimately choose to proceed with environmentally harmful projects, they must show that the decision was made with full awareness of the environmental trade-offs involved.[65]
D. Environmental Review Versus Project Efficiency
Since its enactment in 1970, NEPA has embodied a persistent tension between environmental review and project efficiency.[66] Supporters of NEPA see the statute as a democratic safeguard that promotes transparency, public participation, and informed decision-making in major federal actions, particularly in light of the context in which NEPA was created.[67] In its support, NEPA has been described as “America’s most influential and imitated environmental law,” with over 100 countries adopting their own versions of NEPA in the past fifty years.[68]
On the other hand, critics have long argued that NEPA’s procedural requirements invite litigation and contribute to significant delays in the approval of critical infrastructure projects due to the length of EAs and EISs, along with other procedural speed bumps that are a part of the NEPA approval process.[69] In fact, one critic has gone as far as to note that since 1978, “environmental advocates . . . filed as many as four thousand lawsuits to use . . . violations of NEPA or the CEQ regulations to delay or kill federal projects.”[70] This tension has intensified over time as the scope and complexity of environmental review expanded.[71]
By the 2010s, the average EIS took approximately four and a half years to complete, adding to the concerns about the pace of federal permitting, especially true in light of the fact that the CEQ in 1981 estimated that agencies should be able to complete most EISs in twelve months or less.[72] In fact, “[v]irtually every administration since President Carter’s has tried and mostly failed to reduce lengthy agency NEPA reviews,” particularly because the EIS in many ways tended to become a roadblock in itself rather than a guiding force for making better environmental decisions.[73]
In response to mounting pressure to modernize environmental review and streamline infrastructure development, the Trump Administration has taken several measures. First, through the One Federal Decision (OFD) policy, established by Executive Order 13807 in 2017, the Administration aimed to streamline environmental review to be completed in only two years.[74] These changes became regulation via a CEQ rule in 2020.[75] More specifically, the rule narrowed the scope of environmental review, limited cumulative impact analysis, and confined NEPA’s reach to more proximate environmental effects, with the stated goal of reducing delay and litigation risk for federal agencies and project proponents.[76]
In response, the Biden Administration sought to revert to the previous iteration of procedural compliance by federal agencies.[77] In January 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order No. 13990, which revoked Trump’s Executive Order No. 13807 and directed agencies to review and rescind rules inconsistent with his Administration’s climate and environmental policies.[78] This Executive Order (EO) was designed to strengthen environmental protection, restore scientific integrity, and reinforce procedural safeguards in federal environmental reviews.[79]
One takeaway from this “regulatory tug-of-war” between the Trump and Biden Administrations is that NEPA continues to serve as the nation’s environmental “Magna Carta” given the attention it has from both sides of the aisle.[80] And, like the loss of power that the Magna Carta endured over time,[81] the rollback of CEQ’s regulatory authority, the Judiciary’s reassessment of agency interpretive power, and the repudiation of Chevron deference have collectively disrupted the stability and predictability that once made NEPA the statute it was.[82]
In the wake of the aforementioned changes, bipartisan reform to NEPA occurred in 2023 when Congress passed the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA).[83] This was the first major legislative overhaul of NEPA in nearly fifty years.[84] The FRA codified several of the trends that were advocated for either by previous administrations or by the federal Judiciary.[85] Namely, the 2023 FRA set caps on page and time limits for the EIS and restricted the scope of review to only “reasonably foreseeable” environmental effects.[86]
III. Three Key Developments That Gutted NEPA
This Part describes three developments that have collectively reshaped NEPA and unsettled the institutional framework described in Part II. Specifically, this Part analyzes: (1) the rescission of CEQ regulations dating back to 1977; (2) judicial decisions denying CEQ’s statutory rulemaking authority; and (3) the Supreme Court’s rejection of Chevron deference.
A. Executive Rescission of CEQ’s Implementing Regulations
In near-identical fashion to President Trump’s first term, the second Trump Administration began with its sights set on serious NEPA reform.[87] On January 20, 2025, President Trump announced Executive Order No. 14154, Unleashing American Energy, which aimed at rescinding the CEQ’s existing NEPA regulations. Trump’s EO also revoked Executive Order No. 11991, signed by President Carter in 1977, which had previously empowered the CEQ with its rulemaking authority.[88] This EO was confirmed by the CEQ in January 2026 via a final rule, dismantling the CEQ’s regulatory framework that had guided NEPA for the past fifty years.[89] In responding to public comments, the CEQ rejected arguments that decades of agency reliance, congressional cross-references, or judicial recognition could supply regulatory authority in the absence of an express delegation.[90] The purpose of this final rule was to return NEPA implementation back to the hands of individual federal agencies.[91] The CEQ emphasized that its prior regulations rested on authority from the President Carter EO rather than statutory command, and therefore once that delegation was withdrawn it lacked discretion to retain binding rules.[92] To further root this rescission, the CEQ notes that the rescission of NEPA implementing regulations is “unrelated to the Marin Audubon Society decision,” which some find to be an effort to restrict future administrations from ping-ponging back to the previous CEQ rules regime.[93]
It is important to note that Trump’s EO does not remove an agency’s duty to follow the text of NEPA itself.[94] Only the CEQ regulations, which lengthen the required content and process of the statement, are no longer binding, but the need for a “detailed statement” of potential environmental effects for major actions that substantially affect the environment is still required.[95]
Without the CEQ regulations, federal agencies are now relying on their own NEPA procedures or statutory text.[96] As has already been the case, this is particularly problematic given that NEPA is one of the most litigated federal environmental statutes, with 100–150 NEPA cases heard annually in federal courts.[97] The consequences of the rescission of the CEQ regulations, including increased litigation, are discussed in Part IV.[98] Without enforceable CEQ regulations to structure environmental review, agencies are left to develop their own NEPA procedures in the absence of a uniform federal standard, raising questions about consistency and predictability.[99]
B. Judicial Rejection of CEQ’s Rulemaking Authority & Seven County
Several recent decisions by the federal Judiciary have entrenched the disruption to NEPA’s environmental review process as a matter of statutory interpretation. The first decision came in 2024, in Marin Audubon Society v. Federal Aviation Administration, where the D.C. Circuit held that all CEQ’s regulations were “ultra vires” and therefore unenforceable.[100] This result was particularly “surprising” given that no party challenged the CEQ’s authority to issue binding NEPA regulations.[101] Nonetheless, the court rooted its decision in the fact that the CEQ had derived its rulemaking authority from the President Carter EO instead of from a statute authorized by Congress.[102] Because the President alone cannot confer rulemaking authority via EOs, the CEQ therefore has no authority to create rules or review compliance with NEPA.[103] Based on the holding from Marin alone, the CEQ has lacked binding rulemaking authority all along.[104] In early 2025, a federal district court came to a similar conclusion in Iowa v. Council on Environmental Quality.[105] There, the court held that the CEQ was not conferred rulemaking authority after doing a plain reading of NEPA, and that President Carter’s EO again did not hold water in the way that was once thought.[106] Taking these two decisions together, for over fifty years the CEQ’s regulations have established the basic procedures for complying with NEPA, but these regulations are now in question as to their lasting authority.[107] Because these decisions are specific to the D.C. Circuit and the district court in North Dakota, respectively, plaintiffs may forum shop to find a jurisdiction that better aligns with their position.[108] What’s more, there are significant questions about the breadth of NEPA case law that exists, which was decided based on the idea that the CEQ had the authority to issue binding regulations.[109]
In Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, the Supreme Court concluded that judicial review of NEPA analyses is narrow and that courts must afford agencies substantial deference.[110] NEPA does not confer upon the CEQ independent authority to promulgate binding regulations governing federal environmental review.[111] Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh concludes that this assignment of responsibility requires courts to afford “substantial deference” to the agency’s discretionary choices regarding the depth, breadth, and “manageable line” of its environmental inquiry.[112] Even though the courts in the 1970s converted the broad NEPA statute into procedural commands under CEQ, the Supreme Court could easily undo that same command because of the “less-than-clear congressional language” of NEPA and the idea surrounding infrastructure growth, which sees NEPA as being more of a roadblock than an environmental boon.[113] The Supreme Court’s opinion is rooted in the text of NEPA itself, but the underlying tones suggest a decision that is largely driven by policy, particularly because the majority describes the decision as “bring[ing] judicial review under NEPA back in line with the statutory text and common sense.”[114]
The Supreme Court holding that “substantial deference” should be afforded to an agency’s discretionary choices is ironic in light of the overturning of Chevron deference in 2024.[115] The Court tries to reconcile Seven County and Loper Bright by clarifying the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact: For example, any EIS requirement, such as the fact that it must be “detailed,” is a question of statutory interpretation to be decided by a court, but the fact of what substantive elements must be in an EIS to meet the same “detailed” requirement is an agency decision that is entitled to substantial deference.[116] For NEPA decisions, federal agencies are required to make predictive judgments when preparing an EIS in considering both alternatives and all scenarios, and because the agency, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, is in the best position to consider these alternatives, the role of the court is to be “most deferential” when reviewing these types of judgments.[117] In many ways, this raises the question of to what extent the Chevron doctrine was really overruled.[118]
Lastly, but also very critically, the majority in Seven County held that NEPA does not require an agency to evaluate the effects of future upstream and downstream projects even if a future project is reasonably foreseeable.[119] The Court held that future upstream and downstream projects are outside of the scope of review for the agency, and thus evaluation of those impacts in an EIS would require an agency to act outside of this authority.[120] For example, if an agency is building a pipeline, the agency’s only requirement is to look at any effects of building the pipeline itself.[121] There is absolutely no requirement that any agency does any consideration of related circumstances such as where the “natural gas come[s] from” or “where does it go?”[122]
Ultimately, the effect of these decisions is twofold. For one, it is clear that the CEQ does not have any statutorily granted rulemaking authority,[123] and any rules that are promulgated by the agency are certain to be considered ultra vires because they are promulgated without valid statutory authority.[124] Second, agencies are now to be afforded substantial deference in their own interpretations of their EIS.[125] And, agencies are not required to consider upstream or downstream impacts of their projects.[126] Nonetheless, regulation of agency actions still exists under the APA.[127] Plaintiffs would have a cause of action if an agency’s action in establishing a project or failure to comply with NEPA’s EIS requirements were arbitrary and capricious.[128] Litigation, as such, following the Seven County decision is discussed in Part IV.[129]
C. Overturning Chevron Deference
A third pressure point on NEPA arose before either of the two previously discussed pressure points when the Supreme Court overturned the Chevron doctrine in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.[130] For more than four decades, the Chevron doctrine stood as a cornerstone of administrative law, instructing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions.[131] Under its two-step framework, courts first asked whether Congress had spoken clearly to the precise question at issue, and if not, the agency’s interpretation controlled so long as it was reasonable.[132]
In Loper Bright, the Court rejected this “deference,” holding that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment on all questions of statutory interpretation.[133] Quoting Marbury v. Madison, the majority declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” taking interpretive authority away from administrative agencies and toward the courts.[134] Although agencies may continue to inform judicial analysis, their statutory interpretations no longer receive binding deference simply because they are “reasonable.”[135]
For NEPA, the consequences of the overturning of Chevron are profound. Without Loper Bright, the Seven County decision likely would not have come out the way it did, because agencies would have still had the same level of deference absent this holding.[136] Absent Chevron deference, courts are no longer obliged to accept agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms within the text of NEPA such as “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”[137] Instead, CEQ interpretations would likely receive Skidmore deference, meaning courts will give weight to the CEQ’s reasoning to the extent it is persuasive, formal, and grounded in expertise, but courts retain independent interpretive authority.[138]
Following these three changes, in September 2025, the CEQ issued nonbinding guidance to federal agencies, representing its first comprehensive effort to coordinate NEPA compliance following Seven County and the rescission of its regulatory authority.[139] Instead of issuing rules, the guidance provides a roadmap for agency compliance through advisory mechanisms.[140] Most notably, it includes a “NEPA Procedures Template,” which encourages agencies to model their procedures in line with the already rescinded 2020 CEQ regulations.[141] This guidance reflects the CEQ’s attempt to preserve a coordinating role through soft law instruments such as an informal memorandum and templates as opposed to rules or regulations.[142] What’s more, the memorandum self-identifies as neither mandatory nor binding and, somewhat ironically, is designed to provide clarity as to NEPA’s requirements and promote consistency across federal agencies.[143]
IV. Consequences of Gutting NEPA
These changes to NEPA have not only resulted in deregulation but also completely restructured the environmental review process in unpredictable ways. As such, the likely consequences of this shift are unpredictable but also necessary for project developers to understand. This Part attempts to describe the likely consequences of these recent changes.
A. Accelerated Project Timelines
One of the most immediate and visible effects of the recent changes to NEPA review is the acceleration of project timelines,[144] which was the benefit most touted by the Trump Administration.[145] With the CEQ’s procedural framework rescinded, agencies now possess discretion to determine the scope, depth, and duration of their environmental reviews.[146] The Administration has also implemented other changes to limit the scope and need for NEPA review, such as the removal of review “where the federal agency lacks sufficient control, responsibility, and legal authority to warrant Federal review” and an increase in the number of projects that are considered “categorical exclusions” from NEPA review.[147] Further, because of the Seven County decision, an agency’s NEPA analysis does not need to consider upstream or downstream effects that are remote, which allows for an agency’s NEPA review to be condensed to just the immediate effects of the described project itself.[148]
In practice, agencies now have broad discretion in how far they can compress their timelines.[149] For example, the Department of the Interior announced “emergency permitting procedures” that reduce EA review to approximately fourteen days,[150] and EIS review down to twenty-eight days.[151] Compare these timelines to the previous regime where a typical EIS had a timeline average of 4.5 years.[152] From a developer’s perspective, the shortened review periods are a godsend: Shortened timelines allow for projects’ quicker access to cash, reduced permit waiting periods, and the ability to keep up with fast-moving markets, such as AI infrastructure.[153]
At the same time, it remains a question of how short an environmental review can be while still remaining functionally meaningful.[154] The old NEPA review process produced a lengthy administrative record that agencies could use to defend against claims under the APA, because it would demonstrate that “the agency acted rationally” and its NEPA review decision was not clearly erroneous.[155] What’s more, if EA and EIS progress on such expedited timelines, can an agency reasonably claim that it really complied with the “hard look” requirement for environmental consequences in a way that complies with the arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the APA?[156] As discussed in the following section, the time saved could be merely illusory if an agency is forced to defend against an assortment of claims brought by opportunistic plaintiffs.[157] For projects that are able to avoid litigation because they are not heavily scrutinized, the benefits touted by the Administration are a boon.[158] However, for projects that are trapped in litigation, if the agency’s decision-making under NEPA is found to be arbitrary or capricious, court orders of either remand, vacatur, or injunction would result in an increase in total time to project completion.[159]
Nonetheless, the Trump Administration has made it clear that building giant AI data centers fast is a priority, and that permitting or construction should not be held back by NEPA review.[160] Executive Order 14318, Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure, paves the way for the Administration to exempt AI data centers from the full EIS process by including AI data centers as part of the group of “categorical exclusions” and also said that if federal funding is less than 50% for an AI data center, then it is not considered a “major [f]ederal action.”[161] This could be one way that the Administration attempts to curb the number of opportunistic plaintiffs that try to slow down projects via litigation for certain categories of projects.
B. Uncertainty in Litigation
Going hand in hand with accelerated project timelines is likely a stark change in NEPA litigation. The text of NEPA does not present a cause of action, and instead plaintiffs wanting to sue under NEPA for a lack of agency compliance must do so under the APA.[162] The federal courts use the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing agency actions under NEPA and require agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences before acting.[163]
As mentioned, NEPA has been one of the most litigated federal statutes ever, and that metric is based on the past fifty years when the EIS was prepared in its full form, and lengthy EIS review was common.[164] Litigation, even if unsuccessful, would add years to a project timeline. But under the current landscape with the CEQ regulations largely gutted, the “hooks” for plaintiffs to sue do not exist in the same way, which could mean a decrease in the amount of litigation because plaintiffs lack clear causes of action.[165]
The Seven County decision also has several impacts on the future of litigation within the federal Judiciary. First, because the Court held that agencies are not required to consider indirect or downstream effects of a project, plaintiffs could be discouraged from seeking to expand the scope of EISs to include evaluation of indirect impacts, such as climate impacts.[166] Second, the Supreme Court held that the court’s role is to be minimal in NEPA review by requiring the federal Judiciary to provide agencies “substantial deference” in their decision-making.[167] At the same time, however, providing the agencies with deference does not mean that agencies are free from arbitrary and capricious review if their analysis is deemed to be cursory.[168] The result could be a shift in litigation where the complaint is not about whether a project followed specific CEQ regulations, but rather whether an agency’s review was meaningful enough to survive arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.[169]
Complaints have been filed in federal district courts against agencies in response to the quick shift in regulation for each agency, and it serves as a litmus test for the type of litigation that is to come under NEPA.[170] So far, plaintiffs have argued that procedurally, agencies are skipping notice and comment and are placing their regulations into immediate effect without valid justification.[171] Some experts say that this is a violation of the APA, given that NEPA requires a meaningful opportunity for public comment during the review process.[172] Though it has not yet been argued, plaintiffs could also argue that deregulation actions taken by an agency are a “major [f]ederal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” which would then trigger environmental review under NEPA.[173] Plaintiffs could also argue that agencies not giving a reasoned explanation for the rollback aren’t grappling with reliance and the long history of public involvement, amounting to an arbitrary and capricious reversal of long-standing practice.[174] Ironically, even though the Trump Executive Order said that “agencies must prioritize efficiency and certainty over any other objectives,” agencies being forced to defend against litigation is unlikely to be efficient.[175] In practice, litigation may not disappear but rather could become more unpredictable, which could be arguably worse for developers who rely on consistency.
C. Changes to Project Costs and the Value of Predictability
A major point of relief touted by the Trump Administration was a decrease in permitting and project development costs.[176] One way infrastructure projects can now decrease their cost is by narrowing the scope of EIS reports.[177] Procedurally, this change works in that if an EIS report no longer requires an extensive due diligence analysis, then there is reduced need for additional specialized expertise from scientists and engineers to evaluate the impacts of a specific project.[178] Likewise, the overall cost of the EIS report preparation itself will also decrease as the length is shortened.[179] The cost of a typical EIS in 2015 was about $4.2 million, so even a small reduction in scope could lead to significant savings for project developers.[180] But cost reduction is only one component of regulatory efficiency, and for some capital-intensive industries, predictability of the market is just as valuable as speed at which projects churn.[181]
A modern parallel is the Environmental Protection Agency’s 2025 proposal to eliminate its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program.[182] Although framed as regulatory relief, “Big Oil” and the American Petroleum Institute urged the Trump Administration to reconsider its decision to eliminate the long-standing centralized emissions reporting system because the industry functions on predictability and stability.[183] These industry players argued that it would potentially make it more difficult to be eligible for federal tax credits, undermine compliance with European and Asian import standards, and force companies that operate across state lines to navigate a fragmented patchwork of substitute requirements.[184] Industry representatives described the rollback as creating “regulatory whiplash,” because predictable standards and reporting were foundational to investment planning and participation in carbon capture, and because these standards would likely be reinstated by a future administration.[185]
This same dynamic confronts the NEPA reforms in that by replacing binding CEQ regulation with nonbinding guidance and agency-specific discretion, the federal government is essentially transforming environmental review from a uniform procedural system into an agency-by-agency experiment.[186] The benefit that NEPA provided agencies with was that it was a process that people understood.[187] While this approach may yield short-term efficiencies for certain projects, it risks long-term instability by forcing some of the industry’s biggest players to operate without a clear and predictable compliance baseline, which undermines the certainty that effective permitting regimes are meant to provide.[188]
D. Changes to Due Diligence for Liability and Environmental Insurance
Although the EIS and EA under CEQ regulations were often considered to be burdensome given their scope and length, the EIS and EA have long functioned as “one-stop” due diligence documents because they provided the public with comprehensive information about a project and its risk.[189] NEPA used to function as a public, standardized information product.[190] The EIS, for example, addressed the environmental impacts of a local area, making these impacts known and widely accessible.[191] They provided the public with details about environmental health within communities in a single report, and provided insight as to how federal legislation and requirements might impact a project.[192] This predictability provided certainty and a significant amount of information about a given project. But as disclosure decreases, for example, this uncertainty could potentially cause project insurance costs to rise.[193]
Insurance helps project developers hedge against the cost of defending and paying for environmental claims.[194] For insurers providing any sort of coverage, the material in an EIS became a matter of public record and helped to reduce informational asymmetry, which is key for any sort of insurance coverage, especially with projects at this scale.[195] For example, when pricing insurance, insurance underwriters assess risk via metrics such as loss history, exposure, and safety plans.[196] But the shift away from binding, uniform NEPA procedures may disrupt the due diligence that is necessary for proper insurance calculations, particularly given that information that was once readily available to the public is now private, or not shared at all.[197] As agencies increasingly rely on categorical exclusions or abbreviated EAs, projects proceed with less standardized documentation of project details and environmental risk.[198] If projects are not subject to environmental reviews, there is also a loss of the legal immunity that comes with the federal Judiciary’s blessing on an EIS.[199] This could mean that developers are more likely to face opposition at the state and local levels, particularly if there is a lack of federal oversight.[200]
What’s more, the Seven County holding could also substantially change the project insurance landscape for projects. If the courts must show “substantial deference” to an agency’s decision, it could become increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to challenge future developments based on potential environmental impacts.[201] If there is a reduction in litigation, this could help to alleviate the cost of development and the length of permitting and EIS approvals, overall.[202] This also could translate to a more risk-averse subset of developers, and insurers, being attracted to projects if there is a lower chance that an opportunistic plaintiff will sue.[203]
Insurance markets respond predictably to such uncertainty.[204] For one, insurers may increase premiums to account for information gaps, narrow policy coverage, or add exclusions for environmental and climate-related harms.[205] In some cases, insurers may decline coverage altogether for projects that are missing a robust environmental record or have moved too quickly because “[w]eakened enforcement and insufficient oversight” could be detrimental to policy providers. In recent years, regulatory uncertainty has meant that insurers are less willing to take on significant market capacity and carriers are actively shrinking their policy limits by up to 66.7%.[206] The same is true for shortened policy length, and insurers are cognizant of the need to do annual risk reassessments to account for the massive swings in regulation, the climate, and “overall exposure.”[207] This is similar to the way that private insurers have refused or withdrawn coverage in areas where risk has increased, and underwriting has become unpredictable, like in climate-vulnerable states such as Florida and California.[208]
The streamlined EIS may accelerate permitting in the short term, but it also likely undermines the informational infrastructure that has long existed.[209] It is possible that the increase in insurance costs may offset any savings achieved through streamlined environmental review.[210] As insurers recalibrate, the cost of this uncertainty is likely to be shouldered by the same developers that deregulation purports to benefit.[211]
E. Changes to Due Diligence Infrastructure in Private Lending
As is the case for insurance, NEPA’s procedural framework also functioned as a necessary component of lender due diligence for infrastructure and energy projects.[212] While some funding for projects that are subject to NEPA review comes from the federal government, a substantial amount of funding also comes from private lenders.[213] Projects that are subject to NEPA review often involve, at minimum, millions of dollars in capital.[214] In providing these loans for projects, lenders that provide capital for projects rely on EIS and EA documentation, and the data incorporated in these documents, to assess regulatory, environmental, and litigation risk.[215]
Like with insurance, the EIS is designed to reduce information asymmetry by providing a standardized, government-validated record of foreseeable environmental impacts and agency responses, which provides lenders with information that is necessary to fully evaluate lending risk.[216] Public enforcement procedures, such as EA and EIS review, made violations of environmental laws more visible through mechanisms like inspection and public disclosures.[217] The upshot is that the loss of the EA and EIS means that private lenders lose their ability to price environmental risk, their ability to draft targeted environmental covenants, and their ability to detect violations.[218] If there is a NEPA violation, remedies can include a total work stoppage via injunction “while a retroactive assessment is performed—a nightmare for project finance.”[219]
In the alternative, construction companies that rely on both federal and private capital may make public–private partnerships more attractive “by reducing environmental-review uncertainty and the litigation risk that has consistently discouraged private investors.”[220] If public–private partnerships are able to have lower due diligence costs and fewer potential challenges and litigation, this could lead to clearer timelines and reduced regulatory risk.[221] In turn, there is a chance that the public–private partnership grows in the wake of these regulatory changes.[222]
In the absence of robust NEPA documentation and EIS review, lenders are also required to do their own independent environmental assessments, find outside consultants, or rely on alternate studies of varying quality and credibility of a project.[223] Privatization of due diligence operates as a solution for this information asymmetry, but it in turn increases transaction costs, makes it harder for these same projects to get funding, and introduces uncertainty into risk pricing. In turn, this can ultimately increase project costs overall.[224]
Alternatively, lenders could respond by pricing risk conservatively by increasing interest rates, tightening financial agreements, expanding contract covenants, and demanding stronger indemnities or parent guarantees.[225] While cutting “red tape” of NEPA at the agency level may seem like a win, it may raise the cost of capital overall by shifting compliance burdens onto private actors as they try to replicate the same level of due diligence they had during the CEQ–NEPA era.[226]
F. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms
The dismantling of NEPA does not eliminate environmental review but instead redistributes this review to other laws.[227] If there is no uniform federal procedural framework, states or other federal statutes are increasingly positioned to fill the gap with their own environmental review.[228] In every way, “NEPA acts as an umbrella process,” and compliance with other laws is still a requirement.[229]
States such as California, New York, and Washington already have environmental policy acts that mirror NEPA and are likely to expand their scope or enforcement intensity as federal oversight recedes.[230] In fact, fifteen states already have their own version of NEPA that could step up in the absence of these existing procedural safeguards.[231]
For agencies that operate on the national scale, this fragmentation is likely to be more costly. Rather than navigating a single, standardized federal process, developers are now forced to consider the differences in standards between states and state review, each with distinct triggers, substantive emphases, and litigation quirks.[232] A project that spans several states may face varying sets of obligations or timelines.[233] Plaintiffs can strategically invoke a State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) process to delay or derail development even where federal review has been streamlined.[234]
Compliance under a patchwork of state regimes is often more expensive, less predictable, and more adversarial than compliance under a centralized federal process.[235] This could mean that agencies or firms may choose to only do projects in certain states, firms could be forced to retain state-specific counsel, or projects may be forced to commission duplicative environmental studies.[236] In this respect, NEPA’s rollback may substitute a single federal process with fifty separate ones, which in turn undermines the very efficiency and predictability that deregulation purports to achieve.[237]
Alternative enforcement is not only limited to state law—other federal laws can present permitting challenges. Federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the Clean Water Act have permitting and environmental obligations that can still serve as enforcement mechanisms and can independently constrain development.[238] Even projects that are designed to avoid NEPA-level review could still trigger obligations under these statutes.[239]
G. Diminished Public Engagement and Transparency
At its core, NEPA functioned as a forum for public participation.[240] Through a structured forty-five-day notice-and-comment process, community groups and affected stakeholders could review draft EIS and provide agencies with comments about a proposed plan.[241] The public participation process allowed ordinary citizens to understand what a federal agency was proposing, offer alternatives, and provide comments on the agency’s analysis of the environmental effects of the proposed action.[242] But as agencies streamline the EIS review process and rely on categorical exclusions, the opportunity for public engagement is narrowed.[243] The rollback of NEPA threatens to dismantle community involvement in the permitting process, to the extent that working-class families on the front lines of climate crisis are divested of the ability to provide input on what happens in their own backyards.[244]
Some agencies have begun posting final EAs and EISs without circulating drafts for public comment by compressing timelines.[245] The Department of the Interior (DOI), for example, has moved its public comment requirements out from its binding requirements and into nonbinding guidance, leaving it so that the DOI bureaus now have broad discretion over whether to publish draft environmental documents for public input at all.[246] The Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a model of “strategic engagement” rather than default participation to emphasize “efficiency” over “uniform participation.”[247] Under the DOE’s new rules, public solicitation must avoid steps that do not improve efficiency, but it does not clearly require that draft EAs be released for public review.[248] In contrast, the Department of Defense has generally retained more traditional notice-and-comment policies.[249] Ultimately, even though public participation has not fully disappeared, it has become uneven and contingent on agency priorities.[250] This, in many ways, operates outside of the purpose of NEPA’s democratic participation core because it forces citizens to be aware of every agency’s comment policies, if they are able to comment at all.[251] NEPA’s public process historically allowed agencies and project proponents to surface concerns early, in line with the statute’s mandate to “inform the public about their decision making.”[252] Rather than a civilized form of discourse, alternative forms of opposition are often less predictable, which could be more disruptive to project timelines and costs.[253]
V. Conclusion
Over the past fifty years, NEPA has functioned as the pause button for federal projects. It has required agencies to take a “hard look” before proceeding with their projects. The CEQ’s regulations translated NEPA’s short but broad statutory language into a procedural framework that was adhered to by project developers for decades.
The rescission of CEQ’s regulations, judicial rejection of CEQ’s rulemaking authority, and the changes to interpretive power and deference between the agencies and the courts have unraveled the procedures that have long made NEPA what it was.
While changes to the NEPA review process may aspire to generate agency and project efficiency, faster permitting, lower costs, and fewer delays, a valid counterargument, as discussed, is that risk shifts from one entity to another. Thinner records, shortened and cursory environmental review, and uneven procedures do not make environmental uncertainty disappear, but rather push this uncertainty into markets such as insurance underwriting and project finance. These changes to due diligence have implications that include a reduction in access to capital and tangible increases to transaction costs.
In conclusion, the changes to NEPA undermine the very purpose Congress had for the statute. When NEPA compliance varies agency by agency, this threatens the national coherence that NEPA was meant to provide. That instability complicates long-term planning and investment decisions for industry, agencies, and individuals. Moreover, the diminished public participation risks turning NEPA from a democratic safeguard into something optional which is offered or withheld depending on agency priorities. The environmental governance that those in the 1970s were feverish for, in many ways, has become a mere paperweight.
NEPA is still good law, but it has been stripped in a way that makes it work nothing like it has throughout its fifty-year history. While the “judicial oak” that Justice Kavanaugh described has not yet tipped over, the Administration and the courts have taken a few good swings at it so far. It remains to be seen whether future administrations or Congress will advocate for a more uniform framework. Perhaps it will be written on the paper that is made from the judicial oak once it is cut down. Here begins a new chapter of environmental review.
Jake Joseph
Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1514 (2025).
Chris Thomas et al., Will NEPA Reform Actually Work This Time?, Nat. Res. & Env’t, Winter 2026, at 30, 30.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h. Heream Yang, Note, NEPA’s Environmental Vision: Close, but Not Quite, 42 Va. Env’t L.J. 120, 122–23 (2024).
143 Cong. Rec. H1443, S3102 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Chair Kathleen McGinty); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (concluding that “NEPA merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action”).
42 U.S.C. § 4342.
See Exec. Order No. 11991, Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 25, 1977); Council on Env’t Quality, Exec. Off. of the President, A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA: Having Your Voice Heard 5–6 (2021) [hereinafter A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA].
See Jay C. Johnson & Megan L. Algya, CEQ Formally Rescinds Its NEPA Implementing Regulations, Venable LLP (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2026/01/ceq-formally-rescinds-its-nepa-implementing [https://perma.cc/8QGQ-M5XT\] (noting that after the CEQ implementing regulations were rescinded, federal agencies quickly removed several of these long-standing bureaucratic hurdles with the goal of speeding up the review process). Even though NEPA created the CEQ, NEPA does not itself grant the CEQ authority to create binding regulations. That authority comes from a President Carter Executive Order (EO) issued in 1977. This same EO also forced federal agencies to abide by CEQ regulations. Id.
Remarks by President Trump on Proposed National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, White House (Jan. 9, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-proposed-national-environmental-policy-act-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/35ZN-RW8M\].
Emily Gardner, Plan to End NEPA’s “Regulatory Reign of Terror” Is Finalized, Eos: Rsch. & Devs. (Jan. 8, 2026), https://eos.org/research-and-developments/plan-to-end-nepas-regulatory-reign-of-terror-is-finalized [https://perma.cc/XQ54-ZD72\]; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14318, Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure, 90 Fed. Reg. 35385, 35385–86 (July 28, 2025) (describing that to strengthen the United States’ position in the AI race and to build additional data centers, President Trump has tried several methods to reduce or remove NEPA review timelines for data centers via categorical exclusion or by exempting them as not “major [f]ederal action[s]”); Categorical Exclusion for Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 91 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4550 (Feb. 2, 2026) (describing another example from early 2026, where a categorical exclusion was created for advanced nuclear reactors).
See discussion infra Parts II–III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
“Environmental Crisis” in the Late 1960s, Mich. in the World & the Env’t Just. Hist. Lab., https://michiganintheworld.history.lsa.umich.edu/environmentalism/exhibits/show/main_exhibit/origins/-environmental-crisis--in-the- [https://perma.cc/47WL-WA22\] (last visited July 18, 2026); Denis Binder, NEPA at 50: Standing Tall, 23 Chap. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2020).
The 1969 Cuyahoga River Fire, Nat’l Park Serv. (May 3, 2022), https://www.nps.gov/articles/story-of-the-fire.htm [https://perma.cc/8LLK-9EV9\]; Binder, supra note 15, at 5–6.
Richard Lazarus & Sara Zdeb, Environmental Law & Politics, A.B.A. (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-19/issue-1/environmental-law-politics/ [https://perma.cc/2UG6-RU6Q\].
Meir Rinde, Richard Nixon and the Rise of American Environmentalism, Sci. Hist. Inst. (June 2, 2017), https://www.sciencehistory.org/stories/magazine/richard-nixon-and-the-rise-of-american-environmentalism/ [https://perma.cc/6QXA-T5ZH\]. Between 1965 and 1970, the number of Americans who thought that environmental problems such as air and water pollution were a problem rose from about 33% to roughly 70%. And, the number of Sierra Club memberships tripled to 100,000 during this period. See id.
Binder, supra note 15, at 6. In spite of his infamous legacy surrounding Watergate and subsequent resignation, President Nixon was a staunch supporter of the National Parks. Rinde, supra note 18. In fact, Nixon went so far as to assert that the National Parks “are part of the birthright of every American.” See Will Walkey & Kamila Kudelska, Why Did the Endangered Species Act First Pass, and How Is It Doing?, Wyo. Pub. Media (Oct. 20, 2023, at 16:56 MT), https://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/open-spaces/2023-10-20/why-did-the-endangered-species-act-first-pass-and-how-is-it-doing [https://perma.cc/DYB9-NDN8\].
Lazarus & Zdeb, supra note 17. It was the first of a wave of environmental laws passed in the 1970s under Nixon. Subsequent legislation included the Clean Air Act passed in 1970, the Clean Water Act passed in 1972, and the Endangered Species Act passed in 1973. See id.; Endangered Species Act Milestones: 1970s, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., https://www.fws.gov/esa50/our-history/1970s [https://perma.cc/36K5-QSNE\] (last visited Aug. 24, 2026).
42 U.S.C. § 4332. See Yang, supra note 3, at 155; Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1511 (2025).
See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 801, 805–06 (1977) (“The enactment of NEPA was predicated upon a remarkable consensus of opinion that the physical environment in the United States was rapidly deteriorating and that the federal agencies were doing more to exacerbate this process than to impede it.”).
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
42 U.S.C. § 4332.
Binder, supra note 15, at 9–10 (finding that NEPA § 102, which houses the meat of the procedural requirements for NEPA review, is less than 500 words in total).
A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA, supra note 6, at 4 (noting the NEPA review process is not limited to actions by federal agencies; for example, a private company’s request to a federal agency for a permit may require the agency to conduct NEPA review).
Kristen Hite, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11932, National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Review and Remedies (2025) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11932 [https://perma.cc/HE23-RBBU\].
See Elaine L. Chao, Governors Meeting: Infrastructure and Urban Policy Development, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/governors-meeting-infrastructure-and-urban-policy-development [https://perma.cc/YDN6-BN9Z\].
Olympic Hot Springs Road Access/Environmental Assessment, Nat’l Park Serv., https://parkplanning.nps.gov/projectHome.cfm?projectId=84555 [https://perma.cc/3LTL-DYQ3\] (last visited Aug. 15, 2026); Project Impact Evaluation Process & National Environmental Policy Act, Nat’l Park Serv. (May 27, 2025), https://www.nps.gov/dscw/nr-project-impact-evaluation-nepa.htm [https://perma.cc/WF64-YWDQ\].
A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA, supra note 6, at 5.
See Madalyn Brown Feiger, Environmental Challenges Seek to Block Renewable Projects, Winston & Strawn (Sep. 1, 2021), https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/winston-and-the-legal-environment/environmental-challenges-seek-to-block-renewable-projects [https://perma.cc/KD7R-RYHV\]. Legislation from the Biden Administration such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act significantly favored the development of clean energy because of a significant increase in federal renewable funding. This naturally resulted in an increase in the number of published EAs and EISs for renewable energy projects, and concomitantly, litigation about these renewable energy projects. Aidan Mackenzie & Santi Ruiz, No, NEPA Really Is a Problem for Clean Energy, Inst. for Progress (Aug. 17, 2023), https://ifp.org/no-nepa-really-is-a-problem-for-clean-energy/ [https://perma.cc/W4DJ-E3J9\].
Feiger, supra note 31; Arthur G. Fraas et al., Taking Green Energy Projects to Court: NEPA Review and Court Challenges to Renewable Energy 7, 10, Res. for the Future (2025), https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/taking-green-energy-projects-to-court-nepa-review-and-court-challenges-to-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/E3E7-WQWX\].
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
Siena Fouse, How the CEQ Lost Its Rulemaking Authority, Sandbar, Apr. 2025, at 4, 4.
A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA, supra note 6, at 5.
Exec. Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 25, 1977); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 357 (1979).
Andrus, 442 U.S. at 357 (quoting Exec. Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 25, 1977)).
Under NEPA review, there are three levels of analysis once a federal action is proposed. A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA, supra note 6, at 5, 10–16. The first option is that the federal action is considered a “categorical exclusion” from NEPA review, which happens when the action normally does not have any significant effect on the human environment. Id. at 10. The second option requires an agency to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA), which is a concise report which describes the proposed action, includes a discussion of significant environmental effects, and considers alternatives. Id. Upon review of the EA, if the reviewing agency determines that the proposed projects will likely involve significant environmental impacts, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared. Id. The requirements for an EIS are significantly more detailed than the requirements for an EA. Id. at 12. To spell out the process: First, the agency must publish a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register, which initiates a scoping phase to identify significant issues and invite a forty-five-day public comment period following publication of the draft document. Id. at 13. Then the agency must prepare a Draft EIS for public comment, a Final EIS that addresses those comments, and finally there is a Record of Decision that explains the agency’s final choice and any planned mitigation efforts. Id. at 13, 15–16.
Id. at 22; Jennifer Jeffers, Jacob E. Aronson & Zachary D. Rego, The CEQ Has No Clothes: The End of CEQ’s NEPA Regulations and the Future of NEPA Practice, Allen Matkins (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.allenmatkins.com/real-ideas/the-ceq-has-no-clothes-the-end-of-ceqs-nepa-regulations-and-the-future-of-nepa-practice.html [https://perma.cc/H6XS-Y6WH\].
Jeffers, Aronson & Rego, supra note 39.
Edward Boling, Laura Zagar & Thomas Jensen, CEQ Regulations Replaced by Guidance for a Year of Living in Uncertainty, Ashurst Perkins Coie: Blog (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.ashurstperkinscoie.com/en/insights/ceq-regulations-replaced-by-guidance-for-a-year-of-living-in-uncertainty/ [https://perma.cc/KTM8-8CQW\]; Jeffers, Aronson & Rego, supra note 39 (finding that for the past fifty years, both federal agencies and federal courts have generally been accepting of the CEQ’s authority to issue rules without much objection).
Jeffers, Aronson & Rego, supra note 39.
Kristen Hite, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R48717, Judicial Review and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 6 (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48717 [https://perma.cc/FWV9-T9G4\].
Id. at 17, 20–21.
Exploring the Hard-Look Doctrine: A Deep Dive into Administrative Law, US Legal Forms, https://legal-resources.uslegalforms.com/h/hard-look-doctrine [https://perma.cc/R7XG-96U6\] (last visited July 18, 2026).
As the following text within this section will outline, this is certainly true of the federal courts in the 1970s. Oddly, since NEPA’s enactment, SCOTUS has issued eighteen NEPA opinions and the pro-environment plaintiffs have yet to win. See Richard Lazarus, Repealing Environmental Law’s Magna Carta Amidst the Devolution of Environmental Law, 104 Tex. L. rev. online 36, 36–37, 55–56 (2025).
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1128–29.
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 55–56.
Id. at 56; Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1114.
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 56; see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created such a ‘common law.’ . . . Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA’s success.”).
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1128.
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 533, 558 (1978); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352–53 (1989).
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352–53.
Id. at 349–51.
Id. at 350.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
Id. at 767.
Id.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20–22 (2008); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).
Supreme Court Determines No Presumption for Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases, Crowell & Moring (June 21, 2010), https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/supreme-court-determines-no-presumption-for-injunctive-relief-in-environmental-cases [https://perma.cc/H53C-X9VJ\].
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 & n.21 (1976); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 229 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706; then Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21).
Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409–10.
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351–52.
See also Nicholas C. Yost, The Background and History of NEPA, in The NEPA Litigation Guide 1, 13 (Albert M. Ferlo, Karin P. Sheldon & Mark Squillace eds., 2d ed. 2012) (explaining that efforts to ensure the adequacy of environmental review documents led to excessive delay in the NEPA process).
Alejandro Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, NEPA: The Accepted Lies and Mistakes About This Critical Environmental Law, Ctr. for Progressive Reform: CPR Blog (June 30, 2025), https://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/nepa-accepted-lies-mistakes-about-critical-environmental-law/ [https://perma.cc/9Z55-QKR5\].
Richard Frank, Commemorating the National Environmental Policy Act’s 50th Anniversary, Legal Planet (Jan. 1, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/01/01/commemorating-the-national-environmental-policy-acts-50th-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/PGB3-G2N6\].
These critics are not wrong. NEPA is in fact one of the most litigated pieces of federal legislation ever created. Hite, supra note 27; see also Emily Joiner & Arthur G. Fraas, Delays to Wind and Solar Energy Projects: Permitting and Litigation Are Not the Only Obstacles, Resources, Fall 2025, at 30, 34, 39 (finding that although NEPA litigation delayed some solar and wind projects, most projects requiring EIS review proceeded without court challenges).
Mark C. Rutzick, Regul. Transparency Project of the Federalist Soc’y, A Long and Winding Road: How the National Environmental Policy Act Has Become the Most Expensive and Least Effective Environmental Law in the History of the United States, and How to Fix It 4–5 (Oct. 16, 2018), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Energy-Environment-Working-Group-Paper-National-Environmental-Policy-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CBG-ASUX\] (noting that the basis for so much of the NEPA procedural hurdle comes from the CEQ Regulations which fill up “30 pages of the Federal Register”).
Id. at 4, 6.
Council on Env’t Quality, NEPA Modernization, White House Archives (Aug. 15, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ceq/nepa-modernization/ [https://perma.cc/VU5L-E9R7\]; Council on Env’t Quality, Exec. Off. of the President, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations (1981) (explaining as much in question 35).
Thomas et al., supra note 2, at 30 (noting that the delay in EIS movement has been in part due to agency and project developer fears of litigation under the APA).
Exec. Order No. 13807, Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, 3 C.F.R. 371, 371–73 (2018).
Brandon Tuck et al., The New NEPA: Federal Agencies Overhaul Procedures for Environmental Reviews, Vinson & Elkins LLP (July 11, 2025), https://www.velaw.com/insights/the-new-nepa-federal-agencies-overhaul-procedures-for-environmental-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/TC6S-8MPK\]; Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43309 (July 16, 2020).
Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43305, 43306, 43323, 43326, 43343.
Tuoya Saren, Using AI in NEPA Review: Legal Challenges and Judicial Scrutiny, 55 Env’t L. Rep. 10596, 10600 (2025).
Exec. Order No. 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021).
Id.
Yang, supra note 3, at 125.
David Torrance, Magna Carta: Does It Still Matter?, UK Parliament: House of Commons Libr. (Sep. 24, 2024), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/magna-carta-does-it-still-matter/ [https://perma.cc/F5DW-F4A6\].
See infra Part III.
Jay C. Johnson & Tyler G. Welti, NEPA Amendments: Highlights and Practical Implications, Venable LLP (June 8, 2023), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2023/06/nepa-amendments-highlights-and-practical [https://perma.cc/HAN2-ZAEF\].
Rebecca Hays Barho & Svend Brandt-Erichsen, National Environmental Policy Act Regulations: Phase 2 – Streamlining NEPA Review, Nossaman LLP (May 23, 2024), https://www.nossaman.com/newsroom-insights-national-environmental-policy-act-regulations-phase-2-streamlining-nepa-review [https://perma.cc/XMQ3-BEG8\].
See Johnson & Welti, supra note 83.
Id.
See M. Benjamin Cowan et al., President Trump Moves to Repeal NEPA Regulations, Troutman Pepper Locke (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.troutman.com/insights/president-trump-moves-to-repeal-nepa-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/9QSP-A949\].
See Exec. Order No. 14154, Unleashing American Energy, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353, 8355 (Jan. 29, 2025); see also Understanding the Impact of Executive Orders, Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs (Mar. 14, 2025), https://www.nspe.org/nspe-advocacy/latest-news/understanding-the-impact-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/QP8R-QQ4F\] (highlighting the fickle nature of law based on EOs). The change in administrations can be devastating to law that is not rooted in law that is made by either Article I via Congress or by binding precedent from Article III by the federal Judiciary.
Removal of National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations, 90 Fed. Reg. 10610, 10612–13 (Feb. 25, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–1508); John H. Strom & Peter A. Tomasi, Trump Administration Rescinds Council on Environmental Quality’s Guidelines, Creating Widespread Uncertainty for the National Environmental Policy Act Compliance by Energy and Infrastructure Projects, Foley & Lardner LLP (Feb. 25, 2025), https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2025/02/trump-administration-rescinds-council-environmental-quality-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/X4YC-VHNU\].
Jeffrey A. Knight, Ashleigh K. Myers & Jillian Marullo, CEQ Finalizes Rescission of NEPA Implementing Regulations, Pillsbury Law (Jan. 16, 2026), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/ceq-rescission-nepa-implementing-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/99TS-KELJ\].
See, e.g., Taite R. McDonald et al., DOE Issues New NEPA Procedures Aimed at Streamlining Environmental Reviews, Holland & Knight: Energy Tech. Blog (Aug. 1, 2025), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/08/doe-issues-new-nepa-procedures-aimed-at-streamlining [https://perma.cc/NEX8-6LCV\] (explaining how the DOE is implementing its own guidance in the wake of no binding regulations from the CEQ).
Knight, Myers & Marullo, supra note 90.
See Johnson & Algya, supra note 7.
Rutzick, supra note 70, at 17.
Id.
Pamela Goodwin, Andrew T. Bockis & John R. Dixon, The Three Things You Should Know About the Council on Environmental Quality’s Removal of Its National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations, Saul Ewing LLP (Mar. 5, 2025), https://www.saul.com/insights/alert/three-things-you-should-know-about-council-environmental-qualitys-removal-its [https://perma.cc/AW2X-VE8P\].
Hite, supra note 27.
See infra Part IV.
Goodwin, Bockis & Dixon, supra note 96.
Marin Audubon Soc’y v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 121 F.4th 902, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2024); see D.C. Circuit Answers Unasked Question to Invalidate 50 Years of Environmental Regulatory Framework as Ultra Vires, Sidley Austin LLP (Nov. 13, 2024), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2024/11/dc-court-of-appeals-answers-unasked-question-to-invalidate-50-years-of-environmental-regulatory [https://perma.cc/TC7B-QRPK\]; see also Neal McAliley, NEPA: New Executive Order and Court Rulings Create Major Uncertainties for Compliance and Litigation, Carlton Fields (Feb. 14, 2025), https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2025/nepa-new-executive-order-and-court-rulings-create-major-uncertainties-for-compliance-and-litigation [https://perma.cc/Q5YB-HD6G\] (suggesting that some judges on the D.C. Circuit believe that because the holding did not turn on whether the CEQ has the authority to issue binding regulations, it is merely dictum and can be ignored).
D.C. Circuit Answers Unasked Question to Invalidate 50 Years of Environmental Regulatory Framework as Ultra Vires, supra note 100.
Marin Audubon Soc’y, 121 F.4th at 908; D.C. Circuit Answers Unasked Question to Invalidate 50 Years of Environmental Regulatory Framework as Ultra Vires, supra note 100.
Marin Audubon Soc’y, 121 F.4th at 908; see also D.C. Circuit Answers Unasked Question to Invalidate 50 Years of Environmental Regulatory Framework as Ultra Vires, supra note 100 (arguing that CEQ regulations are ultra vires and unenforceable, in spite of the fact that the court recognized that the Supreme Court has said that CEQ’s regulations are “entitled to substantial deference” in Andrus v. Sierra Club. The court dismissed this finding because it found that it was not rooted in any legal analysis, and second, as discussed in Section III.C, following the overturning of Chevron, deference to agency decisions is no longer valid.).
Marin Audubon Soc’y, 121 F.4th at 914.
Iowa v. Council on Env’t Quality, 765 F. Supp. 3d 859, 883–84 (D.N.D. 2025).
Id.
McAliley, supra note 100.
Id.
Id.
Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1512–13 (2025). To briefly summarize, the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition proposed an eighty-eight-mile railroad line which would connect the Uinta Basin in Utah to the national rail network. Id. at 1508. This would allow for oil from the Uinta Basin to be transported to the Gulf Coast, which is abundant in refineries. Id. The United States Surface Transportation Board (STB), as the overseeing federal agency, was responsible for an environmental review of the project. The STB then produced a 3,600-page EIS under the old NEPA rules that did not have page limits. Id. The agency then approved the project and found that any economic benefits outweighed environmental impacts. Id. at 1509. Eagle County then challenged the STB decision because they thought the EIS was insufficient for not considering “reasonably foreseeable” upstream impacts (increased oil drilling in Utah) and downstream impacts (oil refining and greenhouse gas emissions on the Gulf Coast). Id. at 1508–09. SCOTUS reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that agencies are only required to consider environmental effects that are directly and proximately caused by the project and fall within the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 1510–12. The Court also held that courts must afford agencies substantial deference in their NEPA analysis, which was not done at the appellate level. Id. at 1508–12.
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1513.
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 56–57.
Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1514 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1512–13. But see Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024).
Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1511–12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).
Id. at 1512 (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
Id. at 1513 (clarifying deference to agency decision-making so long as decisions fall within a “broad zone of reasonableness”); see also Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273 (“Chevron is overruled.”).
Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1517–18.
Id. at 1515–16.
Robyn Griggs Lawrence, What NEPA Rollbacks Mean for Local Projects, Smart Cities Dive (Aug. 11, 2025), https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/what-nepa-rollbacks-mean-local-projects-climate-justice-alliance/757316/ [https://perma.cc/4YE4-5CDE\].
Id.
Marin Audubon Soc’y v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 121 F.4th 902, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 876 (8th Cir. 2013).
Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1511–12.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1511.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024).
Id. at 2254.
Id. Like the CEQ did for NEPA, the Chevron framework provided agencies with predictability and the ability to rely on agency expertise.
Id. at 2273.
Id. at 2257 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (alteration in original).
Id. at 2256, 2273.
Id. at 2273.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273.
Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2309 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Jennifer L. Hernandez et al., Permitting Reform in Action: CEQ Updates Roadmap for Agency NEPA Compliance, Holland & Knight (Oct. 24, 2025), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/10/permitting-reform-in-action-ceq-updates-roadmap-for-agency [https://perma.cc/L53N-G6MR\]; see also Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act Guidance, 90 Fed. Reg. 47734 (Oct. 2, 2025) (noting no comprehensive coordination effort predating the September 2025 guidance).
Hernandez et al., supra note 139.
Id.
See Katherine R. Scarlett, Council on Env’t Quality, Memorandum for Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies: Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act 3, 7 (Sep. 29, 2025), https://nepa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Agency-NEPA-Implementation-Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGC5-NNU8\].
Id.
Robert M. Smith et al., More Federal Agencies Streamline NEPA Procedures to Expedite Review and Permitting, K&L Gates (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.klgates.com/More-Federal-Agencies-Streamline-NEPA-Procedures-to-Expedite-Review-and-Permitting-8-5-2025 [https://perma.cc/LHR9-LV3H\].
Neal McAliley, NEPA: Are New Developments Actually Speeding Federal Permit Reviews?, Carlton Fields (Aug. 13, 2025), https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2025/nepa-are-new-developments-actually-speeding-federal-permit-reviews [https://perma.cc/52H5-RJHP\].
See Goodwin, Bockis & Dixon, supra note 96.
Smith et al., supra note 144.
Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1517–18 (2025).
Jim Noe et al., DOI Implements Unprecedented 14-Day NEPA Review Process Under National Energy Emergency EO, Holland & Knight (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/04/doi-implements-unprecedented-14-day-nepa-review-process [https://perma.cc/732F-P3G7\].
For context, an EA traditionally takes at least a year to complete. See id.
Id.
Council on Env’t Quality, Exec. Off. of the President, Environmental Impact Statement Timelines (2010–2018) (June 12, 2020), https://nepa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CEQ_EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBG3-KHTL\].
Smith et al., supra note 144; Exec. Order No. 14318, 90 Fed. Reg. 35385 (July 28, 2025).
Council on Env’t Quality, supra note 152.
Hite, supra note 27.
Exploring the Hard-Look Doctrine: A Deep Dive into Administrative Law, supra note 45; see also Noe et al., supra note 149 (describing DOI procedures compressing environmental assessments to fourteen days and EIS to twenty-eight days).
See infra Section IV.210B.
See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 144.
See Hite, supra note 27.
Exec. Order No. 14318, § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 35385.
Id. § 5, at 35386.
Hite, supra note 27.
Id.
Heather McPherron & Kristen Hite, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12960, Council on Environmental Quality Rescinds NEPA Regulations: Legal and Policy Considerations (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12960 [https://perma.cc/8RUP-APY3\]; Hite, supra note 27.
Hite, supra note 43 (noting that some frequently litigated issues include claims that a federal agency was inadequate in its preparation of documentation, “mischaracterized the significance of an action’s environmental impact, and failed to adequately consider relevant information or comments about a proposed action,” many of which were former CEQ regulations).
John Rousakis & John D. Renneisen, Supreme Court Limits Judicial Review in NEPA Cases, O’Melveny (June 3, 2025), https://www.omm.com/insights/alerts-publications/supreme-court-limits-judicial-review-in-nepa-cases/ [https://perma.cc/5HZU-3E35\]; see also Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1517 (2025) (holding that agencies need not study indirect or downstream effects of projects separate in time or place from the project at hand).
See supra Part III; see also Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1511–12 (holding that courts must afford agencies substantial deference when determining whether an agency’s EIS complied with NEPA).
See supra Part III; Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1514.
Seven Cnty., 145 S. Ct. at 1514.
See, e.g., Complaint at 20–21, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 3:26-cv-00866 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2026), https://biologicaldiversity.org/programs/environmental_health/pdfs/USDA-IFR-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA39-CFC9\]; Rylan DiGiacomo-Rapp, Suit Claims Trump Admin Snubbed NEPA Public Input Regs, E&E News (Jan. 28, 2026, at 16:14 ET), https://www.eenews.net/articles/suit-claims-trump-admin-snubbed-nepa-public-input-regs/ [https://perma.cc/ZD4M-HKEL\].
Complaint at 7, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:26-cv-00866.
Hannah Northey, ‘Test Case’ for NEPA: Fast-Tracked Mine Reviews Fuel Outcry, E&E News (Oct. 21, 2025, at 13:42 ET), https://www.eenews.net/articles/test-case-for-nepa-fast-tracked-mine-reviews-fuel-outcry/ [https://perma.cc/TDR3-QP4B\].
Emily Bass & Emma Kovak, Can Sidestepping NEPA “Unleash Innovation” at USDA?, Breakthrough Inst. (July 25, 2025), https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food-agriculture-environment/will-sidestepping-nepa-unleash-innovation-at-usda [https://perma.cc/2277-5ZAC\].
Complaint at 25, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 3:26-cv-00866; Bass & Kovak, supra note 173.
Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353, 8355 (Jan. 29, 2025); Scarlett, supra note 142.
Fact Sheet: President Trump Is Delivering Historic Permitting Wins Across the Federal Government, White House (June 30, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-trump-is-delivering-historic-permitting-wins-across-the-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/H9LS-W5CF\].
Lauren A. Behan, Supreme Court Cuts Down ‘Judicial Oak’ of NEPA; Energy and Infrastructure Developments Projected to Increase, Goldberg Segalla (June 18, 2025), https://www.goldbergsegalla.com/blog/environmental-law-monitor/nepa/supreme-court-cuts-down-judicial-oak-of-nepa-energy-and-infrastructure-developments-projected-to-increase/ [https://perma.cc/4FDN-CAM5\].
Id.
Id.
Cynthia L. Taub, How Fast Is the FAST Act?: An Analysis of Reforms Streamlining the NEPA Review Process, Legal Backgrounder, Apr. 1, 2016, at 1, 1, https://www.steptoe.com/a/web/6145/WashingtonLegalFoundation.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU2Y-EJVM\].
Zahra Hirji & Ruth Liao, Big Oil Urges Trump to Rethink Plan to End Emissions Reporting, Bloomberg L. (Oct. 23, 2025, at 6:00 CT), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/big-oil-urges-trump-to-rethink-plan-to-end-emissions-reporting [https://perma.cc/8D86-QBXM\].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maeve Allsup, The Risks of DOE Sidestepping NEPA, Latitude Media (Feb. 11, 2026), https://www.latitudemedia.com/news/the-risks-of-doe-sidestepping-nepa/ [https://perma.cc/Z4ZS-48WX\].
Id.
Hirji & Liao, supra note 181.
Tiffany Middleton, What Is an Environmental Impact Statement?, A.B.A.: Pub. Educ. (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-an-environmental-impact-statement/ [https://perma.cc/9NDL-R3QE\].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Marcel Akhame & Xan Fishman, NEPA, Judicial Review, and SPEED Act Roundtable Takeaways, Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr. (Nov. 19, 2025), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/issue-brief/nepa-judicial-review-and-speed-act-roundtable-takeaways/ [https://perma.cc/ZT5D-XJJ4\]; Chris Davis, Regulatory Uncertainty Clouds Environmental Liability Insurance Market, Ins. Bus. Mag. (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/environmental/regulatory-uncertainty-clouds-environmental-liability-insurance-market-530099.aspx [https://perma.cc/2E5K-HN8B\].
Insurance Coverage for Environmental Liabilities, Perkins Coie (July 25, 2024), https://web.archive.org/web/20250318172034/https://perkinscoie.com/insurance-coverage-environmental-liabilities [https://perma.cc/26F8-C38T\].
Middleton, supra note 189; see Melody Bell, Anthony Dietz & Julia Tell, Construction Insurance Pricing: What Determines the Cost of Insurance?, Procore: Libr. (Sep. 5, 2024), https://www.procore.com/library/construction-insurance-pricing [https://perma.cc/9TQY-YYRG\].
Bell, Dietz & Tell, supra note 195.
Middleton, supra note 189.
Id.
Allsup, supra note 186.
Id.
Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1518 (2025).
Behan, supra note 177.
Id.
. Alberto Monti, Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Environmental Risks and Insurance: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Insurance in the Management of Environment-Related Risks 17 (2003), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2003/10/environmental-risks-and-insurance_g1gh3adb/9789264105522-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q4M-SRKW\] (“Even if uncertainty is not so critical to impede risk insurability, it still has an impact on the cost of insurance . . . .”).
Davis, supra note 193.
Id.
Id.
Whitney Orloff & Hadley Brown, Risky Business: Insurance in the Era of Climate Change, Env’t & Energy Study Inst.: Briefings (May 6, 2025), https://www.eesi.org/briefings/view/050625insurance [https://perma.cc/F84G-2JQ2\].
Davis, supra note 193.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., WIFIA Federal Requirements, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wifia/wifia-federal-requirements [https://perma.cc/93ZZ-GTM4\] (Sep. 9, 2025) (explaining that an EPA program explicitly requires environmental review including NEPA determinations as part of the loan process. Borrowers must provide existing environmental documentation, such as environmental assessments or consultations, to support the environmental review that takes place before a loan is obligated. Thus, the presence and quality of NEPA documents can directly affect the availability and structuring of federal financing.).
See Christy Rivera & Christine Brozynski, Data Center Financing Structures, Norton Rose Fulbright: Project Fin. NewsWire (June 11, 2025), https://www.projectfinance.law/publications/2025/june/data-center-financing-structures/ [https://perma.cc/QA7E-P9DQ\] (asserting that AI data centers primarily come from private credit, specifically because “[t]hese financings have access to capital markets, commercial banks, permanent capital and the private credit markets”).
See, e.g., id. (finding that “[d]ata center financings in the United States were $30 billion in 2024 and are expected to reach $60 billion” in 2025).
Environmental laws, like NEPA, increase lender risk in two ways. The first is through higher default risk because borrowers must comply with objectives such as environmental regulations, and compliance itself can be costly. The second way is via direct liability risk in that lenders may become responsible for cleanup costs that exceed the value of the loan. See Eleanor Erdevig, Lender Liability Under Environmental Law, 49, Chi. Fed Letter (Sep. 1991), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/1991/september-49 [https://perma.cc/VR9A-U7QU\].
Zack Rieger, The Importance of Environmental Due Diligence for Lenders, ADEC Innovations: Res. (May 13, 2024), https://www.adec-innovations.com/blogs/the-importance-of-environmental-due-diligence-for-lenders [https://perma.cc/XX7T-B9VW\].
Stacey Choy et al., Public Environmental Enforcement and Private Lender Monitoring: Evidence from Environmental Covenants, J. Acct. & Econ., Apr.–May 2024, at 1, 5, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165410123000459 [https://perma.cc/QRY8-XDFK\].
Id. at 4–5.
Allsup, supra note 186.
W. Tyler Lloyd, Environmental Due Diligence – What’s the Hold Up?, A.B.A. F. on Constr. L.: Div. 1 Blog (Oct. 21, 2025, at 10:28 CT), https://abaconstructionforumdivision1.blogspot.com/2025/10/environmental-due-diligence-whats-hold.html [https://perma.cc/VY66-VATL\].
Id.
Id.
Rieger, supra note 216.
Id.; Choy et al., supra note 217, at 4–5.
Fred Asante et al., Loan Pricing Uncertainty and the Use of Financial Covenants 11 (HKUST Bus. Sch., Rsch. Paper No. 2025-228, 2025), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5389579 [https://perma.cc/LR4Q-A7S4\] (finding that loans exposed to greater pricing uncertainty are associated with a higher number of financial covenants as lenders seek more control rights when uncertainty could resolve unfavorably); see Choy et al., supra note 217, at 4.
Choy et al., supra note 217, at 4; Rieger, supra note 216.
Allsup, supra note 186.
State, Tribe, and Local Government Information, Council on Env’t Quality, https://web.archive.org/web/20260902154327/https://nepa.gov/content/state-tribe-and-local-government-information [https://perma.cc/4QX9-HSMC\] (last visited June 19, 2026).
Allsup, supra note 186.
Brigit Rollins & Jason Roberson, States’ “Mini-NEPA” Laws, Nat’l Agric. L. Ctr., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/state-mini-nepa-laws/ [https://perma.cc/CS9D-QSHQ\] (last visited May 22, 2024). In fact, some of these states have laws that are identical to NEPA. See Greta Raser, States as Laboratories: State Environmental Policy Acts Are Tools to Address Pressing Environmental Harms, Vt. L. Rev. Online (Dec. 5, 2023), https://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/states-as-laboratories-state-environmental-policy-acts-are-tools-to-address-pressing-environmental-harms/ [https://perma.cc/4DTY-N6N7\].
Raser, supra note 230.
See, e.g., A. Ortega, NY’s Environmental Framework (SEQRA): How It Compares to NEPA and CEQA, The Environment Consultant (Dec. 18, 2025), https://theenvironmentconsultant.com/2025/12/18/new-yorks-environmental-review-framework-seqra-how-it-compares-to-nepa-and-ceqa/ [https://perma.cc/M9WB-AG2Z\]; Raser, supra note 230.
Navigating State Regulations in Construction and Environmental Projects, Res. Options (Nov. 10, 2025), https://www.resourceoptions.com/navigating-state-regulations-in-construction-and-environmental-projects/ [https://perma.cc/GBV4-SVAA\].
Ortega, supra note 232.
Id.
Id.
Allsup, supra note 186.
Heather McPherron, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R48595, Legislative Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act 9 (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48595 [https://perma.cc/PA36-2KBT\].
Id. (“Regardless of how they are developed, CEs affect only NEPA compliance; they do not alter an agency’s responsibilities under further statutory mandates, such as the Endangered Species Act, National Historic Preservation Act, or other permitting obligations under the Clean Water Act or other federal laws.”).
A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA, supra note 6, at 19.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 4, 13.
Id. at 10–11.
Lawrence, supra note 121.
Melanie Hernandez, Caidy Riggs & Ryan Pingree, NEPA Without Public Comment? Risks and Realities, Scout Env’t (Sep. 18, 2025), https://scoutenv.com/2025/09/18/nepawithoutpubliccommentrisksandrealities/ [https://perma.cc/TPK9-NMZK\] (noting that the “Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement recently published the Black Butte Federal Coal Lease WYW-6266 Emergency EIS in Wyoming without releasing a draft EIS for public review, instead moving directly from a scoping period to a final EIS and Record of Decision, reflecting the accelerated approach”).
Chris Carr & Benjamin W. Richmond, Environmental Groups Challenge Interior Department’s New NEPA Procedures, Paul Hastings (Jan. 14, 2026), https://www.paulhastings.com/insights/phast-track-legal-insights-on-environment-energy-and-infrastructure/environmental-groups-challenge-interior-departments-new-nepa-procedures [https://perma.cc/46MH-6TL8\].
Hernandez, Riggs & Pingree, supra note 245.
McDonald et al., supra note 91.
Hernandez, Riggs & Pingree, supra note 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eric Biber, NEPA as a Political Tool, Legal Planet (Mar. 29, 2025), https://legal-planet.org/2025/03/29/nepa-as-a-political-tool/ [https://perma.cc/2S4W-YRJ3\].
