I. Introduction
The U.S.–China relationship is widely regarded as the most consequential bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.[1] China is the only country capable of mounting a systemic challenge to the United States’ role as global leader, architect, and chief guarantor of the postwar international order.[2] The country is not merely a geopolitical rival but also a foundational pillar of the global economy: It serves as the world’s manufacturing hub, the largest trading partner for over 100 countries, and a critical supplier of components that anchor global supply chains.[3] Technology lies at the heart of this intensifying rivalry.[4] China has emerged as a global leader across a wide range of high-tech sectors, including artificial intelligence (AI), electric vehicles (EVs), renewable power generation, high-speed rails, shipbuilding, drones, and batteries, and stands competitive in quantum computing, biotechnology, and telecommunications.[5]
Alarmed by the scale and speed of China’s technological development, Washington has come to view Beijing’s ascent as an existential threat to U.S. economic security.[6] U.S. policymakers have voiced deep concerns that telecom equipment from Huawei can serve as a Trojan horse for espionage by the Chinese state,[7] that Chinese-owned apps such as TikTok may be used to surveil Americans and manipulate public opinion,[8] that Chinese-manufactured EVs could be weaponized on American highways,[9] that malware embedded in Chinese software could be activated by Beijing anytime,[10] that sensors in Chinese-made port cranes might function as covert tools for surveillance or sabotage,[11] and that ethnic Chinese students and scholars may be engaged in unauthorized intelligence-gathering for the Chinese government.[12]
Over the past few years, a vast regulatory machine including a sweeping array of statutes, executive orders, agency regulations, and enforcement actions has been deployed to slow China’s growth and curb its competitiveness.[13] Among the most visible measures are export controls aimed at cutting off China’s access to advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment; sanctions targeting Chinese tech firms deemed threats to national security; and tariffs and bans on high-tech Chinese imports, including telecom equipment, EVs, solar panels, and batteries.[14] The United States has also enacted new laws to regulate digital platforms with Chinese ties, most notably legislation that could force ByteDance to divest from TikTok or face a nationwide ban.[15] The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency committee chaired by the Treasury, continues to expand its jurisdiction over transactions involving sensitive technologies, while the federal government has begun constructing a parallel outbound investment review mechanism.[16] Chinese companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges face persistent threats of delisting due to audit access disputes and broader geopolitical frictions.[17] Meanwhile, U.S. agencies have significantly ramped up enforcement against espionage activities, disproportionately targeting ethnic Chinese scientists, which has led to a talent exodus in recent years.[18] The U.S. government has also limited research exchange and scholarly collaboration, and tightened student visa policies, particularly for Chinese students pursuing degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields.[19] U.S. policymakers have framed these efforts as part of a “small yard, high fence” strategy designed to protect sensitive technologies.[20] However, from the perspective of China’s top leadership, these policies increasingly resemble a strategy of “all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China.”[21]
Economists and political scientists have examined in depth the underlying drivers of the United States’ increasingly confrontational policy toward China. Many economists have traced the emergence of the bipartisan consensus against China to the economic disruptions caused by trade liberalization.[22] Political scientists, particularly those identified as structural realists, view it as an inevitable outcome of strategic great-power competition.[23] Rather than asking why the United States seeks to contain China, this Article explores how it pursues that goal through the deployment of various legal tools—and, crucially, what consequences these legal strategies have produced. Law stands at the focal point of the U.S.–China tech rivalry, serving as the principal vehicle through which U.S. policy toward China is formulated, expressed, and enforced. The design and enforcement of these legal measures play a decisive role in shaping whether—and how—policy objectives are ultimately achieved. Although a few studies have explored how U.S. domestic politics and institutions are responding to China’s rise, there has been no systematic analysis of how the Executive Branch has leveraged the law to construct and advance its China policy.[24] This Article fills that gap.
A central insight of this Article is that, in seeking to curb China’s economic and technological ascent, the United States is increasingly mirroring China by relying on often unconstrained executive power to implement containment measures, resulting in a policymaking process that has become markedly volatile and prone to vast unintended consequences.[25] Acting as policy entrepreneurs, both President Trump and President Biden have played a decisive role in advancing a hardline agenda against China across a wide range of domains: tariffs, sanctions, export controls, investment screening, data governance, and visa policies.[26] These measures are frequently justified under the broad rubric of national security—a concept that has undergone significant expansion in recent years.[27] No longer confined to conventional military threats or intelligence operations, the term has come to encompass supply chain vulnerabilities, cross-border data flows, and the protection of domestic industries deemed strategically essential.[28] This conceptual elasticity has, in practice, created ample space for presidents to invoke national security to advance personal or partisan objectives, often yielding mixed outcomes with dubious returns for the American public.[29]
In my recent book, High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy, I introduced a dynamic pyramid model to explain China’s regulatory governance.[30] Inspired by systems theory, which views the world as a highly complex and interconnected system, I proposed a model that focuses on analyzing the structure, process, and outcomes of China’s regulatory governance framework, as well as the feedback loops that link these elements together.[31] The model highlights how the highly centralized and tightly coupled nature of China’s regulatory system (which I term “hierarchy”) often produces dramatic regulatory pendulum swings in the policy process (“volatility”) and generates vast unintended consequences (“fragility”).[32]
Strikingly, recent developments in U.S. policy toward China have begun to exhibit some of the same features. While centralized power may facilitate swift decision-making, as it often does in authoritarian regimes, it is also susceptible to a structural weakness: the absence of reliable and timely feedback on policy consequences.[33] This information lag can delay public awareness and institutional correction, allowing flawed policies to persist unchecked.[34] The result could be a form of near-unconstrained presidential power that reproduces, in the American context, the same decisiveness and fragility I have observed in China’s regulatory state. As Parts II and III will illustrate, the core challenge in America’s legal containment strategy lies in the long informational lags that hinder accurate and timely feedback to the American public, which remains perhaps the last meaningful constraint on presidential power. In this sense, the evolving institutional architecture of America’s China policy reflects not only a strategic response to external competition but also an underappreciated internal convergence with authoritarian modes of governance.
Almost twenty-five years ago, the United States welcomed China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), hoping that by binding Beijing to global trade norms it would also encourage political liberalization and bring China closer to American democratic values.[35] The irony, however, is that convergence has proceeded in the opposite direction from what Washington once envisioned.[36] As America now scrambles to reshore production and shield its economy from Chinese influence, it has increasingly turned to protectionist measures and embraced aggressive state intervention and industrial investments, policies that strikingly resemble the very practices it once condemned in Beijing.[37] For China’s leaders, the once-feared prospect of “peaceful evolution” has all but disappeared.[38] More troubling still, the United States itself is retreating from the liberal ideals it once championed, squandering the soft power that once made it a global beacon of democracy and freedom.[39]
Before turning to Part II, two clarifications are in order. First, this Article does not contend that efforts to curb China’s technological ascent are necessarily contrary to U.S. interests. Many in Washington perceive China simultaneously as an ideological foe like the former Soviet Union and an economic competitor reminiscent of Japan.[40] What this Article seeks to illuminate, however, is a less examined aspect of U.S.–China relations: In its effort to contain China, the United States has increasingly begun to resemble its rival by embracing presidential unilateralism with fewer checks and balances. Although the United States and China have long been cast as institutional and ideological opposites, this Article challenges the prevailing assumption that those distinctions remain as clear-cut in practice as they are in theory.
Second, while this Article is not the first to question U.S. policy toward China, existing scholarship has yet to identify a coherent pattern across legal domains or to situate that pattern within the broader domestic institutional context.[41] To be sure, different areas of law exhibit varying levels of congressional support for—or judicial resistance to—executive action.[42] Yet a striking self-reinforcing feedback loop has emerged: A creeping expansion of executive power, which enables presidents to adopt precautionary measures without rigorous cost–benefit analysis, fuels institutional momentum toward containment, induces China to double down on self-sufficiency, provokes aggressive retaliation from Beijing, and ultimately demands more intrusive state intervention to mount a decisive response.[43] This Article therefore predicts that, unless the United States fundamentally reorients its constitutional order governing foreign affairs and national security, its legal containment strategy will only deepen its convergence with the authoritarian model of regulatory governance it seeks to resist.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II examines the institutional structure of U.S. foreign policymaking and explains how it is converging with China’s model of regulatory governance. Part III proposes an analytical framework to account for these growing parallels and applies it across four core domains of America’s containment strategy. Part IV looks ahead and offers predictions about the future of the U.S.–China rivalry and its implications for the U.S. constitutional order.
II. Convergence with China
This Part begins with a provocative question: In its effort to contain China, is the United States beginning to mirror aspects of the very state it seeks to counter? At first glance, such a proposition may seem radical. The United States and China are widely perceived as ideological and institutional opposites. The former is traditionally regarded as a bastion of democratic governance, characterized by a constitutional framework rooted in the separation of powers and institutional checks and balances. The latter, by contrast, is a one-party authoritarian state, where political authority is highly centralized under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[44] In the United States, the Executive Branch is subject to congressional oversight and independent judicial review, whereas in China, both judicial independence and legislative oversight are tightly circumscribed.[45]
This popular perception, however, overlooks the phenomenon of “foreign affairs exceptionalism”—the notion that in matters of national security and foreign affairs, the U.S. Executive Branch wields disproportionate power with limited oversight from Congress or the Judiciary.[46] In fact, the steady expansion of executive authority in foreign policymaking is a long-standing trend that predates China’s emergence as a serious rival. Arthur Schlesinger famously described this trajectory as the rise of the “imperial presidency,” warning that the consolidation of power in the Executive Branch posed a fundamental threat to the constitutional order.[47] Harold Koh similarly observed that “the President almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”[48] More recently, Bruce Ackerman has sounded alarms about the erosion of legal checks on presidential power, characterizing the Executive as “the most dangerous branch” and a growing threat to constitutional governance.[49] Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith likewise argue that although President Trump accelerated these dynamics, he was not their originator.[50]
Drawing on insights from systems theory, which conceptualizes the world as a complex and interdependent set of structures and feedback loops, this Part seeks to unpack the U.S. system of foreign policymaking through three interrelated elements: decision-making structure, policy process, and regulatory outcome.[51] In doing so, it places these features in comparative perspective, assessing their growing convergence with China’s model of regulatory governance.
A. Structure
In China, political authority is highly centralized within the CCP and, at its pinnacle, the Politburo Standing Committee (Standing Committee). The Standing Committee, currently consisting of seven members, constitutes the apex of China’s political hierarchy and wields unparalleled control over state and party affairs. Since Xi Jinping’s accession in 2012, the balance of power within the Standing Committee has shifted decisively.[52] What was once a collective leadership characterized by intense factional politics has given way to a leadership structure dominated almost entirely by Xi’s loyalists, effectively eliminating the internal checks that previously tempered decision-making at the Party’s highest level.[53]
In the meantime, the institutional safeguards designed to limit the personalization of rule have likewise eroded.[54] The most consequential shift came in 2018, when the National People’s Congress abolished the two-term constitutional limit on the presidency—a reform widely understood as paving the way for Xi to remain in office indefinitely.[55] This move marked a sharp departure from the post-Mao norm of institutionalized succession, which had been designed to prevent the overconcentration of power in a single leader.[56] In tandem, the proliferation of “leading small groups” chaired by Xi has further shifted decision-making authority away from bureaucratic ministries and toward ad hoc bodies directly accountable to him.[57] Beyond the Party elite, state oversight has tightened more broadly: Censorship of traditional media has intensified, internet controls have grown increasingly sophisticated, and civil society has been constrained through the detention or silencing of lawyers and activists.[58] As Susan Shirk observes, Chinese regulatory governance has returned to more personalistic rule under the leadership of President Xi.[59]
By contrast, American presidents possess far less discretion than their Chinese counterparts and, at least on paper, remain subject to an elaborate web of institutional constraints. Yet a closer examination of actual practice reveals a gradual drift toward centralization, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs and national security. The U.S. Constitution allocates foreign affairs powers to both Congress and the President. While Congress is vested with significant authority, such as regulating commerce with foreign nations, declaring war, and providing oversight, the Executive Branch wields substantial power as the primary actor in executing foreign policy.[60] In practice, however, structural and political impediments have severely weakened Congress’s ability to effectively oversee executive action in foreign affairs.[61] Indeed, congressional oversight of the Executive has significantly diminished in recent decades, virtually disappearing after George W. Bush took office.[62] Meanwhile, Congress has steadily expanded the scope of executive authority in foreign affairs by delegating broad statutory powers to the President to act unilaterally in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.[63] As a result, the vast majority of foreign affairs powers exercised by the President today are not inherent constitutional authorities but statutory grants of power from Congress, either explicitly or implicitly.[64]
Judicial oversight of executive action in foreign policymaking is also inherently limited.[65] Courts generally intervene only when an executive decision is formally challenged, rendering judicial review a reactive, rather than proactive, mechanism. In practice, this limitation allows many executive actions in foreign relations to proceed unchecked unless and until they are contested in litigation.[66] Even when courts do review such cases, procedural hurdles often prevent them from reaching the merits.[67] Meanwhile, courts have repeatedly shown reluctance to scrutinize presidential assertions of necessity or urgency in cases implicating national security, often citing the Executive’s superior access to intelligence and the need for decisive action in protecting national interests.[68]
In recent years, scholars have observed a growing willingness among courts to scrutinize China-related administrative actions that conflate national security with economic security.[69] For instance, in 2014, the D.C. Circuit awarded a rare victory to Ralls Corporation, a Chinese company that challenged the CFIUS’s decision to divest its wind farm projects close to a U.S. Navy facility.[70] The court held that Ralls had a due process right under the Fifth Amendment to be informed of the government’s action and to be given an opportunity to respond before being deprived of its property interest.[71] However, the court did not overturn the presidential order, acknowledging that the President’s national security determination was not subject to substantial judicial review.[72] Thus, although the Ralls decision marked an important precedent for foreign investors seeking greater transparency in the CFIUS process, its practical impact has been limited. Because national security justifications are often classified, procedural remedies rarely alter the outcome.[73] Indeed, other than TikTok, no other Chinese company has challenged CFIUS’s order.[74]
In 2021, two Chinese firms, Xiaomi and Luokung, successfully contested their inclusion on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) list of companies linked to China’s military.[75] In granting a preliminary injunction to Luokung, the district court acknowledged the principle of heightened deference to agency determinations in matters concerning national security.[76] However, the court concluded that the Administration failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating a concrete threat, noting that “[d]eference is only appropriate when national security interests are actually at stake.”[77] A similar outcome occurred in 2020, when federal courts granted injunctions blocking the implementation of Trump’s executive orders that sought to ban TikTok and WeChat based on national security grounds.[78] In the TikTok and Marland cases, the courts found that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) includes an exception for “informational materials,” which likely encompasses the user-generated content of these online platforms.[79] The courts also criticized the executive orders for their overbroad application and failure to provide concrete evidence linking the platforms’ operations to a national security threat.[80]
These judicial victories, however, should not be misinterpreted as signaling a robust or sustained constraint on executive authority. As will be elaborated below, a president can function as a policy entrepreneur, strategically expanding the boundaries of presidential power through iterative legal challenges.[81] Even when lower courts invalidate specific executive actions, such rulings often serve less as definitive setbacks than as test cases that reveal the outer limits of executive discretion. Indeed, legal challenges from Chinese firms do not deter the DOD from putting the Chinese firms on the list again.[82] One good example is Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC), a Chinese semiconductor equipment manufacturer. In 2021, after AMEC was designated as a Communist Chinese military company, the company appealed the decision, and the DOD removed it from the list.[83] But the DOD added the firm back to the list three years later and ultimately removed it after AMEC challenged the decision again.[84] Following the Xiaomi and Luokung decisions, for example, the DOD then designated additional Chinese firms—including Tencent, a major player in social media and gaming, and CATL, a leading global battery manufacturer—as “Chinese Military Companies.”[85]
Historically, institutions such as the federal bureaucracy and the media have served as a vital check on executive power in U.S. foreign policymaking.[86] Yet, much as the Chinese bureaucracy has been increasingly marginalized in important policy decisions and media freedom has been severely curtailed, these institutions in the United States have also seen their influence erode—first during the Trump Administration and again in its current term. President Trump demonstrated a strong preference for appointing officials based on loyalty rather than expertise or competence, undermining the ability of agency heads and senior officials to act as independent or moderating voices within the Executive Branch.[87] In his second term, Trump has doubled down by appointing long-standing China hawks to senior positions.[88] This shift further transformed the foreign policy apparatus into an echo chamber—one increasingly insulated from dissent or deliberation and thus more prone to groupthink.[89] At the same time, the role of the media as an independent check on executive power has significantly diminished.[90] Trump’s overt hostility toward the press, coupled with the rise of social media platforms that amplify polarization and misinformation, has further undermined the media’s oversight function.[91] In this environment, disinformation and partisan narratives increasingly shape public opinion and constrain policy options.[92]
A president operating with minimal effective oversight—whether from Congress, the courts, the bureaucracy, or the media—thus enjoys tremendous discretion in shaping foreign policy. This concentrated structure gives rise to tremendous volatility in the policy process, just as has been observed in the Chinese regulatory system.[93]
B. Process
A defining feature of China’s regulatory system is its volatility, marked by recurring cycles of regulatory tightening and regulatory easing. This volatility arises from three interrelated sources. First, the top leadership must constantly balance competing sources of legitimacy—growth, stability, and nationalism—which often stand in tension with one another.[94] Rapid economic growth may produce market chaos and social unrest; heavy-handed intervention can erode entrepreneurial confidence and suppress investment; techno-nationalist campaigns risk deterring foreign capital and innovation; and state-driven industrial policy may distort resource allocation and crowd out other sectors.[95] As Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry observed, such pressures have long produced a “guerrilla-style” adaptive governance rooted in the CCP’s revolutionary past.[96] Second, “the absence of formal checks and balances gives Chinese policymakers and regulators wide latitude to intervene.”[97] While this institutional agility allows swift responses, it also creates significant risks of administrative abuse and overreach.[98] Hastily conceived measures often exacerbate instability, demanding drastic reversals that generate further volatility.[99] Third, the inefficient information transmission in the Chinese regulatory system often impedes accurate and timely feedback.[100] The consolidation of authority at the top deprives local officials of both the autonomy and incentives to address regulatory problems directly, encouraging them either to await explicit directives or to overreact in an effort to signal loyalty.[101] In both scenarios, agencies are disinclined to report adverse information candidly. By the time central leaders intervene, problems are often deeply entrenched, making corrective actions more abrupt and destabilizing.[102]
In the U.S. context, the consolidation of presidential power has also produced volatility in the formulation of policy toward China. As in the Chinese regulatory system, the policy volatility does not stem from the operation of formal checks and balances. As explained above, neither Congress nor the courts have consistently functioned as effective constraints on presidential authority in this domain. Instead, instability arises from three distinctive features of its domestic politics as they interact with the evolving geopolitical environment.[103]
The first is partisan polarization, which generates divergent ideological approaches to China policy—an institutional dynamic absent in China’s one-party system. Republican Administrations—most notably under President Trump—have tended to adopt a more transactional and economically driven strategy.[104] Since his first term, the Trump Administration has repeatedly used restrictive measures against China to extract trade concessions, only to roll them back when Chinese retaliation threatened key commercial interests.[105] This transactional approach to national security permeated multiple policy domains such as tariffs and export controls, as Part III will detail. In contrast, Democratic Administrations, particularly under President Biden, have embraced a more ideological vision of great-power competition.[106] Casting the U.S.–China rivalry as a defining contest between democratic and authoritarian systems, the Biden Administration has prioritized long-term geopolitical objectives, most notably the curbing of China’s technological progress, even at the cost of short-term economic sacrifice by U.S. firms.[107]
A second source of policy volatility derives from the personal interests and shifting political calculations of the President. In this respect, U.S. foreign policymaking resembles the adaptive governance of China’s top leadership, which must continually balance competing sources of legitimacy. Yet the institutional context differs in one critical respect. Chinese leaders, unconstrained by electoral cycles, are less immediately affected by short-term political pressures.[108] By contrast, American presidents must remain acutely responsive to electoral incentives and public opinion.[109] As political circumstances shift, presidents may therefore dramatically alter their positions on the very same restrictive measure, often untethered from a consistent national security rationale. This dynamic was particularly evident in President Trump’s handling of TikTok. As elaborated in Part III below, Trump was the first to target Chinese-owned apps on national security grounds and attempted to force TikTok’s divestiture. Yet during his second term, Trump repeatedly extended the deadline for TikTok’s forced divestment, effectively stalling the policy he had initiated.[110] This reversal appeared driven less by any reassessment of national security risks than by changing political considerations—namely, the app’s popularity among young American voters and lobbying from his major political donors.[111] Another example can be found in the export control policy. In his first term, President Trump proposed tightening restrictions on the export of critical technology components to China, yet he endorsed loosening certain controls in his second term, partly because the prospect of additional revenue offered a means of reducing the federal government’s budget deficit.[112]
A third and underappreciated source of volatility lies in President Trump’s personal style of leadership, which represented a sharp break from traditional presidential norms.[113] Historically, such norms served as informal but meaningful constraints on executive discretion, ensuring a degree of continuity and predictability in the policy process.[114] Trump, by contrast, embraced unpredictability, often framing it as a tactical advantage in negotiation.[115] This disposition infused extraordinary volatility into U.S. foreign policymaking.[116] Trump’s break from presidential norms manifested in at least two distinct ways. First, he consistently pushed the boundaries of executive authority by invoking broad statutory powers in novel and aggressive ways. During the 2018–2019 U.S.–China trade war, after China retaliated with tariffs on American goods, Trump threatened to order U.S. companies to exit the Chinese market, citing IEEPA as his legal authority.[117] Notably, no president before Trump had invoked the statute to threaten economic severance with China—the world’s second-largest economy and one of America’s top trading partners.[118] Indeed, IEEPA was traditionally applied to impose sanctions on rogue regimes in response to terrorism sponsorship, weapons proliferation, slavery, corruption, war crimes, and genocide.[119] In the hands of President Trump, however, IEEPA was transformed into a highly versatile and expansive policy tool. Trump became the first president to invoke IEEPA to restrict information flows by attempting to ban TikTok and WeChat, despite the statute’s express prohibition on measures that restrict personal communications or informational materials.[120] He also relied on IEEPA to prohibit American investment in Chinese companies deemed to have ties to the military, including prominent technology firms such as Xiaomi.[121] Trump was also the first president to invoke IEEPA to impose tariffs.[122] In February 2025, the Trump Administration imposed an additional 10% tariff on Chinese goods, claiming that China’s failure to curb fentanyl trafficking constituted a national emergency under IEEPA.[123] The statute’s appeal for Trump was clear: Unlike most trade-related delegations, IEEPA imposes minimal procedural constraints.[124]
Second, President Trump’s approach to foreign policy was grounded in a transactional worldview that treated international relations as an extension of dealmaking.[125] In 2018, President Trump publicly intervened in the U.S. Commerce Department’s decision to penalize the Chinese telecom giant ZTE for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea.[126] After the agency imposed a seven-year ban on U.S. companies selling components to ZTE—a move widely regarded as a corporate death sentence—Trump tweeted that he was working with Chinese President Xi Jinping to “give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast.”[127] He framed the move as a humanitarian gesture, citing the potential loss of Chinese jobs.[128] In reality, the reversal came amid high-stakes U.S.–China trade talks, and many observers interpreted it as a geopolitical concession aimed at securing broader economic agreements.[129] A similar episode unfolded later that year, when Trump publicly floated the possibility of intervening in the criminal prosecution of Huawei’s former chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou.[130]
C. Outcome
In China, the tightly coupled regulatory structure and the volatility of the policy process have often generated vast unintended consequences, an outcome that I term “fragility.” The Chinese model possesses a unique advantage in its capacity for rapid resource mobilization and swift intervention, but in a tangled and interdependent global system that advantage can quickly become a liability.[131] Interventions meant to fix market failures frequently generate consequences that regulators have not fully anticipated.[132] China is especially exposed to this risk because administrative overreach is common and its regulators face few institutional checks.[133]
Meanwhile, the hierarchical nature of the system further impedes the flow of accurate and timely information, producing prolonged informational lags precisely when nimble decision-making is most essential.[134] When heavy-handed correctives do land, their unintended fallout can be severe and, in some cases, impossible to reverse.[135] The unpredictability of China’s regulatory policy also erodes investor confidence and chills entrepreneurial initiative.[136] Abrupt policy reversals can create uncertainty, sow confusion, and provoke panic among Chinese citizens as well as global investors.[137] This turbulence is amplified by opaque enforcement practices and the lack of institutional checks, such that regulatory shocks reverberate across domestic and international markets.[138] Indeed, dramatic shifts in regulatory direction often invite overreaction by investors and market actors, compounding volatility.[139] As such, “applying a remedy to address one problem can often provoke further problems, leaving Chinese policymakers playing a constant game of ‘whack-a-mole’ as they try to manage ongoing crises.”[140]
Inefficiencies in information flows also undermine the resilience of U.S. policymaking, albeit in a manner quite distinct from that observed in China. In the Chinese system, informational deficits occur because top leadership often fails to realize the severity of regulatory problems until they erupt into regulatory crises.[141] Indeed, reliable data may be scarce at the outset, or officials could have incentives to suppress or misrepresent evidence to advance their own bureaucratic interests.[142] In a politically charged environment, moreover, agencies have every incentive to withhold unwelcome findings that might cast doubt on the policy decisions of top leaders.[143] By contrast, in the American system, the democratic structure formally casts the electorate as principal, with the President and Executive Branch serving as agents. The American people, as ultimate decision-makers, exercise authority through periodic elections that shape the nation’s policy toward China. Yet they, too, face a significant informational deficit because citizens often lack timely and accurate assessments of the costs and benefits of U.S. policy toward China.[144] These delays in public awareness and accountability weaken the capacity of democratic oversight to discipline executive action.[145]
Meanwhile, the unfolding of containment policies toward China has already begun to generate a series of unintended consequences that mirror the very dynamics long associated with China’s centralized regulatory system. Two factors, in particular, have contributed to this outcome. First, the consolidation of presidential authority in the formulation of China policy, coupled with the durable bipartisan consensus against Beijing, has created a permissive political environment in which presidents can prioritize short-term political gains over thoughtful policymaking. Indeed, scholars have long cautioned that bipartisan consensus in foreign affairs can produce what has been termed a “frictionless government”: a political environment in which dissent is sidelined and critical deliberation eroded.[146] These dynamics foster a climate of groupthink that privileges extreme precaution, sometimes without careful consideration of the trade-offs. As such, presidents can pursue aggressive policies under the banner of national security, even when the underlying motivations appear to be partisan or self-interested. This dynamic is visible in successive Administrations’ trade policies. During the first Trump Administration, the trade war was launched under the pretext of combating China’s forced technology transfer but was politically motivated to bolster support for the Administration’s upcoming reelection campaign.[147] The Biden Administration, despite concerns about the inflation caused by tariffs, kept them in place to avoid being seen as soft on China and to win votes from labor unions.[148]
Meanwhile, the compressed time horizon of the four-year presidential cycle incentivizes presidents to seek immediate political gains rather than pursue sustained strategic planning.[149] This institutionalized short-termism fosters a policy posture aimed at “winning” against China at all costs, heightening the risk of a winner’s curse, where temporary and symbolic victories obscure more consequential and enduring losses.[150] The dynamic is particularly visible in the domain of export controls. Early efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced technologies were framed as necessary to preserve U.S. national security and industrial competitiveness.[151] Yet the political imperative to demonstrate responsiveness to China’s rise has at times moved faster than deliberative policymaking.[152] There has been far less attention to the indirect effects of these interventions, such as the extent to which they have accelerated China’s push for technological self-sufficiency while undermining U.S. tech dominance.[153]
Second, the volatility in the policymaking process has itself become a driver of boomerang effects. Persistent instability in U.S. policy toward China—whether through changing tariff rates, evolving export control frameworks, abrupt restrictions on data flows, or sudden changes to visa policies—has created tremendous uncertainty for firms engaged in cross-border trade, investment, and supply chain planning.[154] These disruptions have also undermined the appeal of U.S. higher education for Chinese students, weakening one of the United States’ most enduring sources of soft power and global influence.[155] Even when America ultimately scaled back or deferred certain aggressive measures, the possibility of dramatic policy swings has generated profound uncertainty that has complicated corporate compliance and undermined business confidence.[156] Moreover, because the effectiveness of many U.S. restrictions—particularly in areas like export controls and supply chain security—depends on sustained multilateral coordination, erratic policy signals risk eroding U.S. credibility and jeopardizing allied cooperation.[157]
To be sure, the institutional dysfunctions identified above are by no means unique to America’s formulation of China policy. Problems such as presidential overreach, political opportunism, and short-termism have been endemic features of the U.S. foreign policymaking apparatus.[158] Yet these flaws have not consistently produced comparable boomerang effects in other contexts. A key reason is that none of the United States’ other foreign adversaries—whether Iran, Russia, or North Korea—matches China in power, scale, or systemic importance.[159] As the world’s second-largest economy, with formidable manufacturing depth, a growing high-tech ecosystem, and substantial state capacity, China is uniquely positioned to resist foreign pressures.[160] Indeed, the Chinese economy is deeply intertwined with that of the United States, and it possesses both the capacity and the strategic leverage to retaliate—whether through market access, supply chain disruptions, or regulatory countermeasures, as elaborated in Part III. In short, the stakes in the U.S.–China rivalry are substantially higher, and the risks of strategic miscalculation correspondingly more acute, than in any recent confrontation with a foreign adversary.
III. A Spiral of Regulatory Convergence
This Part begins by introducing the spiral model, an analytical framework that explains the growing parallels in U.S. and Chinese regulatory governance. It then applies the model to explain the dynamics in four core domains of the U.S. containment strategy: restrictions on trade, technology, data, and talent flows.
A. The Spiral Model
The spiral model proceeds in four stages. The first stage is “precaution.” In response to strong political demand to contain China, American presidents have invoked expansive executive power and adopted sweeping precautionary measures, thereby sidestepping the need for rigorous cost–benefit analysis. Within the field of risk regulation, scholars typically distinguish among three regulatory approaches: the safety standard, the feasibility standard, and cost–benefit analysis.[161] Of these, the safety standard is the most risk-averse.[162] It obligates regulators to reduce harm to a predefined “safe” threshold, often without regard to economic or social costs.[163] Within this framework, even policies that impose significant economic or social costs are framed as nonnegotiable necessities in the name of national security. Because China is routinely framed as an existential threat, even speculative or low-probability risks are treated as sufficient grounds for expansive intervention.[164] This echoes a phenomenon that David Beaver and Jason Stanley describe as “presuppositional resonance[],” whereby circumstantial or weakly substantiated claims are projected into the public discourse in ways that resonate with preexisting fears—thereby legitimizing policies that might otherwise be contested.[165] Indeed, in each of the policy domains discussed below, the containment strategy was formulated hastily within a narrow circle of presidential advisors, without public consultation or hearings and with little, if any, cost–benefit analysis.[166]
The second stage is “momentum.” Once precautionary measures are adopted, there is a strong institutional momentum that exerts pressure on presidents to take an aggressive policy stance toward China. A long-standing literature on the diversionary theory of foreign policy suggests that political leaders facing domestic challenges may initiate or escalate external conflicts in order to rally national unity and deflect internal criticism.[167] The scapegoating of a foreign power, particularly one portrayed as a strategic and economic rival, serves as a powerful political strategy for reshaping voter attitudes by shifting blame to an external adversary.[168] Within this context, President Trump has demonstrated particular acuity in deploying the tactic of “China bashing,” a term used to describe the rhetorical vilification of China.[169] By presenting China as a major foe, Trump seeks to rally his political base and unify the divided public against a common rival.[170] As public opinion grew increasingly hostile toward China, it created opportunities for even more aggressive responses, thereby providing political cover for aggressive executive actions.[171] As Stephen Roach has succinctly observed, both President Trump and former President Biden are “captives and protagonists of America’s false narratives on China” that inflamed the viral and hostile public opinion toward China.[172] In this feedback loop, the expansion of presidential power was not merely a response to the public demand for hawkish policy but also a significant contributor to the formation of such demand.[173] The bipartisan consensus, reinforced by public opinion, has made it politically costly for successive presidents to roll back these measures without appearing “soft on China.”[174] More troublingly, President Trump’s unprecedented invocation of the IEEPA lowered the threshold for the use of emergency powers in nonemergency contexts, while normalizing a mode of presidential unilateralism that future presidents are now incentivized to adopt.[175] Across each of the four policy domains, the Biden Administration—despite its distinct political ideology and governing style—has largely preserved, and in several instances expanded or intensified, the containment measures initially imposed by President Trump.[176]
The third stage is “retaliation.” In response to aggressive containment, China doubles down on self-sufficiency, narrowing technological gaps with the United States. Barred from advanced foreign technology, Chinese firms turn to domestic substitutes, inadvertently propping up national champions that have made tremendous progress in recent years.[177] Chinese talent, wary of escalating U.S. containment, increasingly chooses to remain in, or return to, China from America.[178] As China grows more resilient, it demonstrates greater capacity and resolve to mount aggressive retaliation against U.S. measures.[179] Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China commands a far more advanced and expansive technology sector and is deeply embedded in global supply chains.[180] This structural integration affords Beijing much greater leverage and a broader set of tools with which to retaliate. In fact, China is increasingly following the American playbook by leveraging strategic chokepoints and extending the extraterritorial reach of its domestic laws to craft countermeasures. Since 2020, China has tightened its export controls, beefed up its anti-sanction measures, and strengthened its national security review of foreign acquisitions and data security.[181] China has also leveraged the extraterritorial reach of its antitrust regime by delaying or blocking mergers involving U.S. semiconductor companies, thereby impeding further consolidation in key sectors.[182] In key areas of upstream supply chains, particularly in critical minerals such as rare earth elements, China holds a dominant position and can disrupt production across multiple sectors of the U.S. economy.[183] While these countermeasures may prove self-defeating over the long term by accelerating diversification away from China, they nonetheless pose an immediate and credible threat to U.S. economic and national security interests.[184] Indeed, the Trump Administration’s underestimation of China’s strategic countermove to withhold rare earth exports appears to have directly contributed to dramatic policy volatility across multiple domains, including tariffs, export controls, and visa restrictions, as elaborated below.
The fourth stage is “expansion.” In the face of forceful Chinese retaliation, the President invokes further executive authority to intervene in the economy on an unprecedented scale, further entrenching the expansion of executive power. A telling example lies in the Trump Administration’s response to China’s weaponization of rare earths. In the summer of 2025, the DOD hastily entered into a multibillion-dollar partnership with the rare-earth producer MP Materials.[185] State intervention in this sector appeared justified on national security grounds, particularly given that prior market solutions had failed as Chinese firms outcompeted their American rivals with cheaper and better products.[186] The problem, however, is that the DOD’s hasty investment in MP Materials rested on shaky legal grounds.[187] To expedite the process, the Trump Administration invoked the Defense Production Act—a rarely used Cold War-era statute—as a way to sidestep standard procurement and contracting requirements.[188] This controversial shift toward intrusive state investment and industrial policy raises serious questions about whether Washington is drifting toward state capitalism, thereby edging even closer to Beijing’s regulatory model.[189]
From this emerges a self-reinforcing feedback loop that has precipitated a downward spiral in the exercise of executive power: The steady expansion of executive power enables presidents to adopt expansive precautionary measures against China without regard to cost; those measures generate powerful momentum toward containment, induce Beijing to double down on self-sufficiency, provoke escalating retaliation from a more assertive China, and ultimately compel more intrusive state intervention—thereby reinforcing the continuing expansion of executive authority and accelerating convergence with China.
B. Key Areas of Containment
In each of the four policy domains below, I will examine how the institutional structure of U.S. foreign policymaking has enabled the steady expansion of executive power since Trump’s first term, contributed to tremendous policy volatility, and produced far-reaching unintended consequences. I will also apply the spiral model to illustrate the dynamic interactions between the United States and China.
1. Trade Flows
The U.S. Constitution “grants Congress the power to lay and collect duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations,” while Congress vests the authority to negotiate international agreements in the President.[190] Since 1934, Congress has enacted dozens of statutes delegating to the President the authority to adjust tariff rates in response to specific concerns, such as national security or foreign policy, or based on administrative findings by U.S. agencies.[191] These delegations were made under the prevailing assumption that the President would be less susceptible to political pressure than Congress and therefore unlikely to support protectionist tariff hikes or trade wars.[192] Indeed, for much of the postwar period, the United States played a leading role in advancing global tariff reduction and multilateral trade liberalization.[193]
This assumption held until the election of Donald Trump in 2016.[194] Upon taking office, President Trump deployed tariffs aggressively, using them not only as tools of trade policy but as instruments of broader foreign policy, targeting issues far beyond traditional trade disputes.[195] In August 2017, President Trump directed the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to initiate investigations “into Chinese laws, policies, and practices [that] may be harming” U.S. interests under section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974.[196] Six months later, the USTR issued a 182-page report accusing China of using a wide range of unfair trade practices, ranging from state-directed cyber hacking to forced technology transfer, to acquire U.S. technologies to advance its “Made in China 2025” policy.[197] The Trump Administration’s use of Section 301 to impose unilateral tariffs on China marked a sharp break from prior trade practice and was subsequently found to violate America’s obligations under WTO rules.[198]
President Trump’s entrepreneurial use of tariff authority has only expanded in his second term. From February to April 2025, his Administration announced rounds of sweeping tariffs on all Chinese imports, this time invoking the IEEPA.[199] Citing the illegal drug trade and “large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits” as an “extraordinary threat” to national security, the President declared a national emergency to justify his measures.[200] In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling blocking President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, holding that the IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose sweeping tariffs on virtually all trading partners.[201] Yet even this judicial setback is unlikely to deter the Administration. Experts widely agree that the President retains access to a broad array of statutory authorities that may be leveraged to impose tariffs on nations.[202] Slamming the Justices as a “disgrace to our nation,” Trump announced a new blanket 10% tariff just hours after the Supreme Court ruling.[203] Even if the new tariff order faces fresh legal challenges, litigation will take time, and the Administration can continue to use tariffs as leverage in trade negotiations in the interim.[204]
Although President Trump was the first post-World War II president to deploy tariffs on a sweeping and unilateral scale, his actions established a precedent that has significantly expanded the policy toolkit available to his successors. Faced with mounting inflationary pressures, the Biden Administration once considered rolling back certain tariffs as a means of lowering consumer prices.[205] Yet the political risks, particularly the potential loss of support from labor unions that favor high tariffs, constrained its ability to act.[206] Ultimately, the Biden Administration chose to preserve most of the Trump-era tariffs.[207] In 2024, the Biden Administration even escalated the tariff measures by invoking section 301 of the Trade Act to impose a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs—a move that effectively bars their entry into the U.S. market.[208] Simultaneously, it announced new tariffs on steel and aluminum, certain critical minerals, solar cells, batteries and battery components, ship-to-shore cranes, medical products, and semiconductors.[209] The Biden Administration’s decision to maintain Trump’s tariffs exemplifies the powerful institutional momentum underlying America’s legal containment strategy toward China.
Meanwhile, the expansion of executive authority over tariff policy has been accompanied by a marked increase in volatility during the policy process. Among the most significant sources of this volatility is Trump’s personal style of leadership, which sees tariffs as an all-purpose tool for extracting concessions from foreign governments. Yet Trump appeared to have underestimated both the scope and effectiveness of China’s retaliatory capacity. After the Trump Administration announced rounds of sweeping tariffs on all Chinese imports in April 2025, China retaliated with its own tariffs and introduced a suite of additional regulatory countermeasures.[210] Among the most consequential was the weaponization of export controls on rare earth elements, a critical input for both the U.S. defense industrial base and high-tech manufacturing sectors.[211] China’s move exemplifies the retaliation stage of the spiral model. This escalation ultimately compelled the Trump Administration to moderate its position, leading to concessions on tariff measures in an effort to restore access to these strategically vital resources.[212]
While it remains too early to render a final verdict on America’s tariff policy, there is wide consensus among experts and policymakers that the mini-trade deal Trump secured with China during his first term was a failure.[213] China bought little of the extra $200 billion of U.S. exports, and there is no follow-up on China’s actual fulfilment of other concessions.[214] While China’s early concessions have led to important changes in IP-related Chinese laws, big questions remain about implementation and enforcement.[215] Crucially, it is unclear whether these enhanced legal protections have actually improved the bargaining position of U.S. businesses in dealing with their Chinese business counterparts or the Chinese government. In the meantime, abundant economic evidence has shown that it was American firms and consumers who bore the brunt of the tariffs imposed during Trump’s first term.[216] For instance, a study of the 2018–2019 U.S.–China trade war found that U.S. manufacturing job losses due to higher input costs were five times larger than job gains from import protection.[217]
This boomerang effect stems partly from the Executive’s recurring invocation of national security as a pretext for advancing the President’s own political interests. Economic studies show the implementation of the China tariffs was motivated, at least in part, by electoral considerations.[218] Although initially justified as a response to China’s forced technology transfer, the tariffs during Trump’s first term were frequently deployed as bargaining tools to extract unrelated concessions—most notably, commitments to purchase U.S. agricultural goods.[219] Empirical studies reveal that the Trump Administration targeted tariffs at politically competitive counties, with a view to swaying voters most likely to decide electoral outcomes.[220] Counties with roughly “balanced Republican and Democratic constituencies in the 2016 presidential election received [greater] import protection” during the 2018 tariff waves than solidly partisan counties.[221] Ironically, China’s retaliatory tariffs were heavily concentrated on agricultural goods, disproportionately affecting Republican-leaning rural counties, many of which formed the core of Trump’s political base.[222] To mitigate the political fallout, the Administration authorized $28 billion in bailout payments to farmers, effectively using public funds to compensate for the self-inflicted harms of its own trade policy.[223]
Economist Keyu Jin has further cautioned that the Trump-era tariffs have also produced unintended consequences by incentivizing China to reallocate resources away from low-end manufacturing and toward high-value, advanced technologies that are less vulnerable to tariffs and supply chain disruptions.[224] Since the onset of the trade war in 2018, Chinese policymakers have intensified their focus on innovation-driven growth, betting heavily on the development of so-called “new quality productive forces” as a means of reducing the country’s dependence on infrastructure investment and low-tech exports.[225] Furthermore, the tariff shocks have forced Chinese firms to try even harder to cut costs and scale up in order to stay competitive in the United States.[226] After being blocked in America, Chinese EV manufacturers are now aggressively expanding into Europe and Latin America.[227] This dynamic may inadvertently further strengthen China’s diffusion capability and enable it to control the supply chain over a larger part of the world.[228] Ironically, in seeking to isolate China by restricting access to American markets, U.S. policy may instead incentivize Chinese firms to globalize more aggressively, deepening their integration with the rest of the world.
2. Technology Flows
Sanctions and export controls have served as long-standing tools of American economic statecraft.[229] Their appeal lies not only in their ability to project geopolitical influence without resorting to military force, but also in the extraordinary degree of discretion they afford the Executive Branch. Bolstered by broad statutory delegations and minimal judicial oversight, these tools enable presidents to unilaterally impose sweeping restrictions under the banner of national security.[230] In 2018, the Export Control Reform Act further expanded this authority, empowering the Executive to regulate exports of “emerging and foundational technologies” deemed “essential to the national security of the United States.”[231]
Historically, such measures were directed at relatively isolated adversaries—such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba—whose capacity for retaliation or global economic disruption was limited.[232] The Trump Administration, however, marked a significant departure from earlier practice by leveraging export controls to constrain China.[233] U.S. policymakers identified one critical point of vulnerability: China’s heavy dependence on imported semiconductors.[234] The underlying logic reflects a precautionary principle: Semiconductors are dual-use technologies, and export controls are seen as important proactive measures to constrain China’s capacity to develop technologies deemed essential to its military modernization.[235] This rationale, however, has drawn criticism from industry experts, who observed that military applications rely primarily on legacy chips—components that China already possesses in abundance—while it is not clear how advanced large language models trained on the most advanced chips will be used for critical military missions.[236]
Beginning in 2016, the United States escalated a series of export control measures—ranging from placing ZTE and Huawei on the Entity List to pressuring the Dutch government to block the sale of advanced lithography machines—that collectively sought to curtail China’s access to critical semiconductor technology.[237] This trajectory of tightening restrictions continued under the Biden Administration, which in October 2022 imposed sweeping export controls on advanced AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China.[238] The scope of entity-based restrictions has also expanded dramatically. During his first term, President Trump added 384 Chinese entities to the Commerce Department’s Entity List—nearly three times the number designated by his predecessors over the prior sixteen years.[239] Under President Biden, that number grew even more sharply. As of 2024, the Biden Administration had designated 432 Chinese entities, representing a 60% increase over the Trump-era total.[240] In the final months of the Biden Administration, officials rushed to introduce the “AI Diffusion Rule”—a novel export control measure aimed at curbing the global dissemination of advanced semiconductor technologies to entities deemed at risk of transferring them to China.[241] The rule significantly broadened the scope of U.S. export controls by targeting not only direct sales to China but also indirect transfers through third-party countries to prevent regulatory arbitrage.[242]
Alongside the dramatic expansion of executive authority over sanctions and export restrictions, U.S. policy in this domain has also exhibited striking volatility. One major source of this instability lies in the interaction between partisan and personal interests. In May 2025, on the eve of its scheduled implementation, the Trump Administration abruptly rescinded the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.[243] The official rationale framed the rule as “overly complex, bureaucratic, and [a threat to] American innovation.”[244] Yet contemporaneous reporting suggested a broader shift within the Administration, one that sidelined national security officials supporting strict chip export controls in favor of those advocating for the use of advanced chip sales as bargaining tools in trade and investment negotiations.[245] During President Trump’s May 2025 visit to the Gulf States, the Administration signed a series of agreements granting regional partners access to cutting-edge AI chips and supporting the construction of state-of-the-art data centers.[246] While the initiative raised concerns over the potential diversion of sensitive technologies to China, some analysts argue that it could bolster American technological influence in the Gulf and redirect regional capital toward U.S. strategic interests.[247]
Another striking policy reversal appears to have been shaped, at least in part, by President Trump’s “deal-making” leadership style. In April 2025, the Administration barred sales of Nvidia’s H20 chip and Advanced Micro Devices’ (AMD) MI308 chip to China, only to reverse course three months later.[248] Some suggested that the reversal was triggered by Beijing’s retaliatory imposition of rare earth export controls.[249] Others believed that the reversal was driven more by intense lobbying from U.S. industry leaders, who argued that the ban risked backfiring by enabling Huawei to gain market share.[250] Reports further suggest that the Administration negotiated with Nvidia and AMD for a 15% cut of revenues from sales to China, ostensibly to offset the federal deficit.[251]
Despite the unprecedented scope and intensity of sanctions and export controls, their long-term efficacy remains highly uncertain. In fact, these export control measures rest on two critical assumptions, both of which are increasingly difficult to sustain. The first is that restrictions must be strictly enforced. A recurring pattern in the history of U.S. sanctions is their tendency to produce only short-term disruptions.[252] While they may initially disrupt targeted sectors, their effectiveness typically diminishes over time as countries adapt, identify loopholes, and mobilize alternative supply chains.[253] Sanctions frequently spur a wave of global arbitrage and incentivize third-party states or firms to backfill the gaps, weakening the intended chokepoint.[254] Given the complexity and global dispersion of supply chains, effective enforcement of export controls requires a multilateral rather than unilateral approach.[255] Yet this objective has proven increasingly difficult. Many allied countries, already wary of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions, have grown more distrustful of American industrial policy and remain guided by distinct economic priorities.[256] The Trump Administration’s abrupt reversal of its chip export policy is likely to deepen mistrust among key allies regarding the credibility and consistency of U.S. commitments to technological containment. At the operational level, enforcement capacity remains a critical vulnerability. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the principal agency tasked with implementing and policing export controls, continues to face significant resource and staffing constraints.[257] These challenges have been further compounded by the Department of Government Efficiency initiative, which dramatically slashed both its personnel and funding.[258]
The second assumption for effective export control is that the target country will face tremendous difficulties in circumventing the restrictions. Historically, much of China’s technological progress had relied on the adoption and diffusion of foreign technologies, which enabled it to rapidly scale its industrial base.[259] The U.S. sanctions and restrictions exposed the fragility of this model and catalyzed a strategic pivot.[260] In response, the Chinese government has significantly increased public investments in foundational technologies and basic research, with the goal of attaining self-sufficiency.[261] U.S. restrictions have also achieved what China’s prior industrial policies struggled to accomplish: aligning the incentives of private firms with the national agenda of self-sufficiency.[262] The abrupt loss of access to critical foreign components forced private firms to recalibrate their commercial strategies, not merely out of patriotic duty but as a matter of commercial survival.[263] As a result, rather than stalling Chinese innovation, U.S. restrictions have inadvertently accelerated it, galvanizing domestic efforts to close critical technological gaps and build a more resilient innovation ecosystem.
The U.S. export control policies have also imposed immediate and significant collateral damage on the American semiconductor industry. Leading firms such as Nvidia, Intel, and Qualcomm derive over $50 billion annually from sales to China, warning that losing this market would erode investment, jobs, and long-term competitiveness.[264] Empirical research has documented the negative consequences for U.S. firms.[265] Despite these concerns, U.S. policymakers continue to defend the effectiveness of their containment strategy.[266] Their central justification is the counterfactual that China would have advanced even more rapidly in the absence of U.S. restrictions.[267] While this counterfactual cannot be empirically verified, recent breakthroughs by firms such as Huawei and DeepSeek suggest the opposite trend: The tighter the containment regime becomes, the narrower the technological gap appears to grow.
Huawei’s trajectory is emblematic of this paradox. Although the company initially suffered serious setbacks following the imposition of U.S. sanctions, it has mounted a remarkable comeback. In 2023, Huawei unveiled the Mate 60 Pro smartphone, powered by a domestically produced seven-nanometer chip developed by SMIC, defying U.S. efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology.[268] At the same time, Huawei expanded its investment in software, accelerating the development of HarmonyOS as a homegrown alternative to Google’s Android system.[269] Further export restrictions—most notably, the U.S. ban on the sale of advanced AI chips to China—have arguably presented Huawei with yet another strategic opportunity to meet the growing domestic demand for AI hardware. A retrospective assessment of Huawei’s trajectory suggests that U.S. sanctions accelerated—rather than stymied—Huawei’s transformation. When first targeted by the Trump Administration in 2017, Huawei was largely a telecommunications and smartphone powerhouse. Today, it has evolved into a diversified technology conglomerate with strategic footholds in semiconductors, cloud computing, AI, smart devices, and EVs.[270] Rather than crippling the company, the export controls have galvanized its innovation agenda and deepened its commitment to self-sufficiency.[271]
Huawei’s comeback underscores another strategic miscalculation: The U.S. emphasis on technological supremacy often overlooks the importance of manufacturing and product diffusion. While the United States excels in frontier research and foundational innovation, China has demonstrated a comparative advantage in scaling, adapting, and diffusing technology across its vast consumer and industrial base.[272] As Jeffrey Ding observed in his historical analysis of past industrial revolutions, it is not necessarily the country that first invents a transformative technology that reaps the largest rewards, but the country that most effectively adopts and spreads that technology throughout its economy.[273] This is particularly the case for technologies such as AI, which are foundational advances that boost productivity only after many sectors of the economy begin to use them.[274] In this light, China’s ability to rapidly commercialize and scale innovation may prove no less consequential than the United States’ edge in originating technological breakthroughs.[275]
The emergence of a Chinese start-up called DeepSeek offers a revealing case study. In December 2024, DeepSeek stunned the international technology community by releasing an open-source large language model whose performance reportedly rivaled that of frontier models developed by leading U.S. firms such as OpenAI.[276] The efficiency gains achieved by DeepSeek and other Chinese firms are, in many ways, a strategic adaptation to the escalating Western export controls.[277] “To reduce reliance on high-end chips from overseas, Chinese AI companies have experimented with novel approaches in algorithms, architecture and training strategies.”[278] Chief among these strategies is a technique known as model distillation—a process in which a smaller, more efficient AI model is trained to replicate the behavior of a larger, more powerful system.[279] DeepSeek reportedly used this approach to extract and reconstitute knowledge from OpenAI’s models, producing a competitive alternative at a fraction of the computational cost.[280]
DeepSeek’s ascent challenges the prevailing assumption that advancing AI development requires massive computing resources. Equally significant is DeepSeek’s decision to open-source its model, thereby democratizing access to cutting-edge AI tools and disrupting the closed ecosystem dominated by U.S. tech giants. Even if DeepSeek’s models still fall short of the most advanced U.S. competitors, they offer good-enough solutions that can still deliver significant value to its users.[281] The low-cost DeepSeek model could therefore appeal to many countries seeking cheap and effective AI tools. It will also significantly drive down the cost of AI training, while increasing the need for deploying AI models, which can be accomplished with less advanced hardware.[282] DeepSeek has collaborated closely with Chinese hardware manufacturers and, as of August 2025, signaled that its AI model will be supported by China’s next generation of domestically produced chips.[283] This development lends credence to earlier warnings from analysts that the open-source DeepSeek model can “redirect the global market toward Chinese chip architectures and Chinese computing frameworks.”[284] In addition to challenging the position of U.S. hardware manufacturers such as Nvidia, DeepSeek’s emergence also has the unintended consequence of challenging the dominance of leading U.S. AI labs. Given that large-scale models can now be reproduced at minimal expense, this casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of current AI training strategies at leading U.S. labs and directly threatens the competitive moats of American firms that have invested years and billions of dollars in AI development.[285]
The cases of Huawei and DeepSeek, as well as China’s various countermeasures, thus prompt some veteran observers to question the logic of U.S. export controls, given the modest strategic gains and high economic and geopolitical costs they appear to incur.[286] Even former Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo acknowledged the futility of a pure containment strategy, stating that “[t]rying to hold China back is a fool’s errand,” and emphasizing that “[t]he only way to beat China is to stay ahead of them.”[287] In fact, the technological gap between Chinese AI hardware manufacturers and their U.S. counterparts has narrowed to such an extent that Chinese regulators have begun prohibiting domestic firms from purchasing certain Nvidia chips.[288] This development offers yet another striking illustration of the boomerang effects generated by U.S. export control policy.
3. Data Flows
For much of its modern history, the United States has viewed the internet as both a driver of economic growth and a conduit for the global spread of democratic values.[289] Rooted in a techno-libertarian ethos, U.S. policy traditionally favored minimal government intervention in cyberspace, emphasizing open networks, free data flows, and private-sector leadership.[290] However, as the strategic significance of personal data has become increasingly apparent, particularly in the context of national security and foreign surveillance, the U.S. government has adopted a markedly more interventionist posture in regulating digital flows.[291] A major turning point came with the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, which expanded the authority of the Executive Branch, particularly CFIUS, beyond traditional controlling investments.[292] More specifically, it authorizes review of noncontrolling stakes in U.S. businesses involving critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data.[293]
In addition to heightened scrutiny over foreign investments involving sensitive data, the Executive has increasingly turned its attention to foreign-owned digital platforms operating at scale within the United States. Among these, TikTok—a widely popular short-form video app—has emerged as the most prominent flashpoint in the debate over the national security risks posed by foreign technology firms.[294] Policymakers have articulated two principal concerns. First is the fear that TikTok collects vast amounts of user data that could be exploited by the Chinese government for surveillance purposes.[295] Second is the perceived risk of algorithmic manipulation: that the CCP could leverage TikTok’s recommendation systems to subtly influence public discourse, shape political narratives, or disseminate disinformation to American users.[296] These concerns stem from TikTok’s ownership by ByteDance, a Beijing-based firm that, under Chinese law, may be compelled to cooperate with state authorities and intelligence services.[297]
In August 2020, amid escalating tensions over China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump issued an executive order directing ByteDance to divest TikTok’s U.S. operations or face a ban.[298] While this move was framed as a necessary step to protect national security, some observers have posited the real reason was the Administration’s hostility toward China and Trump’s unhappiness with certain anti-Trump content hosted by the app.[299] Although Trump’s executive order was later struck down by the federal courts, the President also relied on the Executive Branch’s long-standing authority through CFIUS to exert pressure on ByteDance to divest its assets.[300] In response to U.S. national security concerns, TikTok proposed “Project Texas,” an extensive data localization and governance scheme intended to insulate U.S. user data from Chinese influence.[301] Nonetheless, these safeguards failed to reassure CFIUS.[302] Critics argue that despite technical protections and corporate restructuring, ByteDance’s ultimate control over the platform renders it vulnerable to covert influence from Beijing.[303] These concerns are not unfounded, because data’s intangibility and replicability make it exceptionally difficult to secure.[304]
In April 2024, Congress enacted, and President Joseph Biden signed, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), which significantly expanded the authority of the Executive in restricting a foreign digital company’s access to U.S. data.[305] The law explicitly designates all applications offered by ByteDance, TikTok, and their subsidiaries as “foreign adversary controlled application[s]” that require either divestiture or banning.[306] TikTok and its users challenged the PAFACA in court, primarily on the grounds that the law had violated the First Amendment by suppressing the speech of U.S. content creators based on an asserted government interest.[307] In January 2025, the Supreme Court declined to overturn the law, despite the lack of public evidence from the government to support its claim.[308] In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court has deferred substantially to the government’s judgment that the proposed mitigation measures were inadequate to address its cybersecurity concerns.[309]
Even as presidential authority over data flows has expanded dramatically, the Executive Branch’s stance on their regulation has remained strikingly unpredictable. In a dramatic turn of events, President Trump issued an executive order granting TikTok an additional seventy-five-day reprieve to identify a potential U.S. buyer, which he later extended four times.[310] The abrupt reversal in his stance appeared to be driven less by national security considerations than by personal and political motivations. Trump offered an unusually candid justification for the delay, stating that banning TikTok would benefit Facebook—a company that he “[does]n’t want . . . doing better”—by enabling it to “double their business.”[311] Observers noted that Trump had amassed a significant base of Gen Z supporters on TikTok and speculated that maintaining access to this demographic may have influenced his decision.[312] Others pointed to the influence of Jeff Yass, a billionaire investor with a major stake in ByteDance, who had contributed millions of dollars to Republican politicians opposing the ban and had reportedly repaired his relationship with Trump in the lead-up to the reversal.[313]
Thus far, both Congress and the courts have leaned toward more categorical solutions—namely, forced divestiture or outright bans.[314] However, this zero-tolerance approach has generated risks of its own. Within forty-eight hours of the initial reports of a potential TikTok ban in the United States, over 700,000 American users migrated to alternative Chinese-owned platforms such as RedNote.[315] Unlike TikTok, which has invested heavily in localization and compliance, RedNote is headquartered in China, stores its data on Chinese servers, and remains fully subject to the Chinese government’s surveillance apparatus.[316] This significantly heightened rather than mitigated the concerns about the data security of these American users.[317] While the U.S. government could, in theory, extend similar restrictions to RedNote under the PAFACA, such measures risk triggering a cascading cycle of bans and platform switching.[318] Displaced users may simply shift to other Chinese-owned apps, many of which operate with even fewer compliance safeguards.[319] Tech-savvy users may circumvent bans using VPNs, and enforcement could devolve into a game of regulatory whack-a-mole.[320] The broader implication is clear: In the absence of a coherent and feasible regulatory framework for foreign digital platforms, the United States risks building its own version of the Great Firewall, while doing little to meaningfully enhance national security.
Selling TikTok is not risk free, either. Although President Trump’s stance on banning TikTok has at times appeared inconsistent, he remained consistent in his efforts to compel ByteDance to divest its U.S. operations.[321] However, in a move that significantly complicated the U.S. strategy, the Chinese government updated its export control law in 2020 to restrict the transfer of certain AI interface technologies, including the core recommendation algorithms used by ByteDance in TikTok.[322] Under these new rules, ByteDance is required to obtain government approval before transferring such technologies overseas.[323] In practice, this amendment effectively granted Beijing veto power over any proposed divestiture of TikTok’s core technological assets.[324] In September 2025, the White House announced a deal with China to establish a U.S.-based joint venture, majority-owned by American investors, to manage the data and algorithms of TikTok’s U.S. operations.[325] Yet TikTok’s U.S. platform will probably require periodic algorithmic updates from ByteDance to remain current and competitive, raising unresolved questions about whether the joint venture can ensure the security of such updates.[326] Moreover, the divestiture creates a new vulnerability for Washington, because Beijing’s residual control over TikTok’s algorithms allows it to wield licensing authority as a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Washington.[327]
The TikTok controversy is only the most prominent example of America’s legal gambit to restrict cross-border data flows. In February 2024, the Biden Administration issued an executive order aimed at restricting the transfer of bulk sensitive data to so-called “countries of concern.”[328] The Department of Justice, which was tasked with establishing and implementing regulations, issued a final rule in December 2024.[329] Meanwhile, the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024 (PADFA) also made it unlawful for data brokers to sell personal data of U.S. individuals to a foreign adversary country or an entity controlled by such a country.[330] Given the myriad loopholes and enforcement challenges associated with the new restrictions on bulk data transfers, data privacy experts have expressed deep skepticism about whether the national securitization of personal data can meaningfully achieve its stated objectives.[331] It remains unclear how the emerging compliance regime will ultimately reshape data flows between the United States and China. However, what is increasingly evident is a shift in the U.S. government’s approach from a targeted focus on select Chinese firms to a broader regulatory posture that purports to assess “threats through rigorous, evidence-based analysis.”[332] This evolution has raised significant concerns among legal scholars and policy experts, who warn that such expansive restrictions may provoke retaliatory measures and inadvertently harm U.S. economic and strategic interests.[333] More broadly, U.S. actions may encourage other countries to adopt reciprocal data localization measures that end up hurting the interests of U.S. tech firms overseas.[334]
4. Talent Flows
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long characterized China’s intelligence activity as “a grave threat to the economic well-being and democratic values of the United States.”[335] The Bureau disclosed that it maintains thousands of open counterintelligence cases related to China, with new investigations launched nearly every day.[336] In 2017, a report released by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that intellectual property theft cost the U.S. economy up to $600 billion annually, with China identified as the principal source.[337] While this figure was widely cited in congressional hearings, policy reports, and national security briefings to underscore the urgency of the threat, critics have also challenged the evidentiary basis of these claims.[338] Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI have expressed a growing concern about the “nontraditional collectors”—a term referring to university professors, researchers, and students suspected of illicitly transferring U.S. technology and trade secrets to the Chinese government.[339] In 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a “China Initiative” program that sought to target individuals and entities accused of engaging in activities detrimental to U.S. interests, including trade secret theft, unauthorized technology transfers, and academic espionage.[340] Although the initiative purported to focus on trade secret theft and unauthorized technology acquisition, the program quickly expanded to sweep in a wide array of alleged misconduct that bore little connection to espionage.[341] In response to growing public and academic backlash, the DOJ formally terminated the China Initiative in 2022, citing concerns over its implementation and unintended effects.[342]
The end of the China Initiative eased concerns about racial profiling but did little to reverse the broader trend of tightening restrictions on talent flows from China. This phenomenon reflects the expansive power of the Executive Branch, which exercises near-plenary authority over visa policy, granting wide discretion in the issuance, revocation, and renewal of visas for foreign students and scholars—often with little transparency or judicial oversight.[343] “[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have routinely held that many protections afforded by the [U.S.] Constitution . . . do not apply to non-citizens physically located outside of the United States,” and thus “foreign nationals have limited due process rights.”[344] Since June 2018, the State Department has restricted visas for Chinese students studying in sensitive research areas to just one year, as opposed to the normal five-year validity.[345] In 2020, Trump issued a sweeping proclamation that suspended entry for students who either received funding from, or were employed by, an entity that supports China’s military–civil fusion strategy.[346] The proclamation was issued pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which authorizes the President to bar entry of foreign nationals by proclamation upon finding that their entry would be detrimental to U.S. interests.[347] Although Section 212(f) has been part of the INA since 1952, President Trump was the first to invoke this authority on a sweeping and sustained basis—not only to restrict the entry of Chinese students and researchers but also to impose a series of far-reaching visa bans targeting nationals from several Muslim-majority countries.[348]
Experts have noted that this development represents a significant departure from—and expansion of—previous visa screening practices.[349] Traditionally, the State Department relied on the interagency “MANTIS” clearance process, a long-standing practice to protect against the transfer of sensitive technology.[350] However, Trump’s 2020 proclamation categorically bans visas for Chinese graduate students not based on their individual risk assessments, but on the universities they attended in China. As a consequence, it excludes many students based on past or minimal association with Chinese entities even if they pass the interagency clearance process.[351] Despite the criticisms of this program, this visa policy was also maintained and even widened under former President Biden, offering another example of the strong institutional momentum behind the containment policy.[352] A think tank estimated that between three and five thousand Chinese students and researchers in STEM areas could be excluded annually.[353]
In May 2025, amid a sweeping campaign to reshape American higher education, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the United States would “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.”[354] Notably, the INA grants vast discretionary authority to the Secretary of State to revoke a visa after its issuance.[355] Once a visa is revoked, the student could face heightened risks of deportation.[356] This announcement sent shockwaves through the American higher education community.[357] Even Greg Milonovich, a former FBI agent who managed the counterintelligence division’s academic alliance program, admitted that the policy seemed to be too heavy-handed.[358]
Just two weeks after Secretary Rubio’s announcement, President Trump declared that Chinese international students would, in fact, remain welcome in the United States.[359] Trump’s transactional style of leadership again appears to have played a major role in this dramatic policy swing. Reports suggest that the abrupt reversal was motivated by the effort to induce Beijing to ease its restrictions on rare-earth mineral exports.[360] As with tariffs, export controls, and data flow restrictions, visa policy is now deployed as a strategic instrument within the broader context of U.S.–China trade negotiations.[361] This episode underscores once again the persistent volatility that characterizes U.S. policy toward China.
Even where the U.S. government may possess legitimate concerns about espionage involving Chinese academics and students, severing such ties imposes substantial costs. The scale of U.S.–China scientific interdependence underscores the magnitude of the disruption. For over two decades, China has been the leading foreign source of scientific talent in the United States.[362] Chinese students comprise a quarter of all international students and contributed $14.3 billion to the U.S. economy in 2023.[363] One study estimates that blocking just 1,000 such students could cost the U.S. economy $210 billion in lost patent value and nearly $1 billion in tuition revenue over a decade.[364]
International Chinese graduate students and postdoctoral researchers—historically a vital source of talent for U.S. STEM fields—are showing declining interest in pursuing long-term careers in the United States.[365] A recent report by Tsinghua University, widely regarded as China’s premier scientific institution, revealed that the proportion of its graduates choosing to study in the United States fell sharply from 11% in 2018 to just 3% in 2021, while this downward trend did not occur with respect to other destinations such as the United Kingdom or Singapore.[366] Many U.S. institutions now face growing difficulty in recruiting international graduate students in STEM areas, particularly from China.[367] Cutting academic ties with China will also likely undermine the United States’ ability to invent foundational technologies, which often arise from “pioneering explorations in U.S. university laboratories.”[368] Empirical research conducted by scholars at the University of California, San Diego shows that U.S. government efforts to limit academic ties with China have likely contributed to a decline in the quality of U.S. scientific output and a slowdown in progress across key fields of research.[369]
This emerging pattern of “human decoupling” carries significant long-term risks for the United States and may inadvertently accelerate China’s ascent in key scientific and technological domains.[370] A 2022 analysis by the Chicago-based think tank MacroPolo found that Chinese researchers accounted for nearly 47% of the world’s top AI talent, a dramatic increase from just 29% in 2019.[371] Meanwhile, Chinese AI researchers and engineers are increasingly rejecting offers from Silicon Valley firms in favor of opportunities in China, citing frustrations with U.S. immigration policy and a perceived climate of hostility.[372] For example, DeepSeek was able to recruit top-tier talent directly from China’s elite universities such as Tsinghua University and Peking University.[373] This shift is not limited to AI. China is also advancing up the value chain in biotechnology, evolving from a low-cost manufacturing hub into a center of cutting-edge research and innovation.[374] One major driver of this transformation has been the return of U.S.-trained Chinese scientists. Over the past decade, these researchers have seeded high-level biotech clusters in cities such as Shanghai, catalyzing a shift in global research leadership. In this context, these various anti-espionage policies may end up helping accelerate China’s scientific and technological rise.[375]
Taken together, U.S. efforts to curb China’s rise have produced mixed results across the four major policy areas discussed above. Although some measures have temporarily slowed China’s progress, they have also inadvertently accelerated it—prompting Beijing to double down on indigenous innovation, expand state-led industrial policy, and encourage top talent to remain in, or return to, China.
IV. Predictions and Implications
The foregoing analysis suggests that the current trajectory of U.S. policy toward China is shaped not only by ideology, economics, and geopolitics, but also by the institutional architecture of America’s legal containment strategies. Absent bold reform of its constitutional order governing foreign affairs and national security, the United States is likely to move toward an ever-closer convergence with China’s authoritarian model of regulatory governance.
Institutions, however, are sticky. Since the first Trump Administration, many academics, industry experts, and think tanks have raised serious concerns about the long-term efficacy and strategic wisdom of the United States’ containment approach toward China.[376] In parallel with the foregoing critiques, leading constitutional scholars and policy experts have also called for sweeping constitutional reforms to rein in the expansive and often unchecked powers of the U.S. presidency in foreign affairs.[377] In practice, however, they have made little political headway. Even President Biden, who campaigned in 2020 on a platform of restoring democratic norms and curbing executive overreach, continued to rely heavily on emergency powers to shape U.S. foreign policy.[378] Why, then, have these thoughtful reform efforts been so roundly ignored, even by those who profess a commitment to restoring institutional balance?
The answer lies in an information deficit: Many of the U.S. policies toward China do not produce immediate or visible costs, thereby delaying public awareness. Consider the case of tariffs. Although it is clear that tariffs raise consumer prices, their overall contribution to economy-wide inflation has been limited.[379] A 2019 analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco estimated that the first three rounds of tariffs on Chinese goods imposed by the first Trump Administration increased aggregate consumer prices by only 0.1 percentage points.[380] Subsequent tariff increases, including the escalation to a 25% rate on many imports, were projected to raise prices by another 0.3 percentage points.[381] In the broader context of pandemic-driven demand shifts, supply chain disruptions, and expansive fiscal and monetary policies, tariffs therefore remained a minor component of recent inflationary pressures.[382] Indeed, ahead of the 2024 election, Biden’s economic advisors projected that lifting tariffs on Chinese imports would produce only modest reductions in consumer prices.[383] This muted impact has helped justify the Administration’s decision to preserve key components of the Trump-era tariff regime, despite the Democratic Party’s historical skepticism toward unilateral trade measures.[384] Moreover, the lag between the imposition of tariffs and any discernible gains in domestic manufacturing creates a political window in which adverse effects can be reframed as transitional setbacks. This delay allows political leaders, particularly President Trump, to deflect accountability for economic underperformance, potentially postponing public judgment until long after he leaves office.
Even when sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports pose the potential for discernible economic shocks, other instruments of technological decoupling such as sanctions, export controls, and visa restrictions operate with far less transparency and public scrutiny. Their long-term costs are diffuse, deferred, and largely insulated from rigorous risk assessment or democratic oversight. A crisis, however, has the potential to shift public opinion. For instance, a prolonged trade war with China culminating in a recession could awaken a broader segment of the American public to the costs of the current containment strategy. Moreover, President Trump’s maximalist approach to executive authority has provoked resistance across multiple institutional fronts, including the federal bureaucracy, the Judiciary, and the academic community.[385] As the consequences of presidential unilateralism become more visible, they may prompt a broader public reckoning over the appropriate scope of executive authority in the United States.[386] The end of a second Trump term could mark a pivotal inflection point, spurring renewed efforts to reinforce institutional checks on executive authority and to restore a more balanced separation of powers. Then America may experience another “China shock”—this time around it is not a shock to its economic system, but a shock to its constitutional order.[387]
V. Conclusion
This Article has examined the deepening tensions between the United States and China through a supply-side institutional lens, focusing on how domestic political and legal institutions have shaped U.S. responses to trade imbalances and China’s geopolitical ascent. A central insight is that, in seeking to curb China’s rise, the United States has increasingly come to mirror its rival across three core dimensions of regulatory governance: structure, process, and outcome. Structurally, decision-making has become ever more centralized in the Executive Branch—particularly the presidency—which has aggressively pushed the boundaries of its authority through novel and expansive interpretations of statutory powers. The policy process, in turn, has been marked by striking volatility, driven as much by partisan dynamics and personal incentives as by shifting calculations of national interest. This institutional dynamic has produced paradoxical consequences: While it has imposed substantial costs on Chinese firms and slowed their progress, it has also generated boomerang effects, particularly when successive Administrations prioritize short-term political gains over a coherent, long-term strategy. Meanwhile, this institutional pattern creates a feedback loop in which expanded executive power enables sweeping precautionary measures, fuels strong momentum toward containment, bolsters China’s push for self-sufficiency, provokes aggressive retaliation from Beijing, and ultimately compels more intrusive state intervention in the U.S. economy.
America’s current strategy of containment starkly illustrates the perils of an overly securitized approach to foreign policy. Framed as a response to national security concerns, the deployment of tariffs, export controls, and data and talent flow restrictions has led to a cascade of unintended and increasingly counterproductive consequences. Far from halting China’s technological rise, these measures have, in many instances, catalyzed its efforts to localize supply chains, accelerate indigenous innovation, and reduce dependence on Western inputs. More troubling still, in seeking to constrain its strategic rival, the United States risks undermining the very liberal-democratic foundations that have long underpinned its global leadership: the rule of law and an open society that has long attracted the world’s most talented minds. Absent a fundamental reorientation that reconsiders not only the substance of its China policy but also the institutional logic enabling it, America risks incurring costs so profound that it ends up containing itself.
Graham T. Allison et al., Is the U.S.-China Relationship the Most Consequential Relationship for America in the World?, Brookings (Feb. 6, 2024), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-us-china-relationship-the-most-consequential-relationship-for-america-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/FQ8Y-ULCZ\].
Id.; see also White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance 8 (2021), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CYC-ZB77\] (“[China] is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”).
Allison et al., supra note 1.
Paul Scharre, America Can Win the AI Race, Foreign Affs. (Apr. 4, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ai-america-can-win-race [https://perma.cc/H5ZP-PEA6\] (noting that technology is “critical to determining which countries dominate global politics”); L. Rafael Reif, America’s Coming Brain Drain, Foreign Affs. (May 6, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-universities-war-america-coming-brain-drain [https://perma.cc/3JDX-9MRJ\] (quoting President Xi’s 2024 speech declaring that technology is now “the frontline and main battlefield of international competition”).
US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering, Bloomberg News (Oct. 30, 2024, at 05:00 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-us-china-containment/ [https://perma.cc/8MBF-XBCJ\]; Camille Boullenois, Malcolm Black & Daniel H. Rosen, Rhodium Grp., Was Made in China 2025 Successful? 5, 73, 75, 77 (May 5, 2025), https://rhg.com/research/was-made-in-china-2025-successful/ [https://perma.cc/QW2D-5A3B\].
Jon Bateman, U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework 15–16 (2022), https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Bateman_US-China_Decoupling_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEM5-64ZY\]; Gina M. Raimondo, U.S. Sec’y of Com., Remarks on the U.S. Competitiveness and the China Challenge, U.S. Dep’t of Com. (Nov. 30, 2022), https://www.commerce.gov/news/speeches/2022/11/remarks-us-secretary-commerce-gina-raimondo-us-competitiveness-and-china [https://perma.cc/X9CY-EFYJ\].
Noah Berman, Lindsay Maizland & Andrew Chatzky, Is China’s Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security?, Council on Foreign Rels. (Feb. 8, 2023, at 13:00 CT), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-huawei-threat-us-national-security [https://perma.cc/7BHS-SSZT\].
Kara Frederick, The Heritage Found., TikTok Generation: A CCP Official in Every Pocket 4–5 (2023), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/BG3757.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDF8-DNFU\].
Christiaan Hetzner, Chinese Electric Vehicles Could Be ‘Weaponized’ and Should Be Banned from Government Use, Report Warns, Fortune (Sep. 17, 2024, at 04:31 ET), https://fortune.com/2024/09/17/china-evs-csri-europe-electric-vehicles-cybersecurity-risk/ [https://perma.cc/V44A-WPM3\]; Aarian Marshall & Will Knight, The White House Warns Cars Made in China Could Unleash Chaos on US Highways, Wired (Feb. 29, 2024, at 05:00 CT), https://www.wired.com/story/china-cars-national-security-threat-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/H3G3-JY8N\].
Ryan Lucas, Wray Warns Chinese Hackers Are Aiming to ‘Wreak Havoc’ on U.S. Critical Infrastructure, NPR (Jan. 31, 2024, at 14:01 ET), https://www.npr.org/2024/01/31/1228153857/wray-chinese-hackers-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/K4EL-RNTT\]; Ken Dilanian, Summer Concepcion & Kyla Guilfoil, FBI Director Warns Chinese Hackers Aim to ‘Wreak Havoc’ on U.S. Critical Infrastructure, NBC News (Jan. 31, 2024, at 13:36 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/fbi-director-warn-chinese-hackers-aim-wreak-havoc-us-critical-infrastr-rcna136524 [https://perma.cc/8X57-EFYL\].
WTAS: Joint Investigation into CCP-Backed Company Supplying Cranes to U.S. Ports Reveals Shocking Findings, Comm. on Homeland Sec. (Mar. 12, 2024), https://homeland.house.gov/2024/03/12/wtas-joint-investigation-intoccp-backed-company-supplying-cranes-to-u-s-ports-reveals-shocking-findings/ [https://perma.cc/J85W-DKQ9\]; Sean Lyngaas, Congressional Probe Finds Communications Gear in Chinese Cranes, Raising Spying Concerns, CNN: Pol. (Mar. 8, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/congressional-probe-communications-gear-chinese-cranes [https://perma.cc/ZMY6-D2R6\].
Dan Cadman, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., How U.S. Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor Policies Undercut National Security 6–10 (2019), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/cadman-foreign-students-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5P5-M8KE\].
Bateman, supra note 6, at 14–16, 21, 31, 69–70.
Id. at 18–19, 27, 31, 36; Joseph Majkut et al., Experts React: Energy and Trade Implications of Tariffs on Chinese Imports, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (May 14, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-energy-and-trade-implications-tariffs-chinese-imports [https://perma.cc/CA2P-LVMG\].
David Shepardson, US House Passes Bill to Force ByteDance to Divest TikTok or Face Ban, Reuters (Mar. 13, 2024, at 22:42 CDT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-house-vote-force-bytedance-divest-tiktok-or-face-ban-2024-03-13/ [https://perma.cc/6QVK-U93V\].
Layvon Q. Washington, The George Washington Univ. Regul. Stud. Ctr., CFIUS and the Pace of Technological Advancement 1–3 (Dec. 14, 2022), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs4751/files/2022-12/cfius_and_pace_of_tech_advancement_commentary_final3.pdf [https://perma.cc/938C-EWHX\]; Jason C. Chipman et al., Biden Administration Finalizes Controls on U.S. Investment in China, WilmerHale (Nov. 4, 2024), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20241104-biden-administration-finalizes-controls-on-us-investment-in-china [https://perma.cc/XR5S-DWJ2\].
Yiqin Shen & Lydia Beyoud, Chinese Stocks Trading in the US Face an Old Foe: Delisting, Bloomberg (Apr. 15, 2025, at 13:28 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-15/chinese-stocks-trading-in-the-us-face-an-old-foe-delisting [https://perma.cc/VLW4-RLQ7\]; Jesse M. Fried & Tamar Groswald Ozery, The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable (HFCA) Act: A Critique, 14 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 257, 269–73, 276 (2024).
Yu Xie et al., Caught in the Crossfire: Fears of Chinese-American Scientists, PNAS, July 4, 2023, at 1, 2–4, https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2216248120 [https://perma.cc/2ME7-53AX\].
Mitch Ambrose, US to ‘Aggressively Revoke’ Visas Held by Chinese Students, Am. Inst. of Physics: FYI: Sci. Pol’y News (May 30, 2025), https://www.aip.org/fyi/us-to-aggressively-revoke-visas-held-by-chinese-students [https://perma.cc/4PWC-KPJW\].
Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affs., Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan in Press Conference, Beijing, People’s Republic of China, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in China (Aug. 29, 2024), https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/remarks-by-apnsa-jake-sullivan-in-press-conference-beijing-peoples-republic-of-china/ [https://perma.cc/Y66U-V446\]; Geoffrey Gertz, Goodbye to Small Yard, High Fence, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/opinion/china-semiconductor-biden-xi.html [https://perma.cc/X3VL-4AEK\] (“[Small yard, high fence] means that sensitive technologies should be kept within a yard protected by a high fence of trade and investment controls. But the yard should be small, limited to a narrow set of advanced technologies with military applications, while broader commercial trade and investment with China would continue.”).
Keith Bradsher, China’s Leader, with Rare Bluntness, Blames U.S. Containment for Troubles, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/asia/china-us-xi-jinping.html [https://perma.cc/DQY2-AJNG\].
See, e.g., David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 2121, 2159 (2013); David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, Ann. Rev. Econ., 2016, at 205, 214–17; Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment, 106 Am. Econ. Rev. 1632, 1633–34, 1656–58 (2016); James J. Feigenbaum & Andrew B. Hall, How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition, 77 J. Pol. 1012, 1012–13, 1025–28 (2015); J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis P. Quinn & Stephen Weymouth, Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting, 71 Int’l Org. 423, 423–24, 426 (2017); David Autor et al., Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure, 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 3139, 3176–77 (2020); Yi Che et al., Did Trade Liberalization with China Influence US Elections?, J. Int’l Econ., July 6, 2022, at 1, 5, 20.
See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 19, 166, 400, 402 (2001); Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? 39–40 (2017); Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security 92–93 (2012); Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism 1–2, 12–13, 108 (2018); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power 38–39 (2015); Kori Schake, How International Hegemony Changes Hands, Cato Unbound (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/03/05/kori-schake/how-international-hegemony-changes-hands [https://perma.cc/5ENL-72QV\].
See, e.g., John Seungmin Kuk, Deborah Seligsohn & Jiakun Jack Zhang, From Tiananmen to Outsourcing: The Effect of Rising Import Competition on Congressional Voting Towards China, 27 J. Contemp. China 103, 109–15, 117 (2018) (providing an empirical study on congressional response to China shock); Mark Jia, American Law in the New Global Conflict, 99 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 636, 685–86, 688–90 (2024) (observing the overreach of China-related presidential orders under President Trump); Anupam Chander & Paul Schwartz, The President’s Authority over Cross-Border Data Flows, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1989, 2010–15, 2017 (2024) (revealing a significant expansion of presidential authority in regulating cross-border data flows); Anu Bradford, Eileen Li & Matthew C. Waxman, How Domestic Institutions Shape the Global Tech War, 16 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 75, 87–104 (2025) (explaining how the U.S. domestic institutions are shaping its policy toward semiconductors).
See infra Part II.
See also Bateman, supra note 6, at 14–15 (explaining the various defensive and offensive measures employed by the Trump and Biden Administrations to advance a hardline agenda against China, including export controls, investment restrictions, sanctions, and visa restrictions).
Daniel W. Drezner, How Everything Became National Security, Foreign Affs. (Aug. 12, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-everything-became-national-security-drezner [https://perma.cc/5H6H-CHUL\] (observing that “the definition of national security has been stretched almost beyond recognition”).
Id.; see also Scott Kennedy, How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired, Foreign Affs. (Nov. 26, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-americas-war-chinese-tech-backfired [https://perma.cc/A8UG-NJ5T\] (highlighting the diverse goals of the U.S. restrictions toward China).
See infra Part II.
Angela Huyue Zhang, High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy 25 (2024).
Id.
Id. at 23, 28, 31, 64.
Id. at 43, 64–65, 152, 248 (noting that the dynamic pyramid model of regulation is inherently fragile due to its tendency to produce significant side effects and its susceptibility to substantial information lags).
See Daniel W. Drezner, The Toddler in Chief: What Donald Trump Teaches Us About the Modern Presidency 67–70 (2020).
President Bill Clinton, Speech on China Trade Bill (Mar. 9, 2000), https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm [https://perma.cc/G95D-LVU6\]. See generally Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 Harv. Int’l L.J. 261 (2016) (explaining that U.S. policymakers supported China’s WTO accession in part because they believed China would converge toward existing market-based economic models).
What Happened When China Joined the WTO?, Council on Foreign Rels.: Educ. (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.cfr.org/education/learn/reading/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto [https://perma.cc/Y22F-8FL8\].
Michael B. G. Froman, China Has Already Remade the International System: How the World Adopted Beijing’s Economic Playbook, Foreign Affs. (Mar. 25, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/economics-china-international-system-tariffs-michael-froman [https://perma.cc/6N6T-KJVC\] (observing that the United States’ evolving China strategy, once rooted in liberal engagement but now increasingly shaped by protectionist imperatives, has begun to resemble “Chinese policy with American characteristics”); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Angela Huyue Zhang, Lawless State Capitalism Is No Answer to China’s Rise, Project Syndicate (Sep. 17, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-state-capitalism-lawless-and-no-answer-to-china-rivalry-by-curtis-j-milhaupt-and-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-09 [https://perma.cc/5ENT-ZNT6\] (arguing that the United States risks reproducing Chinese state capitalism by increasingly intervening in private industry and directing investment through the state).
Wang Xiangwei, Thanks to Trump, US Threat of a ‘Peaceful Evolution’ Recedes for China, S. China Morning Post (June 8, 2025, at 20:30 CT), https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3313380/thanks-trump-us-threat-peaceful-evolution-recedes-china [https://perma.cc/WG5C-PGVQ\].
See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The End of the Long American Century: Trump and the Sources of U.S. Power, Foreign Affs., July/Aug. 2025, at 68, 70, 79; see also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of American Soft Power, Project Syndicate (May 16, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-future-of-american-soft-power-by-joseph-s-nye-2025-05 [https://perma.cc/F7R9-Y26G\] (arguing that America is undermining its own soft power by abandoning its liberal values and institutions that once made it attractive and credible to other countries).
Kurt M. Campbell & Jake Sullivan, Competition Without Catastrophe, Foreign Affs. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/competition-with-china-catastrophe-sullivan-campbell [https://perma.cc/FL5X-CFA4\]. See generally Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence (2021) (arguing that U.S. strategy must move beyond Cold War and Japan-era analogies to reflect the interdependent character of contemporary U.S.–China competition); Minghao Zhao, Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on U.S.–China Strategic Competition, 12 Chinese J. Int’l Pol. 371, 380–81 (2019) (surveying Chinese scholarly perspectives on the U.S.–China rivalry and warning against the analytical distortions of a new Cold War frame).
See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 6, at 9 (analyzing technology decoupling); Ashley Deeks & Kristen E. Eichensehr, Frictionless Government and Foreign Relations, 110 Va. L. Rev. 1815, 1818–19 (2024) (focusing on executive coordination across agencies); cf. Drezner, supra note 27 (mapping the expansion of national-security framing but not analyzing institutional convergence).
See infra Part II.
Bateman, supra note 6, at 10, 37, 48–51.
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 5–7, 16 (2010); Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State 10–12, 15, 35 (2018).
Donald C. Clarke, Order and Law in China, 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev. 541, 546–48, 552; see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 418, 421 (2012).
Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, Soc’y, Jan. 1998, at 23, 23–26; Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1089, 1096 (1999); cf. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897, 1906, 1918–19 (2015) (arguing that courts should embrace the “normalization” of foreign relations law as the prevailing paradigm and documenting its development over the past twenty-five years).
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 279–80, 284 (1973).
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1291, 1318 (1988).
Ackerman, supra note 44, at 4, 15, 38, 40.
Bob Bauer & Jack Goldsmith, After Trump: Reconstructing the Presidency 4, 10 (2020).
Zhang, supra note 30, at 9, 23, 25.
See, e.g., Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership 8, 13, 19 (2016); Economy, supra note 44, at 25–27.
Li, supra note 52, at 12–14.
See generally Mercator Inst. for China Stud., China’s Core Executive: Leadership Styles, Structures and Processes Under Xi Jinping (Sebastian Heilmann & Matthias Stepan eds., 2016), https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/MPOC_ChinasCoreExecutive_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN4L-7HJH\] (documenting the reorganization of top-level decision-making under Xi Jinping and the erosion of the collective-leadership norms established in the post-Mao era).
Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 Va. J. Int’l L. 306, 352–55 (2019).
Id. at 353.
Cary Huang, How Leading Small Groups Help Xi Jinping and Other Party Leaders Exert Power, S. China Morning Post (Jan. 20, 2014, at 05:50 CT), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1409118/how-leading-small-groups-help-xi-jinping-and-other-party-leaders-exert [https://perma.cc/7KQS-2BTZ\].
Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics 146–48, 157–58, 176–77 (2021).
Susan L. Shirk, The Return to Personalistic Rule, J. Democracy, Apr. 2018, at 22, 23.
Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President, Council on Foreign Rels. (Mar. 2, 2017, at 14:28 CT), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president/ [https://perma.cc/R8U2-X8N5\]; Linda L. Fowler, The Long Decline of Congressional Oversight and How Democrats Can Bring it Back, Foreign Affs. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/long-decline-congressional-oversight [https://perma.cc/Z4L2-DYRB\].
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132, 137–38 (1999); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 45, at 440–44.
Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, When Congress Checks Out, Foreign Affs., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 67, 68, 70; see also Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, at 31–33, 35 (2012) (explaining the history of congressional oversight of the Executive and how it has continued to shrink).
Moe & Howell, supra note 61, at 141; Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “the Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 765, 769–72 (2009).
Koh, supra note 48, at 1263, 1291.
Bauer & Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 8, 19 (noting the hurdles for courts to adjudicate the legality of presidential action, including standing, the political question doctrine, the absence of a cause of action, the secrecy of presidential action, and more).
President Trump’s executive order to grant TikTok extended deadlines is one example. Although this controversial decision appears in conflict with legal requirements, no legal challenge materialized. See Alex Lawson, Trump Treads into Murky Waters with TikTok Gambit, Law360 (Jan. 24, 2025, at 13:35 ET), https://www.law360.com/articles/2288181/trump-treads-into-murky-waters-with-tiktok-gambit [https://perma.cc/HST8-DH8S\].
Kristen E. Eichensehr & Cathy Hwang, National Security Creep in Corporate Transactions, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 549, 584 (2023). For instance, plaintiffs must establish standing by demonstrating that they were injured by the alleged executive actions and show the likelihood that the court can provide them relief. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Another form of judicial restraint arises from the “political question” doctrine, under which courts decline to rule on a question if the judges believe its resolution is beyond the Judiciary’s institutional competence. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 311 (2010) (concluding, after reviewing more than fifty reported cases applying the Youngstown framework, that presidential action falling within Category One “verges on immunity from judicial challenge”). See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1361 (2009) (explaining the Executive’s superior epistemic competence and institutional competence).
Eichensehr & Hwang, supra note 67, at 591–92.
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 304–06, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Eichensehr & Hwang, supra note 67, at 591.
Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 316.
Id. at 304, 314 (holding that while the court could review for procedural due process, the President’s national-security judgments are not subject to judicial review).
Vanessa Ortblad, Criminal Prosecution in Sheep’s Clothing: The Punitive Effects of OFAC Freezing Sanctions, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1439, 1448–49 (2008).
James Brower & Nicholas Weigel, Are CFIUS Decisions Legally Vulnerable?, Lawfare (Jan. 16, 2025, at 10:14 CT), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/are-cfius-decisions-legally-vulnerable [https://perma.cc/S4JE-Z57V\]; see also Chander & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 2041 (noting that most companies targeted by CFIUS abide by the Committee’s orders and Ralls is the only one that directly challenged CFIUS); Michael D. Sutherland, Peter J. Benson & Clare Y. Cho, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R48023, TikTok: Frequently Asked Questions and Issues for Congress 9 (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48023 [https://perma.cc/5KNX-QUWT\] (noting that TikTok and ByteDance challenged the presidential divestment order and that the case was held in abeyance at the parties’ request).
See Xiaomi Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., No. 21-280, 2021 WL 950144, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021); Luokung Tech. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 538 F. Supp. 3d 174, 178–79 (D.D.C. 2021).
Luokung Tech. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 3d at 178, 182.
Id. at 195.
U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 916, 926–27 (N.D. Cal. 2020); TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 96–97 (D.D.C. 2020); Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624, 628–30, 645 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
TikTok Inc., 507 F. Supp. 3d at 108; Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 636.
U.S. WeChat Users All., 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927–28; TikTok Inc., 507 F. Supp. 3d at 114.
See infra Section III.B.
Christian C. Contardo, DOD’s Expanding List of Chinese Military Companies, Morgan Lewis (Jan. 22, 2025), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2025/01/dods-expanding-list-of-chinese-military-companies [https://perma.cc/6EWV-24F5\].
Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc. China, Company Statement of Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc. China, PR Newswire (Feb. 5, 2024, at 08:08 CT), https://www.prnewswire.com/apac/news-releases/company-statement-of-advanced-micro-fabrication-equipment-inc-china-302052736.html [https://perma.cc/T4ZQ-ZSQV\].
Eduardo Baptista, Shares of AMEC Jump After Removal from US’s ‘China Military Company’ List, Reuters (Dec. 18, 2024, at 01:27 CT), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/shares-amec-jump-after-removal-uss-china-military-company-list-2024-12-18/ [https://perma.cc/8AWR-BG8J\].
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance with Section 1260H of the William M. (“Mac”) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) (2025), https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/entities-identified-as-chinese-military-companies-operating-in-the-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J8X-SKE6\]; Eleanor Olcott & Zijing Wu, Tencent and CATL Consider Legal Action over Inclusion on Pentagon Blacklist, Fin. Times (Jan. 7, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/90da783c-15d3-4446-ab8c-981fad469332?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [https://perma.cc/5RFW-456P\].
See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2323, 2326–27 (2006); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 556–57 (2015); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688, 1718–19 (2011) (reviewing Ackerman, supra note 44); Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 139, 142 (2018) (noting another camp of scholars who see bureaucracy as a self-interested, power-hungry deep state that acts in darkness to wield the vast military and surveillance power of the state at the expense of the President); see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 248–49, 278 (2008) (describing the press’s historical role as a governmental watchdog and explaining that disseminating information concerning U.S. foreign policy enables the public to check executive power).
Russell Muirhead & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Trump and the Perils of Ungoverning: Institutions Under Assault Will Not Deliver for Americans, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-and-perils-ungoverning [https://perma.cc/N4E7-UFTD\]; see supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
Noah Berman, Who’s Who on Trump’s China Team, The Wire China (May 1, 2025), https://www.thewirechina.com/2025/01/22/whos-who-on-trumps-china-team/ [https://perma.cc/9F5Y-GFS5\]; Stephen Roach, Trump’s New China Team, Substack: Conflict (Nov. 14, 2024), https://stephenroach.substack.com/p/trumps-new-china-team [https://perma.cc/9H7Z-BFND\].
Tom Bowman & Franco Ordoñez, Trump Shrinks National Security Council in Major Foreign Policy Shakeup, NPR (May 23, 2025, at 20:18 ET), https://www.npr.org/2025/05/23/nx-s1-5409610/trump-national-security-council [https://perma.cc/9284-AKHB\]; Alexander Ward & Robbie Gramer, Trump Turns to Small Group of Advisers, Shrinks National Security Council, Wall St. J. (Aug. 30, 2025, at 21:00 ET), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-turns-to-small-group-of-advisers-shrinks-national-security-council-65b12aa5 [https://perma.cc/T3LH-BNT3\].
See generally Trump and the Media (Pablo J. Boczkowski & Zizi Papacharissi eds., 2018) (describing the deterioration of the press’s institutional authority and its role in holding governmental power accountable)Matt Carlson, Sue Robinson & Seth C. Lewis, News After Trump: Journalism’s Crisis of Relevance in a Changed Media Culture (2021) (analyzing how the Trump era transformed press-executive relations and weakened the media’s traditional oversight role)Cass R. Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (2017) (arguing that social media platforms fragment public discourse into ideological echo chambers, undermining the deliberative function media once served in democratic governance).
Carlson, Robinson & Lewis, supra note 90, at 85–86, 116–17.
Victor Pickard, When Commercialism Trumps Democracy: Media Pathologies and the Rise of the Misinformation Society, in Trump and the Media, supra note 90, at 195, 196–97; Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier, Beliefs, Politics, and Environmental Policy, 10 Rev. Env’t Econ. & Pol’y 226, 237 (2016).
Zhang, supra note 30, at 42–43.
The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy 8, 10, 12–13 (André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne eds., 2008); Zhang, supra note 30, at 42, 61–62.
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 12.
. Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China, in Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China 3, 7, 9–10, 12 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011) (observing the legacy of Mao on the policymaking in contemporary China).
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 12.
Id. at 43.
Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer 54–56 (Diana Wright ed.2008).
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 13.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 104–18; see also Thomas Wright, Trump’s Foreign Policy Is No Longer Unpredictable, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-01-18/trumps-foreign-policy-no-longer-unpredictable [https://perma.cc/U5E4-NYA5\] (explaining that President Trump consolidated control over foreign policy and began bypassing the formal interagency process); Zhang, supra note 30, at 12 (explaining that volatility in the Chinese regulatory system stems from the near absence of formal checks and balances).
Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, Trump’s Assault on the Global Trading System, Foreign Affs., Sep./Oct. 2019, at 125, 126, 128–30, 133 (describing Trump’s use of tariffs as bargaining tools); see Susan V. Lawrence & Michael F. Martin, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R41007, Understanding China’s Political System 33 (2013) (explaining that China’s minor political parties must accept the permanent leadership of the CCP and are barred from operating as opposition parties). See generally Bob Davis & Lingling Wei, Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War (2020) (chronicling how the Trump Administration deployed and rescinded restrictive measures against China as leverage in trade negotiations, treating national-security tools as transactional bargaining chips).
See infra Part III.
See generally Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (2021) (framing U.S.–China competition as an ideological and grand-strategic contest and urging sustained U.S. counter-strategy to blunt China’s displacement of the American-led order)Hass, supra note 40 (arguing for a durable, long-horizon strategic framework rather than short-term transactional wins in managing the U.S.–China rivalry).
Gertz, supra note 20.
See Suisheng Zhao, Xi Jinping’s Consolidation of Power at the 20th Party Congress: Implications for Chinese Foreign Policy, Issues & Stud., June 2023, at 1, 8, 23.
See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010) (arguing that laws can do little to constrain the Executive Branch. In their view, what ultimately restrains the Executive is not law, but politics and public opinion).
See infra Part III; Exec. Order No. 14166, 90 Fed. Reg. 8611 (Jan. 30, 2025).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III; see also Aziz Huq, America’s National Security for Sale, Project Syndicate (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-nvidia-amd-deal-suggests-us-national-security-is-for-sale-by-aziz-huq-2025-08 [https://perma.cc/6DVP-36BP\] (arguing that national-security decisions, including on Chinese-owned platforms, have become increasingly influenced by political donors and campaign incentives rather than genuine threat assessments).
Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 Ind. L.J. 177, 190–92, 202 (2018).
Id. at 181, 186.
Roseanne McManus, The Limits of the Madman Theory: How Trump’s Unpredictability Could Hurt His Foreign Policy, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/limits-madman-theory [https://perma.cc/LP2N-GXXP\].
See Keren Yarhi-Milo, The Price of Unpredictability: How Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Ruining American Credibility, Foreign Affs. (Oct. 2, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/price-unpredictability [https://perma.cc/4T9D-SWPE\].
On August 23, 2019, Beijing announced it would retaliate against Trump’s next round of tariffs by raising taxes on American goods. In response, Trump took to Twitter, ordering American companies to “immediately start looking for an alternative to China” and build more products in the United States. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Aug. 23, 2019, at 09:59 CT), https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164914960046133249 [https://perma.cc/J5AZ-55QM\]; Aimee Picchi, Trump Orders U.S. Companies to “Start Looking for Alternatives” to China, CBS News (Aug. 23, 2019, at 15:57 ET), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-says-hes-ordering-u-s-businesses-to-start-looking-for-alternatives-to-china/ [https://perma.cc/F7ZL-P3LR\]; Covington & Burling LLP, The President’s Authority to Order Companies Out of China 1–3 (2019), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2019/08/the_presidents_authority_to_order_companies_out_of_china.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4EE-KJEW\].
Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 117, at 3; Karen M. Sutter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations (2026), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11284 [https://perma.cc/DG3T-F5WL\].
Christopher A. Casey, Jennifer K. Elsea & Liana W. Rosen, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 30–31 (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45618/R45618.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U9E-87KF\].
See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1), (3).
Exec. Order No. 13959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73185 (Nov. 17, 2020); see Contardo, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Brooks E. Allen et al., President-Elect Trump Announces Intent to Impose Tariffs on Goods Imported from Canada, Mexico and China, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Nov. 27, 2024), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2024/11/president-elect-trump-announces-intent-to-impose-tariffs [https://perma.cc/6S82-C4CD\] (noting that although no president has yet imposed tariffs under the IEEPA, President Nixon imposed 10% tariffs on imports under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a predecessor of IEEPA, to address balance of payment deficits).
Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China, The White House (Feb. 1, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/ [https://perma.cc/E2Z3-NNRE\].
See infra Part III.
See John Bolton, John Bolton: The Scandal of Trump’s China Policy, Wall St. J. (June 17, 2020, at 14:46 ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-bolton-the-scandal-of-trumps-china-policy-11592419564 [https://perma.cc/8JE5-M3J8\]; Chad P. Bown, Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat, 30 Duke J. Compar. & Int’l L. 283, 286 (2020) (noting that Trump “had politicized typically bureaucratic and legal export control decisions by using them as bargaining chips in trade negotiations with China”).
Paul Mozur & Raymond Zhong, In About-Face on Trade, Trump Vows to Protect ZTE Jobs in China, N.Y. Times (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/trump-vows-to-save-jobs-at-chinas-zte-lost-after-us-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/3GMB-MJ4N\].
Trump Tells Commerce Department to Help Chinese Telecom Company ZTE, NBC News (May 13, 2018, at 14:29 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-tells-commerce-department-help-chinese-telecom-company-zte-n873736 [https://perma.cc/EQ5L-25YK\].
Id.
David Dollar, Trump Throws ZTE a Lifeline as Part of Broader China Strategy, Brookings (June 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/trump-throws-zte-a-lifeline-as-part-of-broader-china-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/DYT7-7HLW\].
Jeff Mason & Steve Holland, Exclusive: Trump Says He Could Intervene in U.S. Case Against Huawei CFO, Reuters (Dec. 11, 2018, at 18:03 CT), https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/exclusive-trump-says-he-could-intervene-in-us-case-against-huawei-cfo-idUSKBN1OA2PQ/ [https://perma.cc/A7CX-XYTS\].
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 13.
See Dina Smeltz et al., Chi. Council on Glob. Affs., America’s Foreign Policy Future: Public Opinion and the 2024 Election 26 (2024), https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/2024 CCS Overall Report_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7B2-BLTK\]; Karlyn Bowman, China Tariffs, Trade, and Public Opinion Today, Am. Enter. Inst. (July 18, 2019), https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-trade-public-opinion [https://perma.cc/B657-TSZ2\].
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 14–15.
See generally Deeks & Eichensehr, supra note 41 (coining and elaborating “frictionless government” to describe the erosion of inter-branch and inter-agency friction in foreign relations, and warning that reduced friction diminishes critical deliberation and dissent).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
William B. Quandt, The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy, 101 Pol. Sci. Q. 825, 826 (1986); Kemal Derviş, The Coming Short-Termism, Project Syndicate (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-short-term-economic-policy-by-kemal-dervis-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/4MGJ-ESCM\].
Gibbs McKinley, The Pyrrhic Victory of a China Consensus, The Diplomat (Mar. 9, 2023), https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-pyrrhic-victory-of-a-china-consensus/ [https://perma.cc/CP5W-4AXE\].
The United States Announces Export Controls to Restrict China’s Ability to Purchase and Manufacture High-End Chips, 117 Am. J. Int’l L. 144, 144–45 (2023).
See infra Part III.
See Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner & Thomas Howell, The Limits of Chip Export Controls in Meeting the China Challenge, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/limits-chip-export-controls-meeting-china-challenge [https://perma.cc/F2VK-FMAL\].
See Kari Heerman & Asha Patt, From Rules to Discretion: How Trump Reconfigured US Tariff Policy, Brookings (June 9, 2026), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/from-rules-to-discretion-how-trump-reconfigured-us-tariff-policy/ [https://perma.cc/BWW4-9H2X\].
Yingyi Ma, How America Lost the Heart of China’s Top Talent, Brookings (Nov. 16, 2023), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-america-lost-the-heart-of-chinas-top-talent/ [https://perma.cc/F7EA-27C8\].
See Rabihah Butler, Tariffs Are Stress-Testing Manufacturers’ Supply Chains, Thomson Reuters Inst. (Apr. 23, 2026), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/international-trade-and-supply-chain/tariffs-stressing-manufacturers-supply-chains/ [https://perma.cc/V2R2-5HWK\].
See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Economic Security State, Foreign Affs. (Oct. 19, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/economic-security-state-farrell-newman [https://perma.cc/KG6A-BXZS\]; Kate Koren et al., Reining in the Export Control Arms Race, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 10, 2026), https://www.csis.org/analysis/reining-export-control-arms-race [https://perma.cc/UN5R-PDFC\].
Quandt, supra note 149, at 826–28. See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 109 (arguing that formal legal constraints do little to bind the Executive Branch and that only politics and public opinion meaningfully check presidential power); Ackerman, supra note 44, at 9, 15–16 (tracing the long historical trajectory of expanding presidential unilateralism and the corresponding erosion of institutional checks on the Executive).
See Michael Brown & Robert Atkinson, The Real Contest with China, Foreign Affs. (Aug. 28, 2023), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/real-contest-beijing-industrial-strategy [https://perma.cc/9DCW-TL9M\].
See Allison, supra note 23, at 118, 124; Seth G. Jones, Adversaries and the Future of Competition, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Sep. 16, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-1-adversaries-and-future-competition [https://perma.cc/KP9L-TCHW\].
Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 194, 201 (2018); see also Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1184, 1258, 1267 (2014) (comparing health-based safety standards to cost–benefit analysis as competing frameworks for environmental regulation and defending an integrated cost–benefit approach); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 698, 712 (2010) (critiquing feasibility analysis as an incoherent middle path between safety standards and cost–benefit analysis and arguing that regulators should adopt cost–benefit analysis instead).
Keating, supra note 161, at 214.
Id. at 249.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force, Foreign Affs., July/Aug. 2021, at 58, 64; see The United States Announces Export Controls to Restrict China’s Ability to Purchase and Manufacture High-End Chips, supra note 151, at 144–45, 149.
See generally David Beaver & Jason Stanley, The Politics of Language (2023) (developing “presuppositional resonance[]” as a concept to explain how weakly substantiated claims gain public legitimacy by resonating with preexisting fears and ideological presuppositions).
See, e.g., Graham Webster, Inside the Biden Administration’s Gamble to Freeze China’s AI Future, Wired (Aug. 14, 2025, at 15:13 CT), https://www.wired.com/story/chips-china-artificial-intelligence-controls/ [https://perma.cc/B2P7-ZCZR\] (explaining how the Biden Administration formulated the sweeping export control policies against Chinese firms among a small circle of advisors). See generally Peter Navarro, Taking Back Trump’s America: Why We Lost the White House and How We’ll Win It Back (2022) (revealing how the conflict within the inner circle of the Trump Administration influenced the China policy).
Jack S. Levy, The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, in Handbook of War Studies 259, 259 (Manus I. Midlarsky ed., 1989); Christopher Gelpi, Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict, 41 J. Conflict Resol. 255, 255–59 (1997); Katniss Xuejiao Li, Performative Economic Sanctions: How Sanctions Work Without Economic Harm, 15 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 327, 339–40 (2024). See generally Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (1990) (examining how presidents facing declining domestic support have used foreign adversaries to turn public opinion).
Gelpi, supra note 167, at 257–59.
Amber Wichowsky & Jessica Chen Weiss, Getting Tough on China: Are Campaign Ads a Signal of Future Policy or Just Cheap Talk?, 46 Legis. Stud. Q. 637, 637–40 (2021); Ion Marandici, A Second Cold War? Explaining Changes in the American Discourse on China: Evidence from the Presidential Debates (1960–2020), 28 J. Chinese Pol. Sci. 511, 511, 527–28 (2023).
Marandici, supra note 169, at 527.
In 2016, before Donald Trump’s election, 47% of Democrats expressed an unfavorable view of China, while 44% of Americans held a favorable one. Richard Wike, Americans’ Views of China Improve as Economic Concerns Ease, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/04/04/americans-views-of-china-improve-as-economic-concerns-ease/ [https://perma.cc/E7L6-TPUZ\]. By mid-2020, those numbers had shifted sharply: 73% of Americans reported an unfavorable view of China, compared to only 22% with a favorable opinion. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin & Christine Huang, Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (July 30, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/BX8Y-XGLK\]. Although a range of factors have likely contributed to this change, the timing and magnitude of the shift suggest that President Trump’s rhetoric and policies also played a central role in reshaping public perception. Jonathan Pearlman, Trump’s China Card, Austl. Foreign Affs. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/afaweekly/trumps-china-card [https://perma.cc/DKA2-JCGW\].
Stephen Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives 2–4, 68–72 (2022).
See supra Section II.A.
Wichowsky & Weiss, supra note 169, at 637–40.
Peter E. Harrell, The Limits of IEEPA, 48 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1043, 1044, 1054 (2025).
See supra Part II.
See Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner & Thomas Howell, China’s Localization Drive in Semiconductors Gains Impetus from Allied Chip Export Controls, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-localization-drive-semiconductors-gains-impetus-allied-chip-export-controls [https://perma.cc/8N56-SUJG\].
Ma, supra note 155.
Weijia Rao, Signaling Through National Security Lawmaking, 59 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 797, 803, 857–61 (2025).
Brown & Atkinson, supra note 159.
See, e.g., Li, supra note 167, at 341–46; Rao, supra note 179, at 801–02; Ji Li, Superpower Legal Rivalry and the Global Compliance Dilemma, 45 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 891, 909–11 (2024); see also Angela Huyue Zhang, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation 217–28 (2021) (discussing China’s anti-sanction legislation as a countermeasure to foreign sanctions).
Zhang, supra note 181, at 219–22.
See Keith Bradsher, China Halts Critical Exports as Trade War Intensifies, N.Y. Times (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/13/business/china-rare-earths-exports.html [https://perma.cc/GYV4-CZDW\]; Edward White, Ryan McMorrow & Harry Dempsey, Global Supply Chains Threatened by Lack of Chinese Rare Earths, Fin. Times (May 19, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/81ba803e-9cce-4752-8432-4dde4e77c691 [https://perma.cc/2ATC-PA85\]. See generally Angela Huyue Zhang, Strategic Restraint in China’s Extraterritorial Legal Statecraft, 120 AJIL Unbound 219 (2026) (explaining how China strategically delayed weaponizing its dominance in rare earths until its leverage against the United States had strengthened).
Angela Huyue Zhang, Rare Earths Are China’s Trump Card, Project Syndicate (Aug. 7, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-rare-earths-trump-card-in-trumps-trade-war-by-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-08 [https://perma.cc/UTT7-K7NJ\].
Press Release, MP Materials, MP Materials Announces Transformational Public-Private Partnership with the Department of Defense to Accelerate U.S. Rare Earth Magnet Independence (July 10, 2025), https://mpmaterials.com/news/mp-materials-announces-transformational-public-private-partnership-with-the-department-of-defense-to-accelerate-u-s-rare-earth-magnet-independence/ [https://perma.cc/49B3-PTEK\]. Note that the investment is only the beginning of a massive state-led effort to secure rare-earth supplies. In October 2025, the Trump Administration announced that the DOD would take a 10% stake in Trilogy Metals as part of a $35.6 million investment to secure critical energy and mining projects in Alaska. See Ari Natter & James Attwood, US to Take 10% of Trilogy Metals to Unlock Alaskan Minerals, Bloomberg (Oct. 7, 2025, at 08:14 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-06/trump-approves-road-project-in-alaska-stake-in-trilogy-metals [https://perma.cc/HM5T-U8RP\].
Zhang, supra note 184.
Milhaupt & Zhang, supra note 37.
Hannah Northey, Trump’s Mineral Megadeal Is Bypassing US Laws, E&E News by Politico (Aug. 18, 2025, at 13:40 ET), https://www.eenews.net/articles/trumps-mineral-megadeal-is-bypassing-us-laws/ [https://perma.cc/7EBW-M8WY\]; see also Peter E. Harrell, The Legal Bases for Government Stakes in Private Firms, Lawfare (Aug. 28, 2025, at 08:00 CT), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-legal-bases-for-government-stakes-in-private-firms [https://perma.cc/Z3V4-3ZU7\] (examining the statutory and constitutional foundations for federal equity stakes in private firms and concluding that recent DOD investments strain the traditional legal frameworks for direct government ownership).
Greg Ip, The U.S. Marches Toward State Capitalism with American Characteristics, Wall St. J. (Aug. 11, 2025, at 10:16 ET), https://www.wsj.com/economy/the-u-s-marches-toward-state-capitalism-with-american-characteristics-f75cafa8 [https://perma.cc/Z4K7-7ZRS\]; see also Milhaupt & Zhang, supra note 37 (warning that lawless state capitalism—increasingly resembling Chinese practices—is not a viable American response to China’s rise and risks accelerating institutional convergence with the Chinese model).
Christopher A. Casey, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11030U.S. Tariff Policy: Overview (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11030 [https://perma.cc/VW84-HNJF\].
Warren Maruyama, Lyric Galvin & William Alan Reinsch, Making Tariffs Great Again: Does President Trump Have Legal Authority to Implement New Tariffs on U.S. Trading Partners and China?, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-tariffs-great-again-does-president-trump-have-legal-authority-implement-new-tariffs [https://perma.cc/9MK7-QEHA\] (noting that section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the IEEPA, section 122 of the Trade Act, and even legacy provisions such as section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 can be used as potential sources of presidential authority to unilaterally impose tariffs on foreign nations); Scott Bomboy, How Congress Delegates Its Tariff Powers to the President, Nat’l Const. Ctr. (Apr. 2, 2025), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-congress-delegates-its-tariff-powers-to-the-president [https://perma.cc/2ZW4-XZ3E\].
Clark Packard & Scott Lincicome, Presidential Tariff Powers and the Need for Reform, Cato Inst. (Oct. 9, 2024), https://www.cato.org/briefing-paper/presidential-tariff-powers-need-reform [https://perma.cc/97MM-WRFD\].
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2026 Trade Policy Agenda and 2025 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 1 (2026), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/2026 Trade Policy Agenda 2025 Annual Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG3G-4YNA\].
Packard & Lincicome, supra note 192.
Id.; see also Chad P. Bown, The US–China Trade War and Phase One Agreement, 43 J. Pol’y Modeling 805, 813, 829–30, 839 (2021) (documenting the design and reach of Trump’s China tariffs and the Phase One agreement, and showing how tariffs functioned as broader foreign-policy leverage beyond conventional trade objectives).
Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section [https://perma.cc/92VW-AALY\]. If the USTR determines that the alleged conduct is unfair or violates U.S. rights under trade agreements, then it can decide what action to take subject to the direction of the President. Section 301 authorizes the USTR to (1) impose duties or other import restrictions; (2) withdraw or suspend trade agreement concessions; or (3) enter into binding agreements with foreign governments to eliminate the conduct in question or provide compensation. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b), (c), (d).
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2025 Special 301 Report 45 (2025), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/2025 Special 301 Report (final).pdf [https://perma.cc/F94V-WWMN\]; Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 16, 27, 31, 47, 164 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301 Draft Exec Summary 3.22.ustrfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/86HK-KGHK\].
Jingyuan (Joey) Zhou, No Unilateral Action—WTO Panel Ruled U.S. Section 301 Tariffs on Chinese Imports Inconsistent with WTO Obligations, ASIL Insights (Oct. 5, 2020), https://asil.org/insights/volume-24-issue-26/ [https://perma.cc/UYN2-XAQD\].
Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 1, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 2, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625 (Apr. 9, 2025).
Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121; Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041.
Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628, 636–37, 641–42, 646 (2026).
Robert Silvers et al., Supreme Court Strikes Down IEEPA Tariffs—Key Takeaways and Implications for Importers, Ropes & Gray (Feb. 23, 2026), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/insights/alerts/2026/02/supreme-court-strikes-down-ieepa-tariffs-key-takeaways-and-implications-for-importers [https://perma.cc/69F2-KDSW\]; see also Kelly P. Dunbar et al., Supreme Court Strikes Down IEEPA Tariffs—What Now?, WilmerHale (Feb. 21, 2026), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20260220-supreme-court-strikes-down-ieepa-tariffs-what-now [https://perma.cc/36ZF-QKBX\] (analyzing the Court’s IEEPA ruling and cataloguing the alternative statutory authorities—Section 232, Section 301, and Section 122—that remain available to support continued tariff action).
Silvers et al., supra note 202; see also Luke Broadwater & Tyler Pager, Even After Supreme Court Ruling, Trump Insists He Can Do as He Wishes, N.Y. Times (Feb. 20, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/20/us/politics/trump-justices-gorsuch-barrett-roberts.html [https://perma.cc/3KW2-P8A4\] (reporting Trump’s immediate response to the Court’s IEEPA decision and his announcement of a new 10% blanket tariff order relying on alternative statutory authorities).
Silvers et al., supra note 202; Dunbar et al., supra note 202.
Gavin Bade, Biden’s Politically Perilous Choice on China Trade, Politico (May 17, 2022, at 04:00 CT), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/17/bidens-china-trade-trump-tariffs-inflation-00032874 [https://perma.cc/U7GK-HGYF\].
Id.
Packard & Lincicome, supra note 192.
Trevor Hunnicutt & Steve Holland, Biden Sharply Hikes US Tariffs on an Array of Chinese Imports, Reuters (May 14, 2024, at 12:52 CT), https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/biden-sharply-hikes-us-tariffs-billions-chinese-chips-cars-2024-05-14/ [https://perma.cc/UR3M-FQ56\].
Clark Packard, New Biden Section 301 Tariffs (Once Again) Put Politics over Good Policy, Cato Inst.: Blog (May 14, 2024, at 12:13 CT), https://www.cato.org/blog/new-biden-301-tariffs-once-again-put-politics-over-good-policy [https://perma.cc/324P-R7F5\] (noting that these tariffs were not imposed based on the concern about IP violations as documented in the original Section 301 report prepared under the Trump Administration, but rather on cybersecurity concerns about EVs, and that the Biden Administration should have invoked Section 232 instead).
Sophie Jin et al., China’s Comprehensive Retaliation Against U.S. Tariffs, Holland & Knight (Apr. 11, 2025), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/04/chinas-comprehensive-retaliation-against-us-tariffs [https://perma.cc/99J3-HUYU\].
David Fickling, America Has Plenty of Rare Earths. But Not for Long, Bloomberg: Opinion (June 8, 2025, at 14:00 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-06-08/rare-earths-america-has-plenty-but-not-for-long [https://perma.cc/S5NW-NCLB\]; Jon Emont, China Is Still Choking Exports of Rare Earths Despite Pact with U.S., Wall St. J. (June 26, 2025, at 05:30 ET), https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-rare-earths-exports-2fd0dab4 [https://perma.cc/WFH9-R33Z\].
Gracelin Baskaran & Meredith Schwartz, Trump Strikes a Deal to Restore Rare Earths Access, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (June 11, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-strikes-deal-restore-rare-earths-access [https://perma.cc/L5ZP-TKXF\].
Chad P. Bown, Anatomy of a Flop: Why Trump’s US-China Phase One Trade Deal Fell Short, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. (Feb. 8, 2021, at 00:00 CT), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/anatomy-flop-why-trumps-us-china-phase-one-trade-deal-fell [https://perma.cc/M9BB-66VF\].
Id.
Angela Huyue Zhang, The U.S.-China Trade Negotiation: A Contract Theory Perspective, 51 Geo. J. Int’l L. 809, 820–26 (2020).
Id. at 829–30, 833–35. See generally Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Amit K. Khandelwal, The Economic Impacts of the US–China Trade War, 14 Ann. Rev. Econ. 205 (2022) (comprehensive literature review of the economic consequences of the trade war).
Aaron Flaaen & Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 108 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 1289, 1293, 1295–96 (2026).
Bolton, supra note 125; Fajgelbaum & Khandelwal, supra note 216, at 208. See generally John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir (2020) (recounting from firsthand White House experience how Trump’s China trade decisions, including tariff timing and the pursuit of Chinese agricultural purchase commitments, were closely tied to his re-election prospects).
Bolton, supra note 125.
Fajgelbaum & Khandelwal, supra note 216, at 208; see also Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q.J. Econ. 1239, 1265 (2005) (modeling how majoritarian electoral competition induces politicians to concentrate protectionist policies on swing districts to maximize electoral returns).
Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., The Return to Protectionism, 135 Q.J. Econ. 1, 8, 49 (2020); Fajgelbaum & Khandelwal, supra note 216, at 208.
Emily J. Blanchard, Chad P. Bown & David Chor, Did Trump’s Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?, J. Int’l Econ., Jan. 2024, at 1, 6, 9, 11–12, 21 (presenting empirical evidence that President Trump’s first-term tariffs on China adversely affected Republican candidates in the 2018 congressional midterm election); Robert Maxim, Mark Muro & Shriya Methkupally, China’s Retaliatory Tariffs Will Hurt Trump-Voting Counties Most, Brookings (Feb. 10, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-retaliatory-tariffs-will-hurt-trump-voting-counties-most/ [https://perma.cc/376U-RWT8\].
Stuart Anderson, Trump Tariff Aid to Farmers Cost More than U.S. Nuclear Forces, Forbes (Feb. 6, 2020, at 22:04 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/01/21/trump-tariff-aid-to-farmers-cost-more-than-us-nuclear-forces/ [https://perma.cc/5ZLW-4LRD\].
Keyu Jin, If Trump Is Trying to Suppress China, He’s Going About It All Wrong, Fin. Times (May 11, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/258326fb-39c1-4ae5-a79c-270cdbef4a23 [https://perma.cc/LZ27-ZDQP\].
Id.; Zongshuai Fan, China’s Emerging Industrial Vision: The Significance and Impact of ‘New Quality Productive Forces’, Univ. of Cambridge: Cambridge Indus. Innovation Pol’y (Apr. 17, 2024), https://www.ciip.group.cam.ac.uk/reports-and-articles/chinas-emerging-industrial-vision/ [https://perma.cc/HP9E-CDNA\].
Yuanyue Dang, US Tech Curbs Pushed China to Innovate, Regulation Expert Angela Zhang Says, S. China Morning Post (June 5, 2025, at 14:27 CT), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3312444/how-us-tech-curbs-pushed-china-innovate-and-where-super-ai-could-emerge [https://perma.cc/525K-Z6RV\].
Simone Tagliapietra, Cecilia Trasi & Gregor Sebastian, A Smart European Strategy for Electric Vehicle Investment from China, Bruegel (July 16, 2025), https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/smart-european-strategy-electric-vehicle-investment-china [https://perma.cc/5CVA-E9L8\]; Margaret Myers, China’s EV Drive Accelerates in Latin America, E. Asia F. (June 21, 2024), https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/06/21/chinas-ev-drive-accelerates-in-latin-america/ [https://perma.cc/S3CG-9PYM\].
Myers, supra note 227; see James Mayger et al., China Floods the World with Cheap Exports After Trump’s Tariffs, Bloomberg (Sep. 23, 2025, at 06:43 UTC), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-09-22/china-floods-world-with-record-amount-of-cheap-goods-after-trump-s-tariffs?srnd=homepage-americas [https://perma.cc/D6YF-SEUB\].
See generally Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (2022) (tracing the historical development of economic sanctions as instruments of modern statecraft from the interwar period through the present)Saleha Mohsin, Paper Soldiers: How the Weaponization of the Dollar Changed the World Order (2024) (documenting how the U.S. Treasury has increasingly weaponized the dollar and the U.S.-led financial system as tools of coercive economic statecraft)Agathe Demarais, Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests (2022) (showing how sanctions frequently produce unintended long-term consequences that reshape global economic dynamics against U.S. interests).
See Daniel Meagher, Caught in the Economic Crosshairs: Secondary Sanctions, Blocking Regulations, and the American Sanctions Regime, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 999, 1002–10 (2020); supra Sections II.A, C.
Kevin J. Wolf, Thomas J. McCarthy & Andrew R. Schlossberg, The Export Control Reform Act and Possible New Controls on Emerging and Foundational Technologies, Akin (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/the-export-control-reform-act-of-2018-and-possible-new-controls [https://perma.cc/46LK-X5P8\].
See Casey, Elsea & Rosen, supra note 119, at 25; Edward Fishman, Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare 8, 44 (2025).
Edward Fishman, Going It Alone, Wire China (Feb. 26, 2025), https://www.thewirechina.com/2025/02/26/going-it-alone-chokepoints-edward-fishman/ [https://perma.cc/8ZUR-TSNT\]. See generally Fishman, supra note 232 (mapping how the United States has historically leveraged strategic chokepoints in global finance and supply chains against comparatively isolated adversaries, and warning about the changed dynamics when the target is a systemically important economy like China’s).
See Ben Buchanan, The U.S. Has AI Competition All Wrong, Foreign Affs. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-07/us-has-ai-competition-all-wrong [https://perma.cc/EBE4-HP64\]; Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, Int’l Sec., Summer 2019, at 42, 76–77 (discussing how states exploit network position in global markets to exert regulatory power abroad).
Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China’s Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications (Dec. 2, 2024), https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military [https://perma.cc/E753-GJ5X\].
Paul Triolo, Restrictions on Trade with China Harm U.S. Leadership in Technology, in Getting China Right at Home 24, 27 (Jessica Chen Weiss ed., 2025), https://mediahost.sais-jhu.edu/saismedia/media/web/reports/assets/files/getting-china-right-at-home.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PSP-DV8Z\]; see also Reva Goujon, Jan-Peter Kleinhans & Laura Gormley, Thin Ice: US Pathways to Regulating China-Sourced Legacy Chips 3, 5–6, Rhodium Grp. (May 13, 2024), https://rhg.com/research/thin-ice-us-pathways-to-regulating-china-sourced-legacy-chips/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9L-BQFH\] (analyzing potential regulatory pathways for China-sourced legacy chips and highlighting the limits of controls given China’s already substantial mature-node capacity); Paul Triolo, Legacy Chip Overcapacity in China: Myth and Reality, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 30, 2024), https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/legacy-chip-overcapacity-china-myth-and-reality [https://perma.cc/3TL9-A85T\] (arguing that concerns about Chinese legacy-chip overcapacity are overstated and that export controls targeting advanced chips are poorly matched to the military applications that rely primarily on legacy technology).
See Additions to the Entity List, 81 Fed. Reg. 12004 (Mar. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744); Covington & Burling LLP, Department of Commerce Activates Denial Order Against Chinese Telecommunications Company ZTE 4 (2018), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/04/department_of_commerce\_activates_denial_order_against_chinese_telecommunications_company_zte.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWQ7-BN2J\]; Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling & Stephen Nellis, Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel China Chip-Equipment Sale: Sources, Reuters (Jan. 6, 2020, at 01:16 CT), https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uk/trump-administration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-so-idUSKBN1Z50H4 [https://perma.cc/U3YC-8RMG\]; Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22961 (May 21, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744); Martin Chorzempa, Mary E. Lovely & Christine Wan, Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., The Rise of US Economic Sanctions on China: Analysis of a New PIIE Dataset 5 (2024), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2024/rise-us-economic-sanctions-china-analysis-new-piie-dataset [https://perma.cc/HJV2-ZNMV\].
Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification, 87 Fed. Reg. 62186 (Oct. 13, 2022) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 736, 740, 742, 744, 762, 772, 774). These restrictions were further tightened in 2023 to close enforcement gaps and prevent circumvention through third-party countries and indirect supply chains. See Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items, 88 Fed. Reg. 73424 (Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 736, 740, 742, 744, 772, 774); Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections, 88 Fed. Reg. 73458 (Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 734, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 748, 758, 770, 772, 774).
Chorzempa, Lovely & Wan, supra note 237, at 1, 9–10.
Entity List, 15 C.F.R. § 744 Supp. No. 4 (2024), https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-744/appendix-Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 [https://perma.cc/E88J-AWP3\]; Eleanor Hume & Rowan Scarpino, Sanctions by the Numbers: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations’ Sanctions and Export Controls on China, Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. (Oct. 23, 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-comparing-the-trump-and-biden-administrations-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-china [https://perma.cc/C6FQ-KD9E\].
See Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, 90 Fed. Reg. 4544 (Jan. 15, 2025) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 734, 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 762, 772, 774).
Alison J. Stafford Powell, Paul Amberg & Rob O’Brien, US Department of Commerce Significantly Expands Controls Targeting Indigenous Production of Advanced Semiconductors in China, Baker McKenzie: Glob. Sanctions & Exp. Controls Blog (Dec. 6, 2024), https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-department-of-commerce-significantly-expands-controls-targeting-indigenous-production-of-advanced-semiconductors-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/RN7S-HH74\].
See Ana Swanson & Tripp Mickle, As Trump Courts a More Assertive Beijing, China Hawks Are Losing Out, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/20/us/politics/trump-china-technology.html [https://perma.cc/Y4SF-APEQ\].
Ana Swanson & Tripp Mickle, For Trump, It’s a New Era of Deal-Making with Tech’s Most-Coveted Commodity, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/business/economy/trump-middle-east-trip-semiconductor-deals.html [https://perma.cc/J2Z8-DNLW\].
Id.
Blake Montgomery, How Donald Trump’s ‘Historic’ Gulf State Deals Benefit a Handful of Powerful Men, The Guardian (May 17, 2025, at 08:00 ET), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/17/donald-trump-gulf-states-ai [https://perma.cc/B6UM-ECDL\].
Marianne Lu & Nick Shafer, How Washington Could Leverage Its Gulf AI Deals, Lawfare (July 23, 2025, at 10:23 CT), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-washington-could-leverage-its-gulf-ai-deals [https://perma.cc/A4PZ-RVJF\].
Clark Packard & Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, The Nvidia/AMD-Trump Deal: Legal Questions, Crony Capitalism, and National Security for Sale, Cato Inst.: Blog (Aug. 13, 2025, at 17:30 CT), https://www.cato.org/blog/nvidia-amds-deal-trump-administration-national-security-sale [https://perma.cc/E2QH-Z6QL\]; Karen Freifeld, US Licenses Nvidia to Export Chips to China, Official Says, Reuters (Aug. 9, 2025, at 19:14 CT), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-licenses-nvidia-export-chips-china-official-says-2025-08-08/ [https://perma.cc/6V5M-DM49\].
Swanson & Mickle, supra note 243.
Id.
Amrith Ramkumar & Robbie Whelan, Nvidia, AMD to Give U.S. 15% Cut on AI Chip Sales to China, Wall St. J. (Aug. 10, 2025, at 23:11 ET), https://www.wsj.com/tech/nvidia-amd-chip-sales-us-government-f9e34b5f?reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink [https://perma.cc/7VQR-98DJ\]; Huq, supra note 112.
See Jerg Gutmann, Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, The Economic Effects of International Sanctions: An Event Study, 51 J. Compar. Econ. 1214, 1221 (2023) (observing that sanctions create the strongest adverse economic effects in the first two years); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. (Oct. 23, 1997), https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc/2TJE-2H69\] (surveying historical sanctions episodes and concluding that their economic effects tend to erode as target states develop adaptive strategies); Narges Bajoghli et al., How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare 1–5, 7–8, 11, 13–14 (2024) (analyzing Iran’s decades-long adaptation to U.S. sanctions and documenting how sustained pressure has failed to produce the intended collapse of the Iranian economy). See generally Demarais, supra note 229 (showing that sanctions typically produce sharp short-term disruption before targeted states adapt through workarounds, alternative supply chains, and third-party arbitrage).
Bajoghli et al., supra note 252, at 4, 7.
Paul Mozur & Cecilia Kang, U.S. Tech Companies Sidestep a Trump Ban, to Keep Selling to Huawei, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/technology/huawei-trump-ban-technology.html [https://perma.cc/37DE-SZFN\]; Shuhei Yamada, U.S. Chip Software Makers Thrive in China with Non-Huawei Clients, Nikkei Asia (June 10, 2020, at 05:55 JST), https://asia.nikkei.com/business/china-tech/us-chip-software-makers-thrive-in-china-with-non-huawei-clients [https://perma.cc/8N8R-AF4X\].
Chad P. Bown, The Return of Export Controls, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 24, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-export-controls [https://perma.cc/UF7L-8WL2 ].
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner & Thomas Howell, Balancing the Ledger: Export Controls on U.S. Chip Technology to China, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Feb. 21, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/balancing-ledger-export-controls-us-chip-technology-china [https://perma.cc/2KEF-VS2A\].
Robbie Gramer & Rishi Iyengar, Commerce Needs Cash to Curb China’s Chips, Foreign Pol’y (Dec. 8, 2023, at 09:27 CT), https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/08/gina-raimondo-china-commerce-funding-technology/ [https://perma.cc/KPY7-TPUN\].
Mackenzie Hawkins, Trump Blocks 10% of Funds for Key Agency in US-China Tech Race, Bloomberg (Mar. 26, 2025, at 18:52 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-26/trump-blocks-10-of-chip-curb-agency-funds-drawing-senate-alarm [https://perma.cc/HHH4-VLHD\]; Oma Seddiq & Mackenzie Hawkins, Trump Team Plans Mass Firings at Key Agency for AI and Chips, Bloomberg (Feb. 19, 2025, at 14:42 CT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/commerce-agency-to-order-mass-firing-of-chips-ai-staffers [https://perma.cc/FBS5-JSKA\].
Denis Medvedev, Marcin Piatkowski & Shahid Yusuf, World Bank Group, Promoting Innovation in China: Lessons from International Good Practice 15–16 (2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/04eb9bc4-b6f9-573a-8594-2d5bff6442a1/content [https://perma.cc/W7W7-PCLT\].
Bown, supra note 125, at 290 (noting that Beijing’s “fear of being cut off could have created the incentive to speed up diversification of its supplier base”).
Dan Wang, China’s Sputnik Moment?, Foreign Affs. (July 29, 2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/chinas-sputnik-moment [https://perma.cc/URR8-NRBQ\].
Id.
Id.
Tripp Mickle, David McCabe & Ana Swanson, How the Big Chip Makers Are Pushing Back on Biden’s China Agenda, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/05/technology/chip-makers-china-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/F2KF-J6AV\].
See Matteo Crosignani et al., Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Geopolitical Risk and Decoupling: Evidence from U.S. Export Controls 22–26, 30 (2024), http://matteocrosignani.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/CHMS_Decoupling.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTA7-EMVP\]. This study finds that export controls trigger immediate and broad-based decoupling between affected U.S. suppliers and their Chinese counterparts. Id. at 22. Notably, the study finds no evidence that these U.S. firms formed substitute supply chain relationships with alternative foreign or domestic customers in the aftermath of restrictions. Id. at 23–25. As a result, affected firms experienced statistically significant declines in market valuation, with cumulative abnormal returns reflecting a 2.5% drop in stock prices following the imposition of controls. Id. at 26.
Gregory C. Allen, The True Impact of Allied Export Controls on the U.S. and Chinese Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Industries, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Nov. 26, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/true-impact-allied-export-controls-us-and-chinese-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment [https://perma.cc/8UMQ-H5NS\].
Id.; see also DeepSeek: A Deep Dive: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Rsch. & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Gregory C. Allen, Dir., Wadhwani AI Ctr. at the Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud.), https://republicans-science.house.gov/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0D8E8A6C-2A09-413D-9D78-E21DF078BC9E [https://perma.cc/6R8R-GYTD\] (defending U.S. export controls as effective in slowing China’s AI development despite the emergence of Chinese models such as DeepSeek); Gregory C. Allen, DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the U.S.-China AI Race, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Mar. 7, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/deepseek-huawei-export-controls-and-future-us-china-ai-race [https://perma.cc/D5QJ-V8D6\] (arguing that recent Chinese AI breakthroughs vindicate rather than undermine the case for expanded U.S. controls on advanced semiconductors and equipment).
Teardown of Huawei’s New Phone Shows China’s Chip Breakthrough, Reuters (Sep. 4, 2023, at 14:10 CT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/teardown-huaweis-new-phone-shows-chinas-chip-breakthrough-2023-09-04/ [https://perma.cc/77AN-SABL\].
Juliana Liu & Hassan Tayir, Huawei’s New Homegrown Chinese Smartphone Takes on Apple and Android, CNN: Bus. (Nov. 26, 2024), https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/26/tech/china-huawei-harmony-os-mate70-hnk-intl [https://perma.cc/9XTV-7X2T\].
Failed Eradication, Economist, June 15, 2024, at 14, 14–16; Liza Lin, Stu Woo & Raffaele Huang, The U.S. Wanted to Knock Down Huawei. It’s Only Getting Stronger, Wall St. J. (July 29, 2024, at 21:00 ET), https://www.wsj.com/business/telecom/huawei-china-technology-us-sanctions-76462031 [https://perma.cc/A85A-LCDJ\].
Lin, Woo & Huang, supra note 270.
Dan Wang, China’s Hidden Tech Revolution, Foreign Affs., Mar./Apr. 2023, at 65, 66–71, 73–74 (As Dan Wang acutely commented: “For the United States to regain its lead in emerging technologies, it will have to treat manufacturing as an integral part of technological advancement, not a mere sideshow to the more thrilling acts of invention and R & D.”).
Jeffrey Ding, The Innovation Fallacy, Foreign Affs. (Aug. 19, 2024) [hereinafter Ding, The Innovation Fallacy], https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/innovation-fallacy-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/28SN-R5UC\]; see also Jeffrey Ding, Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition 2–10 (2024) (arguing that major shifts in economic leadership are best explained by how technological breakthroughs diffuse throughout economies).
Ding, The Innovation Fallacy, supra note 273.
Radha Iyengar Plumb & Michael C. Horowitz, What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race, Foreign Affs. (Apr. 18, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-gets-wrong-about-ai-race [https://perma.cc/4J8U-LCQV\].
Dennis Normile, Chinese Firm’s Large Language Model Makes a Splash, 387 Science 238, 238 (2025).
Angela Zhang, US Export Controls Have Forced Chinese Tech Companies to Be More Innovative, Fin. Times (Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/c99d86f0-2d17-49d0-8dc6-9662ed34c831 [https://perma.cc/ES4K-FEGS\].
Id.
Jasmine Wu & Deirdre Bosa, How DeepSeek Used Distillation to Train Its Artificial Intelligence Model, and What It Means for Companies Such as OpenAI, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2025, at 08:00 ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/21/deepseek-trained-ai-model-using-distillation-now-a-disruptive-force.html [https://perma.cc/3DPC-37WS\].
Brian Ferguson, Charles Liu & Yuchen Han, Is AI Distillation by DeepSeek IP Theft?, Law360 (Mar. 7, 2025, at 14:55 ET), https://www.law360.com/articles/2306557 [https://perma.cc/Q5RX-WUBR\]; see also Peter Henderson & Mark A. Lemley, The Mirage of Artificial Intelligence Terms of Use Restrictions, 100 Ind. L.J. 1327, 1333–34 (2025) (explaining why companies like OpenAI have little legal recourse against DeepSeek’s distillation practices).
Plumb & Horowitz, supra note 275; S. Alex Yang, DeepSeek Heralds New Era of Artificial Good-Enough Intelligence, Forbes (Feb. 19, 2025, at 07:30 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lbsbusinessstrategyreview/2025/02/19/deepseek-heralds-new-era-of-artificial-good-enough-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/4PMS-MWE4\].
Jared Dunnmon, The Real Threat of Chinese AI, Foreign Affs. (Feb. 28, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/real-threat-chinese-ai [https://perma.cc/7HR7-2HNN\].
Dylan Butts, DeepSeek Hints Latest Model Will Be Supported by China’s ‘Next Generation’ Homegrown AI Chips, CNBC Africa (Aug. 22, 2025, at 17:39 GMT), https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2025/deepseek-hints-latest-model-will-be-supported-by-chinas-next-generation-homegrown-ai-chips/ [https://perma.cc/K8KZ-5XBN\].
Dunnmon, supra note 282.
Angela Huyue Zhang, Will DeepSeek Upend US Tech Dominance?, Project Syndicate (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deepseek-represents-a-challenge-to-us-tech-oligopolies-by-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-02 [https://perma.cc/3SQM-9R8P\].
Paul Triolo, one of the foremost experts on U.S. technology restrictions, has issued sharp critiques of American export control policy toward China. See, e.g., Paul Triolo, “Small Yard, High Fence” Becoming “Small Gain, High Cost”, Substack: AI Stack Decrypted (Apr. 6, 2025), https://pstaidecrypted.substack.com/p/small-yard-high-fence-becoming-small [https://perma.cc/QR5S-Z65Z\]; Paul Triolo, China’s Rare Earth Restrictions: More Collateral Damage from US Export Controls, Substack: AI Stack Decrypted (May 27, 2025), https://pstaidecrypted.substack.com/p/chinas-rare-earth-restrictions-more [https://perma.cc/J53S-N7JL\].
Alexander Ward & Asa Fitch, Raimondo Says Holding Back China in Chips Race Is a ‘Fool’s Errand’, Wall St. J. (Dec. 22, 2024, at 00:02 ET), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-biden-chip-manufacturing-gina-raimondo-b98c2606 [https://perma.cc/DU5B-PMND\].
Zijing Wu, Cheng Leng & Tim Bradshaw, China Bans Tech Companies from Buying Nvidia’s AI Chips, Fin. Times (Sep. 17, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/12adf92d-3e34-428a-8d61-c9169511915c?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [https://perma.cc/9AC4-4SXX\].
Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology 33–52 (2023).
Id.; see also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 Emory L.J. 639, 648 (2014) (discussing how the Clinton Administration committed to minimal government intervention in e-commerce and supported private sector leadership in online spaces).
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 248–49.
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1702(c)(5), 132 Stat. 2174, 2177.
Id.
See Justin Hendrix, Transcript: TikTok CEO Testifies to Congress, Tech Pol’y Press (Mar. 24, 2023), https://techpolicy.press/transcript-tiktok-ceo-testifies-to-congress [https://perma.cc/4S84-M5P5\].
Brian Fung, TikTok Collects a Lot of Data. But That’s Not the Main Reason Officials Say It’s a Security Risk, CNN: Bus. (Mar. 24, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/24/tech/tiktok-ban-national-security-hearing [https://perma.cc/4DN4-GHAY\].
Hendrix, supra note 294.
Jeremy Daum, What China’s National Intelligence Law Says, and Why It Doesn’t Matter, China L. Translate (Feb. 22, 2024), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/what-the-national-intelligence-law-says-and-why-it-doesnt-matter/ [https://perma.cc/Z68K-R92N\]; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Dan W. Puchniak, TikTok’s Identity Crisis: Corporate Personality in a De-Globalizing World, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 3, 2025), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/01/03/tiktoks-identity-crisis-corporate-personality-in-a-de-globalizing-world/ [https://perma.cc/7EZC-374C\] (discussing how ByteDance is required by Chinese law to maintain a CCP committee and assist with national security interests).
Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 11, 2020).
Abram Brown, Is This the Real Reason Why Trump Wants to Ban TikTok?, Forbes (Aug. 2, 2020, at 06:42 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/08/01/is-this-the-real-reason-why-trump-wants-to-ban-tiktok/ [https://perma.cc/HJZ2-LTY2\]; Ana Swanson & David McCabe, U.S. Judge Temporarily Halts Trump’s WeChat Ban, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/business/economy/court-wechat-ban.html [https://perma.cc/K2QN-45BU\].
Press Release, Steven T. Mnuchin, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement on the President’s Decision Regarding the Acquisition by ByteDance Ltd. of the U.S. Business of Musical.ly (Aug. 14, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1094 [https://perma.cc/4YAB-TW3D\]. The CFIUS process applies because ByteDance acquired Musical.ly, a U.S. company, in 2017. Order Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by ByteDance Ltd., 85 Fed. Reg. 51297 (Aug. 14, 2020) (ordering ByteDance to divest after its merger with Musical.ly); Natalie Jarvey, Musical.ly Owner Merges App with TikTok, Hollywood Reporter (Aug. 2, 2018, at 07:55 CT), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/digital/musically-owner-bytedance-merges-apptiktok-1131630/ [https://perma.cc/T5MG-N95R\].
TikTok USDS Joint Venture, TikTok U.S. Data Sec. JV, https://usds.tiktok.com/usds-about [https://perma.cc/W4NA-YR6W\]. Under this plan, TikTok would store all U.S. user data on Oracle servers in the United States, implement firewalls separating its U.S. operations from its Chinese parent company, and subject its content moderation and recommendation algorithms to external review by U.S. entities. TikTok also created a special subsidiary called TikTok U.S. Data Security that will manage all business functions relating to personal data. This special subsidiary will be overseen by an independent board of directors whose appointment will be subject to the vetting and approval of the U.S. government.
Matt Perault, What Happened to TikTok’s Project Texas?, Lawfare (Mar. 20, 2024, at 13:24 CT), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/what-happened-to-tiktoks-project-texas [https://perma.cc/AZ3L-NESU\].
Id.
Id.; see also Lizhi Liu, The Rise of Data Politics: Digital China and the World, 56 Stud. Compar. Int’l Dev. 45, 46–52, 62 (2021) (examining how the Chinese state exercises influence over Chinese technology firms operating globally and the resulting national security implications for host countries).
Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50, 138 Stat. 955 (2024).
Id. at 958–59.
See generally Petition for Review of Constitutionality of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 122 F.4th 930 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (No. 24-1113) (challenging the Act as an unconstitutional restraint on the protected speech of TikTok and its users); Petition for Review and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Firebaugh v. Garland, 122 F.4th 930 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (No. 24-1130) (raising the users’ First Amendment challenge to the Act).
TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57, 69–72 (2025).
Id. at 71 (“Petitioners’ proposed alternatives ignore the ‘latitude’ we afford the Government to design regulatory solutions to address content-neutral interests. ‘So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989)).
See Darlene Superville & Josh Boak, Trump Extends TikTok Shutdown Deadline for Fourth Time After Reaching Framework Deal with China, AP News (Sep. 16, 2025, at 14:27 CT), https://apnews.com/article/trump-tiktok-ban-deadline-extended-900b81465292126359cb83a8276752c0 [https://perma.cc/XP3K-2MZH\].
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 7, 2024, at 22:05 CT), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/112058087970558736 [https://perma.cc/HAC2-2Q5A\]; Edward Helmore, Donald Trump Flip-Flops on TikTok and Now Rails Against a Ban, Guardian (Mar. 11, 2024, at 19:10 ET), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/11/donald-trump-tiktok-ban-biden [https://perma.cc/9W2Y-QEKC\].
Sophia Cai, Inside Trump’s TikTok Flip-Flop, Axios (Mar. 9, 2024), https://www.axios.com/2024/03/09/tiktok-ban-trump-republicans [https://perma.cc/J9Q4-MC4H\].
Lisa Friedman & Sapna Maheshwari, How Donald Trump Went from Backing a TikTok Ban to Backing Off, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/28/us/politics/trump-tik-tok-ban.html [https://perma.cc/XRT2-L6MR\]; Cai, supra note 312.
See Peter J. Benson, Joanna R. Lampe & Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB11127, Regulation of TikTok Under the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act: Analysis of Selected Legal Issues 1–2 (Mar. 9, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11127 [https://perma.cc/H88A-TBJA\]; TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 72.
Eduardo Baptista, Krystal Hu & Doyinsola Oladipo, Over Half a Million ‘TikTok Refugees’ Flock to China’s RedNote, Reuters (Jan. 15, 2025, at 02:22 CT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/over-half-million-tiktok-refugees-flock-chinas-rednote-2025-01-14/ [https://perma.cc/K8GW-XNF5\]; Angela Huyue Zhang, The TikTok Boomerang, Project Syndicate (Jan. 18, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-tiktok-ban-americans-flock-to-chinese-apps-by-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-01 [https://perma.cc/2Z4J-9EKM\].
Zhang, supra note 315; see also Kevin Collier & Kat Tenbarge, Chinese TikTok Alternative RedNote Could Pose Greater Security Risks, Experts Say, NBC News (Jan. 17, 2025, at 12:03 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/chinese-app-rednote-pose-greater-security-risks-tiktok-rcna187619 [https://perma.cc/RB39-R2HC\] (reporting expert consensus that RedNote’s China-based infrastructure and reduced localization compliance expose American users to greater data-security risks than TikTok did).
Zhang, supra note 315.
See Andrew R. Chow, Why So Many TikTokers Are Moving to the Chinese App Red Note Ahead of Ban, Time (Jan. 14, 2025, at 11:27 CT), https://time.com/7206781/red-note-tiktok-migration/ [https://perma.cc/V3EU-D63H\].
Id.; Zhang, supra note 315.
Chow, supra note 318; cf. Moe Long, Thinking About Using VPNs to Get Around a TikTok Ban? Here’s Why That Might Not Work, CNET (June 18, 2025, at 12:00 ET), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/a-vpn-alone-probably-wont-bypass-tiktok-bans-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/L4DQ-KNV8\] (noting that a VPN may allow for continued access to the social media site, despite some challenges).
Friedman & Maheshwari, supra note 313; Superville & Boak, supra note 310.
Julien Blanquart & Reid Whitten, China Expands Technology Export Controls: Fighting Back on TikTok and Putting Your R&D at Risk, Sheppard: Glob. Trade L. Blog (Sep. 2, 2020), https://www.sheppard.com/insights/blogs/china-technology-export-controls-tiktok [https://perma.cc/4W6K-8XRG\].
Id.
Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong & David McCabe, TikTok Deal Is Complicated by New Rules from China over Tech Exports, N.Y. Times (Aug. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/technology/china-tiktok-export-controls.html [https://perma.cc/4QQQ-Z48M\]; Meaghan Tobin, Why Beijing Could Have the Last Say on Any TikTok Deal, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/us/politics/tiktok-ban-sale-china.html [https://perma.cc/JCT3-EX55\].
Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Saves TikTok While Protecting National Security, White House (Sep. 25, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/09/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-saves-tiktok-while-protecting-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/62CA-KVLU\].
Angela Huyue Zhang, A TikTok Deal China Will Love, Project Syndicate (Sep. 26, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-tiktok-deal-china-will-love-by-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-09 [https://perma.cc/3HVQ-9R2K\].
Id.
Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern, Exec. Order No. 14117, 89 Fed. Reg. 15421 (Feb. 28, 2024).
Brian Hengesbaugh et al., US Department of Justice National Security Division Takes Steps to Implement Final Rule on Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries with FAQs, Guidance, and Limited Enforcement Policy for the First 90 Days, Baker McKenzie: Glob. Sanctions & Exp. Controls Blog (Apr. 12, 2025), https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-department-of-justice-national-security-division-takes-steps-to-implement-final-rule-on-protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries-with-faqs-guidance-and-limited-enforc/ [https://perma.cc/CLP7-XF86\].
See Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-50, div. I, § 2(a), 138 Stat. 960 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9901).
Chander & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 2029; see Peter Swire & Samm Sacks, Limiting Data Broker Sales in the Name of U.S. National Security: Questions on Substance and Messaging, Lawfare (Feb. 28, 2024, at 20:38 CT), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/limiting-data-broker-sales-in-the-name-of-u.s.-national-security-questions-on-substance-and-messaging [https://perma.cc/4BX9-6WCK\].
Chander & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 2014.
Id. at 2029, 2047; see also Mariko Oi & Chris Vallance, Apple Shares Slide After China Government iPhone Ban Reports, BBC (Sep. 8, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66748092 [https://perma.cc/X7J5-KB2F\] (reporting China’s restriction on iPhone use by government officials and the immediate market impact on Apple, illustrating how retaliatory data-flow measures can directly harm U.S. tech firms).
Swire & Sacks, supra note 331 (noting that excessive localization could impede the ability to share data across borders for a wide array of cooperative purposes, including “law enforcement, intelligence, cybersecurity, health research, and other common purposes”).
The China Threat, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat [https://perma.cc/73VB-G7TN\] (last visited Oct. 12, 2026).
Christopher Wray, Dir., FBI, Remarks as Delivered at the Hudson Institute: The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States (July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches-and-testimony/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/4WF8-Z62N\].
Stephen S. Roach, America’s False Narrative on China, Project Syndicate (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-false-china-narrative-by-stephen-s-roach-2019-04 [https://perma.cc/Y34A-HG2J\].
Id. (criticizing this estimate as resting on “flimsy evidence derived from dubious ‘proxy modeling’ that attempts to value stolen trade secrets via nefarious activities such as narcotics trafficking, corruption, occupational fraud, and illicit financial flows”). Mark Cohen, who formerly worked at the U.S. government, expressed similar concern, noting that although Chinese “originating counterfeit and pirated goods are as high as 87% of global totals,” that does not have a direct link with trade secret infringement or patent infringement origination. Mark A. Cohen, The 600 Billion Dollar China IP Echo Chamber, China IPR (May 12, 2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019/05/12/the-600-billion-dollar-china-ip-echo-chamber/ [https://perma.cc/T62C-2EGK\].
Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Visa Restrictions for Chinese Students Alarm Academia, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-students.html [https://perma.cc/6PFA-LY7U\]; Dan Cadman, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Stopping Chinese Infiltration of U.S. Educational and Research Institutions 1–2 (2020), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/cadman-foreign-students-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/R657-9P5C\].
Attorney General China Initiative Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1179321/dl?inline= [https://perma.cc/9W2J-XVUB\].
Jenny J. Lee & Xiaojie Li, Comm. of 100, Racial Profiling Among Scientists of Chinese Descent and Consequences for the U.S. Scientific Community 2 (2021), https://www.committee100.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/C100-Lee-Li-White-Paper-FINAL-FINAL-10.28.pdf [https://perma.cc/55JY-BE4P\]; Eileen Guo, Jess Aloe & Karen Hao, The US Crackdown on Chinese Economic Espionage Is a Mess. We Have the Data to Show It., MIT Tech. Rev. (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/02/1040656/china-initative-us-justice-department/ [https://perma.cc/HCU8-TWYY\].
Matthew G. Olsen, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks on Countering Nation-State Threats (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-matthew-olsen-delivers-remarks-countering-nation-state-threats [https://perma.cc/T78Z-2G3C\].
Gabriela Baca, Comment, Visa Denied: Why Courts Should Review a Consular Officer’s Denial of a U.S.-Citizen Family Member’s Visa, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 591, 595–96 (2015) (noting that the State Department does not provide a formal review or appeal process for visa denials, and federal courts generally refuse to hear such cases); Matthew J. Sunday, Note, Extending New Property Theory and Constitutional Protections Extraterritorially to Provide Procedural Due Process to Foreign Nationals During Visa Revocation Proceedings, 30 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 373, 376–78 (2020) (noting that federal courts have considered a consular officer’s decision unreviewable); Adam B. Cox, The Invention of Immigration Exceptionalism, 134 Yale L.J. 329, 339 (2024) (challenging the immigration plenary power doctrine that has long insulated immigration policies from meaningful judicial review).
Sunday, supra note 343, at 377–78.
Yoon-Hendricks, supra note 339.
See Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People’s Republic of China, Proclamation No. 10043, 85 Fed. Reg. 34353 (May 29, 2020) (defining “military-civil fusion strategy” as “actions by or at the behest of the PRC to acquire and divert foreign technologies, specifically critical and emerging technologies, to incorporate into and advance the PRC’s military capabilities”).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
Stuart Anderson, Inside Trump’s Immigration Order to Restrict Chinese Students, Forbes (June 1, 2020, at 00:03 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/06/01/inside-trumps-immigration-order-to-restrict-chinese-students/ [https://perma.cc/E8EG-5GYF\]; see also Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (invoking Section 212(f) authority to suspend entry of nationals from six majority-Muslim countries, an early instance of Trump’s expansive use of the provision that presaged the later Chinese-student restrictions).
Anderson, supra note 348.
Id.; see also U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO-04-371, Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars 7 (2004), https://gao.justia.com/department-of-state/2004/2/border-security-gao-04-371/GAO-04-371-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5SA-7PTQ\] (describing the MANTIS interagency clearance process as the traditional individualized screening mechanism for foreign science and technology students seeking U.S. visas).
Anderson, supra note 348.
Robert Schaefer, Academic Freedom and International Students, Part 4: The China Initiative, ACM SIGSOFT Software Eng’g Notes, July 2023, at 9, 10–11, https://dl.acm.org/toc/sigsoft/2023/48/3 [https://perma.cc/U9R8-RKSG\].
Bateman, supra note 6, at 25.
Press Release, Marco Rubio, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, New Visa Policies Put America First, Not China (May 28, 2025), https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/new-visa-policies-put-america-first-not-china/ [https://perma.cc/PEL4-TBM3\].
Visa Revocations, MyAttorney USA (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 221(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)), https://myattorneyusa.com/immigration-blog/immigration-to-the-usa/visa-revocations/ [https://perma.cc/MM5B-RZQK\] (last visited Oct. 12, 2026) (“Section 221(i) explicitly states that there shall be no means of judicial review or habeas corpus petition from the discretionary decision to revoke a visa under section 221(i) or any other habeas corpus provision. However, if an alien in the United States is placed in removal proceedings under section 237(a)(1)(B) solely based upon the revocation of his or her visa or documentation, the alien is entitled to judicial review.”).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
See Emily Feng, Rubio’s Move to Revoke Chinese Students’ Visas Sparks Condemnation, NPR (May 29, 2025, at 17:54 ET), https://www.npr.org/2025/05/29/nx-s1-5414341/china-student-visas-rubio [https://perma.cc/W86W-DR6Z\].
Devlin Barrett, Experts Who Warn of Risks Posed by Chinese Students Are Skeptical of Trump Plan, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/31/us/politics/trump-china-student-visas-crackdown-risks.html [https://perma.cc/T6N9-NTYF\].
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social, “OUR DEAL WITH CHINA IS DONE . . . .” (June 11, 2025), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114664632971715644 [https://perma.cc/M8F7-9UZS\].
Id.; see also Liam Knox, In Reversal, Trump Says Chinese Students Are Welcome, Inside Higher Ed (June 13, 2025), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/quick-takes/2025/06/13/reversal-trump-says-chinese-students-are-welcome [https://perma.cc/WRR2-BK6E\] (reporting Trump’s public reversal welcoming Chinese students and situating the announcement within ongoing U.S.–China trade negotiations over rare-earth exports).
Emily Feng, Visas Are the Newest Weapon in U.S.-China Rivalry, NPR (Apr. 25, 2019, at 05:12 ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/25/716032871/visas-are-the-newest-weapon-in-u-s-china-rivalry [https://perma.cc/R4AG-PGNX\]; Vivian Wang, A U.S.-China Trade War with Students and Tourists as Potential Pawns, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/world/asia/china-trump-tariffs-students.html [https://perma.cc/MC6R-97BU\]; Bateman, supra note 6, at 14–16, 68, 70; Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1702(c)(5), 132 Stat. 2174, 2177.
Xie et al., supra note 18, at 1.
Wang, supra note 361 (citing U.S. government data).
Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, Analysis of U.S. and Canadian International Student Data 5 n.8 (2022), https://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Analysis-of-International-Student-Data.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL52-B4X2\].
Lee & Li, supra note 341, at 12, 19; Mitch Ambrose, APS Surveys Impacts of Security Policies, Suggests Reforms, Am. Inst. of Physics (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.aip.org/fyi/aps-surveys-impacts-of-security-policies-suggests-reforms [https://perma.cc/ME83-GNSC\]; Robert Flynn et al., Building a Wall Around Science: The Effect of U.S.-China Tensions on International Scientific Research 2–3, 17–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 32622, 2024), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32622/w32622.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6GF-PVVW\].
Ma, supra note 155.
Lee & Li, supra note 341, at 10, 25; Yoon-Hendricks, supra note 339; Flynn et al., supra note 365, at 38–39.
Reif, supra note 4.
See also Christine Clark, Being Tough on China Is Bad for Science, UC San Diego Today (Jan. 14, 2025), https://today.ucsd.edu/story/being-tough-on-china-is-bad-for-science [https://perma.cc/3AY3-4QYT\] (reporting UC San Diego research findings that heightened scrutiny of U.S.–China academic collaboration has coincided with reduced scientific productivity and slower progress in strategically important research fields). See generally Ruixue Jia et al., The Impact of U.S.–China Tensions on U.S. Science: Evidence from the NIH Investigations, PNAS, May 7, 2024, at 1 (finding that scholarly productivity declined among researchers with Chinese collaborators following the NIH-initiated investigations).
Dongbo Shi, Weichen Liu & Yanbo Wang, Has China’s Young Thousand Talents Program Been Successful in Recruiting and Nurturing Top-Caliber Scientists?, Sci., Jan. 6, 2023, at 62, 64–65 (showing that among young scientists who returned to China and joined the Young Thousand Talents Program, the performance in the fields of chemistry and life science was particularly outstanding because these fields have high requirements for material, financial, and human resources).
The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0, MacroPolo, https://macropolo.org/interactive/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/P246-L2FA\] (last visited Oct. 12, 2026).
Viola Zhou, DeepSeek’s Rise Shows Why China’s Top AI Talent Is Skipping Silicon Valley, Rest of World (Feb. 5, 2025), https://restofworld.org/2025/china-ai-talent-deepseek-rise-us-dominance/ [https://perma.cc/7JRU-CKMB\].
Id.
It’s Not Just AI. China’s Medicines Are Surprising the World, Too, The Economist (Feb. 16, 2025), https://www.economist.com/business/2025/02/16/its-not-just-ai-chinas-medicines-are-surprising-the-world-too [https://perma.cc/N98H-LB2R\].
David Wainer, The Drug Industry Is Having Its Own DeepSeek Moment, Wall St. J. (Feb. 7, 2025, at 05:30 ET), https://www.wsj.com/health/pharma/the-drug-industry-is-having-its-own-deepseek-moment-68589d70 [https://perma.cc/W6XJ-CYAX\].
Roach, supra note 172, at 259 (arguing that “[t]he US-China conflict is an accident that didn’t have to happen”); Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 1097, 1163 (2020) (arguing that the broad delegation of tariff authority to the President on economic security grounds poses greater risks than benefits); Bown, supra note 125, at 300–02 (cautioning that if the United States fails to strike the right balance in its export control policy, the policy may prove ineffective in addressing national security risks); Kennedy, supra note 28 (warning that the U.S. campaign against Chinese technology could backfire).
Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy 210–25 (2018) (proposing measures such as interbranch checks, reforming the judicial selection process, and checking presidential administration). See generally Bauer & Goldsmith, supra note 50 (offering more than fifty legislative recommendations aimed at restoring legal and institutional constraints on presidential power); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution in the Twenty-First Century 266–67 (2024) (underscoring the need to restore balance among the branches of government by simultaneously constraining executive overreach and revitalizing the institutional roles of Congress and the courts); Andrew Boyle, Checking the President’s Sanctions Powers: A Proposal to Reform the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (June 10, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/media/7754/download/BCJ-128 IEEPA report.pdf?inline=1 [https://perma.cc/3GK3-9LJZ\] (proposing reforms to IEEPA).
2020 Democratic Party Platform, Am. Presidency Project (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2020-democratic-party-platform [https://perma.cc/8K33-YJVS\]. One particularly salient example is President Biden’s invocation of IEEPA to launch a novel outbound investment screening regime targeting U.S. capital flows into Chinese sectors deemed sensitive to national security, as well as the introduction of the data restrictions rules to China. See supra Part II; Emily Benson & Gregory C. Allen, A New National Security Instrument: The Executive Order on Outbound Investment, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Aug. 10, 2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-national-security-instrument-executive-order-outbound-investment [https://perma.cc/RQ7L-9EWB\].
See Ben Casselman, The Economy Seems Healthy. Were the Warnings About Tariffs Overblown?, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/16/business/tariffs-recession-economists.html [https://perma.cc/P85L-9GCF\].
Galina Hale et al., Inflationary Effects of Trade Disputes with China, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/2019/02/inflationary-effects-of-trade-disputes-with-china/ [https://perma.cc/A9FY-UWNC\].
Id.
Id.
David J. Lynch, Why Biden Hasn’t Killed Trump’s China Tariffs and Made Imports Cheaper, Wash. Post (May 20, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2022/05/20/trump-tariffs-biden-inflation/ [https://perma.cc/WZ4G-PGAC\].
See id.; Erik Guzik, Tariffs Are Back in the Spotlight, but Skepticism of Free Trade Has Deep Roots in American History, Conversation (Oct. 31, 2024, at 08:26 ET), https://theconversation.com/tariffs-are-back-in-the-spotlight-but-skepticism-of-free-trade-has-deep-roots-in-american-history-241311 [https://perma.cc/3XAH-KHEJ\].
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, One Hundred Days of Lawlessness, Project Syndicate (May 2, 2025), https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/trump-100-days-of-lawlessness-what-to-do-about-it-by-harold-hongju-koh-2025-05 [https://perma.cc/N3JB-8E4Z\]; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Crisis Is Real, L.A. Times (Apr. 17, 2025, at 11:28 PT), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2025-04-17/abrego-garcia-el-salvador-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/CF32-6Q8F\].
Karen Greenberg, A New Age of Presidential Unilaterism?, Foreign Pol’y In Focus (Nov. 11, 2024), https://fpif.org/a-new-age-of-presidential-unilaterism/ [https://perma.cc/AA2A-ZUM4\].
James M. Goldgeier & Elizabeth N. Saunders, The Unconstrained Presidency: Checks and Balances Eroded Long Before Trump, Council on Foreign Rels. (Aug. 14, 2018, at 15:16 CT), https://www.cfr.org/article/unconstrained-presidency-checks-and-balances-eroded-long-trump [https://perma.cc/W3AW-2DRU\] (“Many have written eloquently, particularly since 9/11, about the need for checks on presidential power. But the reality is that Congress is in no shape to reclaim its role in foreign policy—and neither are the other traditional sources of constraint on U.S. presidents. It may take a major shock, such as the rise of China, to reboot the system.”).
