- I. Introduction
- II. Tracing Retirement Benefits’ Transition from Gratuities to Contracts to Trusts
- III. ERISA Fiduciary Arrangements
- IV. ERISA Fiduciary Arrangements: Suboptimal Relational Contracts?
- V. Revamping ERISA Fiduciary Relationships by Implementing Existing Incentivization Structures and Risk Allocation Mechanisms
- VI. Conclusion
I. Introduction
Many Americans don’t know what their retirement will look like, or if they’ll be able to afford one. Whether they will retire comfortably, eke out a subsistence lifestyle, or be forced to remain in the workforce may depend on their retirement savings.[1] Today, “[m]any middle class people will be downwardly mobile into poverty in old age.”[2] In fact, most Americans need about half a million dollars more to live securely in retirement.[3] Over 4% of octogenarians, most of whom suffer health issues, must work to survive.[4] “[A] humanitarian and political disaster” is looming,[5] even while Social Security remains solvent. Experts project its insolvency by 2034.[6] In short, retired Americans need more money to survive.
This Article exposes an overlooked contributor to the crisis: the contractual structure of retirement fiduciary arrangements. Employers sponsor defined contribution (DC) retirement plans, like 401(k)s, that enable their workers to contribute some of their pretax earnings to a savings account with the aim of using those funds to live on in retirement.[7] The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs those plans and the fiduciary service providers who administer the plans and the assets therein.[8] The problem? ERISA fiduciary arrangements contain predatory compensation structures, lack sensible risk allocation mechanisms, and fail to align parties’ interests. This structural imbalance exists because the fiduciary arrangement’s primary beneficiary is a nonparty to the contract who has no say in the contract’s structure but who largely bears the financial risk and the burden of enforcement if the fiduciary fails to comply with its obligations.[9] Though these fiduciary arrangements affect plan participants as much or more than DC plans’ terms, until now, no literature has examined their structures. This Article therefore asks: What if altering those structures could better protect Americans’ retirement savings?
Extensive analysis of egregious fiduciary malfeasance exists.[10] Dire individual and significant economic implications are too often the result of such conduct.[11] This Article, however, focuses on overlooked but hardly less insidious conduct: predatory fees and unreasonable fiduciary compensation structures that inhibit savings growth. Excessive fees of as little as 1 to 2% can erode one-third to one-half of a worker’s retirement savings over a worker’s career.[12] Indeed, high fiduciary fees can be so harmful that some plan participants are better off avoiding their retirement plans and saving through other investment vehicles—despite losing the opportunity for pretax savings.[13]
With the aim of optimizing savings outcomes for plan participants, this Article thus prescribes a new approach to structuring ERISA fiduciary arrangements, the most important contractual agreement flowing from DC plans. Applying techniques from contract drafting practices outside of the retirement services sector, it details strategies to incentivize investment growth and more fairly disperse risk. This novel approach aligns with Congress’s stated intent in enacting ERISA: to protect and promote the growth of Americans’ retirement savings.[14]
Building on thoughtful critiques of ERISA fiduciary law’s development[15] and heeding the call of scholars who suggest a new approach to considering fiduciary questions would be instructive,[16] this Article applies contract and relational contract principles and approaches to the ERISA fiduciary arrangement. This Article’s audience will no doubt be familiar with basic contract law principles. Less commonly discussed in law school auditoriums are relational contracts. In relational contracts, parties elect not to specify exact means of achieving shared objectives and instead establish parameters and structures that facilitate their mutual aims while enabling the parties to exercise their judgment in light of developing circumstances.[17] Proactivity and mutuality are hallmarks of these highly optimized contractual relationships.[18] Though fiduciary arrangements share commonalities with relational contracts, the outcomes for parties to those contracts are often normatively more desirable than those achieved by ERISA fiduciaries for plan participants.
Examining ERISA fiduciary arrangements through a relational contracts lens reveals structural misalignments in fiduciary compensation and incentivization and raises foundational questions about how ERISA fiduciaries perform their duties. Applying a relational contract approach to ERISA fiduciary relationships generates opportunities to restructure and optimize these relationships to better protect American workers while fairly compensating fiduciaries and providing them with other advantages. The aim of this Article is not to create default rules or standards, nor is it an effort to convert the fiduciary relationship into one reliant entirely on contract principles. It is more modest, and contract principles are no panacea. They do, however, offer plan sponsors the opportunity to reconsider and to optimize how they engage fiduciaries at a time in which neither Congress nor regulators demonstrate a commitment to timely addressing the retirement crisis. The precarious state of Americans’ retirement prospects demands novel, innovative measures to protect their life savings. Without reimagining the ERISA fiduciary paradigm, workers will continue to suffer harm that, unlike their savings in far too many instances, compounds with time.
Part II briefly details the DC plan, its origin, and associated fiduciary duties under ERISA. Part III evaluates how the fiduciary relationship is contractually structured. Part IV applies contract and relational contract concepts to ERISA fiduciary relationships and asserts that if ERISA fiduciary relationships are relational contracts, they are structured suboptimally. Part V, with the aim of encouraging plan sponsors to engage fiduciaries more thoughtfully, explores various possibilities for optimizing these relationships or at least nudging them back toward a course consistent with ERISA’s protective purpose. Part V contributes by proposing concrete changes DC plan sponsors can make in structuring fiduciary arrangements, namely how incentivization and bonding mechanisms can be implemented so that parties’ interests become more closely aligned—and more in sync with ERISA’s clear policy objectives.
II. Tracing Retirement Benefits’ Transition from Gratuities to Contracts to Trusts
Employer-sponsored retirement benefits originated as gratuities, evolved into contractual promises, and were eventually codified as hybrid arrangements, both contractual and trust-like in nature. Today, plan sponsors provide benefits through a hybrid mechanism with trust and contract characteristics.[19] “An ERISA plan is established and maintained by a ‘written instrument’ which specifies the legal rights and obligations that exist under the plan.”[20] Courts characterize plans as a “binding contract”[21] and construe them in accordance with general contract principles.[22] A brief overview of the rise, evolution, and modern form of retirement benefits links Part V’s proposals with their solid jurisprudential and policy foundations.
A. A Brief History of the Rise of DC Plans
Courts have not always considered retirement benefits to be compensation for work.[23] Many cases seeking to enforce promises concerning retirement plans were famously unsuccessful, largely because in the first half of the twentieth century, employers and courts viewed retirement benefits as revocable gratuities.[24] Around the turn of the twentieth century, and roughly concurrent with societal notions concerning the need for Social Security protections,[25] courts construing retirement promises as gratuities gave way to more sensible contractual interpretations.[26] In short, because employers did not provide retirement benefits in addition to compensation but rather as compensation to be received at a later date (i.e., deferred compensation), courts began to apply contractual principles to benefits disputes.[27] In doing so, they fulfilled contract law’s most fundamental aim: protection of reasonable expectations.[28]
Such interpretations were supported by the substantial value employers received in providing plans and the potentially harsh consequences of failure to enforce retirement benefit promises. Retirement “plans developed . . . as industrial programs designed to affect employee conduct for the benefit of the enterprise.”[29] These plans’ primary purpose was “to serve the employer’s own business needs” by removing less productive workers from the workforce, “attract[ing] employees, reduc[ing] turnover, and prevent[ing] unionization of the workforce.”[30] Yet, construing retirement promises as contracts was insufficient to protect many workers. Insolvent employers were able to avoid obligations, leaving older workers without sufficient means on which to live in retirement. In response, courts called for legislative action to address the woeful lack of retirement protections.[31]
After a high-profile corporate dissolution resulted in workers losing substantial retirement savings,[32] Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,[33] the “comprehensive and reticulated” federal statute governing private employer-sponsored benefits.[34] It is easy to see why: When employers failed to follow through with their promises to provide pension benefits, workers who relied thereon were sorely harmed. Congress deemed enforcement of those contractual promises necessary to protect workers’ retirement prospects.[35] Yet, despite retirement benefits’ contractual origins, in enacting ERISA, Congress expressly imported trust law principles into the statutory regime.[36] This importation of trust law principles stems in part from the fact that in its infancy, ERISA primarily regulated the provision and administration of defined benefit (DB) plans, commonly referred to as pensions.[37] DB plans are analogous to trusts in many ways.[38] For this Article’s purposes, it suffices to say that DB plans provide participants with a set distribution amount each month upon retirement.[39] Plan sponsor employers bear the full risk of ensuring they have sufficient funds (regardless of business or investment performance) to pay out defined benefits.[40]
From ERISA’s enactment through the early 2000s, DB plans were the primary mechanism by which employers provided retirement benefits to employees.[41] DC plans, not DB plans, predominate today.[42] In the past several decades, employers have so consistently jettisoned their DB plans and moved to DC plans that DB plans seem nearly anachronistic. This wholesale shift can largely be attributed to employers realizing they could shift costs—and substantial risks—to their employees.[43] Administrative costs, liability risks, and investment risks now rest squarely on the shoulders of plan participants when they were once borne by plan sponsors.[44] Proponents of DC plans assert that they are more desirable than DB plans because they give plan participants more investment flexibility and are more portable if plan participants change jobs.[45] On balance, scholars and commentators view the shift to DC plans as one largely detrimental to workers saving for retirement.[46]
Normative desirability notwithstanding, DC plans are by far the most common employer-sponsored retirement savings plan today.[47] The most common DC plan is the 401(k).[48] DC plans hold an estimated $13.8 trillion in assets, with about $9.9 trillion of that in 401(k) plans.[49] Roughly half of private industry workers participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans.[50] Of note, no law obligates employers to sponsor plans; rather, tax breaks incentivize plan sponsorship and market competitiveness drives it.[51] Professor Kathryn Moore analogizes employer-sponsored benefit plans with “a ‘reverse image’ of Social Security” in that employers who satisfy Internal Revenue Code requirements receive tax benefits for sponsoring plans.[52]
Unlike DB plans, which provide for set amounts based on a formula to be paid to plan participants (or their beneficiaries) upon the participants’ retirement,[53] DC plans provide employees with individual investment accounts.[54] Individual plan participants who choose to participate may set aside a specified amount of their salaries pretax to their account.[55] DC plans are not fringe benefits or gratuities given in addition to workers’ salary.[56] Rather, the employee’s salary is reduced in order to participate in the savings and investment plan.[57] Then, when they retire, the amount available in the account (which is the amount the plan participant has saved, plus income generated, minus expenses like fees and any losses incurred) will be available for their use.[58] The plan participant bears the burden of ensuring that they will have sufficient savings.[59] That burden is only one component of the substantial risk plan participants shoulder with respect to DC plans.[60]
Because of their popularity, today ERISA governs more DC plans than DB plans.[61] ERISA also governs the fiduciaries that administer plans. Problematically, DC plans lack many of the characteristics of DB plans, and thus ERISA’s regulation of DC plans falls short. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that Congress drafted ERISA with an eye toward DB plans and only added section 401(k)—the provision on which most current DC plans are based—to the Internal Revenue Code in 1978, four years after ERISA’s enactment.[62] Thus, the “comprehensive” statute governing DC plans lacks adequate coverage of today’s predominant employer-sponsored retirement savings mechanism. This timeline largely explains why courts play an outsized role in shaping ERISA fiduciary policy.[63]
But what of the retirement benefit plans themselves? DC plans are a hybrid legal mechanism, with characteristics of both trusts and contracts.[64] A plan is a “written instrument” containing the “basic terms and conditions” governing benefits an employer offers to an employee.[65] Among other things, a plan must name a fiduciary responsible for administering the plan and articulate a procedure for amending the plan and identifying who can amend the plan.[66] A plan’s assets are “held in trust by one or more trustees”[67] for plan participants’ benefit.[68] “[G]uided by the policies expressed in ERISA and other federal labor laws,”[69] courts construe DC plans as contracts[70] and apply contract principles to disputes involving plan interpretation.[71] Courts also apply trust law principles to plans, particularly to the fiduciary relationships arising from plans.[72] For a variety of reasons discussed elsewhere, trust principles regularly fail to achieve ERISA’s primary protective purpose.[73]
B. DC Plans Are Contracts . . . to an Extent
More sources shaped the development of DC plans than trust and contract law alone. Corporate law, social and economic theories, and labor law also contributed.[74] From those bases, U.S. retirement policy developed. Professors Peter Wiedenbeck and Brendan Maher explain that today three primary public policies underpin ERISA: “promoting informed financial decision making; preventing mismanagement and abuse of benefit programs; and protecting the reliance interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.”[75] To a large extent, these policies align with the public policies associated with trust law. But trust law is not always the most apt comparison.[76]
This Section thus focuses on the overlooked application of contract principles vis-à-vis DC plans because ERISA and the relationships flowing from it are best understood in light of all of their historical and conceptual context—including their relationship to contract law.[77] Indeed, the third public policy Professors Wiedenbeck and Maher identify echoes contract law’s central theme of the protection of reasonable expectations.[78] Likewise, the Supreme Court has not lost sight of the contractual nature of benefits. Rather, it has noted that ERISA’s purpose is “to protect contractually defined benefits.”[79]
To begin, although a plan’s terms are construed by applying contract interpretive principles, plans do not originate under circumstances similar to traditional contract formation.[80] Most plan participants only learn the terms of the plan after agreeing to employment with the plan’s sponsor.[81] That is, if they learn of them at all. DC plans are not entered into by all the parties at or near the same time. Instead, a plan participant becomes a party to a DC plan upon employment, or after some waiting period initiated by starting employment.[82] And, while employees of firms sponsoring DC plans have the right to opt out of participating in a plan,[83] such a choice amounts to giving up a federally endowed substantive right, i.e., the right to save part of one’s earnings for retirement before they are taxed.
Another notable difference from traditional or “discrete”[84] contracts is the absence of defined temporal and subject matter parameters typically present in other commercial transactions.[85] Further, DC plans are not contracts entered into by parties with relatively similar levels of sophistication.[86] In that same vein, plan participants have no say in the plan’s terms or the resulting characteristics of plan investment menus.[87] Thus, a drastically unequal dynamic exists between plan sponsors and participants.[88] As such, it would be fair to characterize DC plans as contracts of adhesion.[89]
Indeed, the terms of DC plans are agreed to by parties with uneven bargaining power, distinct levels of sophistication, and asymmetric access to information and resources. Many contracts possess similar characteristics. But DC plans go beyond contracts in which a party may try to maximize their gains vis-à-vis those of their counterparty, an effort balanced by contract law’s requirement that the counterparty not be deprived of the benefits of their bargain.[90] DC plans provide a unique vehicle for workers to save pretax earnings. But the plan sponsor determines the plan’s contours while the plan participants (who played no part in defining the plan’s terms) shoulder the risks and costs associated with the plan. Though contracts of adhesion abound in modern society, few play as pivotal a role as DC plans do in a worker’s life.[91]
Still, the basic elements present in contract formation can be sketched out in any DC plan. Mutual assent, offer and acceptance, and exchange of valuable consideration are present.[92] Plan participants are parties to the plan,[93] as are employers who sponsor plans.[94] Plan administrators, who may be, but generally are not, the plan sponsors, are designated in the plan document.[95] Unlike in traditional contract disputes, however, some courts require the plans themselves to be made parties to litigation arising from plan terms.[96] A requirement that plans be parties to litigation likely arises from ERISA section 502(d)(2), which states that judgments are enforceable “against the plan as an entity” and against others found liable for violations.[97]
Some courts construe DC plans as unilateral contracts. For example, in Carr v. First Nationwide Bank, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California pronounced that “[i]t is well settled that pension benefit plans are unilateral contracts which employees accept by appropriate performance.”[98] It further explained that a pension plan’s existence “constitute[s] an offer to enter into a unilateral contract which may be accepted by performance.”[99] To accept the offer, plan participants must participate in the plan and agree to adhere to the plan’s terms.[100] Traditional contract principles also apply as to the modification of plans. The required elements of contract formation must be present, not only in formation but also in amendment of plans. For example, in Hensiek v. Board of Directors of Casino Queen Holding Co., the trial court found an arbitration provision added after the plan participants’ employment began was unenforceable for lack of consideration.[101] The plan participants did not agree to the plan sponsor’s attempt to unilaterally alter the contract, and continued employment and plan participation did not suffice to serve as valid consideration for revisions to the plan.[102]
Further, basic contract principles of construction govern DC plans. Thus, in construing a plan’s terms, courts must try to determine the intended meaning from the plan’s explicit language.[103] Other classic contract construction principles also apply. They include presuming that unambiguous language is conclusive of parties’ intent; that plans should be construed as a whole so as to give meaning to all terms and to avoid illusoriness; and that specific clauses supersede general provisions.[104] Certainly, DC plans resemble a “standard” contract much less than they approximate contracts of adhesion, but they nevertheless have the essential characteristics of a contract.
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott theorize that most contracts involve a seller of goods or services and a buyer, and that contracts fit into one of four categories: (1) firm to firm; (2) firm to individual; (3) individual to firm; and (4) individual to individual.[105] In one sense, DC plans reflect Schwartz and Scott’s third category of contracts, the individual-to-firm contract (here, the individual plan participant-worker to the plan sponsor-employer firm), in that the individual provides labor and the firm compensates the individual for the labor by providing a mechanism in which pretax earnings may be invested. Conceptualizing plans as contracts using such classifications proves particularly helpful in the following section when considering ERISA fiduciary relationships.
Yet, unlike traditional contract formation, parties’ freedom to contract with respect to DC plans is not unlimited. “ERISA abridges freedom of contract in some respects, but not others.”[106] It limits fiduciaries’ ability to contract around or limit their own liability[107] and, in some circuits, curtails parties’ ability to prospectively contract away their substantive rights through arbitration agreements.[108] Plan participant plaintiffs bringing suit against fiduciaries or plan sponsors who breach terms of the DC plan may also be limited—or empowered—by the DC plan’s express terms. For example, applying the Federal Arbitration Act, numerous courts have upheld arbitration provisions in plans stripping plan participants of their substantive rights to seek plan-wide and equitable relief,[109] which are otherwise generally available.[110] Although ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D) requires fiduciaries to execute their duties “in accordance with [plan] documents,” it does so only to the extent that they “are consistent with [ERISA’s provision].”[111] But, failure to do so does not give rise to a claim for breach of contract. Rather, suits under ERISA are styled as statutory violations, for the recovery of benefits, or for fiduciary malfeasance.[112]
Plan participant plaintiffs bringing claims arising from plan terms may also be restricted by some courts’ requirement that they bring their claims in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan.[113] ERISA also restricts available relief.[114] Reformation of plan terms and the removal of breaching fiduciaries constitute examples of available relief.[115] Although ERISA does not address whether plan participants have the right to a jury trial, “[c]ourts addressing this issue have almost uniformly held that under the common law of trusts proceedings to determine rights under employee benefit plans are equitable in character and thus a matter for a judge, not a jury.”[116] Even when plan participants seek monetary relief, courts construe that relief sought “to be an integral part of an equitable action.”[117]
Setting aside legal barriers to enforcement, equally obstructive practical barriers to enforcement exist. Plan participants lack the expertise and information to adequately monitor whether a plan’s provisions are being followed.[118] Most plan participants likely have not seen their respective plans; those who have are unlikely to understand their terms. They likewise are unaware that ERISA imposes on them the obligation to protect their retirement savings and do not understand their obligation to monitor and police fiduciaries’ administration of the plan. Many likely believe that their employers are obligated to monitor, prevent, and, if necessary, enforce against any violations of the plan.[119] They may thus reasonably prioritize immediate needs over the more amorphous objective of ensuring their DC plans’ terms are fulfilled so as to promote the growth of their retirement savings.[120]
III. ERISA Fiduciary Arrangements
Despite the contractual origins of retirement benefits,[121] trust law principles largely govern DC plan administration and ERISA fiduciary relationships today.[122] ERISA sets out ostensibly robust fiduciary duties for those exercising “any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan.”[123] Fiduciaries owe plan participants “the highest [duty] known to law,”[124] a phrase common to trust law.[125] Plan fiduciaries must administer plans prudently and loyally.[126] This prudent investor standard requires fiduciaries to fulfill their duties “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing” that a prudent person “acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use.”[127] More concretely, plan fiduciaries must give participants appropriate disclosures;[128] act only in the interests and for the exclusive benefit of participants; defray reasonable plan expenses; comply with the plan’s language (so long as the plan is consistent with ERISA); and diversify plan investments.[129] ERISA also obligates fiduciaries with “a prudential duty to be cost-conscious in the administration of a plan.”[130]
These rigorous obligations are hardly surprising. Generations of law students read then-Chief Judge Cardozo’s explanation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty as “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”[131] Public policy explains in part why American courts have generally developed fulsome fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties bridge gaps in which one party in a relationship lacks information and expertise that the other has.[132] Fiduciary duties enable those lacking information or expertise to hire others with expertise so as not to incur substantial costs in directing or monitoring their agents’ conduct.[133] Specifically, they enable a person “to hire someone with superior information to deal on [their] behalf with others having superior information. By imposing a duty of utmost good faith rather than the standard contractual duty of ordinary good faith, it minimizes the costs of self-protection to the fiduciary’s principal.”[134]
ERISA fiduciary arrangements, like other corporate fiduciary relationships,[135] stray far from resembling application of the “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”[136] A look into the contracts underpinning the ERISA fiduciary arrangement proves illustrative. Contracts for ERISA fiduciary services, referred to as “fiduciary arrangements,”[137] seemingly fit neatly into Professors Schwartz and Scott’s firm-to-firm contract category.[138] In fact, “business contracts” such as these are “the main subject of . . . contract law.”[139] Facially, ERISA fiduciary arrangements further fit into a subcategory of firm-to-firm contracts in that both firms are “sophisticated economic actors.”[140] However, deep differences mark the fiduciary arrangement from a traditional firm-to-firm contract.
While sophisticated entities are parties to the contract memorializing the fiduciary arrangement, the identity of a nonparty steals the show. Naturally, fiduciaries are parties to fiduciary arrangements.[141] Plans are generally, but not always, a party.[142] Some fiduciary arrangements include the plan sponsor in addition to the plan,[143] while others may be between the fiduciary and the plan sponsor alone.[144] Though plan participants bear the greatest risk of loss from a fiduciary’s failure to perform their obligations—or any poor investment outcomes[145]—plan participants are not parties to fiduciary arrangements.[146] The contracts memorializing fiduciary arrangements may be for “providing benefits to” plan participants,[147] but they nevertheless exclude the plan participants.[148]
Herein lie the stark differences between traditional firm-to-firm contracts and ERISA fiduciary arrangements. Plan participants have no say in the evaluation, hiring, retention, or compensation of ERISA fiduciaries, but they pay for the fiduciaries’ services.[149] Plan participants are also most exposed to risks associated with the fiduciary’s failure to fulfill their duties—or to perform them well. Despite not selecting their fiduciaries, plan participants additionally must monitor fiduciary performance and police their malfeasance.[150] This obligation is doubly burdensome because individual plan participants are not only empowered to rectify wrongs to their savings but are often required to seek plan-wide relief.[151] And, in policing fiduciary conduct, plan participants face significant procedural and substantive limitations to their enforcement ability and available relief.[152]
Given the public policy for and lofty language concerning the nature of fiduciary duties, one might expect ERISA fiduciary arrangements to result in a proportionate balancing of risks among parties. That is not the case. The most disadvantaged party—the worker who had no say in the evaluation, hiring, management, or retention of the fiduciary administering the plan—not only must compensate the fiduciary but also must bear the risk of, and the obligation to police, fiduciary performance.[153] In addition to fiduciary performance risk, plan participants also bear specific investment performance and general market risks.[154] These risks are substantial. Fiduciaries, on the other hand, bear litigation risk and the tandem risk of increasing insurance premiums.
This is not to attribute all inefficiencies in ERISA fiduciary arrangements to their contract structure. ERISA regulation and jurisprudence also contribute to the situation. Congress’s failure to adequately regulate DC plans incentivizes plan sponsors “to make the wrong choice” when it comes to retirement benefits for employees.[155] Take, for example, ERISA disclosure requirements. ERISA fiduciaries are theoretically obligated to give certain disclosures to plan participants.[156] But they bear little, if any, risk of failing to do so or failing to provide robust disclosures because the Department of Labor (DOL) often does not enforce disclosure requirements.[157] Meanwhile, courts have morphed ERISA into “a shelter from legal accountability for unscrupulous employers, plan administrators, and other fiduciaries.”[158]
When regulators and courts give short shrift to fiduciary obligations, and workers bear the burdens, costs, and risks of fiduciary arrangements, little incentivizes fiduciaries to perform efficiently and effectively—or to charge reasonable fees. Compared to contracts negotiated at arm’s length in which all interested parties have bargaining power, the structure of ERISA fiduciary arrangements grossly misaligns parties’ interests.[159] A key hurdle to conceptualizing fiduciary arrangements as contracts crystallizes here.
Contracts could generally be said to memorialize transactions in which the parties thereto try to maximize their gain at their counterparty’s expense while both parties mutually benefit.[160] If both parties did not determine that entering into the deal would benefit them more than opting for another arrangement or no arrangement at all, rational actors would not do so. But each party’s ability to maximize their gain is bounded by the other party’s ability to walk away.[161] Not so with ERISA fiduciary arrangements. Unlike the results expected from arm’s-length, firm-to-firm contracts, the free market does not achieve efficiency in the ERISA fiduciary arrangement. The bounding mechanism is absent; plan participants cannot negotiate the arrangement’s terms, but they are saddled with its costs and risk.[162] As such, ERISA fiduciary arrangements do not promote efficient retirement plan administration or optimized savings growth as they might if structured differently.
Professor Kathryn Moore summarizes contrasting viewpoints on the ERISA fiduciary arrangement’s efficacy: “Proponents of the current system contend that the marketplace effectively regulates service providers’ behavior and ensures that service providers do not make undue profits from plans. Critics of [the] current system, on the other hand, contend that it results in the provision of many unnecessary costly services.”[163] As Professor Mercer Bullard explains:
In the fiduciary context, pure market dynamics cannot be relied upon to yield the sought-after social benefits of commercial activities. Fiduciary principles, therefore, are not circumscribed by the rules that apply to commercial, “arm’s length” relationships, but are based on non-market criteria because markets are not always efficient. Inefficiencies can reduce the social utility of market-based transactions. These inefficiencies may arise from a host of factors, including unequal bargaining positions, informational asymmetries, monopoly power, bounded rationality and/or rent-seeking regulation.[164]
Further, ERISA fiduciary arrangements’ risk allocation coupled with uneven compensation structures results in significant, suboptimal redistribution that disadvantages the parties DC plans are meant to provide for and protect. Under this atypical and asymmetrical risk allocation, profit-maximizing fiduciaries are incentivized to deliver less-than-optimal services and investment offerings to plans and their participants.[165] Though incentives pervade most business arrangements, they are noticeably one-sided in fiduciary and other ERISA retirement plan service provider arrangements.
For illustrative purposes, consider recordkeeping and administrative (RK&A) fees.[166] Two plan participants in the same plan receiving the exact same RK&A services,[167] which are generally automated,[168] may pay drastically different amounts for those services.[169] This is because expense ratios are used to charge a percentage of the plan participant’s total assets invested as their RK&A fee, regardless of service provider or investment performance and outcomes.[170] Plan participants could well pay for these services with a flat fee,[171] and in non-ERISA fiduciary relationships, a flat fee would often be the compensation structure for such a service.[172] Conversely, it would seem only reasonable for plan participants receiving bespoke advice or services to compensate fiduciaries proportionally to their efforts, time spent on providing a service, expertise needed, and the risk they have undertaken. In fact, plan participants are charged more for those services.[173] Compensation for RK&A services, however, exacts more from those who have been fortunate enough to save more.[174] The result is that a plan participant with substantial assets in their 401(k) may pay multiples of what a plan participant with less pays for the exact same service.[175]
Also consider revenue sharing, a related compensation structure called “the most complex development in 401(k) fees.”[176] Revenue sharing is a payment structure in which fees generated from plan investment options such as mutual funds pay fiduciaries.[177] Revenue-sharing fees are not directly charged to plan participants, resulting in fees that are hard to identify and calculate.[178] Instead, those amounts are taken out of the fees paid in association with the investment products themselves.[179] Recent research reveals that “revenue-sharing plans are more expensive as higher expense ratios are not offset by lower direct fees or by superior performance.”[180] More disturbingly, expense ratios in revenue-sharing arrangements “increase with the market power of the recordkeeper suggesting that third-party funds may revenue share to gain access to retirement assets.”[181] These types of fee structures provide the exact opposite of cost minimization or joint maximization incentives; rather, in their most common form, they opportunistically enrich fiduciaries at the expense of powerless plan participants.[182]
These fee structures inordinately incentivize the inflation of fiduciaries’ earnings while diminishing participant returns at astonishing rates.[183] Though seemingly structured as joint maximizers, expense ratios disproportionately enrich fiduciaries at workers’ expense. They can rather be analogized to a perverse type of contingency fee with a guaranteed floor, in which the fiduciary is incentivized to place their self-interest above that of the plan participant while enjoying a certain minimum level of compensation. The result: Excessive fees can devastate plan participants’ ability to save for retirement. In fact, a seemingly small fee of 1 to 2% can reduce plan participants’ savings by one-third to one-half over the course of their working career.[184] That is because plan participants’ harm is compounded: They lose the fee amount, the growth the fee amount could have generated, and lost potential compounded gains.[185]
Finally, plan participants’ ability to influence fiduciary conduct or curb rent seeking is limited because extralegal sanctions are scarce and often unavailing. Because they are not parties to fiduciary arrangements and are limited in the claims they can assert against fiduciaries, few means aside from litigation exist by which plan participants can alter fiduciaries’ conduct.[186] Even then, claims and available relief are limited. Further, plan participants generally have no ability to directly engage with or instruct fiduciaries to alter their conduct.[187] Rather, plan participants must pressure ERISA fiduciaries indirectly by pushing plan sponsors to terminate or alter fiduciary arrangements. Given that many of those arrangements are for indefinite time periods or only end upon some affirmative action of a party, change does not come easily or often.[188] Further, such efforts require a rare level of coordination among unsophisticated plan participants to achieve an end they may not fully comprehend.[189]
IV. ERISA Fiduciary Arrangements: Suboptimal Relational Contracts?
Many early proponents of 401(k)s are on record expressing their deep regret for promoting the savings mechanism as viable.[190] Perhaps, if those individuals were able to go back and do things differently, they would promote DC plans in which fiduciary arrangements were structured using relational contract principles.
Relational, or incomplete, contracts are agreements in which parties choose not to fully specify obligations in order to equip themselves with maximum flexibility to achieve desired outcomes.[191] “[S]tructures and covenants designed to enable and support parties in an ongoing transactional association” provide this built-in flexibility.[192] Relational contract structures orient a party’s obligations toward “productively working through the inevitable vicissitudes impacting their affairs” instead of eking out every possible immediate-term advantage vis-à-vis their counterparty.[193] In part, this is attributable to the fact that relational contracts commonly involve “repeat players in the same community, business, or industry.”[194] Sophisticated actors know that immediate gains obtained at the expense of a counterparty may ultimately pay off less than productive lasting business relationships.
Relational contracts are often performed over a long duration.[195] The long-term nature of relational contracts underscores the challenges that would arise if parties tried to formulate a complete contract that encompasses every possible contingency.[196] Such a state is neither achievable nor desirable given its impracticality and the resulting transaction costs.[197] That is, as transaction costs increase in identifying potential (and increasingly less likely) contingencies, the likelihood that a contract’s terms address those potentialities diminishes, and with good reason.[198]
Leading scholars have characterized fiduciary arrangements as akin to relational contracts.[199] As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel explained, the fiduciary “duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”[200] Though relational contracts do not and cannot fully define important aspects of the ERISA fiduciary arrangement,[201] the resemblance is intriguing. Specifically, ERISA fiduciary arrangements resemble “best efforts” contracts, a subgenre of relational contracts, which overlaps with fiduciary and other agency obligations.[202] Fiduciary arrangements aim to minimize “agency costs inherent in discretionary power”[203] while best efforts contracts similarly seek to minimize the risk of counterparty performance when obligations contain discretionary elements.[204]
As such, contrasting best efforts and other relational contracts with fiduciary arrangements reveals opportunities to revamp and revitalize fiduciary-compensation and risk-allocation structures.
A. Overview of Relational Contract Theory and Its Implications
Professor Stewart Macaulay began considering relational contract questions in 1963.[205] Professor Ian Macneil further developed Macaulay’s theories in the 1970s and refined them over many years.[206] These law professors’ work shapes present-day discussion of relational contract theory. But, economists also contributed significantly to these theories.[207] Thus, it is necessary to differentiate between the focus of, and the nomenclature employed by, the different academies.
Economists and legal scholars use the term “incomplete contract” to represent different concepts.[208] Economists generally label contracts as incomplete when they “are not sufficiently state-contingent,”[209] meaning they do not adequately account for “relevant future contingencies.”[210] Legal scholars characterize contracts in which obligations (as opposed to future circumstances) are not completely detailed as relational contracts.[211] This Article focuses on the latter conception.[212] Since Professor Macaulay first laid down the foundations of relational contract theory, scholars have considered the origin, nature, and enforceability of incomplete contracts, but they have yet to settle on a comprehensive legal framework for analyzing them.[213]
The absence of a rigid framework perhaps makes analogies to fiduciary relationships easier. However, some commentators would undoubtedly disapprove of this Article’s comparison of relational contracts to fiduciary relationships. One contract theorist asserts that “the ‘fiduciary as contract’ enterprise is built on an unsound theoretical foundation,” namely because fiduciary relationships are intended to encourage virtuous conduct.[214] But, the ERISA fiduciary relationship in its present state lacks that virtuosity, thus making the analogy all the more apt. Relational contract principles’ capacity to curb opportunistic behavior and to not only more equitably allocate risk but also reduce it renders them an attractive proposition for anyone interested in optimizing the ERISA fiduciary arrangement.
Relational contracts can limit or prevent otherwise opportunistic behavior by a counterparty[215]—exactly the type of opportunism reflected in ERISA fiduciary compensation structures. Further, as Professors Henry N. Butler and Barry D. Baysinger explain:
A significant advantage of relational contracting is that it not only provides for the sharing of risks but also a possible reduction of risk. This reduction is possible because the long-term nature of relational contracts reduces the incentives of economic agents to engage in the types of opportunistic behavior that lead, in market-mediated discrete transactions, to transaction failures.[216]
Professor Lisa Bernstein, considering relational contracts’ normatively desirable characteristics, identifies some of their other advantages, including decreased costs of drafting without detailed specifications, decreased monitoring costs due to self-enforcement parameters, decreased need for revisions responsive to market fluctuations, and decreased transaction costs during the agreement’s life cycle.[217]
Rich legal, economic, investment,[218] management,[219] and organizational[220] literature also tackles relational contract questions from different perspectives. The literature shows that in industrial contexts, many firms consider “the most effective means for deterring breach of contract [to be to] combine relational and legal sanctions.”[221] Empirical data also sheds light on how relational contracts and their good faith obligations are construed.[222] But the literature’s treatment of all aspects of relational contracts is not uniformly robust. Minimal scholarship exists on the actual process of relational contract drafting and design.[223] More practical, practice-oriented literature than theoretical work discusses relational contract design. Indeed, the U.S. government (which entered into $755 billion worth of contracts in 2024 alone)[224] has generated some of the most robust and thoughtful resources discussing how to optimally structure relational contracts.[225] Here, modeling contract structures resulting from free-market negotiations may lead to better savings outcomes for plan participants, the people ERISA aims to protect.
B. Best Efforts Obligations
Of all relational contracts, those containing best efforts obligations are most akin to fiduciary duties.[226] As such, surveying best efforts obligations and identifying their similarities to, and differences from, fiduciary relationships provides an opportunity to reconsider the structure of ERISA fiduciary arrangements. A best efforts obligation “requires a party to make such efforts as are reasonable in . . . light of that party’s ability and the means at its disposal and of the other party’s justifiable expectations.”[227] In best efforts contracts, a party agrees to use their best efforts to satisfy their contractual obligations; they do not agree to achieve a specific result.[228] The party not obliged to use their best efforts shoulders the risk of failure.[229]
Discussing the seminal best efforts case Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., the District Court for the District of Minnesota explained:
A party obligated to give best efforts maintains the “right to give reasonable consideration to its own interests,” Bloor, 601 F.2d at 614, and is allowed a “reasonable variance . . . in the exercise of sound business judgment,” Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 269. Although a best-efforts provision does “not require [a promisor] to spend itself into bankruptcy,” it does prohibit a promisor from “emphasizing profit uber alles without fair consideration of the effect” on the promisee. Bloor, 601 F.2d at 614. A best-efforts clause requires the promisor to do more than treat a promisee’s interest “as well as its own.” Id.[230]
In other words, parties may be required to act contrary to their own financial interests in order to satisfy their best efforts obligations.[231]
Best efforts contracts are employed in a variety of contexts, ranging from employment agreements, insurance agreements, licensing agreements,[232] and corporate contracts, including joint ventures, partnerships, and franchise agreements.[233] Industrial contexts reveal numerous circumstances in which best efforts contracts deliver advantages over rigidly defined terms.[234] Specifically, best efforts standards reduce drafting costs, save time and money, lessen disputes between counterparties associated with negotiating detailed requirements, and more closely align interests.[235] They also acknowledge the reality of parties’ inability to accurately predict the future[236] while providing the flexibility to achieve desired outcomes through the use of discretion and creative responses to changing circumstances.[237]
Best efforts clauses typically include objective markers or guides against which performance can be measured.[238] Measurable performance standards and deadlines need not be precisely detailed. For example, phrases such as “as promptly as practicable” and “in the most expeditious manner practicable” are sufficiently detailed standards and therefore enforceable, whereas they might be given less meaning in other contracts.[239] Performance is judged by reasonableness in context—objective guidelines like industry standards or personal circumstances guide courts analyzing best efforts performance.[240] When a contract lacks substantial guide marks, courts may compare the parties’ efforts to “an average, prudent, comparable operator”[241]—a standard echoing the prudent investor standard of fiduciaries.[242]
Some courts have found best efforts provisions impose a “high standard” of conduct on promisors.[243] Best efforts clauses require good faith and diligence toward achieving a specified objective—even in the absence of detailed benchmarks,[244] but that is only the baseline. Best efforts obligations constitute affirmative duties that require actual, continuous attempts to perform.[245] Efforts must be reasonable and tied to the contract purpose—not unbounded or indefinite, but clearly proactive and demonstrative of intent.[246] As such, a higher standard than the implied duty of good faith that exists in contracts applies.[247] Courts generally interpret “best efforts” as requiring reasonable diligence,[248] but not that the person make “every conceivable effort” to achieve an agreed-upon end.[249] Courts employ a “common sense” standard over any requirement that a party achieve perfection.[250]
Parties to best efforts contracts may thus consider their own economic interests in assessing how they will fulfill their obligations,[251] and courts do not require ruinous conduct be undertaken by any party.[252] But, at the least, good-faith adherence to the agreement—despite unprofitability, or even harm, to the performer—is necessary.[253] Indeed, Professor Allan Farnsworth explained that a best efforts duty is “more exacting” than the duty of good faith because parties undertaking best efforts obligations have agreed to do so.[254] “[D]oing one’s best is a factor in determining which measure of damages is appropriate” for failure to employ best efforts.[255] Consequently, best efforts (like fiduciary) undertakings are not reviewed for ultimate success but rather for fulfillment of the obligations set forth in the contract, i.e., that the obligor use their best efforts to achieve the desired outcome.[256]
C. ERISA Fiduciary Arrangements: Devolved Best Efforts Contracts That Promote Rent Seeking, Lack Bonding Mechanisms, and Unevenly Allocate Risk
Law and economics theorists predict that when one party contracts with another, each pursues their own ends, and after arm’s-length negotiations, market forces stabilize to achieve some equilibrium.[257] As alluded to in Part II, that isn’t the case with ERISA fiduciary arrangements. When plan sponsors and fiduciary service providers contract with each other for fiduciaries to serve plan participants (who have limited ability to enforce, incentivize, or sanction fiduciaries, let alone exit power),[258] the arrangement is needlessly unbalanced. Part of that imbalance flows from ERISA fiduciary arrangements’ lack of incentive structures such as those associated with relational contracts that minimize costs and align interests. Part of the imbalance is a result of ERISA fiduciary arrangements’ lack of adequate deterrents.[259]
The primary external deterrents of ERISA fiduciary malfeasance are litigation or the rare extralegal sanction of terminating the fiduciary arrangement. Even then, because of statutory safe harbors,[260] the service-oriented nature of fiduciary work, and the absence of high transaction-specific investments required of fiduciaries,[261] external deterrents’ efficacy is questionable. Fiduciaries are less vulnerable to risks arising from the fiduciary arrangement than plan sponsors who are in turn less vulnerable than plan participants. This structure is suboptimal in more ways than one: It fails to curb rent seeking (particularly with respect to excessive compensation), drives up costs for all,[262] and inadequately protects plan participants. A moral hazard thus exists because fiduciaries, unbound by deterrents and unaligned with plan participants, have every reason to maximize their profits at plan participants’ expense but limited incentive to optimize plan participants’ returns.[263]
Again, consider the market for administrative and other plan-related services. Fiduciaries’ and other retirement service providers’ services are specialized but fungible, and plan sponsors may choose among significantly varied pricing structures for what are materially identical services.[264] Indeed, in today’s DC plan service provider landscape, many administrative service providers offer commodities, and little distinguishes them from their competitors—except for their fee structures and the price of their services.[265] That fact notwithstanding, information garnered from cases and other sources reveals a wide range of prices imposed on plan participants by their plan sponsors and fiduciaries.[266] Moreover, although fiduciary arrangements, like any arm’s-length business transactions, are matters for negotiation, parties’ undisputed allegations and courts’ factual findings in excessive fee litigation brought against fiduciaries and other service providers[267] reveal that often little to no negotiation occurs in the lead-up to memorializing ERISA fiduciary arrangements.[268] Yet, fiduciary services industry materials suggest that fiduciaries regularly negotiate alternative structures[269] (presumably if pressed by plan sponsors to do so).
Even if robust negotiation takes place, fiduciary arrangements fail to align incentives and disperse risks in a manner akin to a traditional bilateral contract, much less a relational contract. They fall far short of what a best efforts contract would require—despite the fact that fiduciary obligations should in theory be much higher.[270] The lack of incentives, risk disbursement tools, and deterrents is not a result of a market in which different fiduciary service providers offer uniform rates and fee structures.[271] That might understandably result in limited bargaining power among parties. Rather, the market for fiduciary services is competitive (for those looking) based on the significant deviations in both fee amounts and fee structures.[272] While smaller plans typically have less leverage and thus incur higher overall investment and administrative costs,[273] “among plans of the same size and offering similar investment options, there is striking variation in fees.”[274]
Facially, this may seem counterintuitive and divergent from the theory that competition should “increase firms’ incentives to undertake investments that increase trust.”[275] But, it is not. It seems plan sponsors are less motivated to aggressively negotiate down fees than they would be if they paid all of those fees.[276] After all, plan participants, not plan sponsors, pay the bulk of the fiduciary fees.[277] Until incentives are revamped, risks are more evenly dispersed, and deterrents to rent seeking are implemented, it stands to reason that fiduciaries will continue to self-enrich at plan participants’ expense. The following section discusses methods for reenvisioning fiduciary arrangements to address each of those areas and more.
V. Revamping ERISA Fiduciary Relationships by Implementing Existing Incentivization Structures and Risk Allocation Mechanisms
Chief Justice Rehnquist once asserted that the practical importance to Americans of ERISA cases far outstrips constitutional matters.[278] The way in which retirement benefits are delivered should likewise be of great concern. But, to date, the structure of ERISA fiduciary arrangements has been largely overlooked. The precarious state of Americans’ retirement prospects compels us to reconsider how ERISA fiduciary arrangements are configured and how they might be optimized.[279] Outside of the retirement services sectors, firms and government entities regularly employ a variety of relational contract mechanisms to align their interests and to protect themselves from rent seeking by their counterparties. From positive risk and reward readjustments to bonding mechanisms to reduce the substantial risk shouldered by plan participants, unexplored options abound.[280]
Some relational contract structures and risk alignment mechanisms derived from best efforts obligations can be nearly transliterated into ERISA fiduciary arrangements, while others serve as starting points for modification and further investigation. The ready existence of these protective measures that have been proven effective in other contexts yet remain unimplemented in fiduciary arrangements simply underscores the need for them. The following subsections therefore consider how to achieve some balance of risk among the parties to fiduciary arrangements as well as nonparty plan participants. They also propose proven relational contract structures and methods to promote fiduciaries’ efficient performance and to discourage rent seeking.
A. Employing Sensible Incentivization Structures and Bonding Mechanisms
For decades, economists have asserted that “[c]ontracts that tie compensation to performance can mitigate incentive problems.”[281] Scholars and industry professionals alike consider incentive structures to play important roles in compensation arrangements.[282] A comprehensive U.S. Department of Defense study (the DOD Report) confirms the efficacy of thoughtfully structured incentives.[283] It determined that arrangements such as relational and best efforts contracts in which parties’ interests are aligned are “highly correlated with . . . better cost and schedule performance outcomes.”[284] The Department of Defense should know: It ranks in the top five units of the federal government with the highest spending rate[285] and therefore should expend significant effort in optimizing its contracts. The DOD Report concludes that “when cost control is predetermined and formulaically incentivized . . . industry responds. The key is predictable incentives . . . .”[286] Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway theorizes that optimizing relational contracts involves “shared goals and objectives,” “guiding principles,” and “robust relationship management processes.”[287]
In light of the foregoing, three primary aims are considered: controlling costs that erode plan participants’ savings; minimizing plan participants’ risk exposure by aligning interests; and developing relationship management processes that should in turn promote plan sponsor and fiduciary buy-in. Though segregating inherently intertwined concepts cannot be done with clinical precision or without some overlap, it is nevertheless a useful exercise to discuss each of these objectives individually.
1. Controlling Costs.
ERISA fiduciary fee structures significantly impact plan participants’ ability to grow their savings.[288] Comparing the fiduciary fee structures trustees and attorneys negotiate at arm’s length with ERISA fiduciary fees proves revealing. The comparison also generates easy-to-model analogs to consider as a starting point for revising ERISA fiduciary arrangements.
Many ERISA fiduciary fees are untethered to the value of services rendered to plans and plan participants or to the difficulty or cost associated with providing them.[289] Indeed, one industry report found that
other plan related variables . . . do not appear to drive fees, [that] service provider related variables [likewise did not] appear to drive plan fees, [and that] [t]he type of service provider (mutual fund company, life insurance company, bank, third party administrator), size of service provider, length of time since the last competitive review of the retirement service provider by the plan sponsor, tenure with the service provider and presence of other service relationships (specifically, a defined benefit or non-qualified plan) were not found to be significant factors in a plan’s ‘all-in’ fee. Plan design related variables also do not appear to drive plan fees.[290]
Non-ERISA fiduciary compensation is different. Generally, non-ERISA fiduciaries use fee-only compensation arrangements.[291] Fee-only compensation structures include charging flat fees, hourly rates, or a percentage of assets under management (AUM).[292] Although little data exists on ERISA fiduciary remuneration, publicly available information reveals that many ERISA fiduciaries’ pay structures are “fee-based.”[293] Fee-based compensation structures charge a hybrid combination of flat fees and a percentage of AUM.[294] They often entail “asset-based administration fees” that “can quickly outstretch a 401(k) provider’s level of service when plan assets increase - resulting in excessive fees that lower [plan participants’] account returns needlessly.”[295] Commission-based compensation also occurs in some ERISA fiduciary arrangements.[296]
Generally, trustees are compensated through fee-only structures. Most individual trustees charge a flat fee or hourly rate while corporate trustees regularly charge a percentage of AUM, sometimes in addition to a minimum fee.[297]
Attorney fees can be more complex. Most attorneys use fee-only structures in which they charge either an hourly rate or a flat fee for their work.[298] Plaintiffs’ attorneys generally charge a contingency fee in which they are entitled to a percentage of any recovery from litigation.[299] That fee may be either inclusive or exclusive of costs associated with the litigation.[300] Attorney fee structures significantly impact the amount of money a client can recover in litigation.[301] The difference between a flat fee versus an hourly rate for transactional work will also likely have a significant impact on compensation to both the client and attorney.[302]
Contingency fee recoveries often entail around one-third of a client’s recovery,[303] which is a substantial amount. That attorneys may receive as compensation such a significant portion of a contingent recovery is a result of the fact that contingency arrangements are rife with risk for attorneys.[304] Indeed, an attorney whose client is unsuccessful in litigation will not only not make any profit but will also have lost the entire value of the time, work, and resources expended on the matter. In the transactional context, which is closer to that of an ERISA fiduciary, the risk attorneys face in charging a flat fee is accurately projecting the project’s complexity and thus the amount of time needed to complete the project.[305] “Hybrid” arrangements in which lowered hourly rates are charged in addition to small contingency fees are the closest to the ERISA fiduciary structure but are notably distinct in that the contingency fee only awards attorneys for recoveries[306] while asset-based fees exact their price from plan participants regardless of outcome desirability, including whether their assets grew or diminished.[307]
ERISA fiduciary fees are strikingly different from trustee or attorney compensation. They are far more complex and more lopsided. Essentially, plan participants may pay ERISA fiduciaries twice. Plan participants may pay flat fees to their respective fiduciary, and then fiduciaries may also exact a percentage of all of the plan participants’ retirement savings regardless of whether the fiduciaries’ efforts aided in growing or shrinking those savings.[308] Unlike some attorneys’ fees arrangements, namely contingency fees in litigation or flat fees for transactional work, ERISA fiduciaries do not undertake similar risks of nonpayment and monetary loss after financing their own work for their clients.[309] ERISA fiduciaries likewise do not undertake projects the duration of which is regularly affected by unknowable factors (like attorneys take on litigation) that may be protracted over years and that may exponentially increase costs of representation.[310]
Fee-based ERISA fiduciary compensation structures ensure fiduciaries bear limited to no financial risk. Fixed-price, or flat-fee, contracts would shoulder fiduciaries with greater risk and responsibility for effective performance and keeping costs low.[311] In other financial services markets, fixed-price fees are regularly characterized as the gold standard.[312]
The uneven ERISA fiduciary compensation structure’s departure from other established methods for paying fiduciaries raises several important normative questions. Why do plan participants, whose fiduciaries owe them the highest duty known to law,[313] not enjoy fiduciary compensation structures remotely resembling the gold standard? Should all plan participants pay the same amount for plan administration? Should fees be a level dollar amount for all participants, or should fees constitute a fixed percent of plan assets (per capita vs. pro rata)? Should fees change based on the plans’ age and amount of assets?[314] In other words, which compensation structure most appropriately “allocat[es] plan administrative revenue and costs”?[315] Cobbling together answers to these questions is no easy feat, but the thought experiment is worthwhile.
In other contexts, contract reform has focused on enhancing principals’ ability to monitor agents.[316] One study found that “[c]ost transparency [was] a critical enabler” of optimally aligned contractual relationships.[317] The granularities of 401(k) fees have been discussed at length elsewhere,[318] but for this Article’s purposes, it suffices to say that they are needlessly obscured to the point that even fiduciaries have a hard time calculating them.[319] Indeed, the Department of Labor’s Sample 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form includes an astonishing twenty-three different types of fees fiduciaries may charge DC plan participants.[320] As such, one industry publication asserts that fiduciaries themselves are not always able “to determine what all the service fees are” because fee arrangements are so complex.[321] Disconcertingly, regulators have not prioritized streamlining fee structures or even requiring that robust disclosures be made.[322] The few regulatory efforts aimed at enhancing disclosures largely failed with respect to DC plans because even the enhanced disclosure requirements are needlessly complicated, opaque, and minimally enforced.[323] But, if they were, that onus would further burden already ill-equipped plan participants to engage in complex and time-consuming mathematical equations.
Regulatory failures, however, can present opportunities for intrepid plan sponsors seeking to optimize the benefits they provide to their employees. Streamlining the number of fiduciary and other service providers servicing a plan is a logical first step to making fee information more comprehensible. A surprising number of excessive fee cases assert that plans employ multiple recordkeepers (and that allegation is seemingly undisputed).[324] Consolidating service providers who are tasked with rendering the same services, or who are capable of supplying the same services, may seem too obvious to merit discussion. Yet many plans continue to engage two or more recordkeeping service providers.[325] No compelling argument for this practice exists. Eliminating duplicative service providers is a first step toward streamlining information transfer while reducing costs for all involved.
In that same vein, vertically integrating relational contracts for plan administration services is a more complex proposition but nevertheless an intriguing potential avenue for reducing fees that should be more closely evaluated. “[V]ertical integration is the combination, under a single ownership, of two or more stages of production or distribution (or both) that are usually separate.”[326] The practice can lead to reduced transaction costs, diminished risk, and improved administrative capabilities.[327] It can likewise result in increased profitability and innovation.[328] Though vertical integration initially became prevalent in heavy manufacturing industries such as steel production, financial service firms have also realized that consolidating their capabilities under one corporate umbrella can reduce transaction costs and better achieve their aims.[329] The undesirable structure of ERISA fiduciary arrangements impels further exploration of vertical integration opportunities in this context.
2. Aligning Interests and Limiting Plan Participants’ Risk.
While ERISA fiduciaries’ fee structures arguably reward fiduciaries for shepherding plan asset growth in that if they grow the funds, they get a larger fee, their fee structures also offer the sweetest of consolation prizes for failure to do so: Fiduciaries still receive a percentage of plan participants’ assets even if their value diminishes.[330] Plan participants, on the other hand, are left shouldering the risk of poor performance. Indeed, DC plans assign “investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk” to the plan participants,[331] leaving little risk to be allocated to fiduciaries—and little plan participants can do except forgo a federally endowed substantive right involving the unique opportunity to save for retirement pretax. This compensation structure and risk allocation include no incentivization for fiduciaries to reduce fees or costs to plan participants despite ERISA’s clear mandate that fiduciaries work to ensure the reasonableness of costs.[332]
Relational contracts are optimized when “the parties are able to provide an appropriate monitoring/bonding package . . . that induces the optimal output. [S]uch provisions . . . serve as a risk-allocating mechanism designed to reduce the agency costs of relational exchange.”[333] Various methods to align interests and reorient risk allocation exist. Incentives for asset appreciation might be offered to fiduciaries for meeting or exceeding specified standards or goals. Potential incentivization and deterrent models are outlined below.
First, an award-fee[334] arrangement could be implemented to include a fixed-price base fee (b) for fiduciary services plus an award (a) provision for a total fee (f) that rewards fiduciaries for achieving optimal performance outcomes. Award-fee arrangements are expressed through the following simple formula of base fee plus award fee equals total fee, or:
b + a = f
Earning such an award should be attainable through an objectively verifiable metric, removing unilateral or subjective discretion from any party.[335] Plan sponsors could include an index clause in fiduciary arrangements to tether additional compensation to performance. Such a compensation arrangement could be structured as the difference between the market average cost for similar services (m) minus the actual costs (c) charged to the plan participant, multiplied by a predetermined factor (x),[336] perhaps 20%, to determine the award fee (a). That would be expressed as follows:
(m – c) * x = a
Naturally, if the actual costs exceed the market average costs, then the award fee would be zero.
Alternatively, plan sponsors could set a specific percentage of investment growth after which additional compensation would be paid. Such a percentage could be singular or could include a range of percentages after which the compensation amount would increase. A simple example of such an arrangement is expressed as the difference between the plan participant’s actual growth (g) minus target growth (i), multiplied by a predetermined factor (x) to determine the award fee (a), or:
(g – i) * x = a
Fiduciary arrangements would need to clearly articulate reasonable and attainable targets, perhaps linking growth incentives to a range of average, similarly situated 401(k) plans’ growth or tethering them to market growth. This would be easy to do given the number of services compiling statistics on plan performance.[337] Regardless of structure, incentives and the method for obtaining them should be clearly articulated and leave no room for guesswork. Failure to employ precise language would invite further uncertainty and potential litigation risk for all involved.[338]
Another potential incentivization structure would be a variation of the fixed-price award-fee arrangement. A cost-plus-incentive fee arrangement would include a negotiated fee to be paid to the fiduciary for their services that could later be adjusted upward or downward based on a formula comparing total actual costs to target costs.[339] Such an arrangement would require the parties to specify a target cost, an agreed-on initial fee, a range of potential fees bounded by a minimum and maximum, and a fee adjustment formula.[340] Negative incentives, or disincentives, could be applied for costs exceeding targets.[341] A disincentive structure could be expressed as the difference between actual costs (c) charged minus the market average cost for similar services (m), multiplied by a predetermined factor (x) to determine the fee reduction amount (r), or:
(c – m) * x = r
A formula that can either decrease or increase a fiduciary fee, and which thus includes both disincentives and incentives for the fiduciary to perform well, would be a radical departure from traditional ERISA fiduciary compensation structures. Such a clause would also be one more aligned with ERISA’s express protective purpose.
3. Reorienting Relationship Management Processes.
Revising fee structures is not the only method by which interests can be better aligned and plan participants’ risks recalibrated. Plan sponsors should also periodically undertake formal requests for proposals to obtain detailed insight into competitive market pricing.[342] While this may seem intuitive, some plan participants bringing suit against their ERISA fiduciaries describe how their plan sponsors issue requests for proposals (RFP),[343] while others assert that RFP processes were not sufficiently robust—or existent.[344] Implementing regular RFP processes with strict information requirements determining methods of communicating and delivering straightforward fee information would enable plan sponsors to better weigh prospective service providers.[345] That in turn would make monitoring fees easier.
For the creative, other contractual or procedural levers might be available. Although ERISA prohibits plans from indemnifying plan fiduciaries for losses they cause,[346] the prohibition is one-sided. Plan sponsors and fiduciaries could agree for fiduciaries to indemnify plans for losses to plan assets, including costs spent to bring successful claims against malfeasant fiduciaries. Though such an arrangement seems unlikely, plan sponsors working to renegotiate fiduciary agreements might propose such an indemnification as leverage. They may later let that request be one of the bargaining chips they set aside in order to obtain more desirable objectives such as compensation restructuring.
In addition, plan participants asserting ERISA fiduciary breach claims commonly undertake expensive prefiling work and extensive briefing on motions to dismiss. Such costs can reduce the ability of plan participants to pursue justice.[347] Plan participants also often face insurmountable barriers to pleading information held solely by fiduciaries.[348] Plan sponsors could make it easier for plan participants to police errant fiduciaries by bargaining for fiduciary arrangements to contain processes for presuit exchange of information.[349] In exchange, the parties could agree to streamlined adjudicative processes, which would reduce costs.[350] Alternatively, the parties could agree to the admissibility of certain industry metrics. Courts routinely reject plan participants’ efforts to plead and use ERISA plan industry averages, despite substantial evidence indicating that such information is both reliable and that ERISA fiduciaries regularly use such information in their normal course of providing services.[351] A baked-in evidentiary metric included in the fiduciary arrangement would minimize costs of briefing and discovery for both fiduciaries and plan participants.
Though unlikely under the present administration’s Department of Labor and its Employee Benefits Security Administration, which has taken a strong pro-industry approach,[352] regulatory intervention is another interesting possibility. Government intervention through set price caps or price schedules for different services, like those offered by Medicare, has successfully curbed abuse and protected individuals by ensuring their access to healthcare.[353] Set price caps could work particularly well for recordkeeping and administration services, which are fungible, and could promote Congress’s ultimate goal behind ERISA: that of promoting retirement savings and security.
B. Promoting Plan Sponsor and Fiduciary Buy-In
No one wants to get less than they pay for, and despite its flaws, ERISA substantially burdens employers sponsoring retirement plans.[354] They, too, should seek to get the most bang for their buck with respect to DC plans and the overall benefits packages they provide to their employees. Indeed, competitive benefits packages are often a requisite for hiring and retaining top talent.[355] Despite the need for some immediate work restructuring fiduciary arrangements, on balance, optimizing those benefits should be a normative no-brainer for plan sponsors.
A more difficult question remains: Why would fiduciaries agree to such arrangements? Undoubtedly, many would hesitate to enter into an arrangement they see as less desirable for themselves. Opportunism and the unequal bargaining power they presently enjoy seem the most likely impediments.[356] Plan sponsors may need to press the issue with fiduciaries who will prefer the status quo. Plan participant groups may need to press plan sponsors, too.[357] They will not be without support for their position.
The relationship management processes discussed above come into play here because profit is not the sole motivating factor for plan fiduciaries. Other relevant factors include litigation risk exposure,[358] increasing insurance premiums, overhead, and, at least to some extent, negative media exposure. The importance of these considerations should increase during what can only be described as a wave of ERISA fiduciary consolidation.[359]
As a part of the structural reform of fiduciary arrangements, the parties could agree to the various underlying propositions that could streamline litigation. For example, parties might agree that fiduciary arrangements charging certain fee rates within a set percentage of agreed-upon industry averages are reasonable, therefore mitigating excessive fee litigation risk. Both fiduciaries and the present administration decry the risks of fiduciary litigation,[360] so this type of contractual acknowledgement could prove highly valuable to fiduciaries. It may also have a cascading effect on overhead because it should enable fiduciaries to obtain lower insurance premiums and reduce legal fees, cost areas that have grown in recent years.[361]
More importantly, as shown above, the fiduciary services market is not without competition.[362] Fiduciary services regularly claim to offer new, innovative products and services.[363] Others act to entice new customers into business arrangements by offering time-limited discounts.[364] All of these facts suggest that room exists in the fiduciary services market for some level of movement toward a more reasonable fiduciary arrangement.
Finally, if courts were to revamp their approaches to ERISA excessive fee litigation and to align them more closely with public policy and best efforts case law, fiduciaries would have no choice but to agree to contracts that are less one-sided. If plan participant plaintiffs’ counsel were to contrast parties’ obligations under relational contracts with ERISA fiduciary arrangements and highlight the differences between ERISA fiduciary compensation vis-à-vis other fiduciary fee structures and compensation structures from relational contracts, courts may begin to reevaluate how they construe the ERISA fiduciary duty.[365] Indeed, courts could be a primary driver of change by more closely scrutinizing fiduciary compensation structures, which would pressure fiduciaries to enter into more commercially reasonable arrangements with plan sponsors.[366]
VI. Conclusion
Contract law is the original foundation of retirement benefit protections. Contract theory and relational contract theory enrich any discussion of the nature of retirement benefits. They can also serve as tools not only to identify but to rectify the manifold deficiencies in how the most important contract affecting the delivery of retirement benefits, the ERISA fiduciary arrangement, is structured.
The contracts memorializing ERISA fiduciary arrangements are so protective of fiduciaries and unfavorable to plan participants that they would arguably be unconscionable under traditional contract analyses. In fact, some fee structures do so much harm that plan participants would be better off avoiding saving through their 401(k)s altogether. That need not be the case. Plan sponsor employers can generate positive, sustained change—and a fiduciary relationship more reflective of ERISA’s core policy of promoting workers’ retirement savings—merely by optimizing fiduciary arrangements. The ERISA fiduciary arrangement can be restructured by implementing incentive structures, bonding mechanisms, and risk distribution tools, all of which are currently, and successfully, deployed in other industries. American workers deserve no less.
Teresa Ghilarducci et al., How Americans Feel About Their Retirement Prospects: Surveying the Surveys, The New Sch. for Soc. Rsch.: Wealth Equity Lab (July 3, 2024), https://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/research/how-americans-feel-about-their-retirement-prospects-surveying-the-surveys [https://perma.cc/5KNZ-EQ8J\].
Teresa Ghilarducci, Americans’ Retirement Savings Fall Short by Nearly $500,000, Forbes (Oct. 30, 2023, at 14:10 ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/teresaghilarducci/2023/10/27/americans-retirement-savings-fall-short-by-nearly-500000/?sh=5f4ae38316fc [https://perma.cc/5UKG-HVQ2\].
Id.
Noah Sheidlower, She’s 93 and Still Job Searching. Why Older Americans Work, Even if They’re Sick, Bus. Insider (Nov. 1, 2025, at 04:00 CT), https://www.businessinsider.com/older-american-workers-health-issues-challenges-disabilities-2025-11 [https://perma.cc/Y3CS-8PQ5\].
See Ghilarducci, supra note 2.
What Would the Trump Campaign Plans Mean for Social Security?, Comm. for a Responsible Fed. Budget (Oct. 21, 2024), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/what-would-trump-campaign-plans-mean-social-security [https://perma.cc/49SD-NTC7\].
Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the Principles and Values It Reflects, 33 Compar. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 5, 20–22 (2011).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), (c).
See infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
E.g., Study Finds Most Corporate Retirement Plans Have Regulatory or Fiduciary Violations, PlanAdviser (Feb. 3, 2025), https://www.planadviser.com/study-finds-majority-corporate-retirement-plans-regulatory-fiduciary-violations/ [https://perma.cc/7ERG-E6DD\].
Lauren K. Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, 41 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 257, 261–62, 265–66 (2025) [hereinafter Valastro, Vindicating Retirees].
. See Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees 2 (2019), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/401k-plan-fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2VJ-T867\]; Chris Arnold, Is Wall Street Eating Your 401(k) Nest Egg?, NPR (Oct. 19, 2015, at 04:24 ET), https://www.npr.org/2015/10/19/445322138/is-wall-street-eating-your-401-k-nest-egg [https://perma.cc/H75B-CJ8V\].
Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 Yale L.J. 1476, 1501 (2015).
Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 Hastings L.J. 131, 133, 136 (2009) (“[T]he primary purpose of ERISA is clearly stated in the Act to be the protection of employees’ benefits.”).
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 375, 397 (2010); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1364–66 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Trail of Error].
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 433, 458 n.128 (2010) (“[A]nalysis of ERISA fiduciary law could benefit greatly from consideration of the well-developed literature regarding incomplete contracts.”).
See infra Part IV.
David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart & Kate Vitasek, An Innovative Way to Prevent Adversarial Supplier Relationships, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/10/an-innovative-way-to-prevent-adversarial-supplier-relationships?ab=hero-subleft-3 [https://perma.cc/4Z6W-P8FF\].
Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1257, 1264–68 (2016) [hereinafter Maher, Regulating] (“Central to ERISA was and is the idea of an employee benefit ‘plan.’ . . . [A]n employer who wishes to offer Good X in the labor deal must do so via a plan. A plan is both an entity and the sum of the terms governing the promised benefit.” (footnote omitted)). Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2000) (“An ERISA plan is a contract . . . and the meaning of a contract is ordinarily decided by the court, rather than by a party to the contract.” (citations omitted)); Moore, supra note 7, at 25–26.
Harris v. Paredes, No. 3:23-cv-50231, 2024 WL 774874, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2024) (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995) (“finding that ERISA plans are a species of binding contract despite being in some sense imposed on those they bind” (citing Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998)))).
Id.
Aramony v. United Way of Am., No. 96 CIV. 3962, 1997 WL 732447, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1997); Bradwell v. GAF Corp., 954 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1992); Bellino v. Schlumberger Techs., Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 7, at 25; Peter M. Rehon, The Pension Expectation as Constitutional Property, 8 Hastings Const. L.Q. 153, 168 (1980).
See, e.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898) (holding employer need not pay pension benefit because the pension was merely a gift), aff’d per curiam, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901).
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, Soc. Sec. Admin., https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html [https://perma.cc/H7RU-ZAND\] (last visited July 14, 2026).
Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 459, 474 (2015) (“[W]hen employees brought pre-ERISA cases in state court, the cases were generally based on contractual rather than trust-based legal theories, and they were generally brought against the employer rather than against a plan trustee.”).
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 457 (2004). See also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential Review in Employee Benefit Claims—Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 147, 157 n.40 (2009) (“The worker’s legal right to receive the benefit, however, arises under the employment contract; not the trust used to secure the promise.”).
See Bogan, supra note 27, at 164.
Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 575, 589 (1992).
Id. at 617 & n.156.
E.g., Plowman v. Indian Refin. Co., 20 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (“[N]o one controverts the wisdom, justice, and desirability of a policy . . . looking to the promotion and assurance of financial protection of deserving employees in their old age.”).
James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 Buff. L. Rev. 683, 730–32 (2001); Patrick Purcell & Jennifer Staman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34443, Summary of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 2 (2009), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL34443 [https://perma.cc/KW4B-RLN7\].
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 104–05, 113 (1989) (“ERISA was enacted ‘to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,’ and ‘to protect contractually defined benefits.’” (first quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); then quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985))).
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113; James A. Wooten, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Political History 67, 271 (2005) (“ERISA reflects a worker-security conception of private pension plans.”).
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“ERISA’s standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection. . . . [T]he law of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”).
Moore, supra note 7, at 20.
For an explication of how trusts are not an apt analogy to DB plans, see Natalya Shnitser, Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of Retirement Savings in the United States, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 629, 640, 661–62.
Moore, supra note 7, at 20.
See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); Paul Rose, Public Wealth Maximization: A New Framework for Fiduciary Duties in Public Funds, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 891, 908, 912.
Moore, supra note 7, at 20.
Id.; Maher, Regulating, supra note 19, at 1270.
See Rose, supra note 40, at 908 n.79; Jill E. Fisch, Annamaria Lusardi & Andrea Hasler, Defined Contribution Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 741, 749–50 (2020).
See Rose, supra note 40, at 912; Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 457.
Fisch, Lusardi & Hasler, supra note 43, at 744, 749.
See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 305, 328–29 (2007); Michael Steinberger, Was the 401(k) a Mistake? How an Obscure, 45-Year-Old Tax Change Transformed Retirement and Left So Many Americans Out in the Cold, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/magazine/401k-retirement-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/H9JP-6M65\].
Moore, supra note 7, at 37.
Id.
Release: Quarterly Retirement Market Data, First Quarter 2026, Inv. Co. Inst. (June 18, 2026), https://www.ici.org/statistical-report/ret_26_q1 [https://perma.cc/6A5A-6CL2\].
What Statistics Does the BLS Provide on Frozen Defined Benefit Plans?, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat. (May 7, 2024), https://www.bls.gov/ebs/factsheets/defined-benefit-frozen-plans.htm [https://perma.cc/V3V2-C8YC\] (stating that, as of March 2023, 49% of private industry workers participated in DC plans); John Iekel, Which Industries Have the Highest Retirement Plan Access?, Plan Sponsor Council of Am. (June 4, 2025), https://www.psca.org/news/psca-news/2025/6/which-industries-have-the-highest-retirement-plan-access/ [https://perma.cc/J25C-S4YR\] (stating that as of 2025, about 53% of private industry workers participate in DC plans). Still, many Americans (reportedly more than 50%) lack access to employer-sponsored retirement savings plans. Aimee Picchi, Half of Americans Lack Access to a Retirement Plan. Here Are the Worst States, CBS News (Aug. 21, 2023, at 17:16 ET), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/retirement-plan-access-states-where-it-is-worst/ [https://perma.cc/RN52-Y9BH\].
Peter J. Wiedenbeck & Brendan S. Maher, ERISA Principles 43 (2024); Moore, supra note 7, at 17.
Moore, supra note 7, at 17.
ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); Rose, supra note 40, at 908 n.79.
ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).
I.R.C. § 401(k).
Maher, Regulating, supra note 19, at 1306; Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 665 [hereinafter Maher, Paternalistic Market].
Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 457; Peter M. van Zante, Mandated Vesting: Suppression of Voluntary Retirement Benefits, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 125, 132 (1999).
ERISA § 3(34)–(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)–(35); Stegemann v. Gannett Co., 970 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2020).
Marc Kronson, Employee Costs and Risks in 401(k) Plans, Comp. & Working Conditions, Summer 2000, at 12, 15 (“Ultimately, it is mainly the employee who is responsible for minimizing the investment risks and costs associated with employer-sponsored 401(k) retirement plans.”).
Id. at 14. Investment risk, including the effects of market volatility and inflation, among others, is also present in DC plans. Id.
See Moore, supra note 7, at 37.
Kronson, supra note 59, at 12; see also Workplace Flexibility 2010, Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr., A Timeline of the Evolution of Retirement in the United States 3–4 (2010), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=legal [https://perma.cc/PB3T-3UGG\] (detailing the evolution of U.S. retirement benefits law). “401(k)” has its origins in the tax code provision concerning deferred arrangements for tax-qualified trusts, I.R.C. § 401(k). In DC plans, including 401(k)s, participants can choose to defer their receipt, and thus the taxation, of their income. Albert Feuer, Ethics, Earnings, and ERISA: Ethical-Factor Investing of Savings and Retirement Benefits, in 2020 New York University Review of Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation 6-1, 6-62.
I consider why state trust law effectively governs fiduciary conduct while ERISA fiduciary jurisprudence resembles a fiduciary protection statute in a forthcoming article, Lauren K. Valastro, Sui Generis: Are ERISA “Fiduciaries” Fiduciaries? (Jan. 25, 2025) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Conison, supra note 29, at 581, 600 (arguing that benefit plans are “sui generis”).
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 437 (2011); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 n.4 (2008); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996); Donald T. Bogan, The Silliness of ERISA: The Plan Is Not the Only Proper Party Defendant in an ERISA Benefits Claim, 16 Marq. Benefits & Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 395, 427 n.139 (2015).
ERISA § 402(c)(1)–(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1)–(3).
ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
ERISA § 403(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c). “The term ‘participant’ means any employee or former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer . . . or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.” Id. § 1002(7). “The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” Id. § 1002(8). Here, for ease of reading, “plan participants” will refer to both plan participants and their beneficiaries.
Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
Harris v. Paredes, No. 3:23-cv-50231, 2024 WL 774874, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2024) (“While the ordinary principles of contract formation are inapplicable in ERISA matters, the ordinary principles of contract interpretation generally apply.” (citing Smith v. Bd. of Dirs. of Triad Mfg., Inc., 13 F.4th 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2021))); Aramony v. United Way of Am., No. 96 CIV. 3962, 1997 WL 732447, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1997) (“A court must construe an ERISA-regulated plan according to general principles of contract law, looking to the language of the plan and to other indicia of the intent of the plan’s creator.”).
E.g., Kemmerer v. ICI Ams. Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he district court appropriately applied contract principles. . . . [B]reach of contract principles, applied as a matter of federal common law, govern disputes arising out of the plan documents.”); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Actions to . . . enforce rights under the terms of a plan will typically involve the application of those general principles of contract law . . . .”).
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.”); Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 15, at 1319 (“ERISA is, in its most important dimension, federal trust law.”).
See generally Shnitser, supra note 38 (discussing why trust law principles fail to adequately protect participants). Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” Relief Is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 Okla. L. Rev. 721, 723, 754, 756 (2008) (evaluating trust law’s remedies for fiduciary breaches and asserting that though remedies exist, trust law offers inadequate relief for ERISA plans).
Conison, supra note 29, at 611–14.
. Wiedenbeck & Maher, supra note 51, at 15.
See Shnitser, supra note 38, at 654–55 (explaining why the trust law analogy is flawed and how those flaws undermine ERISA’s policy objectives). See generally Maher, Paternalistic Market, supra note 56, at 681 n.104 (“Trust law is also a poor analog regarding deference because it presupposes, generally, the presence of an unconflicted trustee, and because it fails to account for ERISA’s regulatory intent (as opposed to the contractarian nature of trust law).”).
Conison, supra note 29, at 580, 618, 632.
Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 525, 534 (2014).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)). See also Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1083, 1114 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court noted that the resulting standard was consistent with the judicial standard pre-ERISA, which applied principles of contract law in lieu of labor law.”).
See Bruzzese v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 998 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“The essential elements of contract formation are an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration, manifestation of mutual assent, and legality of object and of consideration.”).
Maher, Regulating, supra note 19, at 1299–1300 (arguing that it is unlikely prospective employees are able to access and evaluate detailed information on retirement plans prior to employment, or use that information by negotiating terms or switching employers); Samantha J. Prince, Benefits Transparency, 108 Marq. L. Rev. 37, 40, 55 (2024) (“Jobseekers rarely know of the details surrounding benefits offered . . . until the hiring process has commenced.”).
Prince, supra note 81, at 85.
See Moore, supra note 7, at 21.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Potential Legal Value of Relational Contracts in a Time of Crisis or Uncertainty, 85 L. & Contemp. Probs., no. 2, 2022, at 131, 133 (“A strictly discrete contract is a legally enforceable agreement in which the parties assent to specific, detailed promises that are designed to govern the whole of their prescribed relationship.”).
Conison, supra note 29, at 595–96.
Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 817 F. Supp. 2d 214, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[A]n ERISA benefits plan is not a negotiated contract between two competent business persons. . . . [S]ignificant difference[s] [exist] between such a contract and an agreement whose terms were freely negotiated and agreed to by parties standing as equals . . . .”).
Natalya Shnitser, Retirement Plan Reforms in the Absence of a Retirement Policy, in The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection 117, 123 (Arthur B. Laby ed., 2022).
Coleman v. Supervalu, Inc. Short Term Disability Program, 920 F. Supp. 2d 901, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“ERISA plans are rarely the subject of arms’-length negotiation. Instead employers most often unilaterally design the benefits packages that they offer their employees . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Conison, supra note 29, at 595 (“A pension plan is an arrangement in which one supposed party—the employer—may dictate the terms unilaterally, and in which there is no bargaining between it and the other supposed party—the employee or pension recipient. . . . Putting aside the document reflecting it, a plan does not resemble a negotiated deal.”); Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “adhesion contract” as a “standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position”).
W.C. Bunting, The Forgotten Binary Paradigm in Modern Fiduciary Law, 2026 Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 19 & n.48), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5377865 [https://perma.cc/7Q4U-JU2X\].
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1174, 1189 n.57 (1983) (discussing the ubiquity of adhesive contracts).
But see Conison, supra note 29, at 603, 609 (“The contract approach to protecting employee pension expectations did not work because plans are materially different from contracts.”).
Harris v. Paredes, No. 3:23-cv-50231, 2024 WL 774874, at *3, *7 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2024).
Aramony v. United Way of Am., No. 96 CIV. 3962, 1997 WL 732447, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1997) (discussing the employer’s ability to alter plan provisions); Navigate Fin. LLC, 3(21) ERISA Service Agreement 1 [hereinafter ERISA Service Agreement], https://navigatefinancial.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Navigate-Financial-LLC-321-ERISA-Service-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/29B3-BSLM\] (last visited Aug. 19, 2026).
Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, ERISA for Asset Managers and Collective Trust Funds § 1:11 (2025).
Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1998); Larson v. United Healthcare Ins., 723 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 2013); Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled by Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins., 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
ERISA § 502(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2).
Carr v. First Nationwide Bank, 816 F. Supp. 1476, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 1492 (listing cases).
Id.
Hensiek v. Bd. of Dirs. of Casino Queen Holding Co., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1054–55 (S.D. Ill. 2021).
Id. at 1053–55.
Carr, 816 F. Supp. at 1493.
Id. (citing Bellino v. Schlumberger Techs., Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1991)).
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 544 (2003).
John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 207, 227.
ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (stating “any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy”).
Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 288, 315.
See, e.g., Robertson v. Argent Tr. Co., No. CV-21-01711-PHX, 2022 WL 2967710, at *2–3, *10 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2022); Holmes v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., No. 21-22986-CIV-Scola, 2022 WL 180638, at *1, *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2022).
Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 269 n.57.
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
ERISA Litigation: Causes of Action and Remedies Under ERISA Section 502 for Benefit and Fiduciary Breach Claims, Westlaw 7-599-4825 (database updated 2026).
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); Cedeno v. Argent Tr. Co., No. 20-CV-9987, 2021 WL 5087898, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Cedeno v. Sasson, 100 F.4th 386 (2d Cir. 2024).
Diane M. Sumoski, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1014, 1030 (1986) (noting that ERISA does not allow recovery of punitive damages).
See, e.g., Burnett v. Prudent Fiduciary Servs. LLC, No. CV 22-270-RGA, 2023 WL 387586, at *5 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2023); Lloyd v. Argent Tr. Co., No. 22cv4129, 2022 WL 17542071, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2022).
Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985).
In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1236–37 (5th Cir. 1980).
. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-357, 401(K) Retirement Plans: Many Participants Do Not Understand Fee Information, but DOL Could Take Additional Steps to Help Them 54–55, 61 (2021) [hereinafter GAO Report], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-357.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGC6-Z7KF\].
No direct data supporting these suspicions has been identified, but a Government Accountability Office’s study published in 2021 reveals that “[a]lmost 40 percent of 401(k) plan participants do not fully understand . . . the fee information” and “41 percent of participants incorrectly believe that they do not pay any 401(k) plan fees,” which suggests that they are unaware of basic plan terms. Id. at 1, 8.
Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 71, 73–74, 73 n.8 (2002) (expressing doubt as to whether “private contractual dealings between the employer and the employee [are] likely to frustrate” ERISA’s policy for promoting retirement security and identifying asymmetric information and time limitations as contributing to plan participants’ difficulties in enforcing rights vis-à-vis plan sponsors).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 697, 707 (2007) (“[ERISA] regulation requires almost all plan assets to be held in trust. Patterning ERISA’s fiduciary standards after those established under trust law seems to have followed naturally from the traditional use and regulation of pension trusts.” (footnote omitted)).
ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 744 F.3d 685, 695 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting “ERISA’s fiduciary duties are the ‘highest known to law.’” (quoting ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2003))).
E.g., Nathan v. Hudson, 376 S.W.2d 856, 860–61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 415–16 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-1(a) (2022).
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
Turner v. Schneider Elec. Holdings, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 3d 127, 136 (D. Mass. 2021) (citing Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp. 3d 189, 213 (D. Mass. 2020)).
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
Rob Park, Comment, Putting the “Best” in Best Efforts, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 718, 720–21 (2006) (first citing Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.7, at 114 (Aspen 6th ed. 2003); then citing Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277, 301 (1998)).
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721 n.66.
Marc I. Steinberg, To Call a Donkey a Racehorse – The Fiduciary Duty Misnomer in Corporate and Securities Law, 48 J. Corp. L. 1, 4 (2022).
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
Nate Moody, Understanding the Differences Between ERISA 3(21) and 3(38) Fiduciaries, Lebel & Harriman Ret. Advisors (July 2024), https://lebelharriman.com/understanding-the-differences-between-erisa-321-and-338-fiduciaries/ [https://perma.cc/5QLN-EVEH\].
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 105, at 544, 562. Yet, because these are agency arrangements in that fiduciaries act as agents of plan sponsors, an argument could be made that they resemble firm-to-individual employment contracts. Id. at 544; Muir & Schipani, supra note 122, at 714. Still, the predominant characteristics of fiduciary arrangements lend themselves to be seen as firm-to-firm relationships.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 105, at 544.
Id. at 545, 552.
E.g., LexisNexis, Investment Management Agreement (ERISA Pension Plan) 2, https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/78dda11a-3f7d-42bd-9b75-be4c49b93589/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/B45H-M382\] (last visited July 13, 2026).
ERISA Service Agreement, supra note 94, at 1; Highpoint Advisor Grp., ERISA 3(21) Agreement 1 (2022) (on file with author).
LexisNexis, supra note 141, at 2.
Bighorn Fin., Inc., 3(21) ERISA Investment Advisory Agreement 1 (2019), https://bighornfinancialcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/321-ERISA-Agreement-Consulting-and-Mgmt-Options-05.15.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPV6-KVNU\].
Courts evaluate fiduciary conduct not based on investment or substantive outcomes but rather procedural prudence. Lauren K. Valastro, Did the Superbowl Ad Curse Heighten Defined Contribution Plan Fiduciary Duties?: Deciphering the Legal and Ethical Landscape of Cryptocurrency Options in 401(k)s, 57 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 109, 125–26 (2023).
See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
ERISA fiduciary relationships also break the mold when it comes to modern classification of fiduciaries and classical trust structures. “[U]nder ERISA, the employees can more accurately be thought of as playing the role of the settlor. Although the employer is nominally the settlor, the employees are the effective settlors, as they are the ones funding the trust with foregone wage compensation.” Maher, Paternalistic Market, supra note 56, at 680–81; see also Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 (A.L.I. 2003) (“[T]he controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention . . . .”).
. Adrienne L. Robertson, 401(k) Answer Book Q 4:45, Lexis (database updated Dec. 2025); Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486; Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 311 & n.290.
See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
ERISA §§ 409(a), 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(2); Cedeno v. Argent Tr. Co., No. 20-cv-9987, 2021 WL 5087898, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Cedeno v. Sasson, 100 F.4th 386 (2d Cir. 2024); Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 289, 291–92.
Eric D. Chason, Redressing All ERISA Fiduciary Breaches Under Section 409(a), 83 Temp. L. Rev. 147, 161–63 (2010); Lauren K. Valastro, How Misapplying Twombly Erodes Retirement Funds, 32 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 421, 464–75 (2025) [hereinafter Valastro, Misapplying Twombly]; Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Untrustworthy: ERISA’s Eroded Fiduciary Law, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1007, 1026–28 (2018); Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 289–95.
See Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, supra note 11, at 296, 311, 318.
Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 458.
Maher, Regulating, supra note 19, at 1304.
Smith v. CommonSpirit Health, 37 F.4th 1160, 1168 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[A] retirement plan must disclose a range of information about costs and performance, including the administrative expenses it charges to participants and investment-related information explaining the characteristics of the plan’s investment options.”).
. See Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2012-02 (2012) [hereinafter Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2012-02], https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2012-02 [https://perma.cc/WKP6-7NYD\]. The DOL has stated that for certain investment types, it “will not take enforcement action against any plan administrator who reasonably determines it would be impracticable, or impossible, to obtain the information necessary to meet the disclosure requirements.” Id.
Secunda, supra note 14, at 174.
James Hawley, Keith Johnson & Ed Waitzer, Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance, Rotman Int’l J. Pension Mgmt., Fall 2011, at 4, 11 (“Business as usual is not likely to result in pension management practices that are designed to be unbiased and aligned with the interests of participants and beneficiaries; nor is it likely to provide suitable pension benefits on a sustainable and impartial basis.”).
Relational Contracting, Univ. of Oxford: Gov’t Outcomes Lab, https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/the-basics/relational-contracting/ [https://perma.cc/T7YZ-C2FH\] (last visited July 18, 2026).
Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 835, 841–42 (2003).
Mercer Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 Conn. Ins. L.J. 335, 352–53 (2014); see supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text.
Moore, supra note 7, at 28 (footnote omitted).
Bullard, supra note 162, at 352–53.
See generally Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Retirement Guardrails: How Proactive Fiduciaries Can Improve Plan Outcomes (2023) (arguing that regulators should embrace safeguards that balance the need to protect plan participants’ autonomy while discouraging fiduciary imprudence).
Various other aspects of the fiduciary investment selection process and related compensation structures could serve as examples, including the provision of costly and ineffective self-directed brokerage windows and offering retail instead of institutional class shares as investment options. Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 434–37 (explaining the impact of fees on plan participants’ ability to grow their retirement savings); Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 445, 454 (2019).
Recordkeeping and administrative “services include enrolling participants, conducting payroll deductions for contributions, preparing and filing disclosures, maintaining websites for participants’ use, providing account statements, offering call centers, creating educational materials, and keeping track of accounts and transactions.” Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 431 (footnotes omitted).
401k Recordkeeping in 2024 and Beyond, Congruent Sols. (May 21, 2024), https://www.congruentsolutions.com/whitepaper/401k-recordkeeping-in-2024-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/5ZSY-Y3WA\]; Cognizant, Digital Retirement Operations: A Path to Automated Record Keeping 2, 4, 7 (2020), https://www.cognizant.com/en_us/industries/documents/digital-retirement-operation-a-path-to-automated-record-keeping.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9GL-T3HU\]; ADP, The Automation of Retirement Plan Administration 7–8 (2015), https://401ktv.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/99-3984_WEB_SPONSORS_Plan_Automation\_WhitePaper_1115_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTA9-79U9\].
John Manganaro, Evolving Best Practices: Recordkeeping Fees, PlanSponsor (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.plansponsor.com/evolving-best-practices-recordkeeping-fees/?layout=print [https://perma.cc/BS5D-ZLSW\] (“[W]ith today’s digital recordkeeping technology, it is no more work for the plan provider to administer an account with $1,000,000 versus an account with $100. Thus, the argument goes, it is not reasonable under ERISA for the fee to grow while the service being provided remains the same.”); Eric Droblyen, 401(k) Fee Levelization – It Can Make Revenue Sharing Worse!, Emp. Fiduciary (July 11, 2018) [hereinafter 401(k) Fee Levelization], https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/401k-fee-levelization [https://perma.cc/97RR-F234\] (“Because revenue sharing payments are asset-based, a 401(k) plan with lots of assets can pay much higher fees than a comparable plan with fewer assets for the same administration services.”).
See Expense Ratios: What They Are and Why They Matter, Vanguard, https://investor.vanguard.com/investor-resources-education/education/expense-ratio [https://perma.cc/G264-5ED7\] (last visited Aug. 31, 2026).
401(k) Fee Levelization, supra note 169.
See infra notes 291–97 and accompanying text.
Eric Droblyen, 401(k) Fees - What You Need to Know About the 3 Major Categories, Emp. Fiduciary (July 1, 2021), https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/401k-fees-the-3-major-categories [https://perma.cc/X5GZ-HW8H\]; see also Sigetich v. Kroger Co., No. 1:21-cv-697, 2023 WL 2431667, at *1–4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2023) (discussing plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the fees associated with ad hoc recordkeeping and administrative services).
See Droblyen, supra note 173 (showing how expense ratios work).
Elizabeth Dyer, Lawrence N. Vignola & Marcia S. Wagner, Strafford, ERISA Revenue Sharing Arrangements: Avoiding Plan Asset Status, Complying with Due Diligence Requirements 49 (2015), https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/1101401/2021/07/TLBJRF1YRAPresentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7LN-6PRK\].
Robertson, supra note 149, at Q 4:53.
Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486; Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 49.
See Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486–87.
Id. at 1486.
Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans, Abstract (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30721, 2022).
Id.
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233, 234 n.3, 241 (1979).
Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1481–82.
. Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., supra note 12, at 2; Arnold, supra note 12.
Eric Droblyen, 401(k) Fees: The Hidden Retirement Killer You Can Stop Today, Emp. Fiduciary (Aug. 26, 2025) [hereinafter Retirement Killer], https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/401k-fees-the-hidden-retirement-killer [https://perma.cc/WTQ4-7BBS\].
See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1086–87 (D. Colo. 2020) (issuing fact findings concerning a fiduciary arrangement “in effect ‘without limit as to time’”), aff’d, 1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021).
See GAO Report, supra note 118, at 8–9; Leslie A. Muller & John A. Turner, Financial Literacy, the “High-Fee Puzzle,” and Knowledge About the Importance of Fees, J. Ret., Winter 2021, at 29, 35–37.
Steinberger, supra note 46.
Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 585, 585–86 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Default Rules].
Heminway, supra note 84, at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 187, 190–91 (2005) (“To a lawyer, a contract may be incomplete in failing to describe the obligations of the parties in each possible state of the world.”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 105, at 595; Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 151, 152 (2005).
Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health Care, 67 Emory L.J. 1, 43 (2017) (asserting that “degree of transaction costs to detail, extent of information asymmetry, and desirability of forming relational capital” may be evaluated to assess “the desirability of contractual completeness”).
Id. at 42.
See Default Rules, supra note 191. This definition is from the perspective of legal scholars, not economists.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 426 (1993).
Maher & Stris, supra note 16, at 459 & n.130 (“[E]fforts to convert ERISA’s fiduciary promise into one that relies entirely on contract principles are misguided.”).
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1092–93 (1981).
Chason, supra note 152, at 153.
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377, 1402–03 (2010); Robert E. Scott, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets, 83 L. & Contemp. Probs., no. 2, 2020, at 71, 75–76, 75 n.17.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Socio. Rev. 55, 56 (1963).
D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 8–9, 9 nn.44–45 (2009) (detailing the history of relational contract theory’s development).
Id. at 8–16.
Oliver Hart, The Nobel Prize, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2016/hart/facts/ [https://perma.cc/4JJ4-NVHT\] (last visited July 18, 2026); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev. Econ. Stud. 115, 134–35 (1999) (developing a model for the idea that contracts are incomplete); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control 372–73 (2016), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/hart-lecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SZD-SFDJ\].
Default Rules, supra note 191, at 585.
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 92 n.29 (1989). But see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 277, 277 (Peter Newman ed., 2002) (“Economists have not settled on a definition of incompleteness but agree on a paradigm case: a contract is incomplete when it is insufficiently state contingent.”); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 Econometrica 741, 743 (1999) (“For all its importance, there is unfortunately no clear definition of ‘incomplete contracting’ in the literature.”).
Default Rules, supra note 191, at 585, 588. This is not to suggest that all incomplete contracts are deficient from a technical or drafting standpoint. Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 393, 406 (2007).
For an accessible, business-oriented introduction to relational contracts, see Frydlinger, Hart & Vitasek, supra note 18.
Epstein, supra note 197, at 5; Smith & King, supra note 206, at 8–9.
Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 303, 305 (1999).
Heminway, supra note 84, at 137.
Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 Emory L.J. 1009, 1039 (1983).
Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. Legal Analysis 561, 614 n.170 (2015).
See generally Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1033 (1994) (discussing the advantages of relational investment).
Christina E. Shalley, Jing Zhou & Greg R. Oldham, The Effects of Personal and Contextual Characteristics on Creativity: Where Should We Go from Here?, 30 J. Mgmt. 933, 935–36 (2004). See generally Nicholas Argyres, Fabrice Lumineau & Giorgio Zanarone, Strategic Management Meets the Economics of Relational Contracts, Strategic Mgmt. Rev. (forthcoming), https://www.strategicmanagementreview.net/assets/articles/Argyres Lumineau and Zanarone.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E6R-8SM2\] (discussing the application of relational contract theory to strategic management).
Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 91, 103–08 (2015).
Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 Va. L. Rev. 559, 560, 569–77 (2015).
Id. at 583.
Robert Anderson IV, Path Dependence, Information, and Contracting in Business Law and Economics, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 553, 554.
A Snapshot of Government-Wide Contracting for FY 2024 (Interactive Dashboard), U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.: WatchBlog (June 24, 2025), https://www.gao.gov/blog/snapshot-government-wide-contracting-fy-2024-interactive-dashboard [https://perma.cc/W7WU-B87U\].
See infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text. Thoughtful manual notwithstanding, the U.S. government is not known for its efficiency or economy in spending. But, as has been recognized elsewhere, “[d]espite a vast literature on contract theory, scholars are only just scratching the surface of understanding how parties design their contracts in the real world.” Henry Allen Blair, Anticipating Procedural Innovation: How and When Parties Calibrate Procedure Through Contract, 72 Okla. L. Rev. 797, 797 (2020).
Park, supra note 132, at 720–21.
. 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.17 (2d ed. 1998).
Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
Id.
White v. Nat’l Football League, 766 F. Supp. 2d 941, 952 (D. Minn. 2011) (alteration in original).
Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979).
Daniel J. Coplan, When Is “Best Efforts” Really “Best Efforts”: An Analysis of the Obligation to Exploit in Entertainment Licensing Agreements and an Overview of How the Term “Best Efforts” Has Been Construed in Litigation, 31 Sw. U. L. Rev. 725, 730–31 (2002).
Goetz & Scott, supra note 202, at 1111 n.43; FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Kenneth A. Adams, Interpreting and Drafting Efforts Provisions: From Unreason to Reason, 74 Bus. Law. 677, 678 (2019); see First Union Nat’l Bank v. Steele Software Sys. Corp., 838 A.2d 404, 449 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (citing Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997, 1000 (1992)) (recognizing parties cannot accurately predict future circumstances and instead agree to best efforts clauses to ensure later flexibility of standards).
Adams, supra note 234, at 677–78.
Matthew Jennejohn, Braided Agreements and New Frontiers for Relational Contract Theory, 45 J. Corp. L. 885, 892 (2020) (“[When] uncertainty often makes future performance obligations difficult to foresee, parties use standard-like terms, such as ‘best efforts’ provisions, in their agreements. These . . . terms build flexibility into the exchange relationship and, in the event of litigation, . . . invite more searching inquiries of the relational context of an exchange.”); Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 227, 266 (2004) (“[R]elational contracts provide a means of coping with unforeseen contingencies as they arise, rather than attempting to plan for them in advance.”).
See Cal. Pines Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Pedotti, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 799–800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Triple-A Baseball Club Ass’n v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that best efforts “cannot be defined in terms of a fixed formula . . . [but] varies with the facts and the field of law involved”)).
Id.; Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2002).
Herrmann, 302 F.3d at 560.
. Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts § 8:10 (2025).
Med. Components, Inc. v. Osiris Med., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 743, 752 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting Herrmann, 302 F.3d at 559).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
E.g., Nat’l Data Payment Sys., Inc. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).
Baron Fin. Corp. v. Natanzon, 509 F. Supp. 2d 501, 509 (D. Md. 2007).
Vokacek v. Vokacek, 933 P.2d 544, 545–46, 548–49 (Alaska 1997) (holding that a husband who agreed to “at all times make best efforts to remain gainfully employed” was required to undertake continuous attempts to stay gainfully employed).
Steiner v. Thexton, 226 P.3d 359, 366–67 (Cal. 2010).
. Hunter, supra note 240, § 8:9.
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-306 also sets forth reasonable diligence obligations in best efforts contracts. U.C.C. § 2-306 & cmt. 5 (A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2023).
. Hunter, supra note 240, § 8:9.
Id. § 8:10.
Citri-Lite Co. v. Cott Beverages, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923–24 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 613–14 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 613.
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1984).
Id. at 16.
Baron Fin. Corp. v. Natanzon, 509 F. Supp. 2d 501, 510–11 (D. Md. 2007).
. Henry N. Butler, Joanna Shepherd & James C. Cooper, Economic Analysis for Lawyers 208–09, 212 (4th ed. 2024).
See supra Section II.B.
See Study Finds Most Corporate Retirement Plans Have Regulatory or Fiduciary Violations, supra note 10 (discussing study finding that 84% of U.S. retirement plans likely violate ERISA’s fiduciary and regulatory requirements).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B) (2025).
Deloitte Consulting LLP, Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan Fees, 2013: A Study Assessing the Mechanics of the ‘All-In’ Fee 9 (2014), https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/rpt_14_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5N8-UMH6\] (finding that “other plan related variables . . . do not appear to drive fees”).
Id. at 17; see Tulio D. Chirinos et al., Fee and Investment Litigation 2015–2020: Five Year Review of Developments and Best Practices to Mitigate Risk – Part I, 34 Benefits L.J., Spring 2021, at 6, 6–10.
Chason, supra note 152, at 152–53.
Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 457–58.
Eric Droblyen, Evaluating 401(k) Providers: Separating Commodity from Value-Added Services, Emp. Fiduciary (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/evaluating-401k-providers-separating-commodity-value-added-services [https://perma.cc/5X6W-QNCX\] (“Custody and recordkeeping [services] are ‘commodity’ services. Like any commodity, given [materially] equal quality, the key benchmark for these services is price. The cheaper you can find competent custody and recordkeeping services, the better for participants.”).
For example, in Daggett v. Waters Corp., plaintiffs asserted they paid 108% more than what similarly situated plans were paying for the same recordkeeping and administrative service due to fiduciary failure to solicit competitive bids and to negotiate fees. Daggett v. Waters Corp., 731 F. Supp. 3d 121, 129 (D. Mass. 2024). Similarly situated plans allegedly paid as low as $40 per plan participant for recordkeeping services while they were paying $107. Id. at 130. Likewise, in Mator v. Wesco Distribution, Inc., plaintiffs presented evidence of recordkeeping service fees ranging from $31 per plan participant to $154 per plan participant. Mator v. Wesco Distrib., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00403, 2022 WL 3566108, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2022), vacated and remanded, 102 F.4th 172 (3d Cir. 2024).
The precise contours of when a service provider acts as a fiduciary have remained unclear since the Department of Labor first issued interpretive guidance on which actors are fiduciaries. Norman P. Stein, I, Fiduciary: Some Reflections on the Definition of Fiduciary Under ERISA, 6 Drexel L. Rev. 555, 557, 561–62 (2014). In a post-Chevron deference era, those parameters, it would seem, are murkier than ever. Lucian Wells, Comment, Chevron’s Retirement and ERISA’s Future: Judicial Review of EBSA Rules After Loper, 78 Admin. L. Rev. 201, 203 (2026).
Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1086–87 (D. Colo. 2020) (issuing fact findings concerning a fiduciary arrangement “in effect ‘without limit as to time’”), aff’d, 1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021); Brown v. MITRE Corp., No. 22-cv-10976, 2023 WL 2383772, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 2023) (“[G]iven that the Plans remained with the same two recordkeepers for at least fourteen years despite an alleged increase in recordkeeping costs, it is plausible that the Committee was imprudent for not conducting an RFP at reasonable intervals . . . .”); Turner v. Schneider Elec. Holdings, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 3d 127, 136–37 (D. Mass. 2021) (alleging that fiduciary failed to negotiate lower fees or to conduct competitive bidding processes sufficed to allege a breach of the duty of prudence regarding recordkeeping fees).
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 44.
See Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 744 F.3d 685, 695 (11th Cir. 2014).
Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 456.
Shnitser, supra note 87, at 123.
Id. See also Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 261, at 4–5 (noting that, as a percentage of plan assets, larger plans generally have lower fees).
Shnitser, supra note 87, at 123.
Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions 17–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30978, 2023).
. Robertson, supra note 149, at Q 4:45; Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486.
Robertson, supra note 149, at Q 4:51; Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486.
Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 469, 472 & n.15 (2001) (citing William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Dedication of the David A. Harrison III Law Grounds, University of Virginia (Nov. 8, 1997)).
Shnitser, supra note 87, at 117, 129, 133; Maher & Stris, supra note 16, at 474.
Bernstein, supra note 217, at 614 n.170; Butler & Baysinger, supra note 216, at 1040.
E.g., Levin, supra note 161, at 835.
E.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1039, 1041 (2011); What Is Compensation Management?, CPS HR Consulting, https://cpshr.us/blog-article/compensation-management/ [https://perma.cc/X6BY-6V3F\] (last visited Aug. 3, 2026).
Off. of the Under Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Guidance on Using Incentive and Other Contract Types 4, 16 (2016) [hereinafter DOD Report], https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA001270-16-DPAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6J7-DWY4\].
Id.
How Much Has the U.S. Government Spent This Year?, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury: FiscalData, https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/federal-spending/ [https://perma.cc/SS63-N47X\] (last visited July 24, 2026).
DOD Report, supra note 283, at 16.
Heminway, supra note 84, at 136–38 (quoting Frydlinger, Hart & Vitasek, supra note 18).
. Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., supra note 12, at 2–3; Arnold, supra note 12.
. Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 261, at 5–9, 20–25.
Id. at 9.
Shawn Steffens, How Does a Fiduciary Make Money?, Steffens Fin. Corp. (Jan. 2, 2025), https://www.steffensfinancial.com/blog/how-does-fiduciary-make-money [https://perma.cc/BZ3R-ZKDS\].
Id.
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 15, 47, 54–55.
Peter Gratton, What You Need to Know About Fee-Only Financial Advisors, Investopedia (Sep. 6, 2026), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102014/feeonly-financial-advisers-what-you-need-know.asp [https://perma.cc/8UCM-B65R\].
Droblyen, supra note 173 (asserting “an asset-based 401(k) administration fee over 0.10% - enough to cover asset custody - is unnecessary and can lead to . . . [plan] participants overpaying for plan administration services”).
Steffens, supra note 291.
Dan Felix, The Cost of the Wrong Trustee, Indep. Trustee All., https://www.trusteealliance.com/the-cost-of-the-wrong-trustee/ [https://perma.cc/EX6Z-9ARL\] (last visited July 13, 2026). See generally Alexander v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 401 N.E.2d 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (discussing percentage-based compensation for corporate trustees).
Hiring a Lawyer: Attorneys’ Fees, Tex. State L. Libr. (July 7, 2026, at 14:05 CT), https://guides.sll.texas.gov/hiring-and-firing-your-lawyer/attorneys-fees [https://perma.cc/4UWS-46Q9\].
Fees and Hiring a Lawyer, Tex. L. Help (July 11, 2026), https://texaslawhelp.org/article/fees-and-hiring-a-lawyer [https://perma.cc/3BFV-VTF8\].
Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.5(c) (A.B.A. 2020).
Fees and Hiring a Lawyer, supra note 299.
Fees and Expenses, A.B.A. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_services/milvets/aba_home_front/information_center/working_with_lawyer/fees_and_expenses/ [https://perma.cc/6XLA-44YM\].
. Hiring a Lawyer: Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 298; Fees and Hiring a Lawyer, supra note 299.
Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 Ind. L.J. 1021, 1029–30 (2020); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 480 (1981).
Time Versus Value Billing (Shifting the Risk), Colo. Bar Ass’n, https://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/MGMTHQ/Time vs Value Billing - Shifting the Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQZ7-DT3V\] (last visited July 19, 2026).
. Fees and Hiring a Lawyer, supra note 299.
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 55.
Id. at 15.
Notably, courts assessing trustee compensation weigh trustees’ assumption of risk, John E. Schiller, Trustee Compensation: Proceed with Caution, Tax Adviser (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2010/aug/clinic-story-04-aug-2010/ [https://perma.cc/4XSQ-7YZY\], but that factor is absent from ERISA fiduciary compensation evaluations.
Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 261, at 7, 9, 13.
DOD Report, supra note 283, at 8.
Chip Addis, The Hidden Truth: Why Fee-Only Advisors Are Best for Your Retirement, Addis Hill (Oct. 4, 2024), https://addishill.com/the-hidden-truth-why-fee-only-advisors-are-best-for-your-retirement/ [https://perma.cc/8NTR-KZPT\]; James Sweeney, “Fiduciary” and “Fee-Only” Matter Less Than You Think, White Coat Inv. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.whitecoatinvestor.com/financial-advisor-conflicts-of-interests/ [https://perma.cc/N8PD-6NVE\].
Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 744 F.3d 685, 695 (11th Cir. 2014).
Some assert asset-based recordkeeping fees may be suitable for new plans with minimal assets, but they are not reasonable for established plans. Manganaro, supra note 169.
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 48.
Eric A. Zacks, The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 991, 1025 (2015).
Agustin Gutierrez et al., Taking Supplier Collaboration to the Next Level, McKinsey & Co. (July 7, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/taking-supplier-collaboration-to-the-next-level [https://perma.cc/2B4S-R942\].
E.g., Ayres & Curtis, supra note 13, at 1486–87, 1487 nn.34–39; Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 435 & nn.78–83.
Robertson, supra note 149, at Q 4:114.
. Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/employers-and-advisers/plan-administration-and-compliance/fiduciary-responsibilities/401k-plan-fee-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNK5-WRCK\] (last visited July 18, 2026).
ERISA Fee Disclosure Requirements Part I: Service Providers, Archer & Greiner, P.C.: News & Insights (May 3, 2012), https://www.archerlaw.com/en/news-resources/client-advisories/erisa-fee-disclosure-requirements-part-i-service-providers [https://perma.cc/N6B5-NHFQ\].
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2012-02, supra note 157 and accompanying text.
GAO Report, supra note 118, at 13–14, 50, 55; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-24-107125, 401(k) Plans: Reported Impacts of Fee Disclosure Regulations, and DOL Efforts to Support Implementation of Regulations 3, 10–11 (2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/871896.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2TT-4KA7\].
See, e.g., Brown v. MITRE Corp., No. 22-cv-10976, 2023 WL 2383772, at *3–4, *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 2023) (noting “the Plans remained with the same two recordkeepers for at least fourteen years despite an alleged increase in recordkeeping costs”); Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 328 F. Supp. 3d 273, 293–94 & n.45, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussing one plan with two recordkeepers and another with three recordkeepers), aff’d, 9 F.4th 95 (2d Cir. 2021).
Brown, 2023 WL 2383772, at *6; Sacerdote, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 293–94.
Robert D. Buzzell, Is Vertical Integration Profitable?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 1983, at 92, 93, https://hbr.org/1983/01/is-vertical-integration-profitable [https://perma.cc/77LW-LJN8\].
Id.
Id. at 102.
John Manganaro, Ambitious Firms Seeking Vertical Integration in the Financial Services Industry, PlanAdviser (June 17, 2020), https://www.planadviser.com/exclusives/ambitious-firms-seeking-vertical-integration-financial-services-industry/ [https://perma.cc/8MMT-2JWM\]; Andrey Yashunsky, Vertical Ecosystem Integration in Financial Services, Fin. IT (Feb. 7, 2021, at 14:00 CT), https://financialit.net/blog/financial-services/vertical-ecosystem-integration-financial-services [https://perma.cc/QG3L-5GMH\].
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 46, 54.
Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 458.
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 415–16 (2014).
Goetz & Scott, supra note 202, at 1150.
DOD Report, supra note 283, at 20. See also Levin, supra note 161, at 836 (“[Parties] can contractually specify some fixed payment and can incorporate further performance measures in a relational contract that specifies how payments and future trade will adjust to reflect performance.”).
. Hunter, supra note 240, § 8:10; DOD Report, supra note 283, at 22; see Levin, supra note 161, at 837.
A predetermined factor is needed to determine the amount of the award. Otherwise, the plan participant would retain the entire benefit.
E.g., 401k Averages Book, 401k Averages Book, https://www.401ksource.com/ [https://perma.cc/8ZL9-N558\] (last visited Aug. 8, 2026).
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 Yale L.J. 848, 882 (2010).
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Contracts (CPIF), Warfighting Acquisition Univ., https://www.waru.edu/glossary/cost-plus-incentive-fee-contracts [https://perma.cc/N9X9-MBWH\] (last visited July 16, 2026).
DOD Report, supra note 283, at 23.
Id. at 17, 23. See also Levin, supra note 161, at 836 (“[R]elationships should optimally respond to variable outcomes through adjustments in price rather than through changes in the underlying incentives. In practice, a pricing system that grants discounts to customers whose last delivery was flawed . . . can serve precisely this purpose.”).
Dyer, Vignola & Wagner, supra note 175, at 32.
E.g., Sellers v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 729 F. Supp. 3d 136, 153 (D. Mass. 2024); Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 328 F. Supp. 3d 273, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 9 F.4th 95 (2d Cir. 2021); Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078, 1101, 1103 (D. Colo. 2020), aff’d, 1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021).
E.g., Rodriguez v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 4:22-cv-00072, 2024 WL 1070982, at *10 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 7, 2024).
Mastering the RFP Management Process, ERISA Advisory Grp., https://www.erisaadvisorygroup.com/mastering-the-rfp-management-process/ [https://perma.cc/E62K-XLBQ\] (last visited July 19, 2026).
ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110.
Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 453, 467, 472–73.
Id. at 442.
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 814, 831 (2006) (“[P]arties can achieve further contracting gains by varying the procedural rules that will govern their disputes in court.”).
Blair, supra note 225, at 822 (“Perhaps most intuitively, parties can agree to pre-dispute customizations that directly reduce the costs of litigation. . . . [P]arties can do more ex ante to simplify or streamline the dispute resolution process.”).
Paige Thompson, Navigating Fee Benchmarking in a Litigious Era, Fiducient Advisors (Apr. 24, 2025), https://www.fiducientadvisors.com/blog/navigating-fee-benchmarking-in-a-litigious-era [https://perma.cc/Q2LU-AD98\]; e.g., Matousek v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 51 F.4th 274, 280 (8th Cir. 2022); Smith v. CommonSpirit Health, 37 F.4th 1160, 1169 (6th Cir. 2022).
Exec. Order No. 14330, 90 Fed. Reg. 38921, 38921–22 (Aug. 12, 2025).
Fee Schedules – General Information, U.S. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.: CMS (July 8, 2026, at 16:15 ET), https://www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/fee-schedules [https://perma.cc/4THU-8BMC\]; see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-09-647, Medicare Physician Payments: Fees Could Better Reflect Efficiencies Achieved When Services Are Provided Together 6–7 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-647.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5TF-UUW2\]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-06-704, Medicare Physician Services: Use of Services Increasing Nationwide and Relatively Few Beneficiaries Report Major Access Problems 1–2, 5–6 (2006), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-704.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT38-8P5R\].
ERISA Requirements for Employee Benefit Plan Administration, Wolters Kluwer (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/erisa-requirements-for-employee-benefit-plan-administration [https://perma.cc/V38P-BHYG\].
Stephen Miller, Better Pay and Benefits Loom Large in Job Satisfaction, SHRM (Nov. 15, 2023), https://www.shrm.org/topics-tools/news/benefits-compensation/better-pay-benefits-loom-large-job-satisfaction [https://perma.cc/2PK7-6M9J\].
Relational Contracting, supra note 160.
Retirement Killer, supra note 185.
401(k) Fee Levelization, supra note 169 (asserting revenue-sharing arrangements are “a potential source of fiduciary liability” and they “make it difficult to impossible” to comply with the fiduciary duty to “[a]llocate plan fees and expenses amongst participants on a uniform basis”).
Fred Barstein, How to Prepare for the Next Wave of 401(k) Record Keeper Consolidation, WealthManagement (Dec. 8, 2025), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/rpa-news/how-to-prepare-for-the-next-wave-of-401-k-record-keeper-consolidation [https://perma.cc/PQ4E-LQ7G\]; Richard Clarke, Rising ERISA Litigation and Fiduciary Risks Offer Mid-Year Wake-Up Call for Plans, Nat’l Ass’n of Plan Advisors (July 9, 2025), https://www.napa-net.org/news/2025/7/rising-erisa-litigation-and-fiduciary-risks-offer-mid-year-wake-up-call-for-plans/ [https://perma.cc/JU24-SH5X\]; Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 261, at 9.
Exec. Order No. 14330, 90 Fed. Reg. 38921, 38922 (Aug. 12, 2025) (indicating that fiduciary litigation “constrains fiduciaries’ ability to apply their best judgment in offering investment opportunities to relevant plan participants”); Pension Predators: Stopping Class Action Abuse Against Workers’ Retirement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp., Lab., & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 119th Cong. 6 (2025) (statement of Lynn Dudley, Senior Vice President, Glob. Ret. and Comp. Pol’y, Am. Benefits Council).
Clarke, supra note 359; Jay Desjardins, Fiduciary Liability Insurance – Current Trends and Emerging Issues for Public Companies, Aon (Jan. 2024), https://www.aon.com/risk-services/financial-services-group/fiduciary-liability-insurance-current-trends-and-emerging-issues-for-public-companies [https://perma.cc/WAW8-S9WW\].
See Shnitser, supra note 87, at 127, 132; see also Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 261, at 6 (discussing flexibility and variety of options fiduciary service providers offer to plan sponsors).
E.g., Powerful Plan Management, Backed by Collaboration, Fidelity, https://www.fidelityworkplace.com/s/retirement-edge [https://perma.cc/3VQH-7EBY\] (last visited July 18, 2026) (advertising its “innovative 401(k) program”); David Schmid, Emerging Technological Innovations in the 401(k) Retirement Industry, Parkside Fin. Bank & Tr. (June 2024), https://www.pfbt.com/emerging-technological-innovations-in-the-401k-retirement-industry [https://perma.cc/ZR45-GZET\] (advertising its services and stating that “[t]echnological innovations are transforming the 401(k)-retirement sector, offering increased personalization, security, and efficiency”).
How Do Gusto’s Promotional Discounts Work for 401(k) Plans?, Guideline: Gusto (Aug. 25, 2026), https://help.guideline.com/en/articles/11132448-how-do-gusto-s-promotional-discounts-work-for-401-k-plans [https://perma.cc/PK8D-JFVD\] (“Gusto Retirement periodically offers discounts on its [401(k)] services. . . . Here’s an example of how a three-month employer discount would apply for billing: Your plan’s start date is January 1. On February 1, March 1, and April 1, you will receive your invoices, which will outline any fees that are waived. You will not be charged for applicable fees during this time. . . . We reserve the right to modify or discontinue promotions at any time without prior notice.”).
Cf. Valastro, Misapplying Twombly, supra note 152, at 436 n.90 (noting that courts have credited plaintiffs’ counsel-driven litigation with prompting fee reductions and clarifying fiduciaries’ duties, suggesting that similar litigation strategies could prompt further reevaluation of fiduciary duty).
Carol Buckmann, 50 Years Later, ERISA Remains a Work in Progress, Law360 (July 11, 2024, at 14:49 ET), https://www.law360.com/benefits/articles/1856721 [https://perma.cc/WG6H-7LGF\] (discussing the ERISA fiduciary breach litigation that has “undoubtedly” helped reduce fees fiduciaries charge).
