I. Introduction

Each day, millions of people in the United States make a series of seemingly mundane decisions about food—what to purchase, what to cook, what to eat, and what to discard. These decisions are often framed as matters of personal choice or preference, yet they are structured, constrained, and enabled by federal food law. Food law governs what foods may be sold, what information must be disclosed, and who bears responsibility for managing food-related risks.[1]

At the center of this framework is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a public health agency charged with protecting and promoting public health.[2] FDA works to “fulfill[] . . . society’s interest in assuring the conditions in which people can be healthy,”[3] and an integral part of that mission is “ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply.”[4] Yet prevailing approaches to FDA food law often emphasize the technical and scientific dimensions of regulation, giving insufficient attention to how regulatory choices structure participation, responsibility, and inequality.[5]

FDA carries out its mission within an increasingly complex national and global food system[6]—one in which the meaning and proper scope of public health governance, including how risk, responsibility, expertise, and information are defined and allocated, are often contested.[7] Because food structures everyday conditions of life, decisions about food regulation—and who participates in making them—shape not only health outcomes but also equity and democratic legitimacy.

Drawing on democratic theory, feminist legal methods, and theories of human flourishing, this Article develops an integrated framework for analyzing how regulatory regimes distribute authority, responsibility, and labor. This framework illuminates dimensions of FDA food law that are often overlooked—and how legal structures shape who participates in governance, who bears the burdens of regulation, and how those distributions impact not only health outcomes but equity and human flourishing. Applying this framework to FDA food law, this Article contends that the foundational federal food statutes—the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938—were produced through statutory lawmaking processes that systematically constrained women’s participatory authority, and that the statutory framework emerging from those processes continues to allocate responsibility for carrying out the work of food regulation to consumers in ways that structure the conditions for future participation in food governance and human flourishing.[8] Addressing these dynamics is essential because FDA food law does not merely regulate food; it structures everyday conditions of life, including the distribution of responsibility for health and care and opportunities for participation in governance.

This Article proceeds as follows: Part II situates FDA food law within the agency’s public health mission and examines the legal and cultural meanings of “food.” It then develops an integrated analytic lens drawing on democratic theory, feminist legal methodology, and human flourishing.[9] Part III applies this lens to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,[10] showing how exclusion from statutory lawmaking shaped the foundation of FDA food law. Part IV considers the implications of the analysis for contemporary FDA food law, arguing that attention to flourishing, participation, and gendered responsibility highlights how food law operates as a structural determinant of health. The Article concludes with a case study of FDA Nutrition Facts labeling,[11] illustrating how food law allocates regulatory responsibility to consumers in ways that implicate human flourishing.

II. Democracy, Feminism, Flourishing, and Food (Law)

This Part develops a theoretical framework in which democracy, feminism, and human flourishing serve as mutually reinforcing principles for understanding U.S. food law. Democracy highlights the promise of participatory governance, feminism reveals how gender and other axes of identity shape participation, and flourishing provides a broader normative aim for democracy, feminism, and food law.

This framework is not intended to displace the central role of science in food regulation.[12] Rather, it recognizes that science does not operate in a vacuum. Even though science is indispensable to assessing the risks food poses and advancing its safety, science alone does not determine food law.[13] Food law is shaped by power dynamics and social structures that affect participation in food governance, elevate certain interests, structure resource allocation, and, ultimately, shape prevailing policy priorities.

Together, democracy, feminism, and flourishing provide an orienting lens for viewing food law, one that highlights participation, equity, and well-being. Ultimately, this lens is a way to evaluate how scientific expertise is mobilized in food law, and whether its use reflects and serves the needs and interests of the publics impacted by the law.

A. FDA Food Law

1. FDA’s Public Health Mission and Authority over the Food Supply

Although FDA is not the sole regulator of food in the United States,[14] it is responsible for regulating most of the nation’s food supply—approximately 77%.[15] FDA’s jurisdiction includes foods that consumers encounter and consume daily, giving FDA a central role in shaping the health, safety, and informational environment of the U.S. food system, and the conditions under which individuals navigate that system.[16]

FDA’s food-related mission is to protect and advance the public health.[17] Specifically, FDA aims to “protect[] the public health . . . by ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply” and “advanc[e] the public health . . . by helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use . . . foods to maintain and improve their health.”[18] FDA also works to “ensur[e] the security of the food supply.”[19] Taken together, these goals frame FDA’s mission as fundamentally grounded in science and public health protection. At the same time, the scope and structure of FDA’s food authority position it to shape far more than discrete health outcomes.[20]

Although multiple federal agencies have jurisdiction over food, FDA nonetheless structures the baseline conditions under which the majority of food is produced, marketed, and consumed in the United States.[21] The effects of its regulatory choices extend beyond the products, entities, and activities that it directly regulates.[22] Domains that may appear distinct are in fact deeply intertwined. For example, labeling requirements that emphasize information disclosure shift responsibility onto individuals, with consequences for time burdens, care work, and the capacity for participation.[23] Similarly, safety standards shape food production costs, availability, and affordability, thereby influencing access.[24]

FDA food law thus does not merely regulate food; it organizes the food system.[25] Its technocratic orientation is neither neutral nor inevitable but reflects normative governance choices about how responsibility should be allocated and which forms of intervention are appropriate—choices shaped by who participates in governance decisions and on what terms.[26] Because FDA food law and policy structure the conditions under which people make everyday food decisions, they affect individuals’ real opportunities to secure affordable, nutritious, and culturally appropriate food,[27] to manage the provision of care, and to participate in food-related decision-making, regardless of institutional boundaries.[28]

Accordingly, the division of authority across agencies is not a reason to forgo analysis of FDA food law and policy.[29] To the contrary, because this division can obscure responsibility and diffuse democratic accountability, it is even more important to examine FDA food law through the integrated lens of democracy, feminism, and flourishing.

2. Defining Food: Law and Culture

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) establishes the scope of FDA’s authority by defining what counts as “food.”[30] The FDCA gives FDA jurisdiction over most food and prohibits the distribution of adulterated or misbranded food.[31] The Act defines “food” as “articles used for food or drink for man or other animals.”[32] Or, more succinctly: “food” is food.[33] Courts and FDA have interpreted this broadly to include “articles used by people in the ordinary way most people use food—primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive value.”[34] While everyone must eat to live, food is more than a means of physical sustenance and sensory stimulation.[35] The statutory definition of food extends beyond the common-sense understanding of food: chewing gum, food additives, and dietary supplements are “food” under the Act.[36] By defining “food” as “articles used for food,” the legal definition incorporates culturally contingent understandings of food, insofar as those understandings shape how particular articles are used.[37] The legal definition of food is important because it determines the scope of FDA’s jurisdiction and enforcement authority.[38]

Extralegal understandings of food also recognize its central importance to human life.[39] The Oxford American Dictionary defines food, in part, as “any nutritious substance that people . . . eat or drink . . . to maintain life and growth.”[40] Taste and aroma, which are intertwined, are also closely associated with lay understandings of food consumption.[41]

At the same time, lay understandings also recognize that food is not merely a source of nutrition or sensory pleasure.[42] Food plays an important role in shaping identity, community, and culture.[43] For example, many religions have dietary or food preparation rules.[44] People may describe themselves relative to food—e.g., “foodies,” vegans, or vegetarians—and food often reflects broader cultural and social affiliations. In this sense, we are what we eat.[45] Food is thus biological, social, and symbolic. Because food law is embedded in these dimensions of life, it does more than regulate products to promote nutrition and prevent harm. It structures everyday practices, allocates responsibility, and shapes whose preferences and values are reflected in the food system. Decisions about food regulation, therefore, raise not only technical and public health questions but also questions of power, inclusion, and participation—concerns that are fundamentally democratic.

B. Democracy & Participation in Governance

Democracy provides a framework for evaluating these questions. The definition of democracy has been long debated and contested.[46] At its most basic level, democracy is a system of governance in which the power belongs to the people.[47] Or as President Abraham Lincoln succinctly stated in the Gettysburg Address, “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”[48]

Democracy is both an ideal and a practice.[49] Classic democratic theory has long focused on several core features. According to political theorist Robert A. Dahl, “[d]emocracy provides opportunities for: 1. Effective participation[,] 2. Equality in voting[,] 3. Gaining enlightened understanding[,] 4. Exercising final control over the agenda[, and] 5. Inclusion of adults.”[50]

There are multiple conceptions of democracy and how people should participate in democratic governance.[51] Participatory democratic theory treats participation as an essential and constitutive feature of democracy.[52] As Carole Pateman describes it, participation not only produces governance decisions but also develops individuals’ capacities, helping to create the conditions necessary for democracy and making it self-reinforcing.[53]

Representative democratic theory, in contrast, emphasizes decision-making by representatives, who “do most of the real work” and are elected directly or indirectly by the people.[54] Under this conception, representatives, based on elections or on functional interests such as in the context of agencies, act on behalf of the people.[55] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin describes representative government as both controlled and responsible to those represented.[56] Dimitri Landa and Ryan Pevnick argue that regular elections promote social peace, while representatives’ independence between elections can improve both the quality of officeholders and their policy choices.[57]

Deliberative democratic theory, in turn, grounds democratic legitimacy in “the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of those subject to collective decisions.”[58]

Although these theories differ in what they regard as the foundation of democracy—participation, representation, or deliberation—they all rest on the idea that people should have a say in governance.[59] Yet many theories tend to assume an undifferentiated public—the people—which may obscure who participates and who does not and why.[60]

C. Feminism, Power, and Exclusion

Feminism helps fill this gap by directing attention to how women and other marginalized groups are positioned within democratic life. Although “feminism” has been defined in varied and changing ways,[61] this Article uses the term to indicate both an analytical approach that employs “gender as a central category of analysis” and a movement to challenge gender-based inequality and power imbalances.[62]

Power imbalances may be embedded in democracies themselves.[63] Critical democratic theories seek to expose how inequities hinder meaningful participation.[64] Nancy Fraser’s critique of the public sphere is particularly illuminating.[65] Fraser argues that critical theory should “render visible the ways in which social inequality taints deliberation within publics” and “how inequality affects relations among publics,” and “expose ways in which the labelling of some issues and interests as ‘private’ limits the range of problems, and of approaches to problems, that can be widely contested.”[66] Weak public spheres, in turn, can “denude[] ‘public opinion’ of practical force.”[67] In short, Fraser argues that power differentials fundamentally shape participation in and across public spheres.[68]

At the same time, in response to these “exclusionary norms,” Fraser emphasizes that “members of subordinated social groups,” including women, “have . . . found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics” thus “reducing, although not eliminating, the extent of . . . [their] disadvantage in official public spheres.”[69]

Feminist democratic theorists have also considered how social inequalities shape public participation. For example, Iris Marion Young argues that the conception of citizenship as expressing “a general will that transcends the particular differences of group affiliation” has led to the exclusion, oppression, and disadvantage of groups lacking privilege, and that to overcome these harms, difference must be recognized.[70] To remedy this, Young argues that democratic theory should account for “differentiated citizenship” and “a democratic public . . . should provide mechanisms for the effective representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged within it.”[71] Seyla Benhabib argues that the categorization of matters as public versus private in models of public space has “served to confine women, and typically female spheres of activity like housework, reproduction, nurturance, and care of the young, the sick, and the elderly to the ‘private’ domain” with the effect of legitimizing the oppression and exploitation of women.[72] Benhabib connects democratic theory to the women’s movement, which seeks to renegotiate the line between public and private, issues of justice, and matters of the good life by examining them “from the standpoint of their gender context and subtext.”[73] These critical approaches to democratic theory critique the idea that deliberation can be neutral.[74] In other words, formal inclusion in decision-making does not eliminate the impact of gendered social structures.[75] Even where women and other historically excluded groups participate and hold positions of authority, lawmaking processes are still shaped by norms, expectations, and inequalities that shape whose perspectives are given weight, what concerns are prioritized, and how conflicts are resolved.[76]

It is important to note that gender does not operate in isolation, and focusing on gender alone risks obscuring how gendered experiences are shaped by race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other social positions.[77] Intersectional feminism seeks to account for this by expanding feminism to consider how multiple forms of subordination intersect.[78] Thus, when examining democratic participation, gender should be analyzed along with other axes of subordination.

Ultimately, feminism and critical democratic theories may be mutually reinforcing. Democratic theories center on participation, while critical and intersectional approaches deepen that inquiry by examining how power relationships and axes of subordination shape who can meaningfully participate, who is excluded from the public sphere, and what is considered public or private.[79] To evaluate these dynamics, however, a normative framework is required. Flourishing, to which the next section turns, provides that framework by supplying an aim for democracy and feminism.

D. Flourishing as a Normative Standard

While the concept of human flourishing has varied across contexts and over time, at its heart it concerns human well-being.[80] This Article adopts Tyler J. VanderWeele and Tim Lomas’s definition of “flourishing” as “the relative attainment of a state in which all aspects of a person’s life are good including the contexts in which that person lives.”[81] VanderWeele identifies several domains that are central to flourishing, including (1) happiness and life satisfaction; (2) mental and physical health; (3) meaning and purpose; (4) character and virtue; (5) close social relationships; and (6) financial and material stability.[82] Of particular relevance here, flourishing includes health and extends beyond it.[83]

Although the definition of flourishing highlights the quality of an individual’s life, it recognizes that an individual cannot flourish unless “the contexts in which that person lives” support and sustain that flourishing.[84] Thus, flourishing must be understood not only at the individual level but also more broadly. Laws, institutions, and governance structures impact whether flourishing is possible by allocating resources, structuring risks, and determining whose needs, voices, and vulnerabilities are recognized and addressed.[85]

Viewed in this light, flourishing provides a lens through which to examine democracy both as a system of governance and a means of creating conditions that enable individuals and communities to flourish.[86] As discussed above, democratic theories often emphasize participation as a core component of legitimacy.[87] A focus on flourishing may reinforce the participation that is central to democracy. This is because flourishing, like democracy, can be understood as “an active pursuit” rather than a passive state.[88] Flourishing is shaped by cultural norms and relational structures “that involve[] choice-making and action, under conditions of constraint, over time.”[89]

Flourishing offers a normative aim for democracy that extends beyond participation: Democratic processes are valuable because they permit participation and because they provide a means to advance the flourishing of individuals and society more broadly.[90] This understanding is reflected in the Declaration of Independence, a foundational document of the United States.[91] The Declaration’s reference to the “pursuit of happiness” draws on eudaimonia, “[t]he Greek word for happiness,” which may be more accurately understood as “human flourishing.”[92] Similarly, Robert A. Dahl characterizes democratic process and political equality not as ends in and of themselves but rather as “an essential means to a just distribution of freedom and to fair opportunities for self-development.”[93] Accordingly, democracy may be normatively justified to the extent that it helps to create conditions conducive to human flourishing. And democratic participation can be understood as a means by which individuals seek to shape the conditions that impact their individual and communities’ well-being.[94]

Flourishing also can be understood as a central normative aim of feminism, which, when broadly conceived, includes the flourishing of women and society among its objectives.[95] Feminist scholarship has argued that formal equality and participation are insufficient if social, economic, and legal structures systematically undermine women’s ability to live healthy, meaningful, self-directed lives,[96] or, more succinctly, to flourish.[97] Feminism draws attention to how gendered divisions of labor, caregiving responsibilities, social and bodily vulnerability, and structural inequality impact who can participate in democracy and under what conditions.[98]

A feminist approach that centers on flourishing emphasizes how democratic institutions must be evaluated not only based on their formal inclusiveness but on whether they substantively support the well-being of women and other historically marginalized groups.[99] Thus, democracy and feminism converge around a shared concern with the conditions necessary for human flourishing.

A central critique of leading accounts of flourishing is that they often fail to address how inequities shape individual and collective well-being.[100] Critical democratic and feminist theory help address that critique by foregrounding questions about gender, power, structure, and inequality.[101] It is not enough to ask whether law promotes flourishing; we must also ask whose flourishing is being advanced—and whose isn’t—how flourishing is advanced, and at what cost. This inquiry highlights flourishing’s relational and interdependent dimensions, both for individuals and for society, and enriches our understanding of what it means to flourish.[102] Together, democracy, feminism, and flourishing reveal food law as a site of democracy that can be assessed based on whether it meaningfully promotes the well-being of people, including those from historically marginalized groups.[103]

E. Food (Law), Democracy, Feminism, and Human Flourishing

Having introduced democracy, feminism, and flourishing as complementary analytic frameworks, this Section explains why these approaches are particularly well-suited to examining food law. Food is essential to survival, health, and social participation, and food systems profoundly shape everyday life and human flourishing.[104] In the United States, FDA food law governs much of the food supply through regulatory frameworks that allocate risk, define safety, and structure access to information.[105] These laws are not merely technical. They reflect choices about legal structure, authority, risk, and responsibility, shaped by patterns of inclusion and exclusion in lawmaking, and they shape conditions relevant to human flourishing in everyday life.

1. Food Systems as Sites of Participation, Power, and Care

Scholars have emphasized the close relationship between food systems and democracy, giving rise to a growing body of work on “food democracy.”[106] Although definitions vary, food democracy is generally understood as a call for greater public participation, transparency, and collective control over the food systems that shape the social, economic, and physical environments in which people live.[107] From this perspective, food systems are sites of governance where questions about participation, power, and structure are central.

Food democracy scholarship has linked democratic participation in food systems to broader human values closely associated with flourishing, including the common good, well-being, and happiness.[108] For example, Neil Hamilton describes one aim of food democracy as restoring “the joy and pursuit of happiness in our relation with food,” emphasizing personal connection, community, and satisfaction alongside health and environmental values.[109] Other scholars similarly have described food democracy as oriented toward flourishing.[110] Importantly, these claims extend beyond local food systems to national food systems, including the federal laws that structure the conditions under which food is produced, distributed, and consumed.[111]

At the same time, scholars have noted that food democracy is an open and contested concept, including with respect to who constitutes “the public” and how participation is structured.[112] Calls for participation and democratic debate raise critical questions about inclusion, power, and institutional design, questions that are particularly important given longstanding patterns of exclusion within food governance. As Molly Anderson observes, food democracy’s promise depends on confronting disparities in who can participate meaningfully and whose voices are marginalized or absent.[113]

Although food may not appear, at first glance, to be a highly gendered product,[114] closer examination reveals that food consumption, labor, and responsibility are shaped by gendered norms and social roles.[115] Food choices and consumption, for example, often differ by sex and gender.[116] Meat—particularly red meat—is often associated with masculinity, whereas foods such as salads and fruit are more often associated with femininity.[117] These norms are reflected in consumption patterns: Men consume a higher proportion of red meat than women,[118] while “women reported greater . . . [fruit and vegetable intake] than men” and a “significantly larger proportion of women . . . than men . . . met” the recommended intake guidelines for these foods.[119]

Gendered divisions of labor are evident throughout the food system, from production to service.[120] Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics illustrate stark occupational divides. In 2022, only 25.4% of “[b]utchers and other meat, poultry, and fish processing workers” were women, while 63.6% of bakers were women.[121] Although a majority (53.3%) of people employed in “[f]ood preparation and serving related occupations” were women, only 26.9% of chefs and head cooks and 38.4% of cooks were women.[122] In contrast, women are overrepresented in service roles, comprising 64.2% of fast food and counter workers, 68.2% of waiters and waitresses, and 71.9% of non-restaurant food servers.[123]

Gendered responsibility for food extends into households. Responsibility for managing food-related labor within households continues to fall disproportionately on women.[124] For example, among U.S. households consisting of two married or cohabiting adults—regardless of whether they have children—women are more likely than men to report that they do most of the meal preparation and grocery shopping:[125] 80% of women with kids and 75% of women without kids report they are the usual meal prepper, while 80% of women with kids and 68% of women without kids say they are the usual grocery shopper.[126] These patterns underscore how food systems rely on gendered forms of labor and care. Taken together, these dynamics reveal food systems as sites where participation, power, and care intersect—raising critical questions about how law structures food systems.

2. Food Law and Flourishing

Food’s importance to human flourishing is closely connected to its role in shaping health, a “central component” of well-being.[127] As a basic human need, access to adequate food is a precursor to pursuing other dimensions of flourishing.[128] But food’s importance to flourishing extends beyond its role as sustenance. Food structures how people live, work, care for others, and participate in social and economic life,[129] making it constitutive of flourishing rather than merely instrumental to it.[130]

This understanding of flourishing is consistent with conceptions of public health that emphasize not only the prevention of disease but the creation of conditions in which people can be healthy. While there is no single static definition of public health, C.-E.A. Winslow has defined it as “[t]he science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting health.”[131] Public health aims to “fulfill[] society’s interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy.”[132] “Health” has been defined by the World Health Organization as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”[133] Together, these definitions underscore that public health is not only concerned with preventing harm but also with fostering the conditions for flourishing.

Food can promote health by providing nourishment and energy,[134] but it can also undermine it.[135] It can pose significant risks to health, for example, due to chemical, microbial, physical, or allergenic contamination,[136] or by increasing the risk of diseases such as heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and some cancers.[137] The dual possibilities of food—as nourishment and as risk—make food and its regulation central to public health and, by extension, flourishing.

At the same time, a wide range of factors determine health.[138] Determinants of health include “the social and economic environment,” “the physical environment,” and “the person’s individual characteristics and behaviours.”[139] Gender is an important social determinant of health. Of particular relevance to this Article, it structures how individuals interact with food systems and shapes the distribution of food-related risks and benefits.[140]

More broadly, food provides a clear example of how health determinants operate across interconnected domains. Food shapes the economic environment because the food industry is a significant source of employment in the United States. Food services, eating and drinking places, and food and beverage stores account for 7.6% of jobs.[141] Farms, fishing, and food and beverage manufacturing provide additional employment.[142] Food also has a tremendous impact on physical environments. It “shape[s] . . . the architecture of American houses, both in the functions of their spaces and in the physical and spatial forms that houses take.”[143] Food also impacts the natural environment: In the United States, over half of the total land area is used for agricultural purposes, and the agricultural sector is responsible for about 10.5% of greenhouse gas emissions,[144] emissions that drive global warming and climate change.[145] Globally, agriculture uses almost half of the habitable land, “[a]gricultural expansion drives almost 90 percent of global deforestation,” and “[a]grifood systems account for about one-third of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas . . . emissions.”[146] Food is therefore not simply a matter of individual choice or personal responsibility.[147] It is produced, processed, distributed, consumed, and disposed of within complex systems that are structured by law. Accordingly, because food systems structure shared conditions, food law helps constitute and allocate the background conditions for collective flourishing, not merely individual risk.[148]

Local, state, and federal food laws—including FDA food law—play an important role in shaping food systems and, in turn, the conditions for human flourishing.[149] For example, food law structures whether a carton of milk is discarded or shared, whether it becomes a vector for foodborne illness, the cause of an allergic reaction, or a safe and nourishing beverage, and whether it can be used in ways that support social connection and participation in everyday life.[150] By regulating safety standards, information disclosure, risk allocation, liability, and distribution practices, food law influences outcomes that directly impact human health, well-being, and flourishing.[151] Because food law shapes the conditions under which people eat, care for others, navigate risks, and participate in social and economic life, it provides a particularly fruitful site for analyzing how institutional design shapes democratic participation, gendered inclusion and exclusion, and the conditions for flourishing.

F. Asking About Women, Democracy, and Flourishing

This Article employs an integrated analytic lens that draws on feminist legal methods, democratic theory, and accounts of human flourishing to examine two critical points in the development of FDA food law. Taken together, these approaches direct attention to who participates in lawmaking, whose experiences and interests are reflected, how authority and responsibility are allocated, and how legal choices shape the conditions of everyday life.

A central component of this analysis is the feminist legal method often described as “asking the woman question.”[152] The method is feminist in that it uses “gender as a central category of analysis” and seeks “to challenge existing distributions of power” to promote “full equality between the sexes.”[153] As a method, asking the “woman question” “is designed to identify the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.”[154]

While often referred to as the “woman question,” it entails asking a series of related questions.[155] Katharine Bartlett identifies these as “[H]ave women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected?”[156] Ultimately, as a feminist legal method, “asking the woman question” aims to advance “the flourishing of women” and society more generally.[157] Scholars have asked variations of these questions about a range of legal contexts, including food and drug law.[158]

The “woman question” is not without limitations. Women’s experiences are shaped by multiple intersecting factors.[159] Treating women as a single, uniform category risks essentialism—the assumption that women share a common, unified set of characteristics or experiences—and may further exclude non-privileged women whose experiences cannot be fully understood without examining the impact of multiple identities.[160] Recognizing these concerns, feminist scholars have broadened the woman question to ask about bases of exclusion beyond gender.[161] Consistent with this broadening, this Article considers how race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and other factors, in the context of the food system and FDA food law, impact women. It recognizes, however, that even broadening the woman question to consider those other factors does not capture the complexity and diversity of women’s lived experiences and how FDA food law and policy shape them. At the same time, because food law structures systems that everyone must navigate, the consequences of these legal choices extend beyond women. Moreover, the category of “women” obscures the complexities of sex and gender.[162] Despite these limitations, asking the “woman question” remains useful for illuminating how gender and other axes of subordination shape law.

Democratic theory provides a second, complementary line of inquiry.[163] Drawing on the democratic theory discussed in Section II.B, this Article treats democratic participation as encompassing not only voting and representation but also meaningful opportunities to shape legislative agendas, define problems, and influence institutional design.[164] Food laws reflect congressional judgments about risk, responsibility, and the role of government in shaping food systems and diets. These judgments are not dictated by science alone;[165] they reflect normative choices that implicate democratic legitimacy, particularly where participation is limited or foreclosed.[166]

Finally, human flourishing provides a normative standard for evaluating institutional arrangements. Food law shapes the conditions for human flourishing by defining the aims, tools, and limits of regulation, and structuring food systems in ways that distribute risks, benefits, and burdens. For example, although FDA food law often focuses on issues of health and safety, it also impacts time, labor, economic security, caregiving responsibilities, and opportunities for social and political participation—dimensions of well-being that are rarely made explicit in statutes.[167] A flourishing-oriented inquiry asks whether food law promotes conditions under which individuals, families, and communities can eat well, care for others, and participate fully in social, economic, and democratic life.

Together, feminism, democracy, and flourishing provide an integrated lens for examining FDA food law and its creation. And it is to that undertaking that this Article now turns.

III. Laying the Foundation: FDA Food Law Through the Integrated Lens of Food Democracy, Feminism, and Flourishing

This Part asks the woman question about participation in the making of FDA food law. It asks who participated in the creation of two pivotal statutes in the development of FDA food law—the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938—and in what ways.[168] Because these statutes established foundational categories, priorities, and constraints, exclusions at the legislative stage may be especially consequential: choices embedded in statutory text structure the subsequent implementation and may be difficult to revise.

A. Applying the Integrated Lens to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906

This Section examines the Progressive Era roots of FDA food law through the enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, “the first national food and drug” statute.[169] It focuses on how gendered and racialized patterns of democratic participation shaped the creation of the 1906 Act. Viewed through the lens of democracy, feminism, and human flourishing, the history of the 1906 Act reveals the systematic exclusion of women and racial minorities from electoral and legislative authority even as women mobilized to support a food law that centered on food purity. These patterns matter not only for the democratic legitimacy of food law but also for its ability to promote flourishing. Because food law structures the conditions in which people eat, care for others, and maintain food safety and health, the exclusion of women and racial minorities from formal participation raises questions about whose flourishing early federal food law was designed to protect and promote. The 1906 Act and its enactment have continuing relevance; while the 1906 Act was repealed by the FDCA in 1938,[170] the FDCA was structured around key concepts found in the 1906 Act, including the adulteration and misbranding of food.[171]

The 1906 Act was enacted through an electoral and legislative process that excluded women and many racial and ethnic minorities and constrained which forms of knowledge were treated as authoritative. When the 1906 Act was signed into law, women lacked formal democratic power. They did not have the right to vote nationwide,[172] and no woman had ever served in the U.S. Congress.[173] Women who were also racial and ethnic minorities faced additional participatory barriers. While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution had been ratified,[174] African Americans’ ability to exercise the right to vote was another matter because Southern states systematically disenfranchised most Black voters following Reconstruction.[175] In addition, there were no African American members of Congress in either house in 1906.[176] There were also no Asian Pacific American, Hispanic American, or Native American senators, and the Asian Pacific American in the House was a delegate and the Hispanic American a resident commissioner.[177] Thus, when the 1906 Act was enacted, women and racial and ethnic minorities lacked formal democratic power. As a result, foundational decisions about the law were made without the electoral, representative, or deliberative participation of large segments of the population who were nonetheless impacted by food law.[178]

Women’s exclusion from formal authority extended beyond Congress to the federal institutions responsible for food regulation. Within the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and its Bureau of Chemistry,[179] women’s employment was largely confined to clerical and supporting roles,[180] while leadership, supervisory, and policymaking positions remained overwhelmingly occupied by men.[181] Although following the Meat Inspection Act of 1890, USDA did employ women as assistant microscopists to examine meat, those positions were subordinate technical positions.[182] This gendered division of labor systematically limited women’s influence.

Mary E. Pennington’s experience illustrates both women’s participation and its limits in the context of early federal food regulation. In 1905, Harvey W. Wiley added Pennington to the Bureau of Chemistry staff.[183] Two years after the passage of the 1906 Act, she became the first female chief of a lab when the Food Research Laboratory was established.[184] However, her selection was controversial, and Dr. Wiley “disguised the fact that she was female by submitting his hiring request” using her first and middle initials.[185] Furthermore, her designation as the Department’s representative at an international conference met opposition because she was a woman.[186] Pennington’s trajectory illustrates how women’s scientific expertise was recognized hesitantly and remained precarious within the male-dominated Bureau. Furthermore, her experience was exceptional rather than representative, highlighting the structural barriers facing women at the time.

The 1906 Act also represented a shift in food governance. As the federal government assumed responsibility for regulating food purity, it took on functions that had long been associated with women’s domestic, caregiving, and consumer roles and women’s “voluntary endeavor.”[187] Organizations such as the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the National Consumers’ League, and the Women’s Temperance League drew explicitly on gendered roles to justify women’s involvement in food reform and mobilize support for a pure food law.[188]

Women and women’s organizations played a significant role in advocating for the 1906 Act. As Lorine Swainston Goodwin documents, women “crusaders” vigorously “fought to secure and enforce” the 1906 Act.[189] Goodwin’s account documents how this participation occurred primarily through informal channels such as clubs, consumer leagues, and moral persuasion, and not through voting, representation, or formal authority.[190] Thus, women’s advocacy expanded civic engagement while democratic participation was still cabined by gendered boundaries. Dr. Wiley himself “organiz[ed] groups—particularly women’s groups—to support the legislation,”[191] and “credit[ed] the club women of the country for turning the tide of public opinion in favor of the ‘pure food’ bill.”[192] But it’s important to note that much of the support was through informal channels as a result of the exclusions mentioned earlier. And women’s organizations were not alone in supporting the Act; food manufacturers and others were important drivers of the legislation.[193]

Gendered limits on participation were further compounded by racial exclusion. Leading women’s reform organizations often reflected and supported prevailing racial, ethnic, and class hierarchies, limiting participation in ways that were often exclusionary and denying many women a seat at the table.[194] For example, “[m]ost early members of the General Federation [of Women’s Clubs] were white upper- to middle-class, married women who took a rather conservative approach to issues such as women’s rights and who had ‘limited sympathy’ for African American, working-class, and immigrant women.”[195] As a result, even the informal channels through which women exerted influence over food law were themselves exclusionary, further narrowing whose experiences and priorities shaped early federal food law.

At the heart of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was the concept of purity—a term that was used extensively by food manufacturers in the late nineteenth century but “remained vague.”[196] Food manufacturers used “purity” to “connote[] superiority without saying anything very definite.”[197] Wiley argued that chemical analysis could determine food’s purity, framing it as a matter of laboratory science.[198]

At the same time, purity carried significant moral and cultural weight. Reformers “attached a moral and spiritual quality to diet,”[199] linking purity with honesty and goodness, and contrasting it with adulteration, fraud, and vice.[200] This dual character made purity politically useful. As Clayton Anderson Coppin and Jack C. High explain, the term’s vagueness allowed it to accommodate competing interests while aligning scientific authority with moral reform.[201] This combination of moral resonance and conceptual flexibility enabled purity to function not only as a descriptive standard but also as a legitimating concept that helped justify federal food regulation.[202]

In the legislative debates surrounding the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, scientific expertise—overwhelmingly exercised by men—occupied a privileged position in the framing and justification of federal food law, while caregiving, consumer, and experiential knowledge—more commonly associated with women—was frequently marginalized or excluded from the institutional processes through which federal food law was debated and developed, even while playing an important role in the Act’s passage.[203] In 1897, Wiley, in his role as USDA Chemist, published a manual on the scientific analysis of agricultural products, which framed adulteration as a matter of chemistry and laboratory science.[204] In the years leading up to the Act’s passage, Wiley reinforced this framing through a series of official bulletins presenting scientific studies of foods and their adulterants.[205] Together, these official publications institutionalized expert knowledge as the authoritative basis for identifying and remedying food adulteration.

Women’s knowledge of food, by contrast, was largely outside of this framework of recognized expertise. Women, who lacked seats in Congress, could not participate in the floor debates, and women’s testimony at the hearings on food reform was rare.[206] One of the few moments in which women’s perspectives appeared explicitly in the hearing record came through the testimony of Dr. R. Kennedy Scobell, who spoke on behalf of a “vast host of housewives who have made observations and yet have had no chance to bring them before the attention of such lawmakers that could correct the existing evils, so full of menace to our families.”[207] Dr. Scobell’s testimony underscored that women’s everyday knowledge of food—gained through shopping and purchasing food—was understood as politically relevant only insofar as it could be translated into pleas to lawmakers or motivation for compliance.[208] Dr. Scobell testified that “[a]s housewives we feel the first and foremost work is to plead with the lawmakers to try to bring about in some way an improvement in the care of foods in store.”[209] Dr. Scobell’s statement concluded that “the grocers and people who handle food that obey the suggestions of the committee will have the hearty indorsement of the women generally.”[210] Apart from Scobell’s brief testimony,[211] women appear only sporadically in the hearing records. In one instance, a “lady bee keeper[]” testified regarding honey adulteration.[212] Her testimony was limited to responses to direct questions from a Senator, and largely consisted of endorsing the testimony of a preceding male witness, George W. York, the editor of the American Bee Journal, and very briefly answering questions about her beekeeping practices.[213] Thus, her appearance underscores how women’s participation was limited and did not disrupt the broader privileging of scientific and commercial expertise.[214]

Elsewhere in the hearing records, men referenced women. In these references, women appeared primarily as people to be protected or as people preparing food within households as subjects of instruction rather than as participants in governance.[215] Men, by contrast, testified repeatedly in their capacities as scientists, physicians, and representatives of industry.[216] Where gender-neutral terms such as “consumers” were used, they often obscured the fact that the relevant domain was widely understood to be women’s responsibility, even as it remained largely governed by male expertise.[217]

Thus, the legislative record reveals a persistent divide between authoritative knowledge and its application in everyday life. Scientific expertise was elevated as the basis for federal action, while the experiential and observational knowledge of those most directly responsible for household food was largely omitted. This shaped who could participate meaningfully in the creation of early federal food law and foreshadowed enduring patterns of gendered exclusion in food law.

B. Applying the Integrated Lens to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938

When Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938,[218] it did so through democratic institutions that nevertheless excluded many Americans from meaningful participation. Nearly two decades after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, which formally enfranchised women,[219] women remained largely absent from the sites of legislative agenda setting and committee oversight that structured federal food law reform.[220] Racial and ethnic minorities were even more starkly excluded through a combination of formal disenfranchisement and severe congressional underrepresentation.[221] Women and women’s organizations actively participated in the public debate over food and drug law reform, yet that participation was largely confined to roles—e.g., witnesses, advocates, and educators—that legitimized reform rather than controlled its substantive contours.[222] Control over agenda setting, allocation of responsibility, and design remained concentrated in the hands of White male lawmakers and administrators.[223]

Women’s representation in Congress was extremely limited. There was only one woman in the Senate and five women in the House of Representatives.[224] As a result, the extent to which women participated by sponsoring or voting on bills, serving on committees, and representing constituents was limited. Although the sole female Senator and two of the women in the House chaired committees, substantive food law reform was not within the bailiwick of any of those committees.[225] Senator Caraway did serve as chair of the Committee on Enrolled Bills, the committee that presented the President the enrolled bills, which would become the FDCA; however, this role was largely procedural.[226] These institutional constraints shaped the terms on which women members of Congress participated in food law reform: They appeared in hearings and debates, but as 6 out of 531 lawmakers with voting power,[227] they largely operated at the margins of legislative decision-making rather than at its core.[228]

Racial and ethnic minorities were even more starkly excluded from formal lawmaking authority. Despite the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,[229] African Americans continued to be disenfranchised in the 1930s.[230] In addition, racial and ethnic minorities remained largely absent from Congress. In June 1938, there was only one African American member of the House of Representatives and no African American senators.[231] There was only one Hispanic American Senator[232] and one Hispanic American member of the House; the only additional Hispanic American representative served as a nonvoting Resident Commissioner.[233] No American Indian, Asian American, Pacific Islander, or Native American Senators served in Congress,[234] and the three Asian and Pacific Islander Representatives were Resident Commissioners or a Delegate who lacked voting authority and thus did not participate in formal lawmaking.[235] The absence of women—and racial and ethnic minorities—from Congress shaped the debate over food law reform both in terms of who participated and how.

Exclusion from formal legislative and regulatory authority did not eliminate women’s participation in food law reform; instead, it redirected that participation into nondecisional roles largely outside formal lawmaking mechanisms. Information about the role of women at FDA in 1938 is limited, but in 1938 women comprised approximately 19.5% of civil service employees, with over half (55.6%) of the women being in clerical positions, and just 7.9% being in semitechnical, semiscientific, and semiprofessional occupation groups, and 4.2% in technical, scientific, and professional occupational groups.[236] This occupational segregation constrained women’s influence over scientific and risk-assessment judgments such as those that structured food law’s substance.[237]

Many of the key architects of the food and drug law reform at FDA were men. For example, lawyer and administrator Walter G. Campbell has been credited with “direct[ing] the strategy in the five year campaign” that ultimately led to the passage of the 1938 Act, and chemist Charles Crawford has been described as “FDA’s principal representative with the members of Congress and legislative advisers who drafted the 1938 [Act].”[238] Senator Royal S. Copeland sponsored the bill that would become the 1938 Act.[239]

Women’s labor, in contrast, was instrumental yet derivative—mobilizing public support for a reform agenda controlled by men. One of FDA’s most visible women employees in the period leading up to the passage of the 1938 Act was Ruth deForest Lamb, whose role at FDA largely focused on public education as opposed to scientific research or administrative leadership.[240] With a background in food, drug, and cosmetic advertising, Lamb, as FDA’s first (and only) Chief Educational Officer, helped draw attention to the problems of food and drug law.[241] Lamb is well-known for her book, American Chamber of Horrors.[242] The book, written while Lamb was on a leave of absence,[243] “was designed primarily to enlist the support of women’s groups in the effort to pass a new food and drug statute,” and was based on an exhibit of controversial products.[244]

First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s participation also illustrates how women’s influence over food law operated through informal legitimacy-building rather than institutional authority.[245] First Lady Roosevelt helped to publicize the exhibit on which Lamb’s book was eventually based, touring the exhibit with a reporter who “dubbed it ‘an American chamber of horrors’” and showing it to a group of congressional wives.[246] Her role was unelected, unpaid, and “largely governed by gender norms,” and while she helped reshape the position of First Lady, the role remained outside of formal legal channels.[247] Thus, her involvement with food and drug law reform is another example of women working outside formal mechanisms.

Women’s exclusion from formal legislative and regulatory authority structured their participation as supportive and legitimating, while male lawmakers and administrators retained control of agenda setting and statutory design.[248]

While women’s formal roles in shaping the 1938 Act were limited, women and women’s organizations were instrumental in its passage, serving as advocates and educators.[249] Women testified at congressional hearings,[250] wrote letters, advocated and lobbied for reform,[251] and educated consumers.[252] For example, a written statement of Congresswoman O’Day indicates that “[e]ach Member of the House” received a communication from representatives of fourteen national organizations, including the National League of Women Voters and the National Consumers’ League, opposing a judicial review provision they thought “would prevent quick and effective action against dangerous and fraudulent products.”[253]

The legislative record simultaneously acknowledges women’s expertise in food practices and the impact of food law on women, while denying them authority over food law itself. That women had expertise relevant to food practices and were deeply impacted by food and drug law was acknowledged in the legislative record. For example, FDA Chief Campbell is quoted as stating,

You have indicated there, Senator, the difficulty of explaining the significance of the requirements of this bill to a committee of men. Unfortunately Senator Caraway is not here. She would appreciate it at once. . . . [T]he housewife understands that the preserves or jams are made from the use of a pound of fruit and a pound of sugar, approximately that, properly cooked to a certain consistency.[254]

This reflects a recognition, at least implicitly, of the fact that men were legislating in an area that was traditionally viewed as women’s domain.[255] In addition, legislation was described as providing information and protection to women as consumers, including women in caregiving roles.[256] And women’s organizations viewed reform as being in their interest.[257]

Women’s exclusion from formal legislative and regulatory authority did not render them absent from the debate over food law reform; rather, it structured their participation in ways that were largely supportive, derivative, and nondecisional.[258] This gendered allocation of participation shaped the process through which the FDCA was enacted.[259] The resulting statute focused on adulteration, misbranding, and post-market enforcement rather than on the broader social contexts in which food is produced, distributed, and consumed[260]—contexts in which women shouldered responsibility and provided labor.[261] In this sense, the FDCA emerged from a democratic process that acknowledged women’s centrality to food practices while denying them authority over food law. When those impacted by laws are excluded from agenda setting and design, the law may succeed in preventing some harms while still falling short in promoting conditions under which individuals, families, and communities can eat well, care for others, and fully participate in life domains—i.e., flourish.[262]

As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the foundations of FDA food law are not neutral. Rather, they are deeply shaped by the gendered political, institutional, and social contexts in which the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 were conceived, debated, and enacted.[263] Women and women’s organizations played visible and often influential roles in the movements that culminated in these statutes.[264] Yet even as women gained formal democratic rights in the period between the two Acts—including suffrage and limited congressional representation—their participation in food and drug lawmaking remained largely circumscribed.[265] Women were positioned primarily as advocates and educators whose contributions helped legitimate reform but rarely extended to control.[266]

IV. Rethinking FDA Food Law

This Part considers what it would mean to rethink food law through a lens attentive to human flourishing, gender, and democratic participation.

A. Beyond Health and Safety: Food Law as Flourishing

Using flourishing to examine food law exposes the distributional consequences that narrower food law frameworks focused on safety and health outcomes may systematically overlook.[267] Flourishing should not replace safety and health as aims of food law but rather serve as a complementary normative lens. It is broad enough to encompass traditional understandings of “safety” and “health,” but it can also bring into focus the ways in which food law shapes lived experiences—time and labor, stress and security, dignity and vulnerability, access and exclusion, and the capacity to care for oneself and others.[268]

The 2022 infant formula shortage illustrates what a flourishing-oriented analysis reveals and what safety and nutrition frameworks may miss.

Infant formula is a regulated food subject to stringent safety and nutrition requirements,[269] and the recall and temporary cessation of production at a major manufacturing facility reflected safety concerns.[270] The resulting shortage exposed how a regulatory system oriented primarily toward food safety and nutrition can fail to secure the conditions necessary for flourishing when access breaks down.[271] For many infants, formula is their “sole source of nutrition,”[272] and the shortage had negative impacts on infants.[273]

A flourishing lens does not deny the importance of safety and nutrition, but it reveals the limits of evaluating food law solely by reference to illness prevention and nutritional composition. In this way, flourishing helps frame food law not only as a system for preventing harm but also as one that structures the conditions under which people are able—or unable—to live well.

B. Food Law Through a Feminist Lens

Using feminist legal methods to examine food law highlights how food law structures gendered experiences of responsibility and care. Asking “the woman question” about FDA food law directs attention to whether the law takes women’s lived realities into account, and when it does not, how those omissions shape the distribution of burdens and benefits in ways that matter for human flourishing.[274]

Revisiting the 2022 infant formula shortage illustrates the benefits of this approach. A feminist lens reveals that the shortage did not just impact infants; it imposed significant and gendered burdens on caregivers, particularly mothers, who bore responsibility for locating scarce formula, managing uncertainty, and absorbing the emotional costs of regulatory failure.[275] The shortage “adversely impacted mothers’ mental and emotional health; and, navigating the situation had significant and unanticipated financial, physical, emotional, and lifestyle-related (e.g., time) costs.”[276] These impacts flowed from a legal and regulatory framework that focuses on safety and nutrition while assuming essential food products will be available.[277] And when the system failed, it relied on caregivers to manage the disruption.[278]

A feminist lens does not deny the importance of food law to human flourishing generally. Instead, it shows how food law interacts with gendered care work that often remains largely invisible in FDA food law. A flourishing lens underscores why food law must be evaluated using broader concepts of well-being. A feminist lens complements this analysis by underscoring how laws structure the conditions that impact women and other marginalized groups’ well-being.

C. Food Law, Democratic Legitimacy, and the Public/Private Divide

Using feminist legal methods to examine food law also highlights the limits of women’s participation in the creation of food law. The earlier examination of women’s participation in the creation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 shows a pattern of constrained participation even as the Acts established regulatory frameworks governing food domains long associated with women’s labor, expertise, and responsibility.[279] The exclusion of women from meaningful lawmaking authority in the public sphere thus coincided with the creation of legal frameworks that structured food safety, responsibility, risk, and information without fully incorporating the perspectives of those directly engaged in food work in the private sphere.[280]

D. Food Law as a Structural Determinant of Health

Viewed through the lens of feminism, democracy, and human flourishing, it becomes clear that FDA food law is a structural determinant of health.[281] It structures labor, vigilance, risk, responsibility, and care in ways that shape the ability of people to live well.[282]

Recognizing food law as a determinant of health has important implications. A regulatory system may succeed in reducing foodborne illness or improving nutritional information while undermining flourishing by intensifying care work, increasing stress or insecurity, or excluding those impacted by food law from meaningful participation in its creation. These dynamics reveal the limits of a purely technocratic regulatory framework, which, even when attentive to population-level outcomes,[283] tends to evaluate food law through the management of measurable risks (e.g., food safety), rather than how it structures shared conditions of health, care, and participation.[284]

Accordingly, this Article argues for a broader evaluative framework for food law—one in which health, safety, and nutrition are necessary, but not sufficient, and that accounts for how law structures lived experience, care, and democratic participation.[285] Such a framework better captures the role of FDA food law in promoting—or constraining—the conditions individuals, families, and communities need to flourish. It is against this backdrop that disclosure-based interventions such as Nutrition Facts labeling must be evaluated.

E. FDA Nutrition Facts Labeling as an Example

The Nutrition Facts labeling requirements provide a clear example of how food law operates as a structural determinant of health, with possible gendered implications for both flourishing and democratic participation. Although Congress substantially expanded nutrition labeling requirements through later amendments to the FDCA, most notably through the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA),[286] those amendments built on a legal framework embedded in the 1938 Act’s misbranding provisions, which focused on the disclosure of information.[287] Nutrition labeling, therefore, illustrates how foundational features of FDA food law continue to shape everyday life and, accordingly, the conditions for human flourishing.[288]

Federal food law relies heavily on information disclosure to promote healthier diets.[289] Under the FDCA, as amended, the failure to provide required nutrition information renders a food misbranded, and therefore unlawful under the Act.[290] Underlying these disclosure requirements is the premise that informed consumers will make better dietary choices.[291] But they do more than inform. By structuring regulation around the provision of nutritional information, the law assigns substantial responsibility for nutritional health and health management to individuals and households.[292] This allocation reflects a form of healthism: it frames health as a matter of individual choice, self-discipline, and moral responsibility rather than as a function of structural conditions.[293] Viewed in this way, FDA’s informational regulation does not merely encourage healthier consumption; it organizes responsibility in ways that obscure care burdens, mask inequities, and undermine the conditions necessary for flourishing. By framing health as an individual obligation, healthism makes structural constraints harder to see and, as a result, less susceptible to regulatory intervention.[294]

The disclosure model also presumes that consumers, once equipped with standardized nutrition information, will make choices that promote their own health and well-being.[295] Yet, as Andrea Freeman has argued, nudging and information-based interventions systemically overestimate the capacity of individuals to translate information into action, particularly under conditions of time scarcity, economic constraint, and entrenched consumption patterns.[296]

The preambles to FDA’s nutrition label regulations make the individualistic healthism logic explicit. In the preamble to the original Nutrition Facts label regulations, FDA stated that providing “more informative labeling in an improved format” would reduce consumer “uncertainty and ignorance” and lead some consumers to “select more nutritious, healthier foods.”[297] When FDA updated the Nutrition Facts label regulations in 2016, it emphasized that the changes were intended to reflect scientific data and to make labels easier to understand in order “to help consumers maintain healthy dietary practices” and “make more informed choices to consume a healthy diet.”[298] These regulatory statements underscore the extent to which FDA’s approach both presumes and seeks to cultivate individual responsibility for dietary health.

In the process of revising its regulations, FDA considered the costs and benefits of the final rules.[299] FDA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) focuses on the costs of the final rules to manufacturers, specifically the costs of labeling, reformulating foods, and keeping records.[300] By contrast, the RIA conceptualizes the benefits of the rules as their ability to “help consumers maintain healthy dietary practices.”[301] The RIA frames the Nutrition Facts label as providing possible relief from information failure to the extent that consumers lack access to nutrition information, and increasing both consumer knowledge of packaged foods’ nutrition content and ease of nutrition label use.[302]

While improving dietary choices and health outcomes is an important aim of food law, focusing on these outcomes risks obscuring the costs. Reading, interpreting, and acting on nutrition information requires time, attention, literacy, and nutritional knowledge.[303] It also entails follow-up labor, such as planning meals, comparing products, purchasing higher nutrition foods, and modifying household consumption practices.[304] These costs are not trivial, nor are they evenly distributed.

Indeed, in the RIA for the final revised nutrition facts label rule, FDA bases its analysis on a 2011 study of the effects of the NLEA by economist Jason Abaluck, a study whose data set “contains only women of 19 to 50 years of age who are the main meal planner in their household.”[305] In the study, Abaluck measured gains to consumer welfare from additional information about food’s nutrition using consumers’ willingness-to-pay for nutrient content based on revealed preference data on food consumption and prices.[306] FDA “illustrate[s] the benefits from the final rules for women only,” and then extrapolates the “benefits for the total U.S. population.”[307] This modeling choice implicitly treats women’s food-related labor as representative and generalizable.

The RIA gives minimal attention to the costs imposed on consumers.[308] However, FDA did recognize the possibility for the loss of utility (e.g., enjoyment) as well as that “healthy food may require greater preparation time than unhealthy food, in which case there would be a time cost attributable to the final rules.”[309] FDA also noted in passing that “[g]iven that consumers have limited time, attention, and resources for seeking out new information, the Nutrition Facts label attempts to convey relevant nutrition information to better inform choices at the point of purchase,” but again does not explore these costs in depth.[310]

As discussed above, women disproportionately perform food-related household labor, including grocery shopping and meal preparation.[311] The work of engaging with nutrition facts labels is embedded within these broader responsibilities. Empirical evidence suggests that this labor is, in fact, gendered. Although Nutrition Facts label use is widespread, survey data show significant disparities in regular label use,[312] with women significantly more likely than men to report regular use.[313] Thus, nutrition labeling law appears to generate gendered work—work that is woven into everyday life and disproportionately borne by women. Consumers may opt out of this work by ignoring nutrition facts labels, but doing so entails forgoing information that the law frames as important to health.[314]

Even when nutrition labeling succeeds in improving dietary choices,[315] it may do so at the expense of other dimensions of flourishing. Cognitive labor matters.[316] Research shows that cognitive labor—“anticipating needs,” “identifying options for meeting those needs,” “deciding among the options,” and “monitoring the results”—is itself unequally distributed.[317] For example, in a study of household labor, Allison Daminger found that women “carry a heavier cognitive load than their male partners.”[318] Food laws, such as nutrition facts labeling requirements, may contribute to imbalance by increasing the volume and complexity of decisions consumers are expected to manage.[319] Households thus become sites in which regulatory labor is performed. The responsibility for managing household and food-related needs is associated with increased stress, time stress, and diminished well-being.[320]

These unequal burdens have implications beyond individual well-being. Research suggests that cognitive and mental load “crowds out energy and mental space for political engagement.”[321] Ana Catalano Weeks found that “gender gaps in the mental load among parents are large” and that “mothers, who bear more mental load, experience more negative impacts on political engagement, especially on general issues that seem distant from family life.”[322] To the extent that food law reallocates regulatory responsibility into the private sphere, it may indirectly shape patterns of democratic participation. Nutrition labeling reveals how a regulatory system organized around disclosure can redistribute responsibility in ways that are formally neutral and yet substantively unequal.

This Article does not argue that efforts to improve dietary choices through nutrition labeling should be abandoned. The foods “people consume have a profound impact on their health” and public welfare.[323] Rather, this example illustrates the need to evaluate food law not only in terms of health and safety outcomes but also in terms of flourishing and democratic inclusion. Given the exclusionary context in which foundational food laws were enacted, attention to how contemporary regulatory strategies distribute responsibility, labor, and cognitive burden is essential to assessing whether food law promotes flourishing—or quietly perpetuates inequality.

V. Conclusion

Viewed through the integrated lens of democracy, feminism, and human flourishing, FDA food law emerges as a legal regime that both reflects and reproduces existing inequalities, including inequalities in democratic participation. Produced through exclusionary lawmaking processes, the regulatory framework allocates food-related responsibilities and burdens in ways that structure not only health outcomes but also the conditions under which individuals and communities can participate in food governance and flourish. Rethinking food law therefore requires attention not only to what the law regulates but also how it is made, how it distributes authority and responsibility, and how those distributions condition the possibilities for human flourishing. More broadly, this analytic approach offers a way to interrogate other regulatory frameworks designed to promote public health.


  1. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (Prohibited Acts); FDCA § 402, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (Adulterated Food); FDCA § 403, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (Misbranded Food).

  2. What We Do, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 21, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/6V8L-R9XR\] (“FDA Mission”); see also Margaret A. Hamburg & Joshua M. Sharfstein, The FDA as a Public Health Agency, 360 N. Eng. J. Med. 2493, 2493 (2009) (FDA Commissioner Margaret A. Hamburg and FDA Principal Deputy Commissioner Joshua M. Sharfstein describing FDA “[a]s a Public Health Agency”). See generally FDCA § 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (stating FDA’s mission is to “promote the public health” and “protect the public health”).

  3. Inst. of Med., Div. of Health Care Servs., Comm. for the Study of the Future of Pub. Health, The Future of Public Health 35, 40, 53 (1988).

  4. See What We Do, supra note 2.

  5. See Sarah Berger Richardson, Is Safe Food Good Food? Looking Beyond Safety to Regulate Good Food Systems 27 (Dec. 2019) (Dr. of Civ. Law thesis, McGill University) (on file with Houston Law Review) (footnote omitted) (arguing that “[c]ontemporary food safety regulations’ careful grounding in the scientific discourse of risk assessments and mechanical objectivity . . . obscures the deeply political and moral dimensions of food law and policy, including whose voices are heard at the policy table and how we decide what constitutes good food”); see also id. at 109–12 (examining the regulation of risk in the context of meat inspection requirements); id. at 28–30 (describing technocratic governance).

  6. See, e.g., Will Hueston & Anni McLeod, Overview of the Global Food System: Changes over Time/Space and Lessons for Future Food Safety, in Improving Food Safety Through a One Health Approach: Workshop Summary 189, 191–92 (2012); FDA Provides Update on Proposal for Unified Human Foods Program, Including New Model for the Office of Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (June 27, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-provides-update-proposal-unified-human-foods-program-including-new-model-office-regulatory [https://perma.cc/MY7K-WUMR\].

  7. See generally Peter Barton Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law (5th ed. 2022) (collecting cases and materials illustrating recurring disputes over contested questions involving scientific uncertainty, regulatory authority, responsibility, and the proper scope of public health regulation); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century: Part I: Law as a Tool to Advance the Community’s Health, 283 JAMA 2837, 2837–38, 2840–41 (2000) (defining “[p]ublic health law” as “the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . and the limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of individuals for the protection or promotion of community health”).

  8. Flourishing, as used in this Article, encompasses human well-being and the conditions that make such well-being possible. See, e.g., Tyler J. VanderWeele & Tim Lomas, Terminology and the Well-Being Literature, 4 Affective Sci. 36, 37–38 (2022), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10104989/pdf/42761_2022_Article_153.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC4U-A8SX\]; see also infra Section II.D (discussing how flourishing has been defined).

  9. While legal scholars have used feminist theory to critique food law and other areas of food and drug law, examinations of how FDA food law and policy impact and may harm women are limited. See, e.g., Mathilde Cohen, Should Human Milk Be Regulated?, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 557, 561–63 (2019) (examining the regulation of human milk); Amanda L. Allen, A Plan C for Plan B: A Feminist Legal Response to the Ways in Which Behind-the-Counter Emergency Contraception Fails Women, 11 CUNY L. Rev. 401, 411–14 (2008) (discussing how access to emergency contraception impacts women’s ability to exercise their reproductive rights); Marie Boyd, Gender, Race & the Inadequate Regulation of Cosmetics, 30 Yale J.L. & Feminism 275, 282, 289, 293, 307–20 (2018) (examining federal cosmetics law and regulations from a feminist perspective); Christina Cole, Women and the FDA: Remedying the Past and Preserving the Future, Hou. J. Health L. & Pol’y 127, 129–35 (2007) (examining sex-based disparities in drug development and clinical studies); Ruth B. Merkatz, Women in Clinical Trials: An Introduction, 48 Food & Drug L.J. 161, 163–65 (1993) (discussing the role of women in clinical trials); Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and Women’s Health Care, 32 Hou. L. Rev. 1201, 1206–10 (1996) (discussing the impact of gender gaps in clinical research on women); Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 973, 982 (1993) (critiquing FDA’s regulation of silicone gel breast implants); Colleen Campbell, Intersectionality Matters in Food and Drug Law, 95 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 26–28 (2024) (discussing the regulation of skin lightening cosmetic products and its impact on women). For an examination of how United States Department of Agriculture food law and policy impacts women, see, for example, Andrea Freeman, Skimmed: Breastfeeding, Race, and Injustice 4–5, 56, 119 (2020).

  10. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).

  11. See FDCA § 403(q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2025).

  12. See Jane E. Henney, Science as the Basis for Food Safety Policy: Good Science: Critical to Regulatory Decision-Making, in Food Safety Policy, Science, and Risk Assessment: Strengthening the Connection: Workshop Proceedings 3, 4 (2001), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK223247/ [https://perma.cc/ZL2L-F6A9\] (“The impact of science on food safety policy in the past has been substantial . . . .”).

  13. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1618–19 (1995); see also Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policy Makers 165 (1990) (examining the role of experts in American administrative process, including at FDA).

  14. See, e.g., Renée Johnson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS22600, The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer 2 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/RS22600/RS22600.52.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6CS-EGDC\]. Unlike the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), whose food-related responsibilities are more narrowly tailored to meat, poultry, and certain egg products, and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, whose responsibilities focus on alcohol, FDA is the primary federal regulator for most foods that people purchase, prepare, and consume. See FDCA § 1003, 21 U.S.C. § 393; Public Health Service Act § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 264; Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695; Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–473; Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–1056; Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–219a; Formal Agreement Between USDA and FDA Relative to Cooperation and Coordination, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/international-interagency-coordination/formal-agreement-between-usda-and-fda-relative-cooperation-and-coordination [https://perma.cc/4PUR-5YGJ\]. Although states and localities also play an important role in regulating food, FDA’s reach extends to states and localities. See, e.g., Laurie J. Beyranevand & Diana Winters, Retooling American Foodralism, 44 Am. J.L. & Med. 489, 495 (2018) (describing FDA’s authority under the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) and noting “collaboration among different agencies [including FDA] at varying levels of government”); Federal/State Integration and the FSMA, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/federalstate-integration-and-fsma [https://perma.cc/SU44-CVNC\]; Neal D. Fortin, Introduction to Food Regulation in the United States, in Food Regulation: Law, Science, Policy, and Practice 3, 7–9 (2d ed. 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885866 [https://perma.cc/PNW5-RKY9\] (discussing federalism and noting that “cooperative and educational efforts,” such as those between states and FDA “have been an important part of the legal landscape in food law”); Office of Integrated Food Safety System Partnerships, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 2, 2024), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/human-foods-program/office-integrated-food-safety-system-partnerships [https://perma.cc/RJ7A-YR6F\] (stating that the Office “[l]ead[s FDA’s] Human Foods Program (HFP) efforts in developing, establishing, and maintaining cooperative relationships of an Integrated Food Safety System (IFSS) among domestic and some international regulatory agencies, public health agencies and other external stakeholders to advance FDA HFP public health goals and objectives . . . .”); P’ship for Food Prot., Partnership for Food Protection (PFP) Strategic Plan, 2021 Through 2026, at 2–3 (2024), https://www.pfp-ifss.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Final-PFP-Strategic-Plan-2021-2026.pdf [https://perma.cc/J89L-MPVL\] (describing the PFP as a “structure used to coordinate representatives from . . . institutions with expertise in food . . . and public health to develop and implement an Integrated Food Safety System,” including federal agencies, local governments, state governments, U.S. Territories, and Tribal Nations). FDA’s reach also extends beyond the United States. See, e.g., FDA Globalization, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/fda-globalization [https://perma.cc/EH38-83GP\].

  15. FDA at a Glance, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 2026), https://www.fda.gov/media/154548/download [https://perma.cc/935H-PKYD\]. FDA regulates foods except for “some meat, poultry, and egg products.” What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 29, 2024), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do/what-does-fda-regulate [https://perma.cc/QCN4-XFF6\].

  16. FDCA §§ 403, 403A, 1003, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343, 343-1, 393; see Gostin, supra note 7, at 2838.

  17. See What We Do, supra note 2.

  18. Id.

  19. Id.

  20. See FDCA § 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (stating FDA’s mission is to “promote the public health” and “protect the public health”); FDCA § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (discussing what acts are prohibited under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act including the “manufacture . . . of any food . . . that is adulterated or misbranded”); FDCA §§ 401–403, 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–343 (authorizing standards for food and defining what adulterated and misbranding are for foods); FDCA § 418, 21 U.S.C. § 350g (discussing “[h]azard analysis and risk-based preventive controls” for food).

  21. See FDA at a Glance, supra note 15; What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 15.

  22. See infra Part IV.

  23. See infra Part IV.

  24. See M Focker & HJ van der Fels-Klerx, Economics Applied to Food Safety, 36 Curr. Opin. Food Sci. 18, 18–19, 21–23 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214799320301089 [https://perma.cc/5YGW-7ZYF\].

  25. See generally FDCA §§ 301, 401–403, 418, 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 341–343, 350g, 393(b) (setting forth prohibited acts; defining adulterated food and misbranded food; authorizing food standards; and setting forth FDA’s mission); FDCA §§ 201(s), 409, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348 (defining “food additive” and setting forth requirements for food additives); FDCA § 415, 21 U.S.C. § 350d (providing for the registration of food facilities); FDCA § 801, 21 U.S.C. § 381 (governing the importation and exportation of foods).

  26. See Richardson, supra note 5, at 27–28.

  27. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Food Labeling: Front-of-Package Nutrition Information, No. FDA-2024-N-2910, at 10 (2024), https://www.fda.gov/media/185202/download [https://perma.cc/5W6C-SD8W\] (stating that FDA food law and policy structure the conditions under which people decide what food “to buy, use, or eat”); FDA Finalizes Guidance to Help Food Establishments Meet Menu Labeling Requirements, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (May 7, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-finalizes-guidance-help-food-establishments-meet-menu-labeling-requirements [https://perma.cc/Q2YF-XMJ5\] (stating the Nutrition Innovation Strategy is aimed at “providing consumers with easier access to nutritious, affordable foods”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights [https://perma.cc/7JKP-3UEJ\]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999), https://docs.un.org/en/E/C.12/1999/5 [https://perma.cc/WT23-TFCG\].

  28. See infra Part III.

  29. See generally Johnson, supra note 14 (explaining that, although food-safety authority is divided among numerous agencies, FDA has primary responsibility for approximately 80%–90% of U.S. domestic and imported foods).

  30. FDCA § 201(f), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f).

  31. See FDCA §§ 201(f), 1003(b)(2)(A), (d)(2), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 393(b)(2)(A), (d)(2) (defining “food” broadly and charging FDA with executing the FDCA and “ensuring that . . . foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled”); see also FDCA §§ 301, 402–403, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 342–343 (setting out prohibited acts and defining adulterated and misbranded food).

  32. FDCA § 201(f), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f). “Food” also includes “articles used for components of any such article” and “chewing gum.” Id.

  33. Id.

  34. Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1983).

  35. For example, people may drink caffeinated drinks to increase their mental alertness or imbibe alcoholic drinks to relax and connect with others. See Beth Johnston, Caffeine (NoDoz, Vivarin, and Others) - Uses, Side Effects, and More, WebMD (June 2, 2025), https://www.webmd.com/drugs/caffeine-nodoz-vivarin [https://perma.cc/5X9J-5EJW\]; Nak-Eon Choi & Jung H. Han, How Flavor Works: The Science of Taste & Aroma 40 (2014) (stating that “caffeine can be identified as the most important factor for the preference of coffee”); Margaret Visser, The Rituals of Dinner: The Origins, Evolution, Eccentricities, and Meaning of Table Manners 121 (1991) (discussing drinking as a tradition and a “symbol and creator of solidarity”).

  36. Schweiker, 713 F.2d at 337 (stating that the definition of “food” “is clearly intended to be broader than the common-sense definition of food”); FDCA § 201(s), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (defining “food additive” as “substance[s] the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in [their] becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food,” with several important exceptions); FDCA § 201(ff), 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (defining “dietary supplement” as “a product . . . intended to supplement the diet” to include products containing vitamins, minerals, herbs or other botanicals, or amino acids, where such products are intended for ingestion in tablet, capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap, or liquid form and are “not represented for use as a conventional food or as a sole item of a meal or of the diet”); see also FDCA § 411(c), 21 U.S.C. § 350(c) (defining “[v]itamins” as “a food for special dietary use . . . which is or contains any natural or synthetic vitamin or mineral, and . . . is intended for ingestion in tablet, capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap, or liquid form, or . . . is not represented for use as a sole item of a meal or of the diet”).

  37. FDCA § 201(f), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f); Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs, and Droods: A Historical Consideration of Definitions and Categories in American Food and Drug Law, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1091, 1132 (2008); see also Visser, supra note 35, at ix (“[W]e turn the consumption of food, a biological necessity, into a carefully cultured phenomenon. We use eating as a medium for social relationships: . . . a means of creating community.”). For example, not everything edible is eaten. In the United States and other Western countries, insects are not commonly thought of as food, although many insects are edible. Marie Boyd, Cricket Soup: A Critical Examination of the Regulation of Insects as Food, 36 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 17, 19–20 (2017) [hereinafter Boyd, Cricket Soup]. In contrast, in other places, insects are considered food, and even delicacies. Id. at 26. In addition, understanding of what constitutes food may evolve over time. Id. at 38 n.119 (discussing the acceptance of sushi in the United States).

  38. See FDCA §§ 201(f), 301, 1003(d)(2), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 331, 393(d)(2).

  39. See, e.g., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford American Dictionary and Thesaurus 505 (2d ed. 2009); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 682 (5th ed. 2011); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 884 (2002).

  40. Oxford Univ. Press, supra note 39, at 505; see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 39, at 682 (defining “food” in part as “[m]aterial . . . that contains or consists of essential body nutrients, such as carbohydrates, fats, proteins, vitamins, or minerals, and is ingested and assimilated by an organism to produce energy, stimulate growth, and maintain life”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, supra note 39, at 884 (defining food as “material consisting of carbohydrates, fats, proteins, and supplementary substances . . . that is taken or absorbed into the body of an animal in order to sustain growth, repair, and all vital processes and to furnish energy for all activity of the organism”).

  41. Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy 1–4 (2002) (“So closely are taste and eating tied to the necessities of existence that taste is frequently cataloged as one of the lower functions of sense perception, operating on a primitive, near instinctual level.”).

  42. Id. at 3–4 (stating that “eating is an activity we freight with significance considerably beyond either the pleasures it affords or the nutritional sustenance it provides” and that “eating is an activity with intense social meaning for communities large and small”); Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1983).

  43. See Donna R. Gabaccia, We Are What We Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans 9 (1998) (“To understand changing American identities, we must explore also the symbolic power of food to reflect cultural or social affinities in moments of change or transformation.”); Massimo Montanari, Food Is Culture xi (2006) (arguing that “[f]ood is culture when it is produced, . . . prepared[,] . . . [and] eaten”); Korsmeyer, supra note 41, at 9 (“One of the most significant roles of food is social: eating is part of the rituals, ceremonies, and practices that knit together communities.”); Pamela Goyan Kittler, Kathryn P. Sucher & Marcia Nahikian-Nelms, Food and Culture 4 (6th ed. 2012) (“What one eats defines who one is, culturally speaking, and, conversely, who one is not.”); Visser, supra note 35, at ix (describing eating as “a medium for social relationships: . . . a means of creating community”).

  44. See, e.g., P. Christian, Religious Customs and Nutrition, in Encyclopedia of Food Sciences and Nutrition 4933, 4933 (Benjamin Caballero, Luiz C. Trugo & Paul M. Finglas eds., 2d ed. 2003) (“All major religions have prohibitions, either permanent or temporary, regarding consumption of animal foods.”); see also Halal Food Certification for Restaurants in the USA: A Complete GuideHalal Food Council USA (Oct. 28, 2024), https://www.halalfoodcouncilusa.com/halal-food-certification-for-restaurants-in-the-usa-a-complete-guide [https://perma.cc/3SX6-72UB\] (discussing Halal food certification which “ensures that food and beverages meet Islamic dietary laws”); Kosher Food: The Kosher Primer, Kosher Certification Serv., https://www.oukosher.org/the-kosher-primer [https://perma.cc/S4AB-U7VE\] (last visited Aug. 20, 2026) (discussing “kosher” food, food that is “fit or proper as it relates to Jewish dietary law”).

  45. See Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, The Physiology of Taste 3 (M.F.K. Fisher trans., HBJ 1978) (1949), https://archive.org/details/mfkfisherstransl0000bril [https://perma.cc/Y6YY-8G88\] (“Tell me what you eat, and I shall tell you what you are.”); see also Alice Waters, Bob Carrau & Cristina Mueller, We Are What We Eat: A Slow Food Manifesto 3, 11–12 (2021) (arguing that how people eat shapes self-understanding and reflects broader cultural and social values); Vasundhara Sawhney, Weirdly True: We Are What We Eat, Harv. Bus. Rev., Aug. 6, 2021, at 1, 4, https://hbr.org/2021/08/weirdly-true-we-are-what-we-eat [https://perma.cc/M3E6-BW3E\] (discussing research suggesting that “the types of food we eat can significantly affect our mood”).

  46. 1 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, The Contemporary Debate 21 (1987); Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 35 (1998).

  47. 1 Sartori, supra note 46, at 21 (“[T]he etymological definition of democracy is, very simply, that democracy is the rule or power of the people.”).

  48. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address Delivered at Gettysburg Pa. Nov. 19th, 1863 (n.d.) (on file with Libr. of Cong., Printed Ephemera Collection, Portfolio 244, Folder 45), https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.24404500/ [https://perma.cc/P2RX-WXJW\].

  49. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 46, at 26 (“When we discuss democracy perhaps nothing gives rise to more confusion than the simple fact that ‘democracy’ refers to both and ideal and an actuality.”).

  50. Id. at 38; see also Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control 10–11 (1982) (describing the features of modern democratic countries); Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not, J. Democracy, Summer 1991, at 75, 81 (stating that “Robert Dahl has offered the most generally accepted listing of what he terms the ‘procedural minimal’ conditions that must be present for modern political democracy . . . to exist”).

  51. See David Held, Models of Democracy 2–3 (2d ed. 1996).

  52. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 43 (1970) (“One might characterise the participatory model [of democracy] as one where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual, so that there is ‘feedback’ from output to input.”); id. at 111 (“We can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart.”).

  53. Id. at 42–43.

  54. Schmitter & Karl, supra note 50, at 80; see also David Plotke, Representation Is Democracy, 4 Constellations 19, 19 (1997), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.00033 [https://perma.cc/TKW3-3CQF\] (arguing “that the opposite of representation is not participation,” it is exclusion, and “[r]epresentation is crucial in constituting democratic practices”).

  55. Schmitter & Karl, supra note 50, at 80–81.

  56. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 232 (1972).

  57. Dimitri Landa & Ryan Pevnick, Representative Democracy: A Justification 4–6 (2025).

  58. John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations 1 (2000).

  59. See Pateman, supra note 52, at 42–43; Schmitter & Karl, supra note 50, at 76–77, 79–80, 83; Landa & Pevnick, supra note 57, at 2, 7–8.

  60. See, e.g.Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 7, 41–42, 81–82, 119 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Inclusion and Democracy] (“Many advocates of a deliberative model of democracy appeal to the republican ideal of a common good as what distinguishes it from an aggregative model of democracy. To form a deliberative public, in this interpretation, citizens must leave aside their parochial concerns of local loyalty and particular affiliation.”); Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, Soc. Text, no25/26, 1990, at 64, 69, 77 (critiquing the “bourgeois conception of the public sphere”); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence 1–3, 5–6 (1995); Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory 1, 118, 120 (1989) (writing in an introduction published in 1989 that “democratic theory, like the wider body of political theory, for the most part remains untouched by feminist argument” and discussing feminist critiques of “the separation and opposition between the public and private spheres”). See generally Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) (discussing gender and justice).

  61. See, e.g., Chris Beasley, What Is Feminism? An Introduction to Feminist Theory ix, xi (1999); Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 10 (1999); Reginald Oh, Defining Feminism, Defining Feminisms, 9 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 465, 467–68 (2003) (“Defining feminism(s) means, in spirit of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, being mindful and respectful that individual Feminists will define Feminism in alignment with the truth of their unique experience, in alignment with the truth of their unique reality.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617, 618–19, 626 (1990); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 64, 72–76 (1985); Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 255, 258–59 (2013) (discussing the shift from second- to third-wave feminism). Women’s studies scholars often distinguish between “sex” and “gender” with “‘sex’ refer[ring] to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men and women [and] ‘gender,’ . . . refer[ring] to the cultural overlay on those anatomical and physiological distinctions.” Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 10 (1995). Despite this, “sex” and “gender” are often conflated in popular usage. See, e.g., Gender, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender [https://perma.cc/KAJ3-X3X3\] (last visited Aug. 20, 2026). Moreover, the Trump Administration has moved to collapse the definitions of sex and gender, specifying that “‘[s]ex’ shall refer to an individual’s immutable biological classification as either male or female,” “‘[f]emale’ means a person belonging, at conception, to the sex that produces the large reproductive cell,” and that “‘[w]omen’ or ‘woman’ and ‘girls’ or ‘girl’ shall mean adult and juvenile human females, respectively.” Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 30, 2025).

  62. Rhode, supra note 61, at 617–18, 622. See Jennifer Baumgardner & Amy Richards, ManifestA: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future 56 (2000); Chamallas, supra note 61, at 1 (stating that feminist legal theory “proceeds from the assumption that gender is important in our everyday lives” and “takes this approach into the study of law by examining how gender has mattered to the development of the law and how men and women are differently affected by the power in law”).

  63. See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 271 (1989) (“Significant inequalities in power have been a universal feature of human relationships throughout recorded history; they exist today in all democratic systems . . . .”).

  64. Fraser, supra note 60, at 64–65; Iris Marion Young, Polity and Gender Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 Ethics 250, 257 (1989) [hereinafter Young, Polity and Gender Difference]; Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas, in Feminism, the Public and the Private 65, 89–91 (Joan B. Landes ed., 1998); Pateman, supra note 52, at 43.

  65. See generally Fraser, supra note 60 (critically analyzing and suggesting reconstructions to the bourgeoisie model of the public sphere).

  66. Id. at 65, 77 (“One task for critical theory is to render visible the ways in which societal inequality infects formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within them.”).

  67. Id. at 77.

  68. Id.

  69. Id. at 61, 67.

  70. Young, Polity and Gender Difference, supra note 64, at 251, 253.

  71. Id. at 251, 261.

  72. Benhabib, supra note 64, at 85, 88–92.

  73. Id. at 87–88, 92.

  74. See, e.g., id. at 77–78, 82. See generally Fraser, supra note 60 (arguing that formal inclusion which ignores social inequalities through bracketing in an effort to neutralize distinctions further perpetuates the dominant and subordinate relationships in the public sphere and hinders deliberation and meaningful participation); Young, Polity and Gender Difference, supra note 64 (critiquing the ideal of universal citizenship that requires homogeneity for participation in the public sphere).

  75. See Fraser, supra note 60, at 63–64; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 64, at 5–6, 11, 52–53, 82–83; Young, Polity and Gender Difference, supra note 64, at 250–51, 256–57, 269, 272; Benhabib, supra note 64, at 88–92.

  76. See Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 6–7, 98–99; Christopher F. Karpowitz & Tali Mendelberg, The Silent Sex: Gender, Deliberation, and Institutions 20–21, 33–34, 37–40 (2014).

  77. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585–86, 604–05, 608 (1990) (stating “[t]he need for multiple consciousness in feminist movement . . . has long been apparent”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 151, 153–54; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment 23–28 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Collins, Black Feminist Thought]; Patricia Hill Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, 14 Signs 745, 745–49 (1989) [hereinafter Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought]; Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought 284, 285–87 (Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed., 1995).

  78. Harris, supra note 77, at 586, 608–09; Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 139–40; bell hooks, Black Women: Shaping Feminist Theory, in Words of Fire, supra note 77, at 270, 270, 277–79, 281–82; Collins, Black Feminist Thought, supra note 77, at 21–28, 37–38; Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race & Class 66–69 (1981); Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, supra note 77, at 745–48, 771–73; Lorde, supra note 77, at 285–86, 290–91.

  79. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 46, at 37–38, 76–78; Pateman, supra note 52, at 43, 103; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 54–55; Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 140, 154–55, 166–67; Harris, supra note 77, at 585, 591–92; Fraser, supra note 60, at 71, 73–74, 77.

  80. See, e.g., Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, The Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. Archive (July 2, 2022), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/aristotle-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/HES3-LT9A\]; VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 36–38; Alan C. Logan, Brian M. Berman & Susan L. Prescott, Vitality Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Flourishing and Its Relevance to Personal and Public Health, Int’l J. Env’t Rsch. & Pub. Health, Mar. 13, 2023, at 1, 1–2, 4, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10049456/ [https://perma.cc/9FTK-7JSG\].

  81. VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 38.

  82. Tyler J. VanderWeele, On the Promotion of Human Flourishing, 114 Procs. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 8148, 8148–49 (2017), https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.1702996114 [https://perma.cc/3P4Q-PSYJ\]; Tyler J. VanderWeele, Eileen McNeely & Howard K. Koh, Reimagining Health—Flourishing, 321 JAMA 1667, 1667 (2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2730087 [https://perma.cc/7XA2-PMA7\]; see also Tim Lomas, James O. Pawelski & Tyler J. VanderWeele, A Flexible Map of Flourishing: The Dynamics and Drivers of Flourishing, Well-Being, Health, and Happiness, Int’l J. Wellbeing, Oct. 2023, at 119, 22–24, https://internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/index.php/ijow/article/view/3665/1183 [https://perma.cc/XZH5-KLSV\] (identifying factors that influence well-being).

  83. The relationships and boundaries among the definitions of well-being, health, happiness, and flourishing are both ill-defined and contested. VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 38; Lomas, Pawelski & VanderWeele, supra note 82 passim. For this Article, regardless of the exact contours of the definition, flourishing is understood to include both health and well-being. VanderWeele, supra note 82, at 8149; Logan, Berman & Prescott, supra note 80, at 2–3 (discussing the concept of flourishing in the health context); Jeff Levin, Human Flourishing and Population Health: Meaning, Measurement, and Implications, 63 Persps. Biol. & Med. 401, 405–10, 413–16 (2020) (discussing the history of the concept of flourishing and suggesting how it can be used in clinical and population-health research); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 407–09 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“[S]ociety should enable human beings to live flourishing lives. Flourishing and health are inherent to the human condition. Certain aspects of health, in particular, maintain other aspects of human flourishing.”); William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581, 643 (2007) (claiming “that some level of basic capability for health is among the most fundamental of capabilities essential to human flourishing”).

  84. VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 38; Lomas, Pawelski & VanderWeele, supra note 82, at 18–19.

  85. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 Emory L.J. 251, 255–56, 274 n.77 (2010) (arguing for a “vulnerability approach” and stating that “[b]y recognizing that privilege and disadvantage migrate across identity categories, we are forced to focus not only on individuals, but also on institutions—the structures and arrangements that can almost invisibly produce or exacerbate existing inequality”); Gostin, supra note 7, at 2837–41 (stating that a “sound public health law infrastructure is important because it establishes the powers and duties of government to prevent injury and disease and promote the population’s health” and proposing that “statutes, regulations, and litigation can be pivotal tools for creating the conditions for people to lead healthier and safer lives”); Lomas, Pawelski & VanderWeele, supra note 82, at 20, 23–24.

  86. See Dahl, supra note 46, at 27–28, 37–38; Fineman, supra note 85, at 272–73; Gostin, supra note 7, at 2838; Lomas, Pawelski & VanderWeele, supra note 82, at 23.

  87. See supra Section II.B.

  88. Sarah S. Willen et al., Rethinking Flourishing: Critical Insights and Qualitative Perspectives from the U.S. Midwest, SSM Ment. Health, Dec. 2022, at 1, 5, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34961852/ [https://perma.cc/5XC8-VNAP\].

  89. Id.

  90. See Democracy Pol’y Lab, Goldman Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, U.C. Berkeley, Delivering on the Promises of “We the People”: Political Psychology Foundations for American Democracy Policy 5, 12–14 (2025), https://democracypolicylab.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/DPL_Report_Final_5.30.25.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3V-4QYM\].

  91. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

  92. Jeffrey Rosen, The Pursuit of Happiness: How Classical Writers on Virtue Inspired the Lives of the Founders and Defined America 7–8 (2024); see also Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of the Pursuit of Happiness, 7 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 195, 262 (2015) (“To recapture the eighteenth-century legal meaning of the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ is to limit the definition of the pursuit of happiness to one great thing—the pursuit of eudaimonia, or human flourishing.”); Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 369, 373–74 (2016) (discussing the understanding of the pursuit of happiness).

  93. Dahl, supra note 63, at 322.

  94. See Pateman, supra note 52, at 42–43, 110–11; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 32–33.

  95. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom—For Whom?: Feminist Legal Theory and Progressive Corporate LawL. & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2004, at 87, 94–95 (“[W]hat unifies feminist legal thought is that it centers on an analysis of the use and distribution power, seeking to articulate both a normative vision of equality and human flourishing for society as well as a critique of structures of subordination, particularly for women, that impede those values.”); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Workplace Restructuring to Accommodate Family Life, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 343, 344 (2007); Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne & Cindy A. Schipani, Feminism(s), Progressive Corporate Law, and the Corporate Oppression Remedy: Seeking Fairness and Justice, 19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 61, 97–98 (2017).

  96. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 5–6, 70–86 (2000) (arguing for a human capabilities approach).

  97. See, e.g., id. at 5–6, 31.

  98. See, e.g., Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 32–34, 52–53, 81–83; Fraser, supra note 60, at 56–57, 63–64, 77; Joan C. Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice 26, 45 (2013).

  99. See Nussbaum, supra note 96, at 71 (articulating a feminist approach to human capabilities, an approach which “directs us to examine [women’s] real lives in their material and social settings”); see also Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 4, 34, 36 (using a critical theoretical approach to examine “democratic practice under conditions of structural inequality”).

  100. Sarah S. Willen, Flourishing and Health in Critical Perspective: An Invitation to Interdisciplinary Dialogue, SSM Ment. Health, Dec. 2022, at 1, 2, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666560321000451?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/X6ST-CY23\]; Willen et al., supra note 88, at 5 (quoting Dorothy Roberts, Whose Conception of Human Flourishing?, in Human Flourishing in an Age of Gene Editing 201, 201, 203 (Erik Parens & Josephine Johnston eds., 2019) as stating “for individuals to flourish, they must be situated in societies that promote their flourishing”); Sarah S. Willen, Abigail Fisher Williamson & Colleen C. Walsh, Who Gets to Define Flourishing? Disentangling Social Science from Theology in Flourishing Measurement and Policy Prescriptions, SSM Ment. Health, June 2025, at 1, 2, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666560324000823?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/C69V-5EF7\]; Jennifer Ayewa Donkoh, Emma Swan & Rebecca Tiessen, Expanding Our Understanding of Wellbeing: Exploring Feminist Flourishing as a Conceptual Framework, 46 Can. J. Dev. Stud. 554, 555 (2025).

  101. Willen, supra note 100, at 2; Willen et al., supra note 88, at 5; Willen, Williamson & Walsh, supra note 100, at 4–5; Donkoh, Swan & Tiessen, supra note 100, at 555–57; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 17–18 (arguing for the “widen[ing of] democratic inclusion”).

  102. Donkoh, Swan & Tiessen, supra note 100, at 555 (“While many of the principles of human flourishing bring value to our understanding of wellbeing, they are often limited to individualistic interpretations. . . . [C]ritical feminist theoretical approaches . . . offer a broader lens for understanding wellbeing that is relational, intersectional and locally-situated.”).

  103. See Tronto, supra note 98, at 1–2 (stating that the “view of home as a place of comfort and care, marked off from politics, is a myth” and that care “involves a fair amount of necessary ‘dirty work’—cleaning, preparing food, bodily care, removing waste—that, as it moves out of the home, creates a new class of people, mostly women and disproportionately people of color, who are increasingly left behind by economic growth in the bottom rungs of society”); id. at 7 (“Democratic politics should center upon assigning responsibilities for care, and for ensuring that democratic citizens are as capable as possible of participating in this assignment of responsibilities.”); id. at 171 (“[C]ontemporary liberal democratic societies start from the premise, still, that care is contained in the private sphere and is of secondary concern to the state. . . . What has counted ideologically as women’s (and oppressed men’s) care—care in the family and the purchasing on the market of such care (e.g., . . . products such as food . . .)—has been accounted as private.”).

  104. See Margot J. Pollans, Bodies as Food System Sacrifice Zones, in Research Handbook on International Food Law 443, 467–68 (Michael T. Roberts ed., 2023).

  105. See FDCA §§ 201, 301–304, 402–403, 409, 413, 418, 419, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331–334, 342–343, 348, 350b, 350g, 350h; FDA at a Glance, supra note 15; What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 15.

  106. See, e.g., Julia Behringer & Peter H. Feindt, Varieties of Food Democracy: A Systematic Literature Review, 18 Critical Pol’y Stud. 25, 43–44 (2024); Tim Lang, Food Policy for the 21st Century: Can It Be Both Radical and Reasonable?, in Hunger-Proof Cities: Sustainable Urban Food Systems 216, 218 (Mustafa Koc et al. eds., 1999); Neil Hamilton, Essay—Food Democracy and the Future of American Values, Drake J. Agric. L. 9, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Hamilton, Food Democracy I]; Lingxi Chenyang, Food Antidemocracy99 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 5) (on file with Houston Law Review).

  107. Hamilton, Food Democracy I, supra note 106, at 15–16; see also Olivier De Schutter, The Specter of Productivism and Food Democracy, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 199, 233 (arguing that democratizing food systems requires empowering citizens and other stakeholders to reclaim control over food systems and become active participants in creating alternatives to the dominant system); Behringer & Feindt, supra note 106, at 34–36, 39–43 (describing food democracy as encompassing strengthened public participation, transparency, and greater citizen involvement in food-system governance and decision-making); Lang, supra note 106, at 218 (using “the expression food democracy to refer to the demand for greater access and collective benefits from the food system”).

  108. See, e.g., Molly D. Anderson, Expanding Food Democracy: A Perspective from the United States, Frontiers Sustainable Food Sys., Apr. 27, 2023, at 1, 2; Julia Behringer & Peter H. Feindt, How Shall We Judge Agri-Food Governance? Legitimacy Constructions in Food Democracy and Co-Regulation Discourses, 7 Pol. & Governance 119, 125–26 (2019); Hamilton, Food Democracy I, supra note 106, at 14; see also Neil D. Hamilton, Food Democracy II: Revolution or Restoration?, 1 J. Food L. & Pol’y 13, 27 (2005) [hereinafter Hamilton, Food Democracy II] (“The truth is that gardening and farmers’ markets are, at their essence, democratic and about the pursuit of happiness.”); id. at 40–41 (“The goal of Food Democracy is a food system offering more opportunities for farmers and consumers, greater varieties of products, more information, more choices, more local involvement, as well as greater attention to health, the environment, animal welfare, and human values. The goal is a food system that offers more personal connections, a stronger sense of community, and more satisfaction in all the ways that food can satisfy human needs.”).

  109. Hamilton, Food Democracy I, supra note 106, at 14, 16–17, 21–22 (arguing that both food and democracy are important “to us as individuals and as a nation,” and that “democracy rests on citizen participation,” “thrives on information and our ability to make informed choices, . . . in exercising our right to vote,” and in having “alternatives from which to choose”); see also Hamilton, Food Democracy II, supra note 108, at 27, 33, 40–41 (“Food Democrats are looking for more satisfaction from food, and their goal is to create a better food system.”).

  110. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 108, at 3; Hamilton, Food Democracy I, supra note 106, at 15–16; Behringer & Feindt, supra note 108, at 125–26; De Schutter, supra note 107, at 233.

  111. Hamilton, Food Democracy I, supra note 106, at 14, 18, 21–24 (stating that democracy “thrives through citizen participation in local as well as national institutions”).

  112. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 108, at 2 (noting that the concept of food democracy is still vague, especially when it comes to defining who is “the public”); see also Behringer & Feindt, supra note 106, at 41 (describing food democracy as a contested family of ideas and strategies for change); Hamilton, Food Democracy II, supra note 108, at 32 (conceptualizing consumers as the public and describing their ability to participate in the food system through voting on their interests, taking action, and influencing its future).

  113. Anderson, supra note 108, at 3–4 (“I propose that the next stage of food democracy is the intentional centering of the people whose right to food and right to the resources necessary for growing and marketing food are not respected, protected and fulfilled. This will enable food democracy to contribute to civic democracy that recognizes the rights of all people.”); see also Chenyang, supra note 106 (manuscript at 30–31) (arguing that antidemocratic tactics were used in the creation of the Farm Bill and have resulted in a “food antidemocracy”).

  114. Food is a basic human need, and everyone, regardless of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status, needs food. Cf. Boyd, supra note 9, at 289 (describing cosmetics, by contrast, as a “highly gendered product and industry” and stating that “[o]n average, women use more cosmetics than men”).

  115. See, e.g., Deborah L. Best & Angelica R. Puzio, Gender and Culture, in The Handbook of Culture and Psychology 235, 236 (David Matsumoto & Hyisung C. Hwang eds., 2d ed. 2019) (“Gender is . . . used to distinguish the female and male members of the human species but with emphasis on sociocultural and psychological meaning that is assigned to biological differences between the sexes.”); see infra notes 120–26; see also Boyd, Cricket Soup, supra note 37, at 76–77 (discussing how food, food law, and culture are intertwined); Carole M. Counihan, The Anthropology of Food and Body: Gender, Meaning, and Power 6, 8–10, 12–13 (1999) (discussing the relationship between food and gender and stating that “[a]n examination of foodways . . . reveals much about power relations and conceptions of sex and gender, for every coherent social group has its own unique foodways”).

  116. See, e.g., Beletshachew Shiferaw et al., Sex-Based Differences in Food Consumption: Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) Population Survey, 2006–2007, 54 Clin. Infect. Dis. S453, S455 (2012).

  117. Jeffery Sobal, Men, Meat, and Marriage: Models of Masculinity, 13 Food & Foodways 135, 137 (2005). But see Daniel L. Rosenfeld & A. Janet Tomiyama, Gender Differences in Meat Consumption and Openness to Vegetarianism, Appetite, June 22, 2021, at 1, 5–7 (finding substantial variation within genders and explaining that men’s meat consumption depends partly on their conformity to traditional masculine norms).

  118. Carrie R. Daniel et al., Trends in Meat Consumption in the USA, 14 Pub. Health Nutr. 575, 578–79 (2011); see also Christian Ritzel & Stefan Mann, The Old Man and the Meat: On Gender Differences in Meat Consumption Across Stages of Human Life, Foods, Nov. 15, 2021, at 1, 9–11 (examining “gender differences in meat consumption” across life stages); Marcia Hill Gossard & Richard York, Social Structural Influences on Meat Consumption, Hum. Ecology Rev., Summer 2003, at 1, 6–7 (exploring how “social structural factors clearly influence meat consumption habits”).

  119. Amber S. Emanuel et al., Theory of Planned Behavior Explains Gender Difference in Fruit and Vegetable Consumption, 59 Appetite 693, 695 (2012).

  120. See Rest. Opportunities Ctrs. United, Ending Jim Crow in America’s Restaurants: Racial and Gender Occupational Segregation in the Restaurant Industry 13–14, 18–19 (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20191225085657/https://rocunited.org/wp2015b/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RaceGender_Report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/X32A-B36F\] (discussing racial and gender discrimination in the restaurant industry).

  121. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat. (Jan. 25, 2023) [hereinafter Labor Force Statistics], https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2022/cpsaat11.htm [https://perma.cc/8L89-L4XZ\]; see also Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, Restaurant Employee Demographics: Data Brief 3 (Apr. 2025), https://restaurant.org/getmedia/a3912d4b-9fd5-42f5-989c-fbc8e8929772/nra-data-brief-restaurant-employee-demographics-april-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/39N8-ABQY\] (discussing gender of restaurant and foodservice workers and noting that “[f]emales make up a majority of tipped positions in the restaurant industry,” but “have a lower representation in the back of the house”).

  122. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 121.

  123. Id.

  124. Katherine Schaeffer, Among U.S. Couples, Women Do More Cooking and Grocery Shopping than Men, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Sep. 24, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/09/24/among-u-s-couples-women-do-more-cooking-and-grocery-shopping-than-men/ [https://perma.cc/TD9L-EA25\].

  125. Id. (stating that around 20% of men report that they are the usual meal prepper or that they split meal prep equally regardless of whether the household has kids or not).

  126. Id. (stating that the percentage of men report that they are the usual grocery shopper or that they split grocery shopping equally ranges from 20% to 27%).

  127. VanderWeele, supra note 82, at 8149; see also Logan, Berman & Prescott, supra note 80, at 2, 4–6 (discussing the concept of “flourishing” in the health context); Levin, supra note 83, at 405–10, 414–15 (discussing the history of the concept of flourishing and suggesting how it can be used in clinical and population-health research); Ruger, supra note 83, at 407 (footnote omitted) (“[S]ociety should enable human beings to live flourishing lives. Flourishing and health are inherent to the human condition. Certain aspects of health, in particular, maintain other aspects of human flourishing.”); Fisher & Syed, supra note 83, at 643–44 (claiming “that some level of basic capability for health is among the most fundamental of capabilities essential to human flourishing”); VanderWeele, McNeely & Koh, supra note 82, at 1667–68 (proposing measures to assess flourishing, including a question about worrying about food); John M. Cooper, Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune, 94 Phil. Rev. 173, 178, 188 (1985) (noting that Aristotle’s conception of “a flourishing life requires external goods,” which include food).

  128. See Ruger, supra note 83, at 436, 468.

  129. See Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health 372, 375 (Darra Goldstein ed., rev. & expanded ed. 2007); Marjorie L. DeVault, Feeding the Family: The Social Organization of Caring as Gendered Work 39, 230 (Catharine R. Stimpson ed., 1991); Claude Fischler, Food, Self & Identity, 27 Soc. Sci. Info. 275, 282, 286 (1988).

  130. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 15, 25, 33–34, 39, 56 (2011) (discussing bodily health, including nourishment, affiliation, and control over one’s environment as capabilities, “crucial element[s] of a life worthy of human dignity”); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 177–78, 182 (1999); World Health Org. Const. pmbl., ch. 2, art. II (“Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”); VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 37–38 (defining flourishing to include “the contexts in which [a] person lives”).

  131. Public Health 101 Series: Introduction to Public Health, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention: Ctr. for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Lab’y Servs., http://www.cdc.gov/training-publichealth101/media/pdfs/introduction-to-public-health.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEV7-ZCKN\] (last visited Aug. 23, 2026).

  132. Inst. of Med., supra note 3, at 140.

  133. World Health Org. Const. pmbl.

  134. See, e.g., Nutrition, Harv. Med. Sch.: Harv. Health Publ’g (Jan. 31, 2023), https://www.health.harvard.edu/topics/nutrition [https://perma.cc/5NMB-CXSM\]; Visser, supra note 35, at 2 (“The main rules about eating are simple: If you do not eat you die.”).

  135. See also Emily M. Broad Leib & Margot J. Pollans, The New Food Safety, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 1173, 1233–36 (2019) (arguing for a broader definition of food safety and changes to the regulation of food to better address food system health risks).

  136. See, e.g., Chemical Contaminants & Pesticides, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 31, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/chemical-contaminants-pesticides [https://perma.cc/3WMY-QDFT\]; Food Safety, World Health Org. (June 4, 2026), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety [https://perma.cc/R3PG-HJHJ\]; CPG Sec. 555.425 Foods, Adulteration Involving Hard or Sharp Foreign Objects, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (May 2005), https://www.fda.gov/media/71953/download [https://perma.cc/SF82-SL4M\].

  137. U.S. Dep’t Agric. & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2020–2025, 5 tblI-1, 23, 102 (9th ed. Dec. 2020) [hereinafter Dietary Guidelines], https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/Dietary_Guidelines_for_Americans-2020-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N2L-862J\].

  138. Determinants of Health, World Health Org. (Oct. 4, 2024), https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/determinants-of-health [https://perma.cc/JX9A-Z58V\].

  139. Id.; see also Social Determinants of Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., https://odphp.health.gov/healthypeople/priority-areas/social-determinants-health [https://perma.cc/ZSW3-M8JH\] (last visited Aug. 23, 2026) (stating that the social determinants of health “can be grouped into [five] domains:” (1) “Economic Stability,” (2) “Education Access and Quality,” (3) “Health Care Access and Quality,” (4) “Neighborhood and Built Environment,” and (5) “Social and Community Context”).

  140. See Orielle Solar & Alec Irwin, World Health Org., Conceptual Framework for Action on the Social Determinants of Health 33–34 (2010), https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/ca294183-3263-470f-a5fe-8e124ec48c72/content [https://perma.cc/YZM8-F65Z\] (stating that “women and girls bear the major burden of negative health effects from gender-based social hierarchies”); see also supra Section II.E.1 (discussing food as a gendered product); Case, supra note 61, at 10 (discussing the meaning of the terms sex and gender).

  141. Kathleen Kassel, Agriculture and Its Related Industries Provide 10.4 Percent of U.S. Employment, U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Econ. Rsch. Serv. (Nov. 3, 2023), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/chart-detail?chartId=58282 [https://perma.cc/QX3E-YPXV\]. There are also significant differences in the average male and female employee salaries in restaurants and food services. Restaurants & Food Services, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/naics/restaurants-food-services [https://perma.cc/33BK-777J\] (last visited Aug. 1, 2026) (indicating that the average male salary in 2022 was $30,089, while the average female salary was $21,837).

  142. Kassel, supra note 141. The employment data, however, does not separate this employment from other agricultural-related industries (i.e., tobacco manufacturing and forestry and related activities). Id.

  143. Elizabeth Collins Cromley, The Food Axis: Cooking, Eating, and the Architecture of American Houses 2–3, 12–14 (2010) (discussing how American houses were shaped by food); see also Carolyn Steel, Hungry City: How Food Shapes Our Lives 150–52 (2009) (discussing how food shapes cities).

  144. Ron Sands, Charts of Note: Agriculture Accounted for an Estimated 10.5 Percent of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2022, U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Econ. Rsch. Serv. (Nov. 5, 2024), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/110340 [https://perma.cc/6PFW-FTLP\]; Scott Callahan, Agricultural Land Uses Account for Over Half of the U.S. Land Base, U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Econ. Rsch. Serv. (Aug. 14, 2026), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/58260 [https://perma.cc/44X4-J8EH\]. Of course, not all land used for agricultural uses is used for food production. For example, corn is a major crop in the United States, with farmers planting approximately “90 million acres of corn each year.” Corn and Other Feed Grains—Feed Grains Sector at a Glance, U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Econ. Rsch. Serv. (May 7, 2026), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn-and-other-feed-grains/feed-grains-sector-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/8Z3B-V3HE\]. While corn is food both for humans and livestock, nearly 45% of corn is used to produce ethanol. See id.

  145. Climate Change Indicators: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency (Nov. 9, 2020), https://19january2021snapshot.epa.gov/climate-indicators/greenhouse-gases\_.html [https://perma.cc/75BY-UR66\].

  146. Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Half of the World’s Habitable Land Is Used for Agriculture, Our World in Data (Feb. 16, 2024), https://ourworldindata.org/global-land-for-agriculture#note-1 [https://perma.cc/LC9G-F6BW\]; COP26: Agricultural Expansion Drives Almost 90 Percent of Global Deforestation, Food & Agric. Org. of U.N. (June 11, 2021), https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/cop26-agricultural-expansion-drives-almost-90-percent-of-global-deforestation/en [https://perma.cc/GK3S-NG55\]; Francesco N. Tubiello et al., Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Agrifood Systems: Global, Regional and Country Trends, 2000–2022 (2024), https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/74bfebdb-3272-4e6a-98f4-ee36c7146d44 [https://perma.cc/5ESE-LNKP\].

  147. See Nestle, supra note 129, at 41–42, 46, 49–51.

  148. See Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12, supra note 27, at 2–7; G.A. Res. 73/165, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/165, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, at 3, 11–12 (Dec. 17, 2018).

  149. See, e.g., Baylen J. Linnekin & Emily M. Broad Leib, Food Law & Policy: The Fertile Field’s Origins and First Decade, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 557, 560, 562, 584–87; Susan A. Schneider, Food, Farming, and Sustainability 673–88 (3d ed. 2025); Nestle, supra note 129, at 28, 30–32; Hamilton, Food Democracy II, supra note 108, at 31–32, 39–41; Emily M. Broad Leib & Baylen J. Linnekin, Food Law & Policy: An Essential Part of Today’s Legal Academy, 13 J. Food L. & Pol’y 228, 228–29 (2017); VanderWeele & Lomas, supra note 8, at 38; FDCA § 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); Hutt et al., supra note 7, at 468–72, 474–75.

  150. See States Regulating Date Labeling, Food Waste Pol’y Finder (Aug. 26, 2026), https://policyfinder.refed.org/uploads/policy-finder-policy-matrix-0826.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M3N-5YS5\]; Emily Broad Leib et al., The Dating Game: How Confusing Food Date Labels Lead to Food Waste in America 2–4, 7, 15, 19, 21, 24 (Sep. 2013), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/dating-game-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZA9-H3CY\]; FDCA §§ 402, 403(h), (q), (w), 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 343(h), (q), (w); 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (2025); 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (2025); Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1791.

  151. Food law does not ensure a particular outcome, but food law may structure conditions in ways that make flourishing more or less likely. See States Regulating Date Labeling, supra note 150; Broad Leib et al., supra note 150, at 2–4; FDCA §§ 402, 403(h), (q), (w), 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 343(h), (q), (w); 21 C.F.R. § 131.110; 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61; Regina Paparo & Patrick Montgomery, Food L. & Pol’y Clinic, Harv. L. Sch., Cottage Foods and Home Cooking: Fifty-State Survey of Laws 2–3 (2021), https://chlpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Cottage-Foods-Final-4.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87U-SPXV\]; 42 U.S.C. § 1791.

  152. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 830–32, 836 (1990).

  153. Rhode, supra note 61, at 617–19.

  154. Bartlett, supra note 152, at 837.

  155. Id.; see also Wishik, supra note 61, at 72–75 (listing “questions [that] might be posed by a feminist inquiry into the relationship between law and society”); Lydia A. Clougherty, Feminist Legal Methods and the First Amendment Defense to Sexual Harassment Liability, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1996) (discussing “[a]sking the woman question”); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 Yale L.J. 259, 262 (1993) (discussing “asking the ‘women question’” in the context of police interrogations).

  156. Bartlett, supra note 152, at 837.

  157. Schiltz, supra note 95, at 344; Testy, supra note 95, at 94–95; O’Byrne & Schipani, supra note 95, at 98; Bartlett, supra note 152, at 888 (describing engaging in critical feminist methods as a form of human flourishing).

  158. See Bartlett, supra note 152, at 838; Clougherty, supra note 155, at 3 n.7; Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why Comment E Is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 1139, 1160–63 (1999) (“asking the Woman Question” about tort law); Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 469, 500–01 (2006) (“Asking ‘the woman question’” about pharmacist refusal clauses); John A. Robertson, Asking the “Woman Question” About Health Care Reform, 3 Tex. J. Women & L. 139, 140 (1994) (“Asking the ‘Woman Question’” about Healthcare Reform); Breanne Sergent, Comment, To Include or to Exclude? The Policy Question Plaguing Women’s Role in Clinical Trials, 34 J. Legal Med. 235, 243 (2013) (examining women’s participation in clinical trials); Mary Anne Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3 Tex. J. Women & L. 7, 56 (1994) (asking the woman question about the legal system’s response to HIV); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 139, 142–43 (2005) (“asking the woman question[s]” about tort law); Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 Harv. Women’s L.J. 23, 36–37 (1996) (“asking variations of ‘the woman question’” about environmental law); Campbell, supra note 9, at 10–11, 26–27 (asking “the woman question” about food and drug law and skin lightening cosmetics); Boyd, supra note 9, at 284, 288–89, 296, 301, 307, 320 (“asking the ‘woman question’” about cosmetics law). The Author has also asked a variation of the “woman question,” the child question, about FDA-regulated products. See Marie Boyd, What About the Kids? Advancing a Child-Centered Approach to Food & Drug Law, 76 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 10, 12–13 (2024).

  159. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 152, at 834–35, 847–49; Harris, supra note 77, at 585–86, 608; Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 149–51; hooks, supra note 78, at 270; Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, supra note 77, at 745, 747–48; Lorde, supra note 77, at 285.

  160. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 152, at 835, 847–49; Harris, supra note 77, at 586, 608 (“The need for multiple consciousness in feminist movement . . . has long been apparent.”); Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 139–40, 160, 166–67; hooks, supra note 78, at 271–73, 281; Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, supra note 77, at 745–48; Lorde, supra note 77, at 285.

  161. See Bartlett, supra note 152, at 834–37, 847–49.

  162. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights for the Intersexed, 12 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 31, 58–59 (2005); Katie Reineck, Note, Running from the Gender Police: Reconceptualizing Gender to Ensure Protection for Non-Binary People, 24 Mich. J. Gender & L. 265, 272, 291 (2017). But see Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615, 8615–16 (Jan. 30, 2025) (asserting that sex is binary and unchangeable and that gender identity provides no valid basis for defining “woman”).

  163. See supra Section II.B.

  164. See Dahl, supra note 63, at 108–14 (identifying “effective participation,” “voting equality at the decisive stage,” and “[c]ontrol of the [a]genda” as ideals for a democratic process); see also Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 16–51 (“In the real world some people and groups have significantly greater ability to use democratic processes for their own ends while others are excluded or marginalized. . . . One means of breaking this cycle, I argue, is to widen democratic inclusion.”).

  165. See States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order 15–17 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).

  166. Dahl, supra note 63, at 108–14, 116; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 60, at 16–51 (“[A] democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision-making.”).

  167. See Nestle, supra note 129, at 375–89; Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 14–15, 25–26, 33–34, 56; Ruger, supra note 83, at 406–08, 455; see also FDCA § 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (directing the Secretary to protect public health by ensuring “foods are safe” and “properly labeled”).

  168. See Donkoh, Swan & Tiessen, supra note 100, at 555 (discussing the meaning of the term “lens”). While subsequent amendments to the FDCA have substantially shaped federal food regulation—for example by increasing FDA’s premarket authority over certain subcategories of food, focusing more on preventive governance, expanding information disclosure, providing new enforcement tools, and defining dietary supplements as foods— they have left the statute’s basic structure and its focus on preventing adulteration and misbranding intact. FDCA §§ 301(a), 402(a)(1), 403(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 342(a)(1), 343(a); see, e.g., Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784–86; FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 103, 206, 124 Stat. 3885, 3889–90, 3939–40 (2011); Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 104 Stat. 2353, 2357 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343); Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4325, 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)). Accordingly, this Article focuses on the foundations of modern food law provided by the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and the 1938 FDCA and does not engage in a statute-by-statute analysis of later legal developments. Nonetheless, as illustrated by the nutrition facts labeling discussed in Section IV.E, these nutrition facts amendments reinforce the central claim advanced here: that food law is an important locus of participation and operates as a determinant of health by structuring how responsibility, authority, and risk are distributed. A sustained feminist and democratic analysis of these later reforms and their impact on flourishing is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra Section IV.E.

  169. George P. Larrick, Fifty Years of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Laws, 11 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 212, 212–13 (1956).

  170. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) (stating that the 1906 Act was “repealed” upon the effective date of the FDCA except as otherwise provided).

  171. David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, L. & Contemp. Probs. 2, 27–28 (1939) (footnote omitted) (“The prohibitions against any food containing a poisonous ingredient which may render it injurious to health and those against insanitary ingredients were carried over with little change from the [1906 Act]. . . . The brief provision declaring a food misbranded if its labeling is ‘false or misleading in any particular’ repeats the language of the old Act.”).

  172. See U.S. Const. amend. XIX.

  173. Jennifer E. Manning & Ida A. Brudnick, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30261, Women in Congress, 1917–2022: Service Dates and Committee Assignments by Member, and Lists by State and Congress 1, 110 (2022), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL30261 [https://perma.cc/3MJS-LJ2Q\].

  174. U.S. Const. amends. XIV, XV.

  175. Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States 247–50 (2000).

  176. African American Senators, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/senators/EthnicDiversityintheSenate.htm [https://perma.cc/3KRB-TH7N\] (last visited Sep. 21, 2026); People Search, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art & Archives, http://history.house.gov/People/Search/ [https://perma.cc/3SFY-88N9\] (last visited July 16, 2026).

  177. African American Senators, supra note 176; People Search, supra note 176 (using the categories indicated in the text).

  178. See U.S. Census Off., Census Bull. No. 103, Population by Sex, General Nativity, and Color, by States and Territories: 1900, at 7 (1901), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1900/bulletins/demographic/103-population-sex-nativity-color.pdf [https://perma.cc/U78A-NVPY\].

  179. The Department of Agriculture was responsible for using “chemical analysis to monitor the safety of agricultural products” before the 1906 Act. FDA History, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (June 29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history [https://perma.cc/KZ6X-JYNV\].

  180. Gladys L. Baker, Women in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 50 Agric. Hist. 190, 190–95 (1976). By 1899, the USDA employed approximately 3,000 employees, of whom 449 were women. Id. at 194. Women served as stenographers, bookkeepers, assistant artists, typists, editorial clerks, and one private secretary. Id. at 193–94; see 1 Official Register of the United States 800–01 (1892) [hereinafter 1 Official Register], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-CS1-c06280c12aba381eb4c70f7b6de8bd70/pdf/GOVPUB-CS1-c06280c12aba381eb4c70f7b6de8bd70.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEB8-JYKV\] (listing the organizational structure of the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Chemistry and identifying two laborers as “Miss”); see also Lucille Foster McMillin, U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, Women in the Federal Service 15 (1938), https://www.governmentattic.org/59docs/WomenInTheFederalService1938-1941.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RKG-JNUZ\] (discussing the history of women in the Federal Service, including in “lower-grade professional and scientific positions”).

  181. See Margaret W. Rossiter, “Women’s Work” in Science, 1880-1910, 71 Isis 381, 387–90 (1980) (discussing the “plant pathology” as “[t]he prime example of sex segregation in the federal government” and noting that “several rapidly growing divisions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture . . . made it a regular practice to hire women as ‘scientific assistants,’” a practice which was described as “unusual”); id. at 390–91 (discussing the “feminization of” home economics work as “the result of men’s aversion and possibly their inability to advise women on domestic matters and their willingness to let the women do it instead”); see also Suzanne Rebecca White, Chemistry and Controversy: Regulating the Use of Chemicals in Foods 1883-1959, at 1, 4–26 (Mar. 28, 1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (ProQuest) (discussing Wiley’s time as Chief Chemist and the efforts to regulate chemicals in food from his appointment in 1882 until 1906).

  182. Baker, supra note 180, at 193; see also 1 Official Register, supra note 180, at 796, 804–08 (listing the Bureau of Animal Industry’s organizational structure and identifying “Assistant Microscopists,” many designated as “Miss”).

  183. Baker, supra note 180, at 195; Mary Engle Pennington: The “Cold Chain” of Food Safety, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history-exhibits/mary-engle-pennington-cold-chain-food-safety [https://perma.cc/H9WB-6JU5\].

  184. Baker, supra note 180, at 195.

  185. Mary Engle Pennington: The “Cold Chain” of Food Safety, supra note 183.

  186. Baker, supra note 180, at 195.

  187. James Harvey Young, Pure Food: Securing the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 183–85 (1989) [hereinafter Young, Pure Food]; Jeffrey Haydu, Consumer Citizenship and Cross-Class Activism: The Case of the National Consumers’ League, 1899-1918, 29 Socio. F. 628, 637 (2014) (“In the pure food campaign, . . . [National Consumer League] women were exercising what they saw as a specifically feminine consumer responsibility to make sure that food be accurately labeled and honestly marketed. They were also discharging their maternal obligation to protect the household from unsafe products.”).

  188. See Haydu, supra note 187, at 632–37 (stating that “[e]ven the leading organization of reform-minded women at the time, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs . . . , regularly had to reassure constituents that public engagement was legitimate—if the causes and tactics were suitable to women and if they continued to honor their domestic duties”); see also Young, Pure Food, supra note 187, at 186 (discussing the role of women’s clubs and leaders such as Alice Lakey and Jane Addams in advocating for passage of a law).

  189. Lorine Swainston Goodwin, The Pure Food, Drink, and Drug Crusaders, 1879-1914, at 5, 294 (1999); see also Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The Health of a Nation: Harvey W. Wiley and the Fight for Pure Food 194 (1958) (discussing the role of “clubwomen”).

  190. Goodwin, supra note 189, at 266–70, 296; see also Jenny Ann Diamond, Who Shall Meet the Foe If Not She? Women’s Participation in the Movement Leading Up to the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, As Seen Through the Pages of Good Housekeeping 4 (2002) (Third Year Paper, Harvard Law School), https://dash.harvard.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7312037c-a364-6bd4-e053-0100007fdf3b/content [https://perma.cc/F5XP-RG8N\] (suggesting “that women readers of Good Housekeeping, at least, were extremely interested in the pure food issue as early as 1885, lend[ing] credence to the theory that women . . . were important agents throughout the long campaign for national pure food legislation”).

  191. Harvey Washington Wiley, Sci. Hist. Inst., https://www.sciencehistory.org/education/scientific-biographies/harvey-washington-wiley/ [https://perma.cc/2D68-P4WT\] (last visited July 13, 2026); Harvey W. Wiley: Pioneer Consumer Activist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.: FDA Consumer Mag. (Jan.–Feb. 2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/107977/download [https://perma.cc/WQP2-UNT8\].

  192. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA Consumer Mag., June 1981, at 32, 35, 37, 39; Clayton A. Coppin & Jack High, The Politics of Purity: Harvey Washington Wiley and the Origins of Federal Food Policy 31 (1999) (“The movement for a national food law came from food commissioners, agricultural chemists, manufacturers of expensive foods, representatives from rural agricultural states, and a small number of middle-class women.”).

  193. See Harvey A. Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet 39–40 (1988) (stating that “giant food processores [sic] . . . help[ed] push the legislation through Congress”); see also Robert C. Alberts, The Good Provider: H. J. Heinz and His 57 Varieties 166, 171–73 (1973) (“I appreciate the loyalty with which your father and all of his staff stood by me in the darkest hours of my fight for pure food. I feel that I should have lost the fight if I had not had that assistance. Dr. Harvey W. Wiley to Howard Heinz, 1924”); Coppin & High, supra note 192, at 4–5 (contending that “[i]nstead of a champion of purity, . . . [Wiley] work[ed] hand in glove with firms that benefited from his enforcement of the pure food law” and “Wiley himself was engaged in a difficult competitive struggle to maintain the size and importance of his bureau”).

  194. Coppin & High, supra note 192, at 31 (stating that “[t]he movement for a national food law came from [among others] a small number of middle-class women”).

  195. Jan Doolittle Wilson, Disunity in Diversity: The Controversy over the Admission of Black Women to the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, 1900–1902, J. Women’s Hist., Summer 2011, at 39, 41; Mary Jane Smith, The Fight to Protect Race and Regional Identity Within the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, 1895–1902, 94 Ga. Hist. Q. 479, 479–82 (2010); see also Levenstein, supra note 193, at 115 (discussing class); Haydu, supra note 187, at 632, 634, 640–44 (examining classism in the National Consumers’ League).

  196. Coppin & High, supra note 192, at 30.

  197. Id. at 118.

  198. Id. at 30.

  199. Id. at 24.

  200. Id. at 166. But see id. at 166–67 (arguing that the real issue was ultimately “who would benefit and lose from regulatory activity”).

  201. Id. at 3–4, 30.

  202. Id. at 30.

  203. See generally Young, Pure Food, supra note 187, at 146–87 (discussing the effects of scientific studies and empirical evidence on federal food law and the role of women); Goodwin, supra note 189, at 213–40 (discussing the role of women and women’s groups in the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906); Gail Jarrow, The Poison Eaters: Fighting Danger and Fraud in Our Food and Drugs 37–43 (2019) (“[I]nvestigat[ing] exactly how the human body reacted to . . . chemicals.”);Deborah Blum, The Poison Squad: One Chemist’s Single-Minded Crusade for Food Safety at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 5–7, 152 (2018) (describing Wiley’s role in the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act).

  204. Harvey W. Wiley, Preface to Volume Three of Harvey W. Wiley, Principles and Practice of Agricultural Analysis: A Manual for the Examination of Soils, Fertilizers, and Agricultural Products, at iii (1897), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/75389/75389-h/75389-h.htm [https://perma.cc/W2CA-FN2K\] (“During the progress of the work the author has frequently been asked why some special method in each case has not been designated as the proper one to be used. To do this would be a radical departure from the fundamental idea of the work; viz., to rely on the good judgment and experience of the chemist. It is not likely that the author’s judgment in such matters is better than that of the analyst using the book, and, except for beginning students pursuing a course of laboratory instruction, a biased judgment is little better than none at all.”); see also Jarrow, supra note 203, at 37 (quoting Wiley as stating “I arrive at my conclusions by experimentation, when experimentation can be used at all”). See generally Blum, supra note 203 (discussing Wiley’s early scientific work and his role in the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act).

  205. See, e.g., H.W. Wiley, Foods and Food Adulterants: Lard & Lard Adulterants, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Div. of Chemistry Bull. No. 13, at 402 (1889), https://archive.org/details/foodsfoodadulter13wile/page/404/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/S5AG-NQV9\] (describing the properties of lard and lard adulterants); see also Alex J. Wedderburn, A Popular Treatise on the Extent and Character of Food Adulterations, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Div. of Chemistry Bull. No. 25, at 5 (1890), https://archive.org/details/populartreatiseo00weddrich/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/L9HS-ZAA7\] (reporting on food adulteration and “evidence in regard to the extent and character of food adulterations, such information being derived largely from the work of the various State sanitary bodies, official reports, documents, and discussions upon which the laws of the different States were based, the laws of the various States themselves, and the expressions of numerous scientific men on this subject”); H.W. Wiley, Influence of Food Preservatives and Artificial Colors on Digestion and Health, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Div. of Chemistry Bull. No. 84, Pt. I, at 3 (1904), https://content.www.wellcomecollection.org/works/qkm67g45/items?canvas=7 [https://perma.cc/8V34-TS9D\] (“[R]eport[ing] on the experiments undertaken in [the Bureau of Chemistry] to ascertain the effects of boric acid and borax on digestion and health.”).

  206. While it is not possible to identify all instances of women’s participation at hearings conclusively based on the records, based on pronouns, titles, and honorifics, women’s participation in the hearings was limited. See, e.g., Adulteration of Food Products: Hearing to Accompany S. Res. 447, 56th Cong. 50–51 (1899) [hereinafter 56th Cong. S.R. 516]; Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on the Pure-Food Bills H.R. 3109, 12348, 9352, 276, and 4342, 57th Cong. 158 (1902) [hereinafter 57th Cong.]; Hearings Before the Committee on Manufactures of the United States Senate on the Bill S. 198, 58th Cong. (1904) [hereinafter 58th Cong.]; Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on the Pure-Food Bills H.R. 3044, 4527, 7018, 12071, 13086, 13853, and 13859, 59th Cong. 15–19, 248 (1906) [hereinafter 59th Cong., pt. 1].

  207. 56th Cong. S.R. 516, supra note 206, at 50–51 (statement of Dr. R. Kennedy Scobell). Dr. Scobell’s gender is not apparent from the record, although the framing of the testimony suggests the doctor is a woman. See id.

  208. Id. at 51 (noting that Dr. Scobell’s “own personal observations have been made in reference to the way foods are kept in places they are on sale,” that “[h]ousewives frequently complain of the hands of clerks in markets and groceries,” and that “a women physician” observed a market clerk with unclean hands).

  209. Id.

  210. Id.

  211. Id. (“Well, I have a paper here that will take me about two minutes to read.”).

  212. Id. at 216 (statement of Mrs. N. L. Stowe) (“I call myself a bee keeper, but I am really a home keeper.”).

  213. Id. at 216–17 (“I don’t know that I can tell anything more than has been said, but I should indorse all that Mr. York has said.”).

  214. See id.

  215. Id. at 553 (stating “the use of alum is undoubtedly deleterious to health, especially to children or ladies, or persons of weak digestion, perhaps more than to men in robust health”); see, e.g., 57th Cong., supra note 206, at 158 (also referenced men); id. at 423–24 (referencing a family who was reported to have been made sick after eating cakes made with alum baking powder); id. at 342, 589; 59th Cong., pt. 1, supra note 206, at 15–19, 248.

  216. See generally 56th Cong. S.R. 516, supra note 206, at v (“Attached to this report will be found the testimony of eminent scientific men, chemists, physiologists, and doctors of medicine, gentlemen of the very highest standing . . . .”). Accord 57th Cong., supra note 206; 59th Cong., pt. 1, supra note 206; 58th Cong., supra note 206.

  217. See, e.g., 59th Cong., pt. 1, supra note 206, at 3–5, 7, 180, 315; 58th Cong., supra note 206, at 14–17.

  218. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1040 (1938).

  219. U.S. Const. amend. XIX.

  220. See infra notes 224–35 and accompanying text.

  221. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.

  222. See infra notes 240–53 and accompanying text.

  223. See infra notes 224–58 and accompanying text.

  224. See Women SenatorsU.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/senators/ListofWomenSenators.htm [https://perma.cc/2MZH-FLUP\] (last visited July 18, 2026) (identifying Hattie W. Caraway as the sole woman senator in June 1938); Women Members by Congress, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Data/Women-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/YA27-PUX2\] (last visited July 19, 2026) (listing Nan Wood Honeyman, Virginia Ellis Jenckes, Mary Teresa Norton, Caroline Love Goodwin O’Day, and Edith Nourse Rogers as women members of Congress in June 1938).

  225. Caraway, Hattie Wyatt, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong. [hereinafter Caraway Biographical Directory], https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/C000138 [https://perma.cc/6YBR-ENSA\] (last visited July 16, 2026); Valerie Heitshusen, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34480, Enrollment of Legislation: Relevant Congressional Procedures 1–3 (Sep. 23, 2026), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL34480#\_Toc482860342 [https://perma.cc/2NUC-J9A7\]; Norton, Mary Teresa, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/19024 [https://perma.cc/QJZ5-FGAQ\] (last visited July 18, 2026); O’Day, Caroline Love Goodwin, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/19110 [https://perma.cc/JR54-GG2S\] (last visited July 16, 2026) (indicating congresswomen chaired the Committee on the District of Columbia, the Committee on Labor, and the Committee on Election of the President).

  226. Charles Wesley Dunn, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: A Statement of Its Legislative Record 1015 (1938); Caraway Biographical Directory, supra note 225 (indicating that Senator Caraway served as the Chair of the Committee on Enrolled Bills); Heitshusen, supra note 225, at 1–5 (noting the historical role of the Joint Committee on Enrollment). This function is now overseen in the Senate by the Secretary of the Senate. About the Secretary of the Senate, U.S. Senate: Offices of the Secretary, https://www.senate.gov/about/officers-staff/secretary-of-the-senate/offices-of-the-secretary.htm [https://perma.cc/PT6H-VLTD\] (last visited July 18, 2026).

  227. Congress Profiles: 76th Congress (1939–1941), U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/76th/ [https://perma.cc/6N7E-B5QQ\] (last visited Aug. 21, 2026) (listing the congressional leaders and officers during the 76th Congress, all of whom were male); see supra text accompanying note 225.

  228. See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 4749 (1935), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 280 (quoting a Senate colleague of Senator Caraway describing her as having taken “a very intelligent and active interest in the bill”); 80 Cong. Rec. 10677 (1936), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 627 (statement of Rep. William Purington Cole, Jr.); 83 Cong. Rec. 8002 (1938), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 969, 992 (identifying Senator Caraway as a Senate conferee); Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Com., 74th Cong. 358–59 (1935), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 1213 (identifying Senator Caraway as a member of subcommittee); 80 Cong. Rec. 10241 (1936), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 585 (noting that Congresswoman Jenckes introduced a bill); 78 Cong. Rec. 8957 (1934), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 155 (noting that Senator Caraway served on a subcommittee to which an early bill to change food and drug law was referred); Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 1944 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Com., 73d Cong. 1 (1933), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 1048; 83 Cong. Rec. 7789 (1938), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 889 (quoting a House colleague of Congresswoman O’Day who indicated that if O’Day had not been absent due to illness, she “would be one of those most interested and most active in discussing this bill”).

  229. U.S. Const. amends. XIV, XV.

  230. See Keyssar, supra note 175, at 228–36.

  231. Black-American Members by Congress, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/YFW5-SL7M\] (last visited July 16, 2026) (identifying Congressman Arthur Wergs Mitchell as the sole African American member of Congress).

  232. Hispanic American Senators, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/senators/hispanic-american-senators.htm [https://perma.cc/GDD5-TSCL\] (last visited July 18, 2026) (identifying Senator Dennis Chavez as the sole Hispanic American Senator).

  233. Hispanic-American Representatives, Senators, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners by Congress, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/HAIC/Historical-Data/Hispanic-American-Representatives,-Senators,-Delegates,-and-Resident-Commissioners-by-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/HQ5M-PLJ6\] (last visited Aug. 21, 2026) (listing Congressman Joachim Octave Fernández and Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias).

  234. American Indian SenatorsU.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/senators/american-indian-senators.htm [https://perma.cc/W7P2-PAAX\] (last visited July 19, 2026).

  235. Asian and Pacific Islander American Representatives, Senators, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners by Congress, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/APA/Historical-Data/By-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/LM9J-KEAF\] (last visited July 13, 2026); see Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Congress, Introduction, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art, & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/APA/Historical-Essays/Introduction/Introduction/ [https://perma.cc/2ZPC-UJJM\] (last visited Sep. 27, 2026) (noting parallels between the experiences of Asian Pacific American and Hispanic Americans in Congress and noting that “[q]uite often these statutory representatives functioned more like envoys, ministers without portfolio, or public relations agents rather than lawmakers”).

  236. Rachel Fesler Nyswander & Janet M. Hooks, Employment of Women in the Federal Government: 1923 to 1939 app. A at 49–52 tbls. I, II, & III (1941). The United States resident population was approximately 65,235,361 (50.2%) male and 64,589,578 (49.8%) female according to a July 1, 1938 Census estimate. See Resident Population—Estimates by Age, Sex, and Race: July 1, 1938, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/1900-1980/national/asrh/pe-11-1938.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S8L-PJAK\] (last visited Sep. 27, 2026) (excluding Alaska and Hawaii).

  237. See generally Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 Gender & Soc’y 139 (1990) (contending that organizational structures are not gender neutral); Fraser, supra note 60, at 58–65, 73 (using critical theory to critique the idealized concept of the public sphere); Jasanoff, supra note 13 (examining the role of experts in American administrative process, including at FDA).

  238. See Walter G. Campbell, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-leadership-1907-today/walter-campbell [https://perma.cc/F6UR-EN9Q\]; Charles Crawford, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-leadership-1907-today/charles-crawford [https://perma.cc/6UBP-MZ46\].

  239. See Developments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 632, 634–65 (1954).

  240. See Ruth deForest Lamb: FDA’s First Chief Educational Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history-exhibits/ruth-deforest-lamb-fdas-first-chief-educational-officer [https://perma.cc/22KJ-5VB2\] (“American Chamber of Horrors, published in 1936, . . . played a key role in explaining to the public, to Congressmen, and particularly to their wives, the importance of updating the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act. Her untiring efforts to engage and acknowledge the activism of women’s groups in support of a new statute bore fruit as women shaped many provisions of the new law passed to replace the Wiley Act: The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”); Gwen Kay, Healthy Public Relations: The FDA’s 1930s Legislative Campaign, 75 Bull. Hist. Med. 446, 452, 473–75 (2001) (discussing the role of the FDA Information Office and identifying Lamb as one of its heads).

  241. See Suzanne White Junod, Ruth de Forest Lamb: FDA’s First Chief Educational Officer, FDLJ Update, May–June 2004, at 49, 49–50. Her principal role “was to devise and publicize a response to the writings of the so-called ‘guinea pig muckrakers,’ the next-generation investigative journalists . . . who concentrated on problem products in the burgeoning consumer marketplace.” Id. at 49.

  242. Ruth deForest Lamb, American Chamber of Horrors: The Truth About Food and Drugs (1936).

  243. The American Chamber of Horrors, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/histories-product-regulation/american-chamber-horrors [https://perma.cc/TW8G-PJ8H\]; see also Kay, supra note 240, at 474 (stating that despite using “information to which people outside government would not have had access,” such as “the letters of private citizens to President and Mrs. Roosevelt . . . and the knowledge of her superiors that she was working on [the American Chamber of Horrors], both Lamb and the FDA maintained that she wrote the book as a private citizen . . . rather than as a government agent”).

  244. Junod, supra note 241, at 50.

  245. See Maurine H. Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment 2, 9, 12 (1987) (“Eleanor Roosevelt emerged as the most influential woman of her day largely because she was able to utilize the media both to advance the causes in which she was interested and to realize her own potential.”); id. at 3 (stating that “[a]s first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, of course, had no official role”).

  246. Junod, supra note 241, at 50; Lamb, supra note 242, at ix–x.

  247. See Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner, Changing the First Lady’s Mystique: Defining the First Lady’s Legal Role and Upending Gender Norms, 13 U. Mass. L. Rev. 2, 6, 8–9, 24 (2018) (identifying Eleanor Roosevelt as an example of a first lady who has “reshaped the office from one focused exclusively on ceremonial duties to more formal policymaking and advising of the President” and being criticized for it); see also Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies, 10 Persps. on Pol. 37, 38–41 (2012) (discussing informal institutions in established democracies).

  248. See supra text accompanying notes 237–38.

  249. For a discussion of the role women played in bringing attention to the problems of cosmetics and their regulation leading up to the 1938 Act, see Boyd, supra note 9, at 313.

  250. See 78 Cong. Rec. 8957 (1934), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 155 (statement of Senator Copeland) (discussing S. 1944 and noting that “[t]he committee heard various citizens who were interested, including a number of women, who were and are greatly interested; for I assure Senators that from the time of the fight under Dr. Wiley in the old days in 1906, when the original bill was passed, there has never been a let-up in the interest which the women of the country have taken in matters having to do with pure food and drugs. So they were heard.”). But see Cavers, supra note 171, at 8 (noting that “[s]ome consumer support had been hurriedly marshalled, chiefly among women’s organizations, but the great majority of those testifying at the hearings were representatives of industry”).

  251. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter & Gisela Sin, Policy Tragedy and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 149, 157–58, 166, 171 (2007) (“Instead, two forces—the FDA . . . and organized women’s groups—exercised strong leverage in pressing for changes to the 1906 law. One of their principal successes was finding able legislative sponsors, principally Senator Royal Copeland (D–NY) and Representative Virgil Chapman (D–KY).”).

  252. Charles O. Jackson, Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal 65–66, 76, 138 (1970).

  253. 83 Cong. Rec. 7789 (1938), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 890; id. at 1013 (quoting an editorial stating that “[t]he conflict has aroused such public interest that representatives of 14 national organizations of women, in an appeal to Senator Copeland, declared that they would seek a Presidential veto unless the court-review section were eliminated”); see also Jackson, supra note 252, at 198 (noting that Lamb later congratulated the fourteen organizations on the final achievement of the 1938 Act).

  254. Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 2800 Before the Comm. on Com., 73d Cong513 (1934), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 1124 (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture).

  255. See id.

  256. 79 Cong. Rec. 4748 (1935), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 278; 83 Cong. Rec. App. 2280 (1938), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 226, at 964–67 (“But although it is recognized that a farmer has a right to know what he feeds his pigs, S. 5 does not recognize that women are entitled to as much information about the foods they give their children.”); see also Lamb, supra note 242, at vi (dedicating the book to “THAT GALLANT GROUP OF WOMEN WHO HAVE BEEN HOLDING THE FRONT-LINE TRENCHES IN THE CONSUMERS’ WAR FOR PURE FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS”).

  257. Jackson, supra note 252, at 213 (“The women in particular were quite convinced that a new law was in their personal interest.”).

  258. Thus, women’s efforts were structurally subordinated. This does not mean that their advocacy was ineffective. To the contrary, contemporary accounts of the enactment of the 1938 Act and later historical examinations credit women and women’s organizations with helping push through the Act. See, e.g., Carpenter & Sin, supra note 251, at 149–50, 157; Jackson, supra note 252, at 198.

  259. See supra notes 224–58 and accompanying text.

  260. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 301, 52 Stat. 1040, 1042 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331).

  261. See, e.g., Susan Strasser, Never Done: A History of American Housework 6, 159 (1982); Deborah Fink & Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa Farm Women in the 1930s: A Reassessment, 49 Annals of Iowa 570, 572, 576 (1989).

  262. See supra Parts II–III.

  263. See supra Sections III.A–B. The language of the 1938 statute itself defines food in reference to “man.” See FDCA §§ 1, 201(f), 52 Stat. at 1040; see also Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (defining “food” in relevant part to “include all articles used for food . . . by man”). Cf. FDCA §§ 201(g), 502(d), 52 Stat. at 1041, 1051 (referring to man in drug provisions); Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 § 6, 34 Stat. at 769 (referring to “man” in the drug definition). This gendered language may be viewed as not merely stylistic, but possibly as reflecting prevailing assumptions about who counted as a participant in governance and whose interests the law protected. See Martha Traylor, Gender in Statutory Language: A Look at Its Use and Misuse, 2 Seton Hall Legis. J. 17, 22, 30 (1976). This is particularly the case when the definition of food is read alongside the legislative history of the 1938 Act and contemporary accounts of the problems of food law, with their references to “housewi[ves]” and their roles in “protect[ing] the health of her family.” See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 226, at 238, 966, 1074–75; Lamb, supra note 242, at 142, 168; Arthur Kallet & F.J. Schlink, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs: Dangers in Everyday Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics 35 (1933).

  264. See supra Part III.

  265. See supra Sections III.A–B.

  266. See supra Sections III.A–B.

  267. Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 135, at 1176, 1181, 1214.

  268. See Jacquineau Azétsop & Tisha R. Joy, Access to Nutritious Food, Socioeconomic Individualism and Public Health Ethics in the USA: A Common Good Approach, 8 Philos. Ethics Humanit. Med., no. 16, Dec. 2013, at 1, 4–7.

  269. See Questions & Answers for Consumers Concerning Infant Formula, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (May 17, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/food/people-risk-foodborne-illness/questions-answers-consumers-concerning-infant-formula#2 [https://perma.cc/BA4U-PNNE\]; FDCA § 412, 21 U.S.C. § 350a; 21 C.F.R. §§ 106.70(b), 107.100(a) (2020).

  270. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Warns Consumers Not to Use Certain Powdered Infant Formula Produced in Abbott Nutrition’s Facility in Sturgis, Michigan (Feb. 17, 2022), https://web.archive.org/web/20220218000251/https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-consumers-not-use-certain-powdered-infant-formula-produced-abbott-nutritions-facility [https://perma.cc/KMR8-2CAL\]; Immediate National Strategy to Increase the Resiliency of the U.S. Infant Formula Market, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 28, 2023), https://web.archive.org/web/20241209161637/https://www.fda.gov/food/infant-formula-guidance-documents-regulatory-information/immediate-national-strategy-increase-resiliency-us-infant-formula-market [https://perma.cc/Y4W7-LSA4\]; see also Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Eng’g, & Med., Challenges in Supply, Market Competition, and Regulation of Infant Formula in the United States 2, 148 (Barbara O. Schneeman et al. eds., 2024) (assessing and reporting on “Challenges in Supply, Market Competition, and Regulation of Infant Formula” and the 2022 infant formula shortage).

  271. Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Eng’g, & Med., supra note 270, at 3, 7, 12, 15–17, 200–01; see, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 106.70, 107.100.

  272. Formula Safety and Supply: Protecting the Health of America’s Babies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 117th Cong. 75 (2022) (statement of Robert M. Califf, Comm’r of Food & Drugs; Frank Yiannas, Deputy Comm’r, Food Pol’y & Response; Susan T. Mayne, Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition), https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg61456/CHRG-117hhrg61456.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QMW-VP8Z\].

  273. Karina Cernioglo & Jennifer T. Smilowitz, Infant Feeding Practices and Parental Perceptions During the 2022 United States Infant Formula Shortage Crisis, BMC Pediatr., June 2023, at 1, 8 (finding a significant increase in the use of “deleterious feeding practices including the use of watered-down infant formula”); Karla Damian-Medina et al., Cross-Sectional Analysis of Infant Diet, Outcomes, Consumer Behavior and Parental Perspectives to Optimize Infant Feeding in Response to the 2022 U.S. Infant Formula Shortage, Nutrients, Mar. 2024, at 1, 9.

  274. See Bartlett, supra note 152, at 837.

  275. Allison C. Sylvetsky et al., Mothers’ Experiences During the 2022 Infant Formula Shortage in Washington D.C., 28 Matern. Child Health J. 873, 875, 881–83 (2023); Dominique DuBois et al., Impact of the 2022 Infant Formula Shortage on Self-Reported Rates of Anxiety and Depression: Evidence from the Household Pulse Survey, 38 J. Perinat. & Neonatal Nurs. 326, 328, 329 tbl. 1, 331 (2024).

  276. Sylvetsky et al., supra note 275, at 881.

  277. See FDCA § 412, 21 U.S.C. § 350a; 21 C.F.R. §§ 106.70, 107.100(a) (2020). The regulations do contain labeling requirements, including directions for use, that are directed to caregivers. Id. § 107.20.

  278. See, e.g., FDA Advises Parents and Caregivers to Not Make or Feed Homemade Infant Formula to Infants, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/food/alerts-advisories-safety-information/fda-advises-parents-and-caregivers-not-make-or-feed-homemade-infant-formula-infants [https://perma.cc/NS3Q-AJ8Y\]; FDA Investigation of Cronobacter Infections: Powdered Infant Formula (February 2022), U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 1, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/fda-investigation-cronobacter-infections-powdered-infant-formula-february-2022 [https://perma.cc/AXF9-8XY9\].

  279. This account resonates with Lingxi Chenyang’s account of “food antidemocracy,” which describes how antidemocratic actions systematically limited democratic participation and accountability in the Farm Bills. Chenyang, supra note 106 (manuscript at 3–5, 30–31).

  280. See Young, Polity and Gender Difference, supra note 64, at 256, 268–69, 272.

  281. See Samantha Bent Weber & Dawn Pepin, Why Law Is a Determinant of Health, 50 Stetson L. Rev. 401, 408 (2021); Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1655–56 & fig. 2, 1663 (2011); see also Solar & Irwin, supra note 140, at 5–6 & fig. A, 35 fig. 2 (setting forth a framework for “structural determinants” and “social determinants of health inequities”); Social Determinants of Health, supra note 139 (“Social determinants of health . . . are the conditions in the environments where people are born, live, learn, work, play, worship, and age that affect a wide range of health, functioning, and quality-of-life outcomes and risks.”).

  282. See Burris, supra note 281, at 1654; Weber & Pepin, supra note 281, at 408, 410.

  283. See Geoffrey Rose, Rose’s Strategy of Preventive Medicine 95–96, 103, 107–08, 110 (2008).

  284. See Scott Burris et al., A Transdisciplinary Approach to Public Health Law: The Emerging Practice of Legal Epidemiology, 37 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 135, 139–41 (2016).

  285. See generally Margot J. Pollans, Abundance and Other Food Fixations, 96 U. Colo. L. Rev. 209 (2025) (arguing that U.S. food law is abundance-promoting even when such abundance causes harm); Margot J. Pollans, Eaters, Powerless by Design, 120 Mich. L. Rev. 643, 646–48, 657 (2022) (arguing that food law entrenches existing power structures and renders “[e]aters, [p]owerless by [d]esign”); Chenyang, supra note 279 (manuscript at 31).

  286. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)); see also FDCA § 403(q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (nutrition information).

  287. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 2(a); FDCA § 403, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (misbranded food).

  288. While this example focuses on nutrition facts labeling, similar arguments may apply to other food law requirements regarding information disclosure—e.g., ingredient labeling, supplement facts labeling, menu labeling, and allergen labeling. See, e.g., FDCA § 403(i), (q), (s), (w), 21 U.S.C. § 343(i), (q), (s), (w). It may also apply to information disclosure requirements for other FDA-regulated product categories, although those requirements and categories are outside of the scope of this Article.

  289. See, e.g., Fred R. Shank, The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 47 Food & Drug L.J. 247, 249–50 (1992).

  290. See FDCA § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331; FDCA § 403(q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q).

  291. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 2(a) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)); Shank, supra note 289, at 249–50; Nestle, supra note 129, at 358–59. But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 135–37 (2014) (arguing that nutritional labeling may have little effect on consumers’ dietary choices).

  292. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 2(a) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)); Beyranevand & Winters, supra note 14, at 490–93; Shank, supra note 289, at 249–50. Cf. Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34669 (June 17, 2015) (announcing that “FDA has determined that there is no longer a consensus that PHOs, the primary source of industrially-produced trans fat, are generally recognized as safe for use in human food, based on current scientific evidence”—thus, the use of PHOs without an approved food additive petition would render the food adulterated and prohibited under the FDCA).

  293. Robert Crawford, Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life, 10 Int’l. J. Health Servs. 365, 368 (1980); see also Clare Herrick & Kirsten Bell, Revisiting Robert Crawford’s ‘Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life’, Socio. Health & Illn., May 2026, at 1, 2 (examining healthism as an analytical lens); Talia Welsh, The Affirmative Culture of Healthy Self-Care: A Feminist Critique of the Good Health Imperative, 13 Int’l J. Fem. Approaches To Bioethics, Spring 2020, at 27, 28–33 (arguing that health ideals shift responsibility for health onto individuals, obscuring structural sources of inequality, and transforming health practices into measures of moral worth rather than morally neutral personal choices); Ruqaiijah Yearby, The Social Determinants of Health, Health Disparities, and Health Justice, 50 J.L. Med. & Ethics 641, 641–44, 646 (2022) (discussing health justice and structural discrimination).

  294. See Lindsay F. Wiley, The Struggle for the Soul of Public Health, 41 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 1083, 1085 (2016); Welsh, supra note 293, at 28–30, 37; Herrick & Bell, supra note 293, at 2.

  295. Andrea Freeman, Behavioral Economics and Food Policy: The Limits of Nudging, in Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics 124, 124–25 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher T. Robertson eds., 2016) (noting that “[b]ehavioral economics represents only one tool among many available to the government to combat obesity and improve health outcomes” and identifying “nutrition labeling” as a form of “[g]entle soft paternalism seek[ing] to alter behavior through information provision and other cognitive strategies”); see also supra note 291 and accompanying text (noting that disclosure requirements presume informed consumers make better dietary choices); infra notes 297–302 and accompanying text (noting that FDA’s nutrition label regulations expressly incorporate individualistic healthism).

  296. Freeman, supra note 295, at 131–34; see also Julie Guthman, Weighing In: Obesity, Food Justice, and the Limits of Capitalism 9 (2011) (suggesting that obesity “is an ecological condition that . . . requires, if we are to understand it in a comprehensive way, that we pay attention to the broader political-economic and cultural context in which individual decisions affecting ecologies—even internal, bodily ecologies—are made”).

  297. Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rules to Amend the Food Labeling Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 2927, 2940 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 20, 100, 101, 105, 130).

  298. See Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 Fed. Reg. 33742, 33746–47 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (discussing the “Need To Update the Nutrition Facts and Supplement Facts Labels”).

  299. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Regulatory Impact Analysis for Final Rules on: “Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels” (Docket No. FDA-2012-N-1210) and “Food Labeling: Serving Sizes of Foods That Can Reasonably Be Consumed at One Eating Occasion; Dual-Column Labeling; Updating, Modifying, and Establishing Certain Reference Amounts Customarily Consumed; Serving Size for Breath Mints; and Technical Amendments” (Docket No. FDA-2004-N-0258) 5 (2018) [hereinafter RIA for Final Rules on Food Labeling], https://www.fda.gov/media/98712/download [https://perma.cc/A5Z8-TSP3\]. FDA combined the regulatory impact analysis for the nutrition facts rule and the serving size rule. See id.

  300. See id. at 9–11.

  301. Id. at 11.

  302. Id. at 13, 16.

  303. See, e.g., Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rules to Amend the Food Labeling Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 2927, 2936 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 20, 100, 101, 105, 130) (referencing the cost of “reading and understanding labels”); Migena Proi et al., Bottom-Up and Top-Down Factors Influencing Consumer Responses to Food Labels: A Scoping Review of Eye-Tracking Studies, Agric. & Food Econ., July 2025, at 1, 2, 23; Guojie Ma & Xiangling Zhuang, Nutrition Label Processing in the Past 10 Years: Contributions from Eye Tracking Approach, Appetite, Jan. 2021, at 1, 2, 6–8 (examining literature on nutrition labeling processing); Consumers Don’t Pay as Much Attention to Nutrition Fact Labels as They Think, Eye-Tracking Study Finds, ScienceDaily (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/10/111024084634.htm [https://perma.cc/4KW6-SCNX\]; see also How to Understand and Use the Nutrition Facts Label, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.fda.gov/food/nutrition-facts-label/how-understand-and-use-nutrition-facts-label [https://perma.cc/K6RC-7FHS\] (explaining how to read and understand nutrition labels).

  304. Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rules to Amend the Food Labeling Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2936 (“[T]he agency notes that the cost of changing dietary behavior is greater than the cost of simply reading and understanding labels.”).

  305. RIA for Final Rules on Food Labeling, supra note 299, at 11, 76, 87.

  306. Jason Abaluck, What Would We Eat if We Knew More: The Implications of a Large-Scale Change in Nutrition Labeling 4 (2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2012-N-1210-0881 [https://perma.cc/86HW-AT6A\].

  307. See, e.g., RIA for Final Rules on Food Labeling, supra note 299, at 87, 94.

  308. See id. at 68 n.27, 87.

  309. Id. at 87.

  310. See id. at 26 (quoting U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Nutrition Facts, Serving Size Combined Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis 6 (2018)).

  311. See supra Section II.E.1.

  312. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 79 Fed. Reg. 11880, 11887 (proposed Mar. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); Brandon J. Restrepo, Who Regularly Uses the Nutrition Facts Label? Exploring Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Geographic Differences, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.: Econ. Rsch. Serv. (May 2025), https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publications/112646/ERR-345_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/75BN-EEPW\].

  313. Restrepo, supra note 312. Nutrition Facts label use was also higher among Hispanic consumers versus non-Hispanic White consumers, those with 4+ years of college versus adults with less than a high school diploma, higher income households versus lower income households, and residents in large metropolitan areas versus residents of nonmetropolitan areas. Id.; see also Kimberly A. Stran & Linda L. Knol, Determinants of Food Label Use Differ by Sex, 113 J. Acad. Nutr. Diet. 673, 677 (2013), https://www.jandonline.org/article/S2212-2672(12)02017-5/fulltext [https://perma.cc/2LB2-3M5T\] (“These findings suggest that women check the majority of the label components more consistently than men. Results are congruent with the majority of research on food label use.”).

  314. There may be barriers which hinder people’s ability to use nutrition labels or increase the costs of doing so. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Blitstein, Joanne F. Guthrie & Caroline Rains, Low-Income Parents’ Use of Front-of-Package Nutrition Labels in a Virtual Supermarket, 52 J. Nutr. Educ. & Behav. 850, 850 (2020), https://www.jneb.org/article/S1499-4046(20)30161-5/fulltext [https://perma.cc/4F43-FFZ6\]. The authors state:

    Differentiating between a healthier and a less healthy product using nutrition facts labels requires nutrition knowledge, numeracy skill, and the time and motivation to process and compare nutrition information. The challenge may be exacerbated in low-income households. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) shoppers, for example, who tend to be younger, have fewer years of formal education, and are less likely to use nutrition labels. In addition, research shows that low-income working families may face demands on their time, such as required overtime hours, varying shifts, and lack of job flexibility, that affect grocery shopping practices.

    Id. (footnotes omitted). And nutrition labels may have negative effects on health for some people. Nora Trompeter et al., Impact of Out-of-Home Nutrition Labelling on People with Eating Disorders: A Systematic Review and Meta-Synthesis, BMJ Public Health, Jan. 2025, at 1, 11, https://bmjpublichealth.bmj.com/content/3/1/e000862 [https://perma.cc/H9BQ-7KDY\] (“Overall, the evidence we have reviewed points towards predominantly negative impacts of such labels on people with eating disorders.”).

  315. See, e.g., Siyi Shangguan et al., A Meta-Analysis of Food Labeling Effects on Consumer Diet Behaviors and Industry Practices, 56 Am. J. Prev. Med. 300, 306–07 (2019) (reviewing sixty intervention studies); Miri Lutski et al., Nutrition Fact Label Use and Adherence to the DASH Dietary Pattern: Results from a National Health and Nutrition Survey, Prev. Chronic Dis., June 2025, at 1, 4–5, https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2025/24_0426.htm [https://perma.cc/F4HH-LNRQ\].

  316. Allison Daminger, The Cognitive Dimension of Household Labor, 84 Am. Socio. Rev. 609, 610 (2019).

  317. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Housework: Who Did, Does or Will Do It, and How Much Does It Matter?, 91 Soc. Forces 55, 56 (2012) (“In 2009/10, women are estimated to do 1.6 times the amount of housework as men, on average (with wives averaging 1.7 times the housework of husbands, and married mothers averaging 1.9 times the housework of married fathers).”); Daminger, supra note 316, at 610, 619.

  318. Daminger, supra note 316, at 610.

  319. See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 291, at 135–37.

  320. See, e.g., Daminger, supra note 316, at 619–21; Elizabeth Aviv et al., Cognitive Household Labor: Gender Disparities and Consequences for Maternal Mental Health and Wellbeing, 28 Arch. Womens Ment. Health 5, 9–10 (2025).

  321. Ana Catalano Weeks, The Political Consequences of the Mental Load, 42 Eur. Socio. Rev. 372, 383 (2026).

  322. Id. at 378–79, 383.

  323. See, e.g., Dietary Guidelines, supra note 137, at vii.