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Vol. 48, Issue 3, 2011September 23, 2011 CDT

An Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder Opt-In as a Solution to the Managerial Power Problem

Andrew L. Bethune,
corporate agency problemexcessive compensationexecutive compensationshareholder opt-in
Photo by rawpixel on Unsplash
Hous. L. Rev.
Andrew L. Bethune, An Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder Opt-In as a Solution to the Managerial Power Problem, 48 Hous. L. Rev. (2011).
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