I. Introduction

Olympism, as defined in the Olympic Charter, “is a philosophy . . . [that] seeks to create a way of life based on . . . social responsibility and respect for internationally recognised human rights and universal fundamental ethical principles within the remit of the Olympic Movement.”[1] The Olympic Charter is a beautifully written document that portrays the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the pinnacle of benevolence, acceptance, and compassion in the world of international sport.[2] However, several of the Olympic Games (the Olympics or the Games) over the last century highlight a stark contrast between what the IOC says and what it does, revealing countless troubling inconsistencies between the idealistic principles of Olympism and the organization’s own actions, or lack thereof.[3]

The allure of the Olympics lies in its ability to bring the world together, to celebrate human achievement, and to promote the values of Olympism, making it a coveted event for countries around the globe.[4] In the eyes of the elites submitting bids to host the Games, the potential benefits, such as economic growth and urban renewal, outweigh the most common drawbacks, such as environmental degradation and human rights violations, that inevitably occur as a result of such an enormous undertaking like hosting a worldwide sporting competition.[5]

To be sure, the Games inspire millions of people, provide a platform for athletes worldwide, and foster a sense of global unity—but at what cost? This Comment examines and seeks to mitigate that cost by proposing a revitalized host nation selection process with additional oversight of the IOC by unaffiliated, international, nongovernmental organizations, ensuring that the pursuit of profit never eclipses humanitarian and environmental concerns. Part II provides an overview of the history, membership, and legal structure of the IOC, exploring why such abuses persist, while also delving into the IOC’s recent claim of alignment with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). Part III includes a discussion of past Games that have failed to uphold the principles of Olympism, emphasizing the social and environmental impacts on communities. Part IV considers recent progress by the IOC to align its proclaimed mission with its on-the-ground behavior. Part V discusses alternative means for justice and proposes a revitalized host-nation selection process that quantifies key metrics for sustainability and public support while advocating for unaffiliated oversight bodies to monitor IOC behavior and enforce compliance with the Olympic Charter. Finally, Part VI emphasizes the need for structured governance mechanisms to address social and environmental harms proactively, so that legal recourse against the IOC is never necessary.

After examining the IOC’s authority and structure, this Part explores the roadblocks plaintiffs encounter in holding the IOC accountable, including its unequal power dynamic with host nations and the limitations of international law, arbitration, and domestic courts.

A. The IOC, Generally

The IOC is a nongovernmental organization established in 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin.[6] It retains ownership of the Olympic symbols while entrusting the organization of the Games to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the selected host country.[7] The Olympic Charter serves as the foundational document of the IOC, outlining the principles, rules, and regulations that govern the Olympic Movement.[8] This Olympic Charter legitimizes the IOC’s authority, although its status as an international organization relies heavily on global recognition and voluntary adherence to its guidelines.[9] Most notably, in 2009, the IOC was granted Permanent Observer status at the UN, solidifying the organization’s legitimacy on the international stage.[10]

The IOC is known for its diverse membership, with a significant portion of it comprised of global elites, former heads of state, business tycoons, and influential world figures.[11] These elites play a crucial role in shaping the IOC’s policies, decisions, overall direction,[12] and, perhaps most importantly, are selected internally by the IOC.[13] Members represent the IOC within their respective countries, rather than their country at the IOC.[14] The inclusion of powerful, influential figures in tandem with the Olympic Charter gives the IOC an aura of prestige and legitimacy.[15] Members have extensive political connections, which can facilitate negotiations that are not only essential for organizing the Games but also for influencing meaningful social reform.[16] While their involvement should enable the IOC to navigate complex diplomatic landscapes more effectively, this is not the case.[17] Members tend to use their prestige to advocate for policies and initiatives that align with their national interests or the interests of their respective NOCs, rather than to promote positive humanitarian and environmental policies.[18] Consequently, the IOC’s focus skews towards maintaining relationships with influential stakeholders rather than addressing the needs and concerns of all participants in the Olympic Movement.[19]

B. The IOC’s Relationship with Host Nations

The relationship between the IOC and host nations relies on extensive diplomatic negotiations and commitments.[20] Host countries provide assurances of their intent to comply with IOC rules and regulations, resulting in a general unwillingness to bring cases against the IOC. This is mirrored by the IOC’s general unwillingness to intervene in problematic cases, as both sides seek to maintain favorable relations in facilitating a successful Olympics.[21] This dynamic often results in a precarious balance of power. Because the IOC seeks to secure its interests, host nations may feel pressure to conform to IOC demands, potentially at the expense of their legal systems and local populations.[22] The implications of these relationships extend beyond the immediate logistical needs of the Games, raising important questions about the accountability of the IOC to local communities and stakeholders and the efficacy of mega-sporting events more generally.[23] Finally, the predominance of global elites within the IOC raises questions about representation and equity in Olympic governance, highlighting the challenge of ensuring that the voices of all stakeholders within the Olympic Movement are heard and considered in decision-making processes.[24]

C. The Lack of Available Recourse Under International Law

The need for a more robust host nation selection process—one overseen by impartial organizations with the legal authority to compel compliance with established Customary International Law (CIL)—is no more apparent than after an examination of the limits of recourse available today. The formation of CIL has been driven by both state action and non-state International Organizations (IOs) such as the Red Cross and the UN.[25] Frameworks within these institutions result in constitutive norms, collaborative lawmaking, and compliance mechanisms, paving the way for new peremptory norms to be formed not just by states, but also by IOs.[26]

In the modern world, governance in the international legal system emerges from state cooperation within organizations like the UN, where states negotiate predictable behaviors that lay the groundwork for norms resembling law.[27] The IOC, although a private entity, similarly influences CIL by fostering consistent behaviors among states, which may gradually acquire the force of law.[28] Treaties, the clearest form of binding international law, are reserved for states, while IOs operate within the realm of “soft law,” influencing state behavior without formal binding authority.[29] The IOC, with its established authority and international legal personality, operates autonomously, complicating legal accountability.[30] Although the IOC lacks the sovereignty required to directly enforce compliance among governments, it can be argued that the Olympic Charter embodies key international norms and therefore functions as CIL.[31] Further, the IOC’s legitimacy and attempts at recognition have solidified its status in international law.[32] In 2009, the IOC was granted Permanent Observer status at the UN,[33] and in 2022, a UN resolution recognized the global importance of major international sporting events, reinforcing the significance of the IOC in international relations.[34] Despite these achievements, significant gaps in accountability mechanisms remain, leaving vulnerable groups with few options for redress.[35] Applying the framework of CIL to the IOC highlights the IOC’s significant normative influence, which requires it to leverage its capacity to reinforce desirable behaviors and address failures to uphold human rights or environmental commitments.[36]

Peremptory norms, or jus cogens, refer to principles of CIL that are universally recognized and from which derogation is generally not allowed.[37] Some of the most vital and substantive jus cogens of the modern day include human rights ideals enshrined in multilateral agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).[38] Only sovereign states have the ability to join treaties according to the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.[39] Consequently, the IOC lacks the legal status necessary to join agreements like the ICCPR and ICESCR. However, many scholars argue that certain provisions of these international human rights treaties have attained the status of CIL, which would obligate organizations like the IOC to conform, irrespective of whether they are formally bound by the treaties.[40] For example, nondiscrimination, the right to an adequate standard of living, and protection against forced displacement are widely recognized under CIL.[41]

Further, in 2022, the IOC, as a permanent observer of the UN, voluntarily aligned itself with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP).[42] By incorporating the principles of the UNGP into its 2022 Strategic Framework on Human Rights, the IOC committed to addressing risks to individuals affected by its operations.[43] The UNGP emphasizes the right to effective remedies, providing access to both judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms for victims to seek redress for human rights abuses.[44] However, while recently adopted by the IOC, these mechanisms fall short as its voluntary commitments are continuously undermined by an absence of legally binding enforcement mechanisms.[45] International human rights bodies, like the UN Human Rights Committee, focus on state actors and rarely address cases involving private entities like the IOC, leaving victims with no international avenue for redress.[46] Thus, there is a need for stronger accountability mechanisms, without which the IOC’s reliance on voluntary frameworks and soft law instruments risks undermining its credibility as a global advocate for human rights.[47] As CIL continues to evolve, it is imperative for the IOC to align in principle and in practice with the fundamental norms of international law to ensure that its influence promotes justice and sustainability, but it appears that it is not willing to do so on its own.

D. The Lack of Available Recourse Through Arbitration

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was established in 1983 as a means for resolving disputes within the Olympic Movement,[48] with jurisdiction over “any private dispute with a nexus to sport.”[49] With its jurisdiction limited primarily to commercial disputes and disciplinary cases, CAS is an ideal venue for addressing grievances between athletes and their NOCs or the IOC.[50] However, its potential to adjudicate broader claims, such as those brought by host nation community members alleging human rights violations linked to the Olympics, remains unrealized. This limitation arises not only from CAS’s focus on sports law over broader international law principles but also from its close ties to the IOC, which raises serious concerns about its independence and impartiality.[51] Originally, the CAS was both manned and funded by the IOC, which hardly made it an impartial body.[52] In 1994, reforms to CAS established the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) to manage CAS operations and funding, reducing IOC control.[53] Despite this reform, in many ways, CAS and ICAS remain dependent on the IOC, which continues to control the appointment of some of the people who serve within CAS’s governing bodies.[54] Consequently, many critical human rights matters remain unaddressed.[55] The continued dependence on IOC appointments, financial support, and statutory control signals that CAS continues to operate more as an extension of the IOC than as a neutral, international arbitration tribunal, leading to potential conflicts of interest.[56] Consequently, while CAS has the framework to uphold the ideals of the Olympic Charter, its jurisdictional and structural constraints hinder its ability to serve as a comprehensive forum for all affected stakeholders.[57]

E. The Lack of Available Recourse in Domestic Courts

Legal challenges against the IOC in domestic courts also encounter significant obstacles. The IOC is largely immune from traditional financial or political pressure, as efforts to assert jurisdiction are often complicated by the organization’s “[d]eep pockets, a well-connected membership, and complete freedom from government oversight.”[58] For one thing, the legitimacy of the IOC and the Olympic Charter’s authority under international law has often been prioritized over domestic law in various court cases.[59] Such cases illustrate the IOC’s role as a significant actor in international law, necessitating compliance with its rules and decisions, but lacking redress for those abused by the Olympic Games.[60]

Further, given the international nature of cases that involve the IOC, which may be tied to diplomatic relations and foreign policy, domestic courts frequently invoke the political question doctrine, suggesting that disputes involving the IOC fall under executive rather than judicial oversight, further limiting plaintiffs’ avenues for redress.[61] The Host City Contract (HCC) further complicates this landscape. By delegating the execution of the Games to the host city, the NOC, and the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), the HCC holds these parties jointly and severally liable for all obligations.[62] Governed by Swiss law, disputes under the HCC go to CAS or, if CAS declines, to Swiss domestic courts.[63] Although the IOC assigns responsibility to local actors, it retains control through financial support, core requirements, and the ability to intervene in cases of noncompliance.[64] This arrangement reinforces the IOC’s central authority while limiting domestic courts’ involvement, leaving impacted parties with few options for meaningful legal recourse.[65] As the IOC continues to assert its authority without sufficient oversight, it is imperative to explore alternative frameworks to ensure justice and to effectively protect vulnerable groups.[66]

III. Historical Shortcomings of the IOC’s Host Nation Selection Process

Before 2014, the IOC’s host selection process prioritized a nation’s prestige, logistical capacity, and economic potential, neglecting the social and environmental impact on local populations.[67] As a result, significant human rights and environmental issues continue to occur in cities hosting the Olympics, as will be discussed below.[68] These issues persist largely because the IOC lacked, and continues to lack, robust mechanisms to address such concerns proactively during the host nation selection process.[69]

In 2014, under increased global scrutiny, the IOC finally began incorporating sustainability and human rights considerations into its host selection process through reforms like the Olympic Agenda 2020.[70] However, despite these reforms, the IOC’s decisions continue to reinforce that the environmental and human rights commitments of the Olympic Movement are still not the primary factor in selecting host cities. For instance, Paris was lauded for its commitment to a “green” 2024 Olympics,[71] yet the city continues to face accusations of social displacement and “cleansing” as low-income communities were relocated and homeless populations cleared from areas surrounding Olympic venues.[72] The bidding for the 2024 Olympic Games was also unique in that the IOC made an unprecedented decision by simultaneously awarding Paris the 2024 Olympic Games and Los Angeles (L.A.) the 2028 Games, signaling the new reality that hosting the Olympics is becoming less and less attractive to local populations who bear the financial and social consequences.[73] In its bid for the Olympics, L.A., like Paris, pledged “[n]o displacement of residents.”[74] However, the city has yet to provide concrete plans on how it will avoid the same fate as Paris, with some activists saying the displacement has already begun.[75] Additionally, L.A.'s mayor, Karen Bass, made an extremely ambitious commitment to a “car-free” 2028 Olympics.[76] Such an environmental commitment could serve as a catalyst for L.A.'s transition away from fossil fuel dependency.[77] However, despite L.A.'s notoriously inadequate public transportation infrastructure and California’s long love affair with cars, the city has yet to provide details on how it plans to achieve this ambitious goal.[78] Implementing a “car-free” Olympics will come at an extremely high cost, or more likely, prove to be completely unfeasible with L.A.'s goals of essentially reimagining its entire existing transit system.[79] These recurring issues suggest that, while progress has been made, the necessary legal enforcement mechanisms are still lacking to ensure that both the IOC and future hosts fully comply with environmental and human rights standards set forth in Olympic Agenda 2020.[80]

A. PyeongChang 2018 Winter Games

The 2018 Winter Olympics, held in PyeongChang, South Korea, exemplifies the tolerance of the IOC to continually overlook and even condone violations of its Olympic Charter, as it has for years, with devastating results for both the environment and human rights.[81] The original sin was awarding the Winter Olympics to a city that traditionally receives very little natural snowfall, forcing the Games to rely on a significant amount of artificial snow—up to ninety-eight percent—requiring extensive water, energy, and alterations to the chemical composition of local ecosystems.[82] Most importantly, much of the public outcry centered around the destruction of an ancient forest located on Mount Gariwang.[83] To accommodate IOC and International Ski Federation course requirements, organizers cleared tens of thousands of trees from this forest.[84] Protected since the fifteenth century as a “royal forbidden mountain” due to its historical and cultural significance, it was not only regarded as sacred by residents of the area, but also protected under Korean law.[85] Despite environmental advocates proposing alternative sites, the IOC and local authorities justified the deforestation by citing alpine skiing requirements, which apparently only Mount Gariwang met.[86] Local groups and environmentalists argued that the IOC’s commitment to sustainability was ignored,[87] as official promises to restore the forest post-Games were deemed impractical by experts.[88]

In 2021, South Korean officials announced that the Olympic infrastructure on Mount Gariwang would be dismantled beginning in 2024.[89] Today, the Olympic-sized scar on Mount Gariwang juts naked into the sky, surrounded by what’s left of the ancient forest that once used to blanket it, serving as a visual testament to the IOC’s decision to prioritize the Games over a mountain sacred to generations of Koreans.[90]

Figure 1
Figure 1.Photo of Mount Gariwang with the Olympic infrastructure still standing.[91]

Beyond environmental damage, the PyeongChang Olympics significantly displaced local communities by demolishing the entire village of Sukam to make way for new infrastructure.[92] For these villagers, the construction of luxury hotels and event spaces represented a painful transformation of their former community, as experienced by others before them.[93] The case of PyeongChang is a particularly disturbing illustration of the IOC’s propensity to overlook the environmental and social costs of its venue choices in pursuit of idealistic Olympic infrastructure,[94] contrary to the values of the Olympic Movement.[95]

B. Beijing 2022 Winter Games

In 2015, the IOC, facing a lose-lose decision for the 2022 Winter Olympics, was forced to choose between Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Beijing, China—two countries with extensive human rights issues.[96] The IOC’s selection of Beijing, despite its dismal human rights record, highlights the diminishing appeal of hosting the Olympics among democratic nations.[97] Originally, cities like Munich, Stockholm, and Oslo bid for the Games, but due to high costs and low public support, their bids collapsed.[98] The IOC could have considered the unprecedented move of canceling the Games or finding an alternative host; however, it ultimately chose Beijing, allowing the Chinese government to continue “sportswash[ing]” ongoing abuses, including the persecution of Uyghur Muslims and the suppression of freedoms.[99] Human rights groups documented abuses tied to forced labor, including Uyghur exploitation in supply chains for Olympic uniforms and merchandise.[100] The IOC’s limited due diligence efforts, including its inability to guarantee that Olympic-branded apparel was not produced with forced labor, have raised concerns that the organization, yet again, prioritized convenience over principled action.[101]

IOC Vice President Dick Pound defended the decision, stating the Games were about international sport, not approval of a government’s policies.[102] Activists and advocates are quick to remind the IOC that its decision to award the 2008 Games to Beijing was made, in part, out of hope that it would improve the human rights conditions of China.[103] That has not been the case, and many believe human rights in China were worse in 2022 than they were in 2008.[104] Had the IOC acted boldly, it might have suspended the Games or asked a country with a more favorable human rights record to host—sending a powerful message that human rights are never to be sidelined for spectacle.[105]

IV. Recent Progress by the IOC

Given the IOC’s repeated failure to address human rights and environmental violations in the past, this Part explores recent progress undertaken to mitigate such concerns through efforts such as Olympic Agenda 2020, HCC revisions, and strengthened oversight mechanisms.

A. Agenda 2020

It is worth noting that the IOC has made significant strides in recent years to address environmental and human rights issues through several key initiatives, the most promising of which are Olympic Agendas 2020 and 2020+5.[106] Launched in 2014, Olympic Agenda 2020 introduced forty recommendations aimed at reforming the Olympic Movement, emphasizing sustainability, credibility, and youth.[107] Building on this foundation, the IOC released the Olympic Agenda 2020+5 Midway Report Highlights, outlining progress and reaffirming its commitment to principles of solidarity, credibility, and sustainable development.[108]

B. Changes to the Host City Contract

In 2017, the IOC revised its HCC to incorporate human rights principles, marking a significant step towards preventing abuses by future Olympic hosts.[109] Developed with input from the Sport and Rights Alliance (SRA), the updated HCC explicitly references the UNGP and anti-corruption standards, requiring host cities to protect human rights, ensure remedies for violations, and adhere to international ethical and sustainability guidelines.[110] These changes follow years of advocacy and criticism over human rights violations tied to past Olympics, including forced evictions and labor abuses.[111] The SRA and its coalition of organizations emphasize that, while the revised HCC is a vital step, effective implementation and monitoring with legal repercussions are essential to ensure that host cities fulfill their obligations, thereby advancing the IOC’s commitment to human dignity and sustainable development.[112]

C. Oversight by IOC Promulgated Entities

The IOC has reinforced its governance framework by establishing various committees dedicated to upholding ethical standards and human rights, such as the Executive Board, which oversees progress and approves the IOC Human Rights Strategic Framework.[113] The dedicated Human Rights Unit works with the Ethics and Compliance team to uphold ethical standards and integrate human rights principles into policies.[114] The IOC engages with experts and affected groups to improve its approach and plans to publish a Human Rights Report every two years.[115]

The IOC has also integrated environmental protections into its Olympic Agenda 2020 initiative, requiring future host cities to address sustainability and labor rights in their contracts.[116] It promotes sustainable development, intergenerational equity, and responsible sourcing by adhering to international standards like those of the UNGP.[117] While these initiatives may reflect an ongoing commitment by the IOC to integrate human rights and environmental considerations into the core of the Olympic Movement, self-promulgated measures are not enough to guarantee meaningful change without independent oversight and accountability.[118] Without external mechanisms to adjudicate and enforce these standards, the IOC risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy where its initiatives are celebrated as progress while systemic issues persist unchecked.

V. Justice Afterward or Prevention and Preservation Before?

This Part explores two methods for holding the IOC accountable: retroactive measures taken after injustice occurs and proactive strategies to be implemented during the host nation selection process.

A. Justice Afterward: Alternative Proposals for IOC Accountability

Some scholars and experts have proposed creating a new judicial body, such as an International Sports Court[119] or a specialized tribunal,[120] to address disputes and human rights violations linked to the Games. This body would have appellate jurisdiction over domestic courts and the power to issue fines and injunctions if necessary.[121] However, such proposals risk repeating the shortcomings of the CAS, which, despite similar ambitions, continues to fail at delivering meaningful accountability for the IOC.[122] Other recommendations focus on providing athletes, international federations, and OCOGs legal pathways to challenge IOC decisions through mechanisms embedded in the Olympic Charter in settings like the CAS or Swiss courts.[123] However, this recommendation fails to broaden the availability of recourse to the general public, affected communities, or other stakeholders who may suffer harm from IOC decisions. Another idea growing in popularity is the designation of a permanent host or group of hosts for the Summer and Winter Games in order to mitigate costs, prevent environmental degradation, and address the declining interest from cities to host the Olympics.[124] However, this proposal risks undermining the global spirit and cultural exchange that define the Olympics, reducing its role as a unifying international event. While each of these proposals aims to address various gaps, they fall short of achieving true IOC accountability because they are largely retroactive, focusing on remedies after issues arise, rather than preventing them upfront. In the words of Shakespeare, “[m]ay not an ass know when the cart draws the horse?”[125]

B. Prevention and Preservation Before

The following is a discussion of several preventative proposals that would proactively satisfy the need for accountability, including independent oversight, quantifying environmental protections, leveraging the UN’s influence, and actively measuring public engagement.

1. Need for External Oversight

True reform of the IOC host selection process requires more than self-promulgated initiatives and internal oversight—it demands transparent monitoring and collaboration with impartial stakeholders to ensure written commitments are effectively implemented in practice. As mentioned above, since adopting Olympic Agenda 2020, the IOC has reformed its host selection process to prioritize sustainability and community benefit.[126] By removing the rigid bid cycle, cities are free to engage with the IOC at any time.[127] Further, by 2030, all hosts must address climate change under the Olympic Host Contract, and hosts are now being encouraged to use temporary and existing infrastructure rather than building magnificent new hotels and stadiums.[128] While these changes are promising, their impact depends on effective oversight and accountability.

One potential nongovernmental entity that could provide meaningful oversight of human rights protections during the bidding process and preparation phases is “the leading organization advancing a world of sport that fully respects and promotes human rights”—the Centre for Sport and Human Rights (the Centre).[129] Formed in 2018, the Centre’s mission is to advance a world of sport that fully respects and promotes human rights by generating awareness, building capacity, and fostering accountability.[130] As an impartial convenor, it brings together stakeholders from governments, businesses, and civil society to align sport with international human rights standards.[131] Its strategic plan, Convergence 2025, outlines priorities such as embedding human rights commitments in sport governance and strengthening accountability mechanisms.[132] Having collaborated with the UN in recent human rights initiatives, and with the IOC being a permanent observer to the UN, the Centre is well-positioned to monitor compliance with human rights standards throughout the lifecycle of mega-sporting events.[133] Further, the IOC supported the Centre’s creation and serves on its advisory council—so the two entities are ideally situated to actively collaborate while remaining independent and impartial.[134] With its established network of stakeholders and its capacity to engage directly with affected groups, the Centre is an ideal partner to ensure that the IOC’s commitments to human rights are not only written but implemented effectively and vigorously enforced.[135]

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the “leading global authority on the environment,”[136] and, as such, is an ideal nongovernmental entity to oversee mandatory environmental protections during the Olympic bidding process and preparation phase. UNEP collaborates with various organizations to promote sustainable practices.[137] Notably, UNEP and the IOC have a history of cooperation aimed at heightening environmental awareness. For example, in 1994, the entities signed a cooperative agreement to raise awareness about environmental issues within the context of the Olympic Games.[138] In 2018, they collaborated in the CleanSeas campaign.[139] In 2021, the IOC funded the Great Green Wall, a reforestation project in the Sahel region of Africa.[140] Most recently, in 2024, the IOC was granted observer status to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, reflecting an ongoing commitment to environmental protections driven by UNEP.[141] Thus, given UNEP’s expertise and its established relationship with the IOC, it is well-positioned as an external monitor for compliance with environmental standards. By leveraging UNEP’s capacity for environmental governance and its global network,[142] the IOC can more effectively implement its sustainability commitments, thereby promoting positive environmental impacts in host regions, a requirement of the updated host nation selection process.[143]

2. Quantifying Environmental Protections in Bids

Quantification of environmental protections in host city bids is critical to ensure the IOC’s sustainability commitments are truly effective. While the updated bidding process encourages the use of existing and temporary infrastructure rather than the construction of new facilities, it is imperative that any new infrastructure adheres to strict environmental standards.[144] This approach is crucial because, while previous frameworks like Agenda 2020 have promoted sustainable practices, they have lacked enforceability.[145] For example, FIFA’s Green Goal program, which aimed to reduce emissions during the 2006 World Cup, focused on offsetting carbon but failed to address the broader environmental footprint, such as transportation and construction.[146] Similarly, the National Football League’s (NFL) energy-offset programs are voluntary and limited in scope, serving as more of a “greenwashing” mechanism while failing to address the full environmental impact of its events.[147]

To improve the state of the global climate, the IOC must require detailed environmental impact assessments as part of the bidding process, including projections for waste management, energy use, carbon emissions, and long-term environmental legacy.[148] For instance, if new infrastructure is proposed, it must meet industry-recognized green building standards, such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification,[149] and incorporate renewable energy sources and sustainable construction practices. Moreover, legally binding agreements like net-zero carbon targets should be incorporated into the HCC.[150] By implementing the most rigorous standards available, the IOC can proactively ensure long-term environmental sustainability by selecting a host that is fully committed to the region’s environmental future.

3. The UN’s Influence

Next, the UN should leverage the IOC’s permanent observer status to demand consistent and legally enforceable human rights standards.[151] The IOC must be mandated to apply uniform human rights obligations in all host city contracts, question partnerships with authoritarian regimes, and ensure suppliers eliminate ties to exploitative labor practices.[152] While recent host city contracts for Paris 2024, Milano Cortina 2026, and L.A. 2028 include explicit human rights protections, the Beijing 2022 contract notably lacked such commitments.[153] This raises serious concerns about whether the IOC will hold future authoritarian hosts to the same standards.[154] All Olympic host nations—not just Western democracies—must be required to comply with UN human rights principles, ensuring that violations are addressed consistently with international agreements. If the IOC continues to disregard these obligations, it not only undermines its mission but also jeopardizes the UN’s credibility.[155] Thus, the General Assembly should make the IOC’s observer status contingent on these reforms, demonstrating that the Olympic Games are not exempt from international human rights principles.[156]

4. Public Engagement

Finally, increasing public engagement is a critical element in addressing the growing discontent surrounding the high cost and negative impact of hosting the Olympic Games.[157] The recent trend of democratic countries withdrawing from the bidding process due to lack of local support underscores the need for a more inclusive approach to decision-making.[158] Hosting the Games has become increasingly expensive, with costs soaring beyond $10 billion in recent editions, further exacerbated by unforeseen events like the COVID-19 pandemic.[159] Declining global interest in hosting led the IOC to award Paris the 2024 Games and to convince L.A. to take on 2028, effectively eliminating competition through a closed-door bidding process.[160] In response, the IOC has sought reforms to make the bidding process less burdensome,[161] yet the fundamental issue of public support remains unresolved. To remedy this, host cities must be required to engage with local populations, civil society groups, and environmental organizations long before the bidding process begins.[162]

Cities should be obligated to ensure true participation by consulting residents on the potential impacts of hosting the Games.[163] Gauging the number of volunteers is an active means to measure public support.[164] For instance, the Paris 2024 Olympics received 300,000 volunteer applications, selecting 45,000, which reflects strong public engagement.[165] Before rampant wildfires broke out all over L.A. in January of 2025,[166] an IOC poll reported 78% support among L.A. residents for hosting,[167] and 13,000 individuals had already signed up for the L.A. 2028 Volunteer Programme, with more expected as planning progresses.[168] Now, tracking volunteer numbers is more crucial than ever for assessing continued community buy-in and for ensuring the Games align with public priorities as L.A. begins a grueling rebuilding process.[169] However, the IOC’s track record suggests it may prioritize the Games over the city’s recovery.[170] If public support wanes or resources are stretched too thinly, residents will bear the burden as the IOC demands the event proceed as planned.[171] The IOC has relocated past Olympics for emergencies;[172] however, recent prioritization of profit over community welfare raises important questions about whether it will act in L.A.'s best interest as public support undoubtedly fades this time around.

These proactive, preventative measures are worth exploring as they are key to ensuring accountability before a host is ever selected. By implementing these measures, the IOC will better align its actions with the principles of Olympism, ensuring that its behavior reflects the values that it champions.

VI. Conclusion

A look at the history of the Olympic Games reveals ongoing environmental and human rights challenges associated with the IOC’s host nation selection process and event execution that have not been adequately addressed by the IOC.[173] While the IOC has introduced some reforms, these efforts must be coupled with robust legal oversight to ensure true accountability. The IOC’s “we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it” mentality has perpetuated poor decision-making and repeatedly furthered environmental destruction, labor abuses, and human rights violations.[174] A revitalized host selection process, anchored by legally enforceable independent monitoring and public engagement, is essential for securing the long-term sustainability and ethical integrity of the Olympics. The IOC can no longer look the other way and must prioritize accountability and cooperation, embracing genuine protections for workers, communities, and ecosystems, thereby ensuring the Games contribute positively to both the host nations and the global sporting movement.[175]

Wyley Sharp

  1. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter 8 (2025), https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/IOC-Publications/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9CC-9S6E] [hereinafter Olympic Charter].

  2. See id. at 13–14.

  3. Yasmeen Serhan, The IOC Wants the Olympics to Be Apolitical. That’s Impossible, Time (July 18, 2024, at 13:21 ET), https://time.com/7000067/olympics-2024-paris-gaza-israel-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/2H97-K4HA] (“For while the Games are ostensibly apolitical, the world in which they operate is not. Indeed, authoritarians past and present have used the spectacle of the Olympics for their own political propaganda.”).

  4. See Hannah Brefeld & Liesl Eschbach, Bidding for Glory: The Flawed Bidding Process for the Olympic Games, Mich. St. L. Rev.: MSLR F. (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.michiganstatelawreview.org/forum-1/2022/1/18/bidding-for-glory-the-flawed-bidding-process-for-the-olympic-games [https://perma.cc/67P5-PXC8].

  5. Gina S. Warren, Big Sports Have Big Environmental and Social Consequences, 85 Mo. L. Rev. 495, 499–501 (2020). The arrival of tourists, athletes, and media provides a financial boost for local business while new infrastructure elevates the living standards for the city’s inhabitants. See The Economic Impact of Hosting the Olympics: Pros and Cons, EconoTimes (Aug. 8, 2024, at 06:49 AM UTC) https://www.econotimes.com/The-Economic-Impact-of-Hosting-the-Olympics-Pros-and-Cons-1683672 [https://perma.cc/YUP7-4LHB].

  6. Sara Coello, What Is the IOC? Inside the Olympic Organization, ESPN (Aug. 13, 2024, at 13:42 ET), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/40840462/what-ioc-olympic-organization [https://perma.cc/A7UY-PM9G].

  7. Olympic and International Sports Law Research Guide, Geo. L. Libr., (July 7, 2025, at 16:51 CT), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/lawolympics/organization [https://perma.cc/2RRE-X7SD].

  8. David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee, 4 Pace Y.B. Int’l L. 97, 99–100 (1992).

  9. Id. at 108–09.

  10. IOC Becomes UN Observer, Int’l Olympic Comm. (Oct. 19, 2009), https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-becomes-un-observer [https://perma.cc/LX5N-QGU9].

  11. See Ettinger, supra note 8, at 117 (“In 1952, some of the members of the IOC included one head of state, three princes, one archduke, three counts, three knights, a pasha, a rajah, and ‘others who held high positions . . . .’”).

  12. Id. at 117−18.

  13. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at 31, 38–39 (stating that the IOC elects its members from eligible persons who must be nationals of the country where they are domiciled and where there is a recognized NOC).

  14. Id. at 32.

  15. See IOC Members, Int’l Olympic Comm., https://olympics.com/ioc/members [https://perma.cc/L39X-942D] (last visited Sep. 18, 2025) (illustrating that three of the four longest-serving IOC members are either a prince or a princess).

  16. See Brett M. Crowell, Using the Ability to Host World Events as Incentive to Procure Voluntary Anti-Discrimination Legal Reform, 17 San Diego Int’l L.J. 165, 171, 175 (2015).

  17. Id. at 171.

  18. See Nina Raffio, Paris 2024: Geopolitics and the Olympics, USC Today (July 25, 2024), https://today.usc.edu/geopolitics-and-the-olympics-paris-2024/ [https://perma.cc/EAH8-8LMR] (“We live in an era in which reputation is central to the security of nations. . . . ‘International actors compete to showcase their own strengths and reveal the weaknesses of their adversaries, real or imagined.’”).

  19. See Roger Pielke Jr., Obstacles to Accountability in International Sports Governance, Transparency Int’l, https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2015.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDZ4-CHUU] (explaining a study that found a majority of high-profile corruption scandals within global sporting organizations were institutionally induced, revealing a need for more comprehensive governance).

  20. James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 489, 497–98 (1992).

  21. See Guiseppe Succimara, The Olympic Games as a Vehicle for Human Rights Reforms: The Case of China, Hum. Rts. Pulse (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/the-olympic-games-as-a-vehicle-for-human-rights-reforms-the-case-of-china [https://perma.cc/K5CS-8N6W] (“What emerges . . . is the perception of a very weak IOC, which is unwilling or unable to intervene even when a country violates the principles of the Charter.”).

  22. See Warren, supra note 5, at 497, 507 (“The ambition of hosting a mega sporting event encourages cities to relax their rules for urban development and restructuring . . . because of the short timeframe . . . or . . . significant internal and external pressure to satisfy their obligations for the event.”).

  23. See Gabriel Silvestre et al., Have the Olympics Outgrown Cities? A Longitudinal Comparative Analysis of the Growth and Planning of the Olympics and Former Host Cities, 39 Plan. Persp. 615, 618–21 (Apr. 4, 2024), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/02665433.2024.2334817?needAccess=true [https://perma.cc/36BH-WSKD].

  24. See Warren, supra note 5, at 499–500, 507–08.

  25. See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 107, 111−12, 114 (2012).

  26. Id. at 113, 118–19.

  27. Id. at 116.

  28. William Thomas Worster, Coming Full Circle: The International Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee, 31 U. Mia. Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 389, 429 (2024); Nafziger, supra note 20, at 491, 498.

  29. Zack Bowersox, Workers’ Rights and the Olympic Games: The International Olympic Committee and Institutional Law Making, 52 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 423, 430−31 (2022).

  30. Worster, supra note 28, at 428–30.

  31. See id. at 390, 425 (“The language of the Charter invokes the terminology of human rights . . . borrowing language from international human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . .”).

  32. See Ettinger, supra note 8, at 108–09.

  33. IOC Becomes UN Observer, supra note 10.

  34. UN General Assembly Recognises That “the Unifying and Conciliative Nature” of Major International Sports Events “Should Be Respected”, Int’l Olympic Comm., (Dec. 1, 2022), https://olympics.com/ioc/news/un-ga-recognises-unifying-conciliative-nature-of-major-international-sports-events-should-be-respected [https://perma.cc/SCA7-CJ9G].

  35. See Worster, supra note 28, at 426–27 (“[A]t a minimum the IOC must take action to prevent or mitigate violations of human rights when others fail to do so, even when not strictly liable.”).

  36. See id. at 427 (calling for amendments to clarify that the responsibilities laid out in the Charter are not merely aspirational, but grounded in international human rights law).

  37. Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 Hastings Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 411, 415–17 (1989). As codified in the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), any treaties that conflict with jus cogens, at the time of drafting or later due to the emergence of a new peremptory norm, are rendered void. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, 64, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).

  38. Parker, supra note 37, at 441–43. Together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR, and the ICESCR form the International Bill of Rights. See Emmaline Soken-Huberty, What Is the International Bill of Human Rights?, Hum. Rts. Careers, https://www.humanrightscareers.com/issues/what-is-the-international-bill-of-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/5ARJ-7TSS] (last visited July 29, 2025); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 72 (Dec. 8, 1948) (noting that the UN in the Chater “reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights” and that the member states pledge to achieve, with the UN’s cooperation, “the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms”). The UDHR remains a landmark document as it inspired the development of more than seventy human rights treaties. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights [https://perma.cc/M6CM-FK4V] (last visited Aug. 8, 2025). The ICCPR commits its parties to respect the right to self-determination and safeguards against forced evictions and displacement. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). It also guarantees the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. Id. at art. 18–19, 21. Finally, the ICESCR commits its parties to work towards granting economic, social, and cultural rights. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at art. 1–3, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).

  39. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, at art. 1 (setting out that the VCLT regards treaties as agreements between states).

  40. Worster, supra note 28, at 428–29.

  41. Parker, supra note 37, at 431–32, 435–36, 439–40.

  42. IOC Takes Next Steps in Establishment of Human Rights Strategic Framework, Int’l Olympic Comm. (May 20, 2022), https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-takes-next-steps-in-establishment-of-human-rights-strategic-framework [https://perma.cc/G7NN-WSYA].

  43. See generally U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) (detailing the UNGP framework for business and human rights that, upon adoption, the IOC would be responsible for implementing).

  44. Id. at 27–35.

  45. See Ettinger, supra note 8, at 116 (“There does seem to be some danger in the IOC’s virtual ‘free reign’ over the Olympic Games . . . with few democratic principles.”).

  46. State Resp. to Regulate and Adjudicate Corp. Activities Under the U.N. Core Hum. Rts. Treaties, Rep. of the Special Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on Its Fourth Session, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (2007). The title of this UN report, alone, indicates that the UN views the duty of investigating and adjudicating claims against private actors as the role of states, not international law. Id.

  47. Worster, supra note 28, at 428 (“[T]he IOC has certainly dedicated itself and pledged to complying with international human rights law. So, while it might not be formally bound, it has consented to act in accordance with human rights law.”).

  48. History of the CAS, TAS/CAS, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html [https://perma.cc/8SQK-JATY] (last visited July 16, 2025).

  49. Darren Kane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 4 Melb. J. Int’l L. 611, 622 (2003).

  50. History of the CAS, supra note 48.

  51. Kane, supra note 49, at 614–15.

  52. History of the CAS, supra note 48.

  53. Id.

  54. Kane, supra note 49, at 618.

  55. Metzeri Camacho, Violations of Human Rights in Mega-Sporting Events: A Study on the Long-Term Effects of the Mega-Sporting Events on Host Population, 58 Tex. Int’l L.J. 74, 94 (2023).

  56. See Kane, supra note 49, at 617–18 (“While other world sporting bodies . . . provide CAS with funding, the IOC is the main contributor.”).

  57. Id. at 613, 615, 618.

  58. See Cybele Greenberg, The International Olympic Committee’s Troublesome Immunity, Inkstick (Feb. 4, 2022), https://inkstickmedia.com/the-international-olympic-committees-troublesome-immunity/ [https://perma.cc/BA5E-88L8].

  59. In Martin, a U.S. court prioritized the Olympic Charter over U.S. law by not superseding the IOC’s decision to exclude certain races for female runners. Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Olympic Committee’s exclusive rights to the term “Olympic,” holding that it warrants trademark protection. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 525 (1987).

  60. Travis Nelson & M. Patrick Cottrell, Sport Without Referees? The Power of the International Olympic Committee and the Social Politics of Accountability, 22 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 437, 447–48 (2016).

  61. See, e.g., Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 178, 179 (N.Y. 1980) (“[O]ur State must refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction to resolve a dispute which has at its core the international ‘two-Chinas’ problem.”); Spindulys v. L.A. Olympic Org. Comm., 175 Cal. App. 3d 206, 207 (1985) (dismissing a complaint against Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee alleging discrimination on similar grounds as a political question).

  62. Tomas Grell, The Olympics & Human Rights – Part I: The Host City Contract, Sports Integrity Initiative (June 16, 2017), https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/olympics-human-rights-part-i-host-city-contract/ [https://perma.cc/666B-RHR8].

  63. Id.

  64. Id.

  65. Id.

  66. Nelson & Cottrell, supra note 60, at 446 (“[W]hether or not one sides with critics who maintain that the values of the IOC are at odds with its actual behavior . . . the organization is adept at wielding its authority. The IOC not only proactively uses its symbolic power to help shield against accountability efforts . . . but also fiercely protects its livelihood and is effectively able to translate its social position and social power into material power.”).

  67. Silvestre et al., supra note 23, at 619–20.

  68. Evan Hsiang, The Social Contract Between Human Rights and International Sports Tournaments, Harv. Pol. Rev. (Aug. 28, 2023), https://harvardpolitics.com/human-rights-sports/ [https://perma.cc/5FMS-2ECU].

  69. IOC Strengthens Its Stance in Favour of Human Rights and Against Corruption in New Host City Contract, Int’l Olympic Comm., (Feb. 28, 2017), https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-strengthens-its-stance-in-favour-of-human-rights-and-against-corruption-in-new-host-city-contract [https://perma.cc/R84X-SV9X] (discussing the updated 2024 HCC and its explicit mention of human rights protection, this IOC publication is void of specific initiatives that proactively address such concerns before a bid is awarded).

  70. See The History of the Process to Elect Olympic Hosts, Int’l Olympic Comm., https://olympics.com/ioc/becoming-an-olympic-games-host/the-history-of-the-process-to-elect-olympic-hosts [https://perma.cc/J4RY-L84Z] (last visited July 28, 2025). Olympic Agenda 2020 is discussed further below. See discussion infra Section IV.A.

  71. See Angela Skujins, Ditching Generators and Recycling Buildings: How Paris Did the Olympics Different, euronews (Nov. 8, 2024, at 14:18 GMT+2), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/08/11/ditching-generators-and-recycling-buildings-how-paris-did-the-olympics-different# [https://perma.cc/8T57-SG3J].

  72. Ross Cullen, Nadia Becir & Layla Quran, Activists Accuse Authorities of ‘Social Cleansing’ for Clearing Homeless Out of Paris, PBS News (Aug. 8, 2024, at 18:20 ET), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/activists-accuse-authorities-of-social-cleansing-for-clearing-homeless-out-of-paris [https://perma.cc/NQ5Q-T4AZ].

  73. See Victor Matheson & Andrew Zimbalist, Why Cities No Longer Clamor to Host the Olympic Games, Geo. J. Int’l Aff. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/04/19/why-cities-no-longer-clamor-to-host-the-olympic-games/ [https://perma.cc/U36F-922A] (“[The IOC] awarded the 2028 Summer Games to Los Angeles without even making a call for other bidders, effectively conceding the point that finding willing and capable Olympics hosts has become exceedingly difficult.”).

  74. Int’l Olympic Comm., Report of the IOC 2024 Evaluation Commission 32, 36 (2017), https://library.olympics.com/Default/doc/SYRACUSE/168409/report-of-the-ioc-evaluation-commission-2024-international-olympic-committee?_lg=en-GB [https://perma.cc/RFA2-APD5].

  75. See Kayla Robbins, LA Olympics 2028: Displacement of Homeless People Has Already Begun, invisible PEOPLE (Sep. 26, 2024), https://invisiblepeople.tv/la-olympics-2028-displacement-of-homeless-people-has-already-begun/ [https://perma.cc/B37A-GFD3].

  76. Katharine Gammon, Los Angeles Wants a ‘No-Car’ Olympics. Can the City of Drivers Turn a Corner?, Guardian (Aug. 16, 2024, at 07:00 ET), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/16/los-angeles-no-car-olympics-2028 [https://perma.cc/2EXS-K77J].

  77. See Ryan Fonseca, How the 2028 Olympics Could Actually Break L.A.'s Car Dependency, L.A. Times (Aug. 14, 2024, at 06:30 PT), https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2024-08-14/l-a-promises-a-car-free-olympics-ill-believe-it-when-i-see-it-essential-california [https://perma.cc/VG7X-R4LN].

  78. See Alissa Walker, Can L.A. Really Pull Off a “Car-Free” Olympics?, dwell (July 31, 2024), https://www.dwell.com/article/car-free-los-angeles-2028-summer-olympic-games-transportation-4f9e653e [https://perma.cc/W4VC-B6QL] (“[S]even years later, it’s becoming increasingly unclear if L.A. can deliver part of its 2028 Olympics promise: to produce . . . the ‘car-free games.’”).

  79. Id. (“[T]he city’s . . . perpetually clogged streets make getting around very difficult without a car—let alone with 10 million Olympics ticketholders moving around town. Which may explain a recent messaging shift . . . now calling them ‘transit-first’ games, signifying an attempt to (slightly) walk back the ‘car-free’ commitment.”).

  80. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020+5: Midway Report 3, 82, 90, 95 (2023), https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/OA2020plus5/midway-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VAX-R25L] [hereinafter Olympic Agenda 2020+5 Midway Report] (noting that commitments to sustainable development and human rights are two of the primary components of Olympic Agenda 2020).

  81. Evelyn Wang, North and South Korea Marched Together at the Olympics Opening Ceremony in a Rare Show of Unity, Glamour (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.glamour.com/story/north-and-south-korea-marched-together-at-2018-olympics-opening-ceremony? [https://perma.cc/Q5GR-WVYT]. Global sports organizations largely ignored warnings from environmental advocates until the 1990s, when backlash over the Albertville Winter Olympics, deemed an “environmental catastrophe,” coincided with the 1992 U.N. Earth Summit. Madeline Orr, The Olympics Have a Dirty History—Literally, Foreign Pol’y (July 20, 2024, at 06:00 CT), https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/20/olympics-climate-change-activism-green-sports-paris-2024-book-excerpt/ [https://perma.cc/7U6L-YQG9]. The IOC has since staggered the Summer and Winter Games in two-year intervals, a decision likely driven more by financial incentive than by sustainability. See Olympics to Hold Events Every 2 Years: Winter Games to Be Split Off, Start Own 4-Year Cycle in '94, L.A. Times (Oct. 14, 1986, at 00:00 PT), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-10-14-mn-3527-story.html [https://perma.cc/9NHD-7GTZ]. The Lillehammer 1994 Winter Games introduced globally recognized environmental measures, including the Management, Operation, Maintenance (MOM) system, a comprehensive audit process, independent of the IOC, which ensured Olympic buildings met strict environmental standards for construction as well as long-term use, requiring contractors to address sustainability criteria in materials, energy use, waste disposal, and maintenance. David Chernushenko, Sports Tourism Goes Sustainable: The Lillehammer Experience, Visions Leasure & Bus., Summer 1996, at 65, 68–70. Despite Lillehammer’s progress, sustainability concerns seemingly vanished from the Olympic Movement until the 2012 London Games, which, despite independent oversight, struggled to meet ambitious targets, in part due to the influence of corporate sponsorship, underscoring the need for legally enforceable sustainability commitments in future host cities. Fiona Harvey, London 2012 Falls Short of ‘Greenest Ever’ Targets, Report Shows, Guardian (July 19, 2012, at 08:42 ET), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/jul/19/olympic-games-green-targets [https://perma.cc/3WPL-CUKD].

  82. Antonio Aguilera, The Environmental Impact of Hosting the Olympic Games, Fordham U. Env’t L. Rev. (Sep. 14, 2022), https://fordhamlawelr.org/?p=1607 [https://perma.cc/V3EP-BKJU].

  83. Justin McCurry & Emma Howard, Olympic Organisers Destroy ‘Sacred’ South Korean Forest to Create Ski Run, Our World (Sep. 30, 2015), https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/olympic-organisers-destroy-sacred-south-korean-forest-to-create-ski-run [https://perma.cc/G6LU-KV87]. Once again, alarms from environmental advocacy groups were dismissed prior to the Sochi 2014 Winter Games, where the Environmental Watch of the North Caucasus (EWNC) reported extensive ecological damage from illegal mining, dumping, and disruption of wildlife. Mona Dai, Sochi 2014: Why the Sustainability Record Matters, Duke: Nicholas Sch. of the Env’t (Feb. 25, 2024), https://sites.nicholas.duke.edu/loribennear/2014/02/25/sochi-2014-why-the-sustainability-record-matters/ [https://perma.cc/555G-PR35]. The Rio 2016 Games also faced criticism for significant environmental destruction. See Sylvia Trendafilova, Jeffrey Graham & James Bemiller, Sustainability and the Olympics: The Case of the 2016 Rio Summer Games, J. Sustainability Educ. (Jan. 14, 2018), http://www.susted.com/wordpress/content/sustainability-and-the-olympics-the-case-of-the-2016-rio-summer-games_2018_01/ [https://perma.cc/AV67-H72C].

  84. McCurry & Howard, supra note 83.

  85. Id. (“The area earmarked for the Olympics falls under a special category—a forest genetic resources preservation area—stipulated in South Korea’s forest protection act . . . .”).

  86. Id.

  87. Id. (“An online petition . . . calling on the International Olympic Committee to ensure that the forest is preserved and the Games ‘truly live up to ideals of sustainability and environmental protection’ failed to halt the trees’ removal.”).

  88. Id. (“Opponents of the development say chemicals used to treat the soil and create snow will leave the area permanently scarred.”).

  89. Government Decides to Dismantle PyeongChang Olympics Ski Slope, Restore Forest, Korea Times (June 11, 2021, at 21:24 KST), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/06/113_310370.html [https://perma.cc/L829-HV4H].

  90. Pam Wright, Olympics Big Loser: ‘Sacred’ South Korean Forest Razed for Ski Complex, Weather Channel (Feb. 14, 2018), https://weather.com/science/environment/news/2018-02-07-pyeongchang-winter-olympics-south-korea-forest-razed-ski [https://perma.cc/6KQ4-EY57]. It looks like the experts were right.

  91. Id.

  92. Aamer Madhani, When Winter Olympics Arrived, an Entire Village Had to Move, and 58,000 Trees Came Down, USA Today (Feb. 18, 2018, at 13:29 ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/winter-olympics-2018/2018/02/18/2018-winter-olympic-venue-displaced-south-koreans-caused-deforestation/340106002/ [https://perma.cc/E8PN-KJBA].

  93. Id. For example, in 1988, Seoul, South Korea demolished entire low-income neighborhoods, forcibly displacing thousands of Korean families. See Lisa Kim Davis, Ctr. on Hous. Rts. & Evictions, Housing, Evictions and the Seoul 1988 Summer Olympic Games 12, 19–21 (2007), https://www.ruig-gian.org/ressources/Seoul_background_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5YV-F5UR]. Seventy-two acres of downtown Atlanta were razed for the Atlanta 1996 Games, displacing low-income residents and local businesses. Peter Applebome, Atlanta’s Olympic Park Plan Reveals The Complications of Urban Renewal, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/19/us/atlanta-s-olympic-park-plan-reveals-the-complications-of-urban-renewal.html [https://perma.cc/2Q57-6RJD]. Over a decade later, the 20Beijing Olympics displaced roughly 1.5 million residents. Lindsay Beck, Beijing to Evict 1.5 Million for Olympics: Group, Reuters (Aug. 9, 2007, at 16:10 CT), https://www.reuters.com/article/world/beijing-to-evict-15-million-for-olympics-group idUSPEK122632/ [https://perma.cc/4PHM-XZQR].

  94. See Aguilera, supra note 82.

  95. See Phil McKenna, Olympic Glory? South Korea Clear-Cuts a Forest to Build Ski Slopes, Inside Climate News (Sep. 20, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20092015/olympic-glory-south-korea-clear-cuts-forest-build-ski-slopes/ [https://perma.cc/5Q37-SBCR] (“There is something about the IOC willfully disregarding their own stated commitment to environmental sustainability and protection . . . . They certainly do have the type of influence that could have stopped this.” (quoting Dalia Hashad, the campaign director of an international advocacy group)).

  96. Jules Boykoff, Beijing and Almaty Contest Winter Olympics in Human Rights Nightmare, Guardian (July 30, 2015, at 06:39 ET), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/jul/30/china-kazakhstan-winter-olympics-2022 [https://perma.cc/F24K-6VV2].

  97. Id.

  98. Id.

  99. Beijing Winter Olympics 2022, Hum. Rts. Watch, https://www.hrw.org/tag/beijing-winter-olympics-2022 [https://perma.cc/DV3S-L9TK] (last visited July 15, 2025).

  100. China: IOC Can’t Ensure Olympic Apparel Is Abuse-Free, Hum. Rts. Watch (Feb. 14, 2022, at 00:01 EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/14/china-ioc-cant-ensure-olympic-apparel-abuse-free [https://perma.cc/9QBH-DXW8]; see also Dan Roan & Alex Capstick, Beijing 2022: Human Rights Groups Call for Winter Olympic Boycott, BBC (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55938034 [https://perma.cc/7EX9-YWD3] (“Zumretay Arkin of World Uyghur Congress said: ‘Our sufferings were completely dismissed by the IOC. It’s now up to the governments to act on it, and show some decent humanity by boycotting a genocide Olympics.’”). This is not the first instance of the IOC ignoring mistreatment of minority populations by an Olympic host, as the Sydney 2000 Games also faced scrutiny for its treatment of Australia’s aboriginal populations. Patrick Barkham, Divided We Fall, guardian.co.uk (Sep. 13, 2000), https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,367679,00.html [https://perma.cc/S47A-TGAZ].

  101. China: IOC Can’t Ensure Olympic Apparel Is Abuse-Free, supra note 100.

  102. Roan & Capstick, supra note 99 (“The Games are not Chinese Games, the Games are the IOC Games . . . . The decision on hosting is not made with a view to signalling approval of a government policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  103. Stephen Wade, IOC Accused of Ignoring Human Rights for 2022 Beijing Games, CBS 6 News (Dec. 16, 2020, at 22:31 CT), https://cbs6albany.com/news/nation-world/ioc-accused-of-ignoring-human-rights-for-2022-beijing-games [https://perma.cc/UGQ6-GNCZ].

  104. See id. (“The coalition [representing ethnic minorities in China] has reminded the IOC that human rights conditions are worse than they were 12 years ago with China operating what it described as an ‘Orwellian’ state.”).

  105. Boykoff, supra note 95.

  106. IOC Releases Olympic Agenda 2020+5 Midway Report Highlights, Ass’n of Nat’l Olympic Comms. (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.anocolympic.org/olympic-movement/ioc-releases-olympic-agenda-20205-midway-report-highlights/ [https://perma.cc/F4FU-PCFU].

  107. Olympic Agenda 2020, Int’l Olympic Comm., https://olympics.com/ioc/olympic-agenda-2020 [https://perma.cc/B47V-HZM6] (last visited July 17, 2025).

  108. See Olympic Agenda 2020+5 Midway Report, supra note 80.

  109. Olympics: Host City Contract Requires Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Watch, (Feb. 28, 2017, at 00:04 EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/28/olympics-host-city-contract-requires-human-rights [https://perma.cc/2PFB-PJA3].

  110. Id.

  111. Id.

  112. Id.

  113. Int’l Olympic Comm., IOC Strategic Framework on Human Rights 46 (2022), https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/Beyond-the-Games/Human-Rights/IOC-Strategic-Framework-on-Human-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q2E-YSCK].

  114. Id.

  115. Id. at 47.

  116. Id. at 7.

  117. See id. at 29.

  118. See generally Brittany Doyle, Self-Regulation is No Regulation—The Case for Government Oversight of Social Media Platforms, 32 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 97 (2022) (describing the failures of the U.S. Government’s hands-off approach to the regulation of social media platforms and emphasizing the necessity of external oversight to address risks and societal impacts posed by prominent self-regulated entities).

  119. Ettinger, supra note 8, at 119.

  120. Camacho, supra note 55, at 89.

  121. Id. at 90–91.

  122. See discussion supra Section II.D.

  123. Marcus Mazzucco & Hilary Findlay, From Sagen to Henriques: Legal Challenges to Olympic Event Selection Decisions and the Role of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 44 Liver. L. Rev. 1, 29–31 (2022).

  124. See, e.g., Andrew Bucklow, Why the Olympics Should Have a Permanent Host City, news.com.au (Aug. 9, 2024, at 10:46 CT), https://www.news.com.au/sport/olympics/why-the-olympics-should-have-a-permanent-host-city/news-story/c014f4b6ff61ed7141c3600d6b0b6928 [https://perma.cc/4UB8-KVAE].

  125. William Shakespeare, King Lear act 1, sc. 4, I. 214.

  126. Frequently Asked Questions: Electing Olympic Hosts, Int’l Olympic Comm., https://olympics.com/ioc/faq/electing-olympic-hosts/what-is-the-new-approach-to-electing-olympic-hosts [https://perma.cc/5VSF-BP6L] (last visited July 16, 2025).

  127. Id.

  128. Id.

  129. Rachel Davis & Mary Harvey, Independent Comment by the Centre for Sport and Human Rights and Shift on the Report by World Athletics’ Human Rights Working Group, Shift (July 2021), https://shiftproject.org/world-athletics-hrwg-comment/ [https://perma.cc/E42D-VRVL].

  130. Centre for Sport and Human Rights, IOE, https://www.ioe-emp.org/international-organisations/centre-for-sport-and-human-rights [https://perma.cc/6K42-4EQY] (last visited July 15, 2025).

  131. What We Do, Ctr. for Sport & Hum. Rts., https://www.sporthumanrights.org/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/6H7A-HSL5] (last visited July 16, 2025).

  132. See Convergence 2025, Ctr. for Sport & Hum. Rts. (Sep. 30, 2021), https://www.sporthumanrights.org/library/convergence-2025/ [https://perma.cc/B76B-D9JB] (“Transforming sport at every level in ways that are consistent with international human rights, labour and sustainability standards will not be achieved by any one actor alone, but only through engagement and collective action across the entire sports ecosystem.”).

  133. See United Nations and Centre for Sport & Human Rights Announce ‘The 75’ Campaign, Ctr. for Sport & Hum. Rts. (Sep. 26, 2023), https://sporthumanrights.org/news/united-nations-and-the-centre-announce-the-75-campaign [https://perma.cc/ES7D-9WAK].

  134. Centre for Sport and Human Rights, supra note 129; 'Sport and Human Rights are in Our DNA’: World Players Association and UNI Global Union Commit to New Global Centre for Sport and Human Rights Advisory Council, UNI Glob. Union (June 29, 2018), https://uniglobalunion.org/news/sport-and-human-rights-are-in-our-dna-world-players-association-and-uni-global-union-commit-to-new-global-centre-for-sport-and-human-rights-advisory-council/ [https://perma.cc/92QT-SE2U] (“The Centre Advisory Council includes sports organisations that have recently adopted or committed to adopting measures to abide by the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and labour rights, including . . . the International Olympic Committee.”).

  135. See 'Sport and Human Rights are in Our DNA’, supra note 134 (“In collaboration with all actors, the Centre . . . [supports] access to remedy for those adversely impacted by the full life-cycle and supply chain of a mega-sporting event, such as the Olympic Games . . . .”).

  136. Todd Brown, About Us, UN Env’t Programme, https://www.unep.org/who-we-are/about-us [https://perma.cc/5D67-FL34] (last visited July 15, 2025) (“UNEP’s mission is to inform, enable, and inspire nations and peoples to improve their quality of life while safeguarding the environment for future generations.”).

  137. Id.

  138. Factsheet: The Environment and Sustainable Development, Int’l Olympic Comm. (Jan. 2014), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents_Factsheets/Environment_and_substainable_developement.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3X8-7YPY].

  139. Olympic Movement Joins CleanSeas Campaign and Commits to #BeatPlasticPollution, UN Env’t Programme (June 4, 2018), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/olympic-movement-joins-cleanseas-campaign-and-commits [https://perma.cc/QD9C-4W53].

  140. International Olympic Committee Boosts the Sahara’s Great Green Wall, UN Env’t Programme (June 17, 2021), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/international-olympic-committee-boosts-saharas-great-green-wall [https://perma.cc/FJ9X-E6RL]. After committing to the donation, IOC President Thomas Bach said, “The Olympic Movement is about building a better world through sport, and the Olympic Forest is an example of that.” Id.

  141. IOC Welcomes Admission as Observer Organisation to UN Climate Change, Int’l Olympic Comm. (Feb. 26, 2024), https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-welcomes-admission-as-observer-organisation-to-un-climate-change [https://perma.cc/W9SL-P95L].

  142. With over 190 member states, UNEP has worked extensively with governments, businesses, and individuals all over the world. Brown, supra note 135.

  143. See Frequently Asked Questions: Electing Olympic Hosts, supra note 125. (“The focus of today’s approach is sustainability and legacy—achieving maximum benefits for communities living in host regions before, during and after the Games.”).

  144. Id.

  145. See Warren, supra note 5, at 523 (“Substantive requirements have little teeth without a procedural mechanism that will allow citizens an opportunity to be heard and to participate.”).

  146. Id. at 509–10.

  147. Id. at 510–12.

  148. See generally Lori Ewing, Mega-Sports Events Caught on Horns of Climate Change Dilemma, Reuters (July 30, 2024, at 13:47 CT), https://www.reuters.com/sports/olympics/mega-sports-events-caught-horns-climate-change-dilemma-2024-07-30/ [https://perma.cc/F8E9-M5LA] (arguing that the IOC is not properly addressing climate change, causing environmental crisis and harming both the region and participants in the Games).

  149. LEED is a globally recognized green building rating system with four certification levels: Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum. LEED Rating System, U.S. Green Bldg. Council, https://www.usgbc.org/leed [https://perma.cc/A8PK-2GD6] (last visited July 29, 2025). Achieving LEED certification is difficult for large sporting venues, but not impossible, with the NFL’s Levi’s Stadium (Santa Clara) holding Gold and Mercedes-Benz Stadium (Atlanta) earning Platinum. See Warren, supra note 5, at 511; see generally Lincoln Financial Field Awarded LEED Gold Certification, Phila. Eagles (Dec. 11, 2018, at 15:03 CT), https://www.philadelphiaeagles.com/news/lincoln-financial-field-awarded-leed-gold-certification [https://perma.cc/4KXP-RVNG] (describing intensive and lengthy measures taken by Lincoln Financial Field to achieve LEED certification).

  150. See Warren, supra note 5, at 522–23 (explaining that, like many cities that have adopted plans to cut energy use and phase out fossil fuels, mega sporting associations should be required to do the same in offsetting all fossil fuel energy use and environmental impacts from their events).

  151. See Greenberg, supra note 58.

  152. Id.

  153. Id.

  154. See Alexander Smith, In Pen Shuai Case, Critics See History of IOC Treating Authoritarian Hosts with Kid Gloves, NBC News (Dec. 7, 2021, at 05:42 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/peng-shuai-case-critics-see-history-ioc-treating-authoritarian-hosts-k-rcna7412 [https://perma.cc/R3XJ-RLK9].

  155. Greenberg, supra note 58.

  156. Id.

  157. See Matheson & Zimbalist, supra note 73 (“The cycle of strong competitive bidding, followed by astronomical hosting costs, then by reduced demand for hosting and greater leverage for the prospective hosts, seems to be repeating itself.”).

  158. See Victor Matheson, Why Democracies Don’t Want the Olympics Anymore, Wash. Post (July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/29/why-democracies-dont-want-the-olympics-anymore/ [https://perma.cc/C4FZ-4GDW].

  159. See Matheson & Zimbalist, supra note 73 (explaining that Oxford researchers found the average cost of hosting the Olympic Games between 1960 and 2016 exceeded the host country’s budget by 156%).

  160. See Bucklow, supra note 123 (explaining that the closed-door bidding process is designed to avoid recent embarrassment the IOC has faced in announcing that several cities are eager to host the Games, only for them to later withdraw and abandon their bids).

  161. See Frequently Asked Questions: Electing Olympic Hosts, supra note 125.

  162. Warren, supra note 5, at 523 (“[H]ost cities should include procedural requirements for public disclosure, debate, participation, and possibly even veto power.”).

  163. Id. at 522 (“Local communities are in the best position to be able to identify potential pitfalls and concerns with hosting an event.”).

  164. Niki Koutrou, Measuring Olympic Volunteers’ Motivation, Sports Volunteering Sols. Consulting, https://sportvolunteeringsolutions.com/measuring-olympic-volunteers-motivation/ [https://perma.cc/XYD2-23UC] (last visited Aug. 3, 2025).

  165. Dakota Smith & Rebecca Ellis, Lessons Learned from the Paris Olympics, According to L.A. City Councilmember Traci Park, L.A. Times (Aug. 24, 2024, at 08:00 PT), https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2024-08-24/la-on-the-record-newsletter-l-a-on-the-record [https://perma.cc/9XJ5-F3FU].

  166. Ryan Fonseca, Fires Tear Through Pacific Palisades, Altadena, Pasadena and Sylmar, L.A. Times (Jan. 8, 2025, at 06:58 PT), https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2025-01-08/a-powerful-windstorm-is-fanning-the-palisades-fire-heres-what-to-know-essential-california [https://perma.cc/C6G4-KD6R].

  167. David Wharton, IOC Poll Suggests that Fewer L.A. Residents Support Olympic Bid than Percentage Touted by Local Leaders, L.A. Times (July 5, 2017, at 10:03 PT), https://www.latimes.com/sports/olympics/la-sp-ioc-poll-la2024-story.html [https://perma.cc/46UB-Y3RT].

  168. Michelle Del Rey, LA Is Starting to Gear Up for the 2028 Olympics, Here Are the Jobs Already Available for the Spectacle, Yahoo Sports (Aug. 7, 2024), https://sports.yahoo.com/la-starting-gear-2028-olympics-170959259.html [https://perma.cc/U4RF-PMTU].

  169. Roger Vincent, Estimated Cost of Fire Damage Balloons to More than $250 Billion, L.A. Times (Jan. 24, 2025, at 09:00 PT), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2025-01-24/estimated-cost-of-fire-damage-balloons-to-more-than-250-billion [https://perma.cc/U9Z5-KUKB] (reporting over $250 billion in economic losses, with over 150,000 people displaced, 15,000 structures destroyed, and twenty-eight deaths).

  170. See discussion supra Section III.A–B.

  171. See generally Jules Boykoff & Dave Zirin, The Olympics Aren’t the Way to Rebuild Los Angeles, Nation (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/los-angeles-olympics-fires/ [https://perma.cc/KF33-A3AF] (laying out California Governor Gavin Newsom’s plans to rebrand the 2028 Games as a recovery plan for L.A., masking the event’s enormous social and environmental costs while promoting a vision that shifts public resources and attention to the mega-event rather than directly addressing the needs of Californians struggling to rebuild a devastated city). Not to mention, L.A. is also set to host the World Cup in 2026 and the Super Bowl in 2027. Id.; David Wharton, Can Fire-Torn L.A. Handle the World Cup, Super Bowl and Summer Olympics?, L.A. Times (Jan. 15, 2023, at 03:00 PT), https://www.latimes.com/sports/olympics/story/2025-01-15/la-fires-world-cup-super-bowl-2028-summer-olympics [https://perma.cc/Y6NH-GYAK].

  172. Wharton, supra note 170 (“As early as 1908, the International Olympic Committee wanted Rome as host but shifted to London after Mount Vesuvius erupted, devastating the nearby province of Naples.”).

  173. See Hsiang, supra note 68.

  174. See discussion supra Section III.A–B.

  175. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at 12–14 (“The mission of the IOC is . . . to encourage and support the promotion of ethics and good governance in sport . . . to oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes; . . . [and] to encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly . . . .”).