

# ARTICLE

## SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS: STATE AND FEDERAL PRACTICE\*

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## INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses the confluence of procedural changes that have shaped summary judgment practice. These changes are built upon a framework set out in the federal summary judgment trilogy—*Celotex*,<sup>1</sup> *Matsushita*,<sup>2</sup> and *Liberty Lobby*<sup>3</sup>—and the application of the Texas “no-evidence” summary judgment rule.<sup>4</sup> Also at play are the gatekeeping functions expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*<sup>5</sup> and the Texas Supreme Court opinion in

1. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

2. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

3. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

4. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

5. *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993).

*E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*<sup>6</sup> and their impact upon expert testimony as a component of summary judgment practice. Most recently, the advent of a “reasonable juror” standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence plays a role in the changing framework upon which summary judgment practice has been built.<sup>7</sup> Upon these pillars, this Article examines the procedural and substantive aspects of obtaining, opposing, and appealing a summary judgment, reviews the types of cases amenable to summary judgment, and, finally, provides an overview of federal summary judgment practice.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a,<sup>8</sup> which governs summary judgment practice,<sup>9</sup> permits a party to obtain a prompt disposition of a case involving “patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses.”<sup>10</sup> The rule provides a means of summarily terminating a case when a question of law is involved and no genuine issue of material fact exists.<sup>11</sup>

When it was adopted in 1949<sup>12</sup> the purpose of the rule was, and remains, to eliminate delay and expense.<sup>13</sup> Motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment are used to win cases, obtain discovery, narrow issues, educate the judge about the case, and determine an opponent’s strategy.

Even though the function of a summary judgment is not to deprive litigants of the right to a trial by jury,<sup>14</sup> the practical

6. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1995).

7. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (citing *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

8. Prior to the January 1, 1988, amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, this Rule was designated 166-A rather than 166a. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a historical note; TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS § 1.01 (3d ed. 2008).

9. See generally DAVID HITTNER ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL: 5TH CIRCUIT EDITION ch. 14 (The Rutter Group eds., 2009) (discussing federal summary judgment practice); PATTON, *supra* note 8, at 1-1 to -2 (discussing summary judgment practice in Texas); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 413 (2006) (discussing summary judgment practice in Texas); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (same); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (1998) (same); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 9, 12 (1994) (same); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 246 (1989) (same).

10. *Casso v. Brand*, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (quoting *City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)).

11. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

12. See Willy E. Rice, *Questionable Summary Judgments, Appearances of Judicial Bias, and Insurance Defense in Texas Declaratory-Judgment Trials: A Proposal and Arguments for Revising Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166A(A), 166A(B), 166A(I)*, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 535, 541 & n.22 (2005).

13. Roy W. McDonald, *Summary Judgments*, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952).

14. *Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004);

effect of applying the complex and technical principles in zealously prosecuting summary judgment motions results in a reduced number of cases presented to a jury. Much has been written about the “vanishing jury trial” and the purported causes of this phenomenon,<sup>15</sup> of which there are many: the ever-increasing cost of litigation,<sup>16</sup> alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation and particularly arbitration,<sup>17</sup> tort reform,<sup>18</sup> heightened pleading standards,<sup>19</sup> fear of the runaway jury,<sup>20</sup> and perhaps even the reduction in the number of seasoned litigators with the skill and experience to take a case to trial.<sup>21</sup> No doubt these all have contributed to the significant decline in the

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Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952).

15. See generally AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE “VANISHING TRIAL:” THE COLLEGE, THE PROFESSION, THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2004) (highlighting “a litigation explosion and trial implosion” that has taken place over the past four decades), available at [http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All\\_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=57](http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=57); Marc Galanter, *The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts*, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004) (comparing the increase in law-related activities in general with the sharp decline in absolute number of trials); Patrick E. Higginbotham, *So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?*, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1405 (2002) (indicating that both criminal and civil trial numbers have declined); Martin H. Redish, *Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix*, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005) (citing changes in the law regarding summary judgment as a probable explanation for “the dramatic reduction in federal trials”); William G. Young, *Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution*, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73–74 (2006) (stating that the “American jury system is dying out” (quoting *United States v. Reid*, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 n.11 (D. Mass. 2002))).

16. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, *supra* note 15, at 15–18.

17. *Id.* at 21–22 (noting a significant increase in filings for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association, from fewer than 1,000 cases in 1960 to more than 17,000 cases in 2002); see also Richard M. Alderman, *Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act, It's All About Separation of Powers*, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 155 n.69 (2009); Justice Nathan L. Hecht, *Jury Trials Trending Down in Texas Civil Cases*, 69 TEX. B.J. 854, 855 (2006), available at <http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Publications3/Journal/20061/October5/Arbitration%20Hecht%20Article.PDF>. See generally Tracy Walters McCormack, *Privatizing the Justice System*, 25 REV. LITIG. 735, 737 (2006); Kirk W. Schuler, Note, *ADR's Biggest Compromise*, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 770 (2006) (citing the expenditures of time and money that are usually required for litigation as reasons for increased reliance on alternative dispute resolution). Indeed, some contend that overly meddlesome judges who pressure parties to settle have contributed to the decline in jury trials. John C. Cratsley, *Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to Meet*, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 569, 595 (2006).

18. See Elaine A. Carlson, *Tort Reform: Redefining the Role of the Court and the Jury*, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 257 (2005) (discussing tort reform as a cause of declining litigation).

19. See *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–54 (2009); *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

20. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, *supra* note 15, at 18–20; see also Frederic N. Smalkin & Frederic N.C. Smalkin, *The Market for Justice, the “Litigation Explosion,” and the “Verdict Bubble”: A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials*, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 8, 18.

21. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, *supra* note 15, at 22–23.

number of cases actually tried to juries in federal and state courts each year. Also contributing significantly to the demise of the jury trial are procedural reforms and precedent, including the heightened scrutiny placed on expert testimony<sup>22</sup> and the seeming increase in the availability of summary judgment.<sup>23</sup>

## PART 1

### STATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE

#### I. PROCEDURE

The decision to file a motion for summary judgment rests on many factors including the facts, the applicable law, the client, the judge, and strategy.

##### A. *Motion for Summary Judgment*

The summary judgment process begins with the filing of a motion for summary judgment.<sup>24</sup> Unless a party to the suit files a motion for summary judgment, no court has the power to render a judgment.<sup>25</sup> Even though it properly grants a summary judgment to one party, a court may not grant summary judgment to another party who did not move for summary judgment or join in the moving party's motion.<sup>26</sup>

A motion for summary judgment is a "trial on paper."<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it should mirror a good trial presentation: "a clear theme that grabs the reader's attention, a persuasive story, and, most importantly, a clear analysis of the facts and the law that demonstrates why it should be granted."<sup>28</sup>

22. See *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993) (adopting a stricter test for admissibility of expert testimony); *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995) (adopting the *Daubert* test).

23. See Royal Ferguson, *Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can It Actually Happen in America?*, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 795, 854 (discussing the "propensity of lawyers to file summary judgment motions as a matter of course in all of their cases"); Paul W. Mollica, *Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide*, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 167-73 (2000) (discussing the increasing reach of summary judgment proceedings); see also Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica, *Judge's Response to Professors Hazard and Taruffo*, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 519, 527 (2006) (recognizing the disposition of cases on summary judgment as contributing to the decline in jury trials).

24. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a)-(b), (i).

25. *Daniels v. Daniels*, 45 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); *Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A.*, 15 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.).

26. *Mitchell v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr.*, 109 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

27. Michele L. Maryott, *The Trial on Paper: Key Considerations for Determining Whether to File a Summary Judgment Motion*, 35 J. SEC. LITIG. A.B.A. 36, 39 (2009).

28. *Id.*



Unlike trial practice, summary judgment practice is not a battle of oration, but of paper. Thus, these hallmarks of a winning trial strategy must be translated to the written word. The value of clear, persuasive writing cannot be overstated.

1. *General Requirements and Uses*

a. *Specification Requirement.* A motion for summary judgment must rest on the grounds expressly presented in the motion.<sup>29</sup> Unless a claim or affirmative defense is specifically addressed in the motion for summary judgment, a court cannot grant summary judgment on it.<sup>30</sup> The motion must state, with specificity, the grounds upon which the movant is relying.<sup>31</sup> The rationale for this requirement is to force the movant to define the issues and give the nonmovant adequate notice for opposing the motion.<sup>32</sup>

An amended or substituted motion for summary judgment supersedes any preceding motion.<sup>33</sup> A ground contained in an initial summary judgment motion, but not included in a later amended motion, may not be used to support the affirmance of a summary judgment on appeal.<sup>34</sup>

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29. *Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez*, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997); *McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993) (quoting *Westbrook Constr. Co. v. Fid. Nat'l Bank of Dallas*, 813 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, writ denied)); *see also* *City of Midland v. O'Bryant*, 18 S.W.3d 209, 218 (Tex. 2000) (holding that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on an issue that was not presented).

30. *Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C.*, 73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002); *Sci. Spectrum*, 941 S.W.2d at 912 (limiting summary judgment to those grounds expressly presented in the motion).

31. *Brewer & Pritchard*, 73 S.W.3d at 204; *Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp.*, 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. 1993); *Great-Ness Profl Servs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville*, 704 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (misclassifying the specific ground for summary judgment as a “suit on a sworn account” was sufficient to defeat summary judgment, even though the affidavit in support and the balance of the motion for summary judgment correctly alluded to a cause of action based upon a breach of a lease agreement).

32. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009); *Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez*, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. 1978); *see also* *McConnell*, 858 S.W.2d at 343–44 (stating that by requiring movant to expressly set forth grounds in the summary judgment motion, the nonmovant has the grounds for summary judgment narrowly focused and does not have to argue every ground vaguely referred to in the motion).

33. *Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Finlan*, 27 S.W.3d 220, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied); *see also* *Padilla v. LaFrance*, 907 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Tex. 1995) (stating that a motion for summary judgment would have to be considered an amended or substituted version in order to supersede the previous motion).

34. *State v. Seventeen Thousand & No/100 Dollars U.S. Currency*, 809 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (explaining that an amended motion for summary judgment “supplants the previous motion, which may no longer be considered”).

To determine if the grounds are expressly presented in the motion, neither the court nor the movant may rely on supporting briefs or summary judgment evidence.<sup>35</sup> Nor may a trial court grant more relief than requested in the motion for summary judgment.<sup>36</sup> Because a party can move for partial summary judgment,<sup>37</sup> omission of a claim from a motion for summary judgment does not waive the claim. Even though the grounds for summary judgment must appear in the motion itself, summary judgment evidence need not be set out or described in the motion to be considered.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, the usual practice, though not required by the supreme court, is to describe the summary judgment evidence.<sup>39</sup>

*b. Categories of Summary Judgments.* Summary judgments typically are divided into two categories. A “traditional” summary judgment is based on the movant’s contention that no genuine issue exists for any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.<sup>40</sup> A “no-evidence” summary judgment is based on the movant’s contention “that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”<sup>41</sup>

Regardless of its burden of proof at trial, either party may file a motion for summary judgment by establishing each element of its claim or defense.<sup>42</sup> The party without the burden of proof also may file a motion for summary judgment urging that there is no evidence to support the other party’s claims or affirmative defenses.<sup>43</sup> A party with the burden of proof may never properly file a no-evidence summary judgment on its claims or defenses, nor may purely legal issues be the subject of a no-evidence

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35. *McConnell*, 858 S.W.2d at 340–41.

36. *Walton v. City of Midland*, 24 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied), *abrogated on other grounds by In re Estate of Swanson*, 130 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.).

37. *McNally v. Guevara*, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).

38. *Wilson v. Burford*, 904 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

39. *See infra* Part 1, II.A.2 (discussing unfiled discovery as summary judgment evidence).

40. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *see infra* Part 1, I.A.2 (discussing traditional motions for summary judgment; Part 1, III.A (discussing burden of proof for traditional summary judgments).

41. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); *see infra* Part 1, I.A.3 (discussing no-evidence motions for summary judgments); Part 1, III.B (discussing no-evidence summary judgment burden of proof).

42. *See infra* Part 1, III (discussing burden of proof for summary judgments).

43. *See infra* Part 1, III.B (discussing burden of proof for no-evidence summary judgments).

summary judgment.<sup>44</sup> A no-evidence summary judgment may not be used by a defendant on its affirmative defense.<sup>45</sup>

A summary judgment motion may also be used when the evidence or lack of it is not the issue. Summary judgment is proper when the parties do not dispute relevant facts.<sup>46</sup> Where “the issues raised are based on undisputed facts, the reviewing court may determine the questions presented as a matter of law.”<sup>47</sup> Summary judgment motions may be used to ask a court to construe a statute.<sup>48</sup> For example, in *Curtis v. Anderson*, the court interpreted section 1.108 of the Texas Family Code to determine that an agreement concerning return of an engagement ring must be in writing to be enforceable.<sup>49</sup> In *PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co.*, the court determined the effect on coverage when an insured fails to timely notify its insurer of a claim but the insurer suffers no harm as a result.<sup>50</sup>

Similarly, summary judgments may be used to construe the meaning of contract provisions.<sup>51</sup> They may also be used to resolve certain jurisdictional claims.<sup>52</sup>

2. *Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.* To obtain relief through a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that no issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.<sup>53</sup> A defendant who moves for summary judgment must either disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or plead and

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44. *Harrill v. A.J.'s Wrecker Serv., Inc.*, 27 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); *see also* Part III.B (discussing burden of proof for no-evidence summary judgments).

45. *Mills v. Pate*, 225 S.W.3d 277, 290 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.).

46. *Havlen v. McDougall*, 22 S.W.3d 343, 345 (Tex. 2000).

47. *Lavigne v. Holder*, 186 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

48. *See, e.g., Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha*, 290 S.W.3d 863, 864, 869 (Tex. 2009) (construing section 33.004(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to determine that it applies narrowly to statutes of limitations and not more broadly to include statutes of repose). Statutory construction is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. *First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs*, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. 2008).

49. *Curtis v. Anderson*, 106 S.W.3d 251, 254–55 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied).

50. *PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co.*, 243 S.W.3d 630, 636–37 (Tex. 2008).

51. *See, e.g., Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett*, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005) (construing the meaning of a certain notice provision of a commonly used oil and gas operating agreement); *see also infra* Part 1, VII.B (discussing summary judgments in suits on written instruments).

52. *See generally* Rebecca Simmons & Suzette Kinder Patton, *Plea to the Jurisdiction: Defining the Undefined*, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 627, 638–39, 681 (2009).

53. *TEX. R. CIV. P.* 166a(c); *SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld*, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005); *Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant*, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); *see infra* Part 1, III.A (discussing burden of proof for traditional summary judgment).

conclusively establish each essential element of any affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's causes of action.<sup>54</sup> A plaintiff must show entitlement to prevail on each element of the cause of action, except damages.<sup>55</sup>

If the movant's motion and summary judgment evidence facially establish the movant's right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine, material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment.<sup>56</sup> A fact is material when it "affects the ultimate outcome of the suit under the governing law."<sup>57</sup> "A material fact issue is 'genuine' only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find the fact in favor of the nonmoving party."<sup>58</sup>

In deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue, the court considers all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, "crediting evidence favorable to [the nonmovant] if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not."<sup>59</sup> The evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if "reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all" the summary judgment evidence.<sup>60</sup>

3. *No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.* "A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict."<sup>61</sup> Rule 166a(i), which provides for no-evidence summary judgments, requires much less from the movant than when moving for a traditional summary judgment.<sup>62</sup> Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), "a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more

54. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995).

55. See, e.g., Fry v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 979 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Green v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 883 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ); Brooks v. Sherry Lane Nat'l Bank, 788 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ); Bergen, Johnson & Olson Gen. P'ship v. Verco Mfg. Co., 690 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

56. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23–24 (Tex. 2000).

57. Rayon v. Energy Specialties, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

58. *Id.* at 11–12.

59. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006).

60. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).

61. Hernandez v. De La Rosa, 172 S.W.3d 78, 80–81 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1356 (1998)).

62. See *infra* Part 1, III.B (discussing burden of proof for no-evidence summary judgments).

essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”<sup>63</sup> The movant need not produce any evidence supporting its no-evidence motion.<sup>64</sup> Instead, the mere filing of a proper motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to come forward with enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>65</sup> If the nonmovant does not, the court must grant the motion.<sup>66</sup>

While it need not be detailed, the no-evidence summary judgment motion must meet certain requirements. First, the movant must identify the grounds for the motion.<sup>67</sup> The motion also must state the elements for which there is no evidence.<sup>68</sup> A defendant’s motion should state the elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action and specifically challenge the evidentiary support for an element of that claim.<sup>69</sup> For example, in a negligence case, it is sufficient to state that there is no evidence of duty, breach, or causation.<sup>70</sup>

Second, the motion cannot be conclusory or generally allege that there is no evidence to support the claims.<sup>71</sup> In other words, a motion that merely states that there is no evidence to support the other party’s claim is insufficient. For example, a no-evidence motion is too general if it states: “[T]here is absolutely no evidence to support [plaintiff’s] assertions that [defendant] committed a wrongful foreclosure . . . .”<sup>72</sup> The underlying purpose

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63. *Western Invs., Inc. v. Urena*, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).

64. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); *Home State County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horn*, No. 12-07-00094-CV, 2008 WL 2514332, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 25, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1356 (1998)); *Branson v. Spiros Partners Ltd.*, No. 04-07-00007-CV, 2007 WL 4547502, at \*2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1356 (1998)).

65. *Home State County Mut. Ins. Co.*, 2008 WL 2514332, at \*2; *see also infra* Part 1, III.B, IV.C (discussing burden of proof for no-evidence summary judgments and how to respond to them, respectively).

66. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

67. *Id.*; *Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant*, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002).

68. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009); *see also Smith v. Lagerstam*, No. 03-05-00275-CV, 2007 WL 2066298, at \*19 (Tex. App.—Austin July 19, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 416 (2006)).

69. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

70. *Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc.*, 988 S.W.2d 428, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

71. *Id.*

72. *Abraham v. Ryland Mortgage Co.*, 995 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.); *see also Meru v. Huerta*, 136 S.W.3d 383, 386–87 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (“Rule 166a(i) does not authorize conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponent’s case.”).

of the requirement that the motion be specific, not conclusory, is to provide the nonmovant “with adequate information for opposing the motion, and to define the issues.”<sup>73</sup> In *Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish*, the supreme court applied a “fair notice” standard to determine whether a motion for no-evidence summary judgment was sufficient.<sup>74</sup> The court allowed that the degree of specificity required depends on the case. It determined that a motion was sufficient that stated that “[p]laintiff has presented no evidence of a design defect which was a producing cause of his personal injury” and included a conclusion that essentially repeated the statement of this element with little additional information.<sup>75</sup> The court also noted that such a motion might be insufficient in a complex products or design defect case.<sup>76</sup>

If a no-evidence motion for summary judgment is conclusory, general, or does not state the elements for which there is no evidence, the motion is legally insufficient and may be challenged for the first time on appeal.<sup>77</sup>

While no evidence need be attached to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, in some instances it may be advisable to do so in light of summary judgment cases construing *City of Keller v. Wilson*.<sup>78</sup> In *City of Keller*, the court determined that “[t]he standards for taking any case from the jury should be the same, no matter what motion is used [for summary judgment].”<sup>79</sup> The court noted that appellate courts “do *not* disregard the evidence supporting the motion.”<sup>80</sup> But it added that “although a reviewing court must consider all the summary judgment evidence on file, in some cases that review will effectively be restricted to the evidence contrary to the motion.”<sup>81</sup> *City of Keller*

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73. *Timpte Indus., Inc.*, 286 S.W.3d at 311 (analogizing this purpose to the “fair notice” pleading requirements of Rules 45(b) and 47(a)).

74. *Id.* In relying on the fair notice standard, the supreme court in *Timpte Industries, Inc.* appears to overrule courts of appeals opinions that refuse to extend the fair notice standard to determine whether a motion for no-evidence summary judgment is sufficient, including the following: *Holloway v. Tex. Elec. Util. Const., Ltd.*, 282 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.); *Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments, Inc. v. Component Control.com, Inc.*, 262 S.W.3d 813, 824 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); *Mott v. Red’s Safe & Lock Servs. Inc.*, 249 S.W.3d 90, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

75. *Timpte Indus., Inc.*, 286 S.W.3d at 311.

76. *Id.*

77. *See Holloway*, 282 S.W.3d at 215.

78. *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822–24 (Tex. 2005) (“[A] reviewing court must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion.”).

79. *Id.* at 825.

80. *Id.* at 824–25.

81. *Id.* at 825.

has been construed to mean that the appellate court reviewing a summary judgment “must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented.”<sup>82</sup>

4. *Combined Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment.* Traditional summary judgment motions under Rules 166a(a) or (b) may be combined with a Rule 166a(i) no-evidence motion.<sup>83</sup> In moving for (or responding to) a summary judgment, it is important to distinguish between the two types of summary judgments because different burdens of proof and standards of review apply and the standards for timing of the motion are different.<sup>84</sup> The fact that a movant attaches evidence to its motion based on subsection (a) or (b) does not foreclose it from also asserting that there is no evidence of a particular element.<sup>85</sup> In fact, as noted above, it may be advisable.<sup>86</sup> The court may also treat it as a traditional motion for summary judgment under subsection (a) or (b).

The supreme court endorses the use of headings to delineate the basis for summary judgment but does not require it.<sup>87</sup> “If a motion clearly sets forth its grounds and otherwise meets Rule 166a’s requirements, it is sufficient.”<sup>88</sup> Nonetheless, using headings makes the motion easier to follow and understand and is good advocacy.

### B. Pleadings

The movant should insure that the grounds for the motion for summary judgment are supported by pleadings. Rule 166a(c) provides that the trial court should render summary judgment

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82. *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes*, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007); *see also* *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (citing *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez*, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006)); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates*, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006).

83. *Binur v. Jacobo*, 135 S.W.3d 646, 650–51 (Tex. 2004). *Binur*’s implication that the nonmovant’s evidence should be disregarded has effectively been supplanted by *City of Keller* and its progeny. *See supra* Part 1, I.A.3.

84. *See* *Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Thompson*, 199 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). A traditional summary judgment is not subject to the same restrictions as a no-evidence summary judgment, which may not be granted until an adequate time for discovery has passed. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a), (i); *infra* Part 1, V.F (discussing standards of review); *infra* Part 1, I.C (discussing timing of filing a motion for summary judgment).

85. *Binur*, 135 S.W.3d at 651.

86. *See supra* Part 1, I.A.3.

87. *Binur*, 135 S.W.3d at 651.

88. *Id.*

based on pleadings on file at the time of the hearing.<sup>89</sup> Where there is no live pleading urging a cause of action, there can be no summary judgment.<sup>90</sup>

1. *Amended Pleadings.* Unless it violates a discovery plan deadline, a party may file an amended pleading after it files its summary judgment motion or response.<sup>91</sup> A summary judgment proceeding is considered a “trial” with respect to filing amended pleadings according to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63.<sup>92</sup> Thus, a party should file an amended answer as soon as possible and no later than seven days before the summary judgment hearing.<sup>93</sup> If filed outside the seven-day period, no leave to file amended pleadings is necessary.<sup>94</sup> In computing the seven-day period, the day the party files the amended pleading is not counted, but the day of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is counted.<sup>95</sup>

Leave of court must be obtained to file amended pleadings within seven days of the date of the summary judgment hearing.<sup>96</sup> If the motion for leave is filed within seven days of the hearing, the appellate court presumes leave was granted if “(1) the summary judgment states that all pleadings were considered, (2) the record does not indicate that an amended pleading was *not* considered, and (3) the opposing party does not show surprise.”<sup>97</sup> “To properly preserve a complaint regarding a pleading which has been filed within seven days of trial, ‘the complaining party must demonstrate surprise and request a continuance.’”<sup>98</sup>

Even though a hearing may be set and reset, “the key date for purposes of Rule 63 [is] the date of the final hearing from

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89. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

90. *Daniels v. Daniels*, 45 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). *But see infra* Part 1, IV.A (discussing unpleaded claims); *infra* Part 1, III.A.3 (discussing affirmative defenses).

91. *Cluett v. Med. Protective Co.*, 829 S.W.2d 822, 825–26 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied).

92. Rule 63 provides for timing of amendments and responsive pleadings, including that amended pleadings may be filed without leave of court up to seven days before the date of trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 63.

93. *Id.*; *Sosa v. Cent. Power & Light*, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

94. *9029 Gateway S. Joint Venture v. Eller Media Co.*, 159 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

95. *Sosa*, 909 S.W.2d at 895 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 4).

96. *Id.*

97. *Eller Media Co.*, 159 S.W.3d at 187; *see also* *Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer*, 920 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. 1996).

98. *Fletcher v. Edwards*, 26 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied) (citing *Morse v. Delgado*, 975 S.W.2d 378, 386 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, no pet.)).



which the summary judgment sprang.”<sup>99</sup> Once the hearing date on the motion for summary judgment has passed, a party may file an amended pleading before the court signs a judgment only if it secures a written order granting leave to file.<sup>100</sup> If a nonmovant does not obtain the trial court’s written permission to amend its pleadings after the hearing date, the movant need not amend or supplement its motion for summary judgment to address those claims.<sup>101</sup> The court cannot grant a motion to amend the pleadings once it signs an order granting summary judgment.<sup>102</sup>

If the plaintiff amends the petition after being served with a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must file an amended or supplemental motion for summary judgment to address the newly pleaded cause of action.<sup>103</sup> Amending the motion is equally necessary for no-evidence summary judgments. If the plaintiff amends its petition adding new causes of action not addressed by the defendant’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the defendant must file an amended motion for summary judgment identifying the elements of the newly pled theories for which there is no evidence. Otherwise, summary judgment on the entirety of the plaintiff’s case will be improper, because the no-evidence motion fails to address all of the plaintiff’s theories of liability.<sup>104</sup> However, if an amended petition only “reiterates the same essential elements in another fashion,” then the original motion for summary judgment will cover the new variations.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, “[i]f a motion for summary judgment is sufficiently broad to encompass later-filed claims, the movant need not amend [the] motion.”<sup>106</sup> Also, “when a ground asserted in a motion for summary judgment conclusively negates a common

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99. *Cantu v. Holiday Inns, Inc.*, 910 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).

100. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Hussong v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., Inc.*, 896 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).

101. *Mensa-Wilmot v. Smith Int’l, Inc.*, No. 01-08-481-CV, 2009 WL 3931252, at \*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2009, no pet. h.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 418 (2006)).

102. *Prater v. State Farm Lloyds*, 217 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

103. *Johnson v. Rollen*, 818 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); *see also* *Worthy v. Collagen Corp.*, 921 S.W.2d 711, 714 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995), *aff’d*, 967 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. 1998) (discussing supplemental motions).

104. *Sosa v. Cent. Power & Light*, 909 S.W.2d 893, 894–95 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

105. *Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua*, 29 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting *Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc.*, 988 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

106. *Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, No. 14-07-00663-CV, 2009 WL 3003251, at \*2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2009, no pet.) (quoting *Espeche v. Ritzell*, 123 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).

element of the newly and previously pleaded claims,” summary judgment may be proper.<sup>107</sup>

In cases with court-ordered discovery plans, the court may set the deadline for amended pleadings before the close of the discovery period.<sup>108</sup> In those instances, movants who wait to move for summary judgment until after the time expires for pleading amendments will not have to amend the summary judgment motion to address amended pleadings filed beyond the deadline without leave of court.

2. *Unpleaded Claims or Defenses.* Unpleaded claims or defenses may form the basis for summary judgment if the nonmovant does not object.<sup>109</sup> Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court has held:

[A]n unpleaded affirmative defense may . . . serve as the basis for a summary judgment when it is raised in the summary judgment motion, and the opposing party does not object to the lack of a [Texas Rule of Civil Procedure] 94 pleading in either its written response or before the rendition of judgment.<sup>110</sup>

Based on the same reasoning, the Eastland Court of Appeals determined that even though the plaintiff failed to plead the discovery rule, summary judgment was precluded when the defendant did not address it after the plaintiff raised it in response to its motion for summary judgment.<sup>111</sup> The court held that “when a non-movant relies on an unpleaded affirmative defense or an unpleaded matter constituting a confession and avoidance,”<sup>112</sup> the movant must object to defeat a motion for summary judgment, otherwise, the issue will be tried by consent.<sup>113</sup>

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107. *Rotating Servs. Indus., Inc. v. Harris*, 245 S.W.3d 476, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

108. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(b)(4).

109. *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes*, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 n.1 (Tex. 2007); *Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc.*, 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991) (“[U]npleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of the parties are treated as if they [were] raised by the pleadings.”); *Patterson v. First Nat’l Bank of Lake Jackson*, 921 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (“An unpleaded affirmative defense, however, cannot be the basis for summary judgment unless appellee fails to object to the lack of a pleading in either its written response or before the rendition of judgment.”).

110. *Roark*, 813 S.W.2d at 494; *see also* TEX. R. CIV. P. 94 (concerning pleading affirmative defenses); *Finley v. Steenkamp*, 19 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.); *Webster v. Thomas*, 5 S.W.3d 287, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

111. *Proctor v. White*, 172 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, no pet.).

112. *Id.*

113. *Id.*

If the nonmovant does object to the lack of an unpleaded claim or defense, the movant must amend to conform its pleadings to the motion.<sup>114</sup>

3. *Pleading Deficiencies and Special Exceptions.* Summary judgment motions are not a proper vehicle to attack pleading deficiencies.<sup>115</sup> Texas has no equivalent to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.<sup>116</sup> “A summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment.”<sup>117</sup> However, a nonmovant must raise a complaint that summary judgment was granted without opportunity to amend or it is waived.<sup>118</sup>

a. *Special Exceptions.* If the nonmovant seeks to challenge the plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action, filing special exceptions is the appropriate method to attack that failure.<sup>119</sup> The purpose of special exceptions is to compel clarification of pleadings when the pleadings are not clear or sufficiently specific or fail to plead a cause of action.<sup>120</sup> Special exceptions allow the nonmovant an opportunity to amend before dismissal.<sup>121</sup> There is no general demurrer in Texas.<sup>122</sup> If the court determines the

114. See *Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.*, 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994) (“Summary judgment based on a pleading deficiency is proper if a party has had an opportunity by special exception to amend and fails to do so, or files a further defective pleading.”).

115. *In re B.I.V.*, 870 S.W.2d 12, 13–14 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam); *Massey v. Armco Steel Co.*, 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983) (“Whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment.”); *Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring*, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9–10 (Tex. 1974) (concluding that the protective features of the special exception procedure should not be circumvented by summary judgment where the pleadings fail to state a cause of action).

116. *Centennial Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos.*, 803 S.W.2d 479, 482–83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); see also *TEX. R. CIV. P.* 90–91 (providing for special exceptions for defects in pleadings and waiver of defects for failure to specially except).

117. *In re B.I.V.*, 870 S.W.2d at 13.

118. *San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke*, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209–10 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court’s judgment may not be reversed where a party does not present a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court); *Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co.*, 933 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (citing *San Jacinto River Auth.*, 783 S.W.2d at 209–10).

119. *TEX. R. CIV. P.* 91; see also *Lavy v. Pitts*, 29 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied).

120. *Friesenhahn v. Ryan*, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998).

121. *Centennial Ins. Co.*, 803 S.W.2d at 483.

122. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 90 discarded the general demurrer. *TEX. R. CIV. P.* 90; *Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring*, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974); see also *BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY* 644, 752 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “general demurrer” as “[a]n objection pointing out a substantive defect in an opponent’s pleading, such as the insufficiency of the claim or the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; an objection to a pleading for

petition is defective, the “court must give the pleader an opportunity to amend his pleadings prior to granting summary judgment or dismissing the case.”<sup>123</sup> In certain circumstances, a trial court may dismiss a claim after sustaining special exceptions. For example, in *Baylor University v. Sonnichsen*, the supreme court determined that because the plaintiff could not have corrected the problem (there was no mutual agreement), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the defendant’s special exceptions and dismissing his breach of contract claim.<sup>124</sup>

Nonetheless, special exceptions can identify and set up conditions to make a case subject to summary judgment disposition. Subject to challenges to jurisdiction and venue, a party should file special exceptions identifying and objecting to non-jurisdictional defects apparent on the face of the opponent’s pleadings.<sup>125</sup> If identification of the defect depends on information extrinsic to the pleadings themselves, special exceptions are not appropriate.<sup>126</sup> Special exceptions must be directed at the plaintiff’s *live* pleadings.<sup>127</sup>

Special exceptions are also the method to force a movant for summary judgment to clarify its position if its motion for summary judgment is unclear or ambiguous. To complain that summary judgment grounds are unclear, a nonmovant must specially except to the motion.<sup>128</sup> If the motion fails to state grounds or states some grounds but not others, the nonmovant should use these defects as a means to defeat the summary

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want of substance”).

123. *Moonlight Invs., Ltd. v. John*, 192 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied); see also *Friesenhahn*, 960 S.W.2d at 658.

124. *Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen*, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2007).

125. *Fort Bend County v. Wilson*, 825 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding that special exceptions should be used to force clarification of vague pleadings and question the legal sufficiency of the party’s petition).

126. *Fernandez v. City of El Paso*, 876 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ denied) (stating special exceptions must only address matters on the face of the other party’s pleading); *O’Neal v. Sherck Equip. Co.*, 751 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, no writ) (stating that a special exception “cannot inject factual allegations that do not appear” in the other party’s pleading).

127. *Transmission Exch. Inc. v. Long*, 821 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The defendants’ statement in their special exceptions, that plaintiff’s pleading did not advise them of the amounts claimed for fraud damages, was taken as an indication that defendants were aware of and, therefore, on notice of plaintiff’s fraud allegations. *Id.* That fact, coupled with the absence of any special exceptions to the vague allegations of fraud in plaintiff’s third amended petition and the defendants’ failure to object to the submission of special issues on fraud, constituted waiver of any complaint that the judgment for fraud did not conform to the pleadings. *Id.*

128. *Lavy v. Pitts*, 29 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (citing *Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 896 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. 1995)).

judgment on the merits, not to identify them by special exceptions and thereby prompting the movant to cure them.

*b. Effect of Amendment and Failure to Amend.* A motion for summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment (subject to a special exception). If the trial court sustains the special exceptions, the offending party may replead or the party may elect to stand on the pleadings and test the trial court's order on appeal.<sup>129</sup> The right to amend is absolute.<sup>130</sup> Yet, if the opportunity to amend is given and no amendment is made or instead a further defective pleading is filed, then summary judgment may be proper.<sup>131</sup> If a pleading deficiency is a type that cannot be cured by an amendment, then a special exception is unnecessary and summary judgment is proper if the facts alleged "establish the absence of a right of action or [create] an insuperable barrier to a right of recovery."<sup>132</sup>

The review of summary judgment differs when based on the failure of a party to state a claim after either special exceptions or an amendment because review focuses on the pleadings of the nonmovant.<sup>133</sup> Review of the sufficiency of the amended pleadings is *de novo*.<sup>134</sup> The appellate court must take "all allegations, facts, and inferences in the pleadings as true and view[] them in a light most favorable to the pleader."<sup>135</sup> The court will reverse the

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129. *D.A. Buckner Constr., Inc. v. Hobson*, 793 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).

130. *Massey v. Armco Steel Co.*, 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983).

131. *Haase v. Glazner*, 62 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. 2001); *Friesenhahn v. Ryan*, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998); *Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.*, 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994).

132. *Swilley v. Hughes*, 488 S.W.2d 64, 66–67 (Tex. 1972) (noting that cases where summary judgment is proper, rather than using special exceptions, are limited); *see, e.g., White v. Bayless*, 32 S.W.3d 271, 274–78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (granting summary judgment without giving the nonmovant an opportunity to cure because the nonmovant's pleading "affirmatively demonstrate[d] that no cause of action exist[ed]"); *Trail Enters. v. City of Houston*, 957 S.W.2d 625, 632–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (finding that the statute of limitations ran and plaintiff did not plead discovery rule).

133. *See Russell v. Tex. Dep't of Human Res.*, 746 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied) (explaining that, after amendment, the focus shifts to the answers in the response).

134. *See Natividad*, 875 S.W.2d at 699; *Hall v. Stephenson*, 919 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

135. *Natividad*, 875 S.W.2d at 699; *Hall*, 919 S.W.2d at 467; *see also Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988) (concluding that the reviewing court will accept as true all factual allegations in the plaintiff's petition to determine whether the petition states a factual basis for plaintiff's claim); *Havens v. Tomball Cmty. Hosp.*, 793 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stating that "the court must take as true every allegation of the pleading against which the motion is directed").

motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, liberally construed, support recovery under any legal theory.<sup>136</sup> On the other hand, “[t]he reviewing court will affirm the summary judgment only if the pleadings are legally insufficient.”<sup>137</sup>

If the nonmovant does not object to the absence of special exceptions and the lack of the opportunity to amend, its complaint is waived.<sup>138</sup>

### C. Time for Filing Motion for Summary Judgment

The timing of filing a motion for summary judgment depends on whether it is a traditional motion for summary judgment or a no-evidence summary judgment.

1. *Traditional Summary Judgment.* Rule 166a(a) provides that the party seeking affirmative relief in a lawsuit may file a traditional motion for summary judgment at any time after the adverse party answers the suit.<sup>139</sup> A summary judgment may not be granted for a plaintiff against a defendant who has no answer on file.<sup>140</sup> A defendant, however, may file a motion for summary judgment at any time,<sup>141</sup> even before answering the lawsuit.<sup>142</sup>

Nonetheless, seldom is a motion for summary judgment appropriate immediately after the defendant has answered. In fact, Rule 166a(g) provides that the court “may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”<sup>143</sup> Examples of proper early-filed motions for summary judgment would be when the case hinges exclusively on the

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136. *Gross v. Davies*, 882 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (stating that if liberal construction of petition shows a valid claim, summary judgment should be reversed); *Anders v. Mallard & Mallard, Inc.*, 817 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding that a motion for summary judgment must be overruled if liberal construction of the pleading reveals a fact issue); *Greater Sw. Office Park, Ltd. v. Tex. Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 786 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (explaining that summary judgment must be reversed if the pleadings would support “a recovery under any theory of law”); *Bader v. Cox*, 701 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discussing the “fair notice” requirement of pleadings).

137. *Natividad*, 875 S.W.2d at 699.

138. *Higbie Roth Constr. Co. v. Houston Shell & Concrete*, 1 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

139. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a).

140. *Hock v. Salaises*, 982 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

141. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(b).

142. *Zimmelman v. Harris County*, 819 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

143. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); see *infra* Part 1, I.H (discussing motions for continuance).

interpretation of a statute, the construction of an unambiguous contract, or application of the statute of limitations when the discovery rule does not apply. Generally, the nonmovant will have grounds for a continuance to conduct some discovery.<sup>144</sup>

2. *No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.* The proper timing of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment is more complicated than that for a traditional motion for summary judgment. Before a no-evidence summary judgment can be filed, there must be an “adequate time for discovery.”<sup>145</sup> “The rule does not require that discovery must have been completed, only that there was ‘adequate time’ for discovery.”<sup>146</sup> Specifically, the rule provides in relevant part:

(i) No-Evidence Motion. *After adequate time for discovery*, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.<sup>147</sup>

The “Notes and Comments” addendum to the rule, which was promulgated in 1997, offers guidance for cases with discovery orders. It provides that “[a] discovery period set by pretrial order should be adequate opportunity for discovery unless there is a showing to the contrary, and ordinarily a motion under paragraph (i) would be permitted after the period but not before.”<sup>148</sup>

The addendum to the rule made no mention of how to proceed in the absence of a pretrial order. The revised discovery rules filled that gap because all cases now have a rule- or court-imposed discovery plan with discovery periods.<sup>149</sup> Rule 190 provides three discovery control plans, each of which has a “discovery period” for all civil cases.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, an “adequate time for discovery” may be measured against the “discovery period” assigned to a given case. The comment to Rule 166a(i) covers what now is called a “Level 3” case, which has a court-

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144. See *infra* Part 1, I.H.

145. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

146. Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

147. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (emphasis added).

148. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) cmt.—1997.

149. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190 cmt.—1999.

150. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.1; see also Texas Supreme Court Order of Nov. 9, 1998, Approval of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 98-9196, reprinted in 61 TEX. B.J. 1140, 1140 (1998).

imposed discovery plan.<sup>151</sup> Levels 1 and 2 have rule-imposed discovery periods.<sup>152</sup> Thus, if the no-evidence motion for summary judgment is filed after the expiration of the discovery periods, presumptively there will have been an adequate time for discovery.

For Level 1 cases, an adequate time for discovery would occur thirty days before trial.<sup>153</sup> The practical effect of this cutoff date is that the case has progressed so far, and the dollars sought are so relatively small, that many defendants will forego filing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in the last thirty days before trial. Also, it will be difficult to get the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment in the limited time before trial. For Level 2 cases, an adequate time for discovery would be the discovery cutoff of thirty days before the date set for trial, or nine months after the first oral deposition is taken or the answers to the first written discovery are due, whichever is earlier.<sup>154</sup> In Level 2 family cases, the nonmovant responding to a motion for summary judgment filed thirty days before trial would have had adequate time for discovery.<sup>155</sup> For Level 3 cases, the close of discovery under the court-ordered discovery control plan determines the date after which an adequate time for discovery has passed.<sup>156</sup>

The timing restriction is not absolute. Movants on no-evidence summary judgments may properly file the motion before the expiration of the discovery period. The ability to file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment before the close of discovery supports judicial economy arguments; the presumption against the early filing of motions for summary judgment supports the right to a certain discovery window to allow a party to secure sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a fact issue.

In appropriate cases, a movant could show an adequate time for discovery has passed, even though the discovery period has not expired, by convincing the court that the nonmovant's claimed need for discovery is unfounded.<sup>157</sup> The nonmovant opposing an early-filed no-evidence motion for summary

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151. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4.

152. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2–.3.

153. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(1); *see also* TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(d).

154. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1)(B).

155. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1)(A).

156. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(b)(2).

157. *See* Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (upholding the trial court's conclusion that an adequate time for discovery had passed despite the fact that the discovery deadline had not yet been reached); *see also* HITTNER ET AL., *supra* note 9, § 14:117.



judgment should attempt to have it denied as premature by convincing the court that remaining discovery is likely to lead to controverting evidence and that, in any event, he or she is entitled to the additional time under the discovery plan.

Even if the no-evidence motion for summary judgment is filed after the close of discovery,<sup>158</sup> Rule 190.5 may provide a basis for a request for continuance of the motion for summary judgment. Rule 190.5 allows for a continuance in obtaining additional discovery after the close of the discovery period. When a nonmovant contends that he or she has not had an adequate time for discovery, he or she must file an affidavit or a verified motion for continuance explaining the need for further discovery.<sup>159</sup> The court may deny the motion for summary judgment, continue the hearing to allow additional discovery, or “make such other order as is just.”<sup>160</sup>

The “adequate time for discovery” standard applies only to no-evidence summary judgments.<sup>161</sup>

#### *D. Deadlines for Filing Motion for Summary Judgment*

A motion for summary judgment shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for the hearing on the summary judgment.<sup>162</sup> If different parties on the same side of the lawsuit file separate summary judgment motions, each movant should comply with the notice provisions of the rule.<sup>163</sup> Parties may alter the deadlines for filing summary judgment motions by Rule 11 agreement.<sup>164</sup> Periods governing summary judgment procedures are counted in the same manner as for other procedural rules.<sup>165</sup> The day of service of a motion for

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158. See *infra* Part 1, I.H (discussing motions for continuance).

159. *Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co.*, 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996).

160. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g).

161. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a)–(b), (i).

162. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Lewis v. Blake*, 876 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam); see also *Krchnak v. Fulton*, 759 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (holding that the rule regarding certificate of service “creates a presumption that the requisite notice was served and . . . has the force of a rule of law”).

163. See *Wavell v. Caller-Times Publ’g Co.*, 809 S.W.2d 633, 636–37 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (emphasizing that the notice provisions for summary judgment are strictly construed), *abrogated on other grounds by* *Cain v. Hearst Corp.*, 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).

164. TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (allowing enforcement of agreements between parties when they are signed and filed, or made in open court and entered on the record); *D.B. v. K.B.*, 176 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).

165. *Lewis*, 876 S.W.2d at 315–16 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 4) (disapproving of a series of appellate court decisions that did not add the extra three days for service by mail or telephonic document transfer).

summary judgment is not to be included in computing the minimum twenty-one-day notice for hearing.<sup>166</sup> However, the day of hearing is included in the computation.<sup>167</sup> If the motion is served by mail, three days are added to the twenty-one-day notice period required prior to the hearing.<sup>168</sup> Thus, a “hearing on a motion for summary judgment may be set as early as the 21st day after the motion is served, or the 24th day if the motion is served by mail.”<sup>169</sup>

The twenty-one-day requirement is strictly construed by the courts and should be carefully followed. “Summary judgment evidence may be filed late, but only with leave of court.”<sup>170</sup> The party filing the late evidence must obtain a written order granting leave to file.<sup>171</sup> Rule 166a(c) authorizes the court to accept materials filed after the hearing so long as those materials are filed before judgment.<sup>172</sup> If a summary judgment hearing is reset, the twenty-one-day requirement does not apply to the resetting.<sup>173</sup> The nonmovant need only be given a reasonable time in which to prepare and file a response.<sup>174</sup> “Reasonable notice . . . means at least seven days before the hearing on the motion [for summary judgment] because a nonmovant may only file a response to a motion for summary judgment not later than seven days prior to the date of the hearing . . . .”<sup>175</sup>

A party waives its challenge for failure to receive twenty-one days’ notice if that party “received notice of the hearing,

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166. *Id.*

167. *Id.* at 316.

168. *Id.* at 315–16.

169. *Id.*

170. *Benchmark Bank v. Crowder*, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996).

171. *Id.* (finding no order in the record granting the party leave to file an affidavit late and therefore holding that the affidavit was not properly before the court and could not be considered).

172. *Beavers v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 884 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)) (finding that a trial court can accept evidence after “the hearing on the motion and before summary judgment is rendered”); *Diaz v. Rankin*, 777 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (holding that the trial court has discretion to allow late filing); *Marek v. Tomoco Equip. Co.*, 738 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (concluding that a trial court may consider affidavits filed after the hearing and before judgment when the court gives permission).

173. *Birdwell v. Texins Credit Union*, 843 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ) (“The twenty-one-day requirement from notice to hearing does not apply to a resetting of the hearing, provided the nonmovant received notice twenty-one days before the original hearing.”).

174. *See id.*

175. *LeNotre v. Cohen*, 979 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (quoting *Int’l Ins. Co. v. Herman G. West, Inc.*, 649 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ)).

appeared at it, filed no controverting affidavit, and did not ask for a continuance.”<sup>176</sup> “An allegation that a party received less notice than required by statute does not present a jurisdictional question and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”<sup>177</sup> It is error for the trial judge to grant a summary judgment without notice of the setting.<sup>178</sup> However, for the error to be reversible, the nonmovant must show harm.<sup>179</sup>

No additional notice is required for the trial court to rehear a previously denied motion for summary judgment.<sup>180</sup>

### *E. Deadlines for Response*

Rule 166a(c) provides that “[e]xcept on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.”<sup>181</sup> The three-day rule for mailing does not apply to the response. A response is timely if it is mailed seven days before the hearing date.<sup>182</sup> If the trial court imposes a shorter deadline to file a response, the nonmovant must object to preserve that error for appeal.<sup>183</sup> The seven-day rule applies equally to responses to cross-motions for summary judgment.<sup>184</sup> Any special exception due to a lack of clarity or ambiguity in the motion for summary judgment is likewise subject to the seven-day deadline.<sup>185</sup> Amended pleadings may be filed without leave of court up to seven days before the hearing.<sup>186</sup>

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176. *Negrini v. Beale*, 822 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); *see also* *Morrone v. Prestonwood Christian Acad.*, 215 S.W.3d 575, 585 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. denied).

177. *Negrini*, 822 S.W.2d at 823.

178. *Milam v. Nat’l Ins. Crime Bureau*, 989 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).

179. *Id.*

180. *Winn v. Martin Homebuilders, Inc.*, 153 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).

181. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

182. *Clendennen v. Williams*, 896 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ).

183. *See Richardson v. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc.*, 905 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that error must be reflected in the appellate record).

184. *Murphy v. McDermott Inc.*, 807 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).

185. *McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 n.7 (Tex. 1993) (finding that any confusion regarding an exception must be responded to in written form, filed, and served at least seven days before the hearing).

186. *Sosa v. Cent. Power & Light*, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); *see supra* Part 1, I.B.1 (discussing amended pleadings).

Courts may allow a late response.<sup>187</sup> The nonmovant must obtain leave of court to file a late response.<sup>188</sup> Refusal to permit late filing is discretionary.<sup>189</sup> The standard for allowing a late-filed summary judgment is a showing of good cause and no undue prejudice.<sup>190</sup> If a court allows late filing of a response to a motion for summary judgment, the court “must affirmatively indicate in the record acceptance of the late filing.”<sup>191</sup> The affirmative indication may be by separate order, by recitation in the summary judgment itself, or an oral ruling contained in the reporter’s record of the summary judgment hearing.<sup>192</sup> A Rule 11 agreement<sup>193</sup> “may alter the deadline for filing a response.”<sup>194</sup> One court has determined that a docket entry is sufficient to show leave was granted.<sup>195</sup> Nonetheless, obtaining a separate order or having the summary judgment order reflect permission is advisable. Although an oral order recorded in a reporter’s record (formerly “statement of facts”) from the hearing may not be sufficient, one court has held that it was sufficient.<sup>196</sup> In the

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187. *Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co.*, 919 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (finding that the trial court has discretion to accept late-filed summary judgment evidence); *Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer*, 943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied) (noting that a court’s acceptance of a late filing of opposing proof is “entirely” discretionary); *Ossorio v. Leon*, 705 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) (holding that the court may specifically grant leave to file late responses and consider those documents as proper support for a summary judgment motion).

188. *Neimes v. Ta*, 985 S.W.2d 132, 139 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. dismissed by agr.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)).

189. *White v. Independence Bank*, 794 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding that the trial court may refuse affidavits that are filed late); *Folkes v. Del Rio Bank & Trust Co.*, 747 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (denying permission to file a late response was not abuse of discretion).

190. *Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.*, 98 S.W.3d 682, 687–88 (Tex. 2002).

191. *Farmer*, 919 S.W.2d at 176; see also *Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988) (holding an amended petition that is part of the record raises a presumption that leave of court was granted); *K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago*, 75 S.W.3d 91, 96 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

192. *Neimes*, 985 S.W.2d at 138; see also *Farmer*, 919 S.W.2d at 176 (finding that a lack of indication in the record showing that leave was obtained leads to a presumption that leave was not obtained).

193. Rule 11 provides in part: “[N]o agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.

194. *Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc.*, 102 S.W.3d 366, 377 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

195. *Shore v. Thomas A. Sweeney & Assocs.*, 864 S.W.2d 182, 184–85 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no writ) (holding that the docket entry appeared on the record and thus satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a). But see *Energio Int’l Corp. v. Modern Indus. Heating, Inc.*, 722 S.W.2d 149, 151–52 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ) (stating that a docket entry is inadequate indication of acceptance).

196. *Woodbine Elec. Serv., Inc. v. McReynolds*, 837 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. App.—

absence of such indication, the appellate court will presume that the judge refused the late filing, even if the response appears as part of the appellate transcript.<sup>197</sup>

#### F. *Movant's Reply*

Aside from the advocacy benefits to filing a reply, the movant must file a reply if he or she intends to object to the nonmovant's evidence. The reply should make any challenges to the nonmovant's summary judgment evidence.<sup>198</sup> Rule 166a does not specify when the movant's reply to the nonmovant's response should be filed. The limited case law that exists indicates that the movant may file a reply up until the day of the hearing.<sup>199</sup> For example, *Reynolds v. Murphy* holds that "a movant's objections to the competency of a nonmovant's evidence that are filed the day of the hearing are not untimely and may be considered and ruled upon by the trial court."<sup>200</sup> Local rules may govern the timing of the reply.<sup>201</sup> Any special exception by the movant concerning vagueness or ambiguity in the nonmovant's response must be made at least three days before the hearing.<sup>202</sup> The seven-day limit before submission in which a nonmovant may submit summary judgment evidence does not apply to the movant's reply.<sup>203</sup>

Summary judgment grounds may not be raised for the first time in the reply.<sup>204</sup> A movant may not rely on his or her reply to

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Eastland 1992, no writ) ("It would be exalting form over substance to shut our eyes to the recorded proceedings which occurred in open court . . ."); see also *Neimes*, 985 S.W.2d at 139 (recommending attorneys ensure their objections are preserved in case of future consideration).

197. *Waddy v. City of Houston*, 834 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (finding nothing in the record indicating that the trial court granted leave for a late filing, giving rise to a presumption that the court did not consider the late response and, thus, the appellate court could not consider the response).

198. See *Alaniz v. Hoyt*, 105 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (observing that failure to file objections in writing or at the hearing results in failure to preserve error for future consideration).

199. See, e.g., *Wright v. Lewis*, 777 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (concluding that there was no harm in allowing objections to be filed before or even on the day of the hearing).

200. *Reynolds v. Murphy*, 188 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

201. See HARRIS COUNTY CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION RULE 3.3.3 (requiring a reply be filed "at least two . . . working days before the date of submission, except on leave of court").

202. *McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 n.7 (Tex. 1993) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 21).

203. *Durbin v. Culberson County*, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

204. *TIG Ins. Co. v. Via Net*, 178 S.W.3d 10, 16 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), *rev'd on other grounds*, 211 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2006); *Larue v. Chief Oil & Gas, L.L.C.*, 167 S.W.3d 866, 875–76 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

the nonmovant's response to provide the requisite specificity (to state the elements of the claim for which there is no evidence) required by Rule 166a(i).<sup>205</sup>

### G. Service

The motion for summary judgment and response should be served promptly on opposing counsel, and a certificate of service should be included in any motion for summary judgment. If notice is not given, the judgment may be reversed on appeal.<sup>206</sup> The nonmovant is entitled to receive specific notice of the hearing or submission date for the motion for summary judgment so that he or she is aware of the deadline for the response.<sup>207</sup> Thus, the nonmovant is entitled to an additional twenty-one days notice of hearing for amended motions for summary judgment.<sup>208</sup> A certificate of service is prima facie proof that proper service was made.<sup>209</sup> To establish a lack of notice, the nonmovant must introduce evidence to controvert the certificate of service.<sup>210</sup>

One court held that the record need not reflect receipt of notice by the nonmovant.<sup>211</sup> Constructive notice is imputed when

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205. *Meru v. Huerta*, 136 S.W.3d 383, 390 n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2002)).

206. *Aguirre v. Phillips Props., Inc.*, 111 S.W.3d 328, 332–33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied); *Smith v. Mike Carlson Motor Co.*, 918 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (“Absence of actual or constructive notice violates a party’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.”); *Rozsa v. Jenkinson*, 754 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (concluding that notice was sent to an incorrect address and therefore the summary judgment was invalid). “[A]n allegation that a party received less notice [of a summary judgment hearing] than required by statute does not present a jurisdictional question and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” *Davis v. Davis*, 734 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Because the issue of notice may not be raised for the first time on appeal, there must be an objection in the trial court. *See id.*

207. *Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc.*, 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); *Okoli v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs.*, 117 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (reversing and remanding proceedings to the trial court because plaintiff was not notified of the date of the hearing on summary judgment).

208. *Sams v. N.L. Indus., Inc.*, 735 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).

209. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(a) (“A certificate by a party . . . showing service of a notice shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of service.”); *see also* *Cliff v. Huggins*, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779–80 (Tex. 1987).

210. *Cliff*, 724 S.W.2d at 780 (holding that an offer of proof must be made to rebut the presumption that notice was received); *Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 897 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (stating that the nonmovant must introduce evidence that notice was not received to defeat the prima facie showing of service).

211. *Gonzales v. Surplus Ins. Servs.*, 863 S.W.2d 96, 101 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

the evidence indicates “that the intended recipient engaged in instances of selective acceptance/refusal of certified mail relating to the case.”<sup>212</sup>

To preserve a complaint of inadequate notice, a party must object and ask for a continuance. Otherwise, a party may waive the twenty-one-day notice requirement.<sup>213</sup> For example, in *Davis v. Davis*, two parties filed separate motions for summary judgment directed against the appellant.<sup>214</sup> One motion gave the appellant twenty-one days’ notice, but the other motion did not.<sup>215</sup> The trial court considered both motions simultaneously.<sup>216</sup> The appellate court found that the appellant waived any objection to the inadequacy of the notice period because he participated in the hearing without objection and failed to ask for a continuance, rehearing, or new trial.<sup>217</sup> “To hold otherwise would allow a party who participated in the hearing to lie behind the log until after the summary judgment is granted and then raise the complaint of late notice for the first time in a post-trial motion.”<sup>218</sup>

Conversely, if a party is not given notice of the hearing or “is deprived of its right to seek leave to file additional affidavits or other written response, . . . it may preserve error in a post-trial

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1993, writ denied) (“It is not required that the record reflect receipt of notice by non-movant.”).

212. *Id.* at 102 (complying with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a is sufficient for constructive notice in such circumstances).

213. *Negrini v. Beale*, 822 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (explaining that a party waives the twenty-one-day requirement “where the party received notice of the hearing, appeared at it, filed no controverting affidavit, and did not ask for a continuance”); *Brown v. Capital Bank, N.A.*, 703 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (finding that nonmovant’s presentation of facts essential to oppose summary judgment in an oral submission, absent an affidavit stating such reasons, was not sufficient cause for continuance); *Delta (Del.) Petroleum & Energy Corp. v. Houston Fishing Tools Co.*, 670 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (finding a waiver of notice when appellant “made no motion for continuance, did not appear at the hearing, and made no post-trial motion complaining of the lack of notice”); *Lofthus v. State*, 572 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (explaining that if counsel, who appeared on the day of the hearing, was given an opportunity to file affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment and failed to do so, and failed to move for additional time, then he waived the objection to inadequate notice).

214. *Davis v. Davis*, 734 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

215. *Id.* at 712.

216. *Id.*

217. *Id.*; see also *Nguyen v. Short, How, Frels & Heitz, P.C.*, 108 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (finding that a nonmovant who fails to object to any untimely notices waives any objection); *Negrini*, 822 S.W.2d at 823 (finding that appellant waived any error on an issue after he received notice of a hearing, appeared at it, filed no controverting affidavit, and failed to ask for a continuance).

218. *May v. Nacogdoches Mem’l Hosp.*, 61 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.).

motion.”<sup>219</sup> For example, in *Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co.*, a motion for new trial was sufficient to preserve error because the trial judge signed the summary judgment before the date set for submission and the nonmovant had no opportunity to object.<sup>220</sup>

If the motion is mailed, a party is allowed an additional three days under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, and the hearing may not be held before twenty-four days have elapsed.<sup>221</sup> In *Chadderdon v. Blaschke*, the court held that even though a motion for summary judgment was filed two months before the hearing on the motion, the fact that a notice of hearing was mailed twenty-one days before the hearing was reversible error, because the notice of hearing was not mailed twenty-four days in advance.<sup>222</sup>

Rule 21a also applies to service by fax.<sup>223</sup> Thus, the notice of hearing must be faxed twenty-four days before the hearing. If fax service is used, the documents must be sent and received before 5:00 p.m. or they will be deemed served on the following day.<sup>224</sup>

Time requirements for service may be altered by agreement of the parties<sup>225</sup> and by court order.<sup>226</sup>

## H. Continuances

1. *General Principles.* The summary judgment rule directly and indirectly addresses continuances in two subsections. Rule 166a(g) directly addresses any type of summary judgment continuance by providing:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.<sup>227</sup>

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219. *Id.*

220. *Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co.*, 932 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied).

221. *Lewis v. Blake*, 876 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).

222. *Chadderdon v. Blaschke*, 988 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

223. *Lewis*, 876 S.W.2d at 315.

224. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a.

225. *EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias*, 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1996).

226. *Hall v. Stephenson*, 919 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

227. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g).



Rule 166a(i) indirectly provides the basis for a continuance of a no-evidence summary judgment when it authorizes the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment only “[a]fter adequate time for discovery.”<sup>228</sup>

Thus, when a nonmovant “contends that it has not had an adequate opportunity for discovery before a summary judgment hearing, it must file either an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance.”<sup>229</sup> Failure to do so waives the contention on appeal that the nonmovant did not have an adequate time for discovery.<sup>230</sup> As noted earlier, Rule 166a(g) specifically provides that the trial court may deny the motion for summary judgment, continue the hearing to allow additional discovery, or “make such other order as is just.”<sup>231</sup>

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(b) provides that a defending party may move for traditional summary judgment at any time.<sup>232</sup> Thus, discovery deadlines have no impact on a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance based on inadequate time for discovery and to proceed to a hearing on the merits of a motion for traditional summary judgment.<sup>233</sup> It is not mandatory for the trial court to grant a continuance simply because it is uncontroverted and in proper form.<sup>234</sup>

When a party receives notice of the summary judgment hearing in excess of the twenty-one days required by Rule 166a, denial of a motion for continuance based on a lack of time to prepare is not generally an abuse of discretion,<sup>235</sup> although sympathetic trial judges frequently grant them. When reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion for continuance, the courts consider on a

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228. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

229. *Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co.*, 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); *see also* *Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp.*, 74 S.W.3d 444, 450–51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.).

230. *Jaimes v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.*, 21 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); *RHS Interests Inc. v. 2727 Kirby Ltd.*, 994 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

231. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); *see supra* Part 1, I.C.

232. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(b).

233. *See* *Clemons v. Citizens Med. Ctr.*, 54 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.). *But see* *Nelson v. PNC Mortgage Corp.*, 139 S.W.3d 442, 445–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding that a traditional summary judgment was improper when discovery motions were outstanding, and the trial court ignored all motions filed by a *pro se* inmate, yet promptly set and responded to all motions filed by civil defendants).

234. *Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates*, 147 S.W.3d 264, 292 n.142 (Tex. 2004).

235. *See* *Medford v. Medford*, 68 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); *Hatteberg v. Hatteberg*, 933 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); *Cronen v. Nix*, 611 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

case-by-case basis whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion.<sup>236</sup> A trial court “abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.”<sup>237</sup>

2. *Factors Considered in Granting Continuances.* In determining whether a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for continuance based on the need for additional discovery, the supreme court has considered the following non-exclusive factors: “the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.”<sup>238</sup>

In *Thomson v. Norton*, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to grant a continuance to a newly appointed attorney who desired additional time to become familiar with the law and facts in the case.<sup>239</sup> The court supported its decision on the grounds that the client was represented by a lawyer at all times before the hearing.<sup>240</sup>

On the other hand, in *Verkin v. Southwest Center One, Ltd.*, the appellate court found abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to grant a motion for continuance in a case that had been on file less than three months, when the motion stated sufficient good cause, was uncontroverted, and was the first motion for continuance.<sup>241</sup>

Nonmovants seeking additional time for discovery should “convince the court that the requested discovery is more than a ‘fishing’ expedition, is likely to lead to controverting evidence, and was not reasonably available beforehand despite [the nonmovant’s] diligence.”<sup>242</sup> Conclusory allegations will not

236. *BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand*, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002).

237. *Id.* (quoting *Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals*, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)).

238. *Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture*, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004) (citing *BMC Software Belg., N.V.*, 835 S.W.3d at 800–01 (discussing the diligence and length-of-time-on-file factors)); *Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co.*, 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996) (materiality and purpose); *Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus., Inc.*, 907 S.W.2d 517, 521–22 (Tex. 1995) (materiality); *State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc.*, 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988) (diligence); *see also Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (using these factors to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance).

239. *Thomson v. Norton*, 604 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).

240. *Id.* at 478.

241. *Verkin v. Sw. Ctr. One, Ltd.*, 784 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); *see also Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, P.A.*, 902 S.W.2d 508, 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).

242. HITTNER ET AL., *supra* note 9, § 14:117.

support a request for continuance.<sup>243</sup> Nonmovants must state what specific depositions or discovery products are material and show why they are material.<sup>244</sup> The party moving for summary judgment, when appropriate, should try to convince the court that the nonmovant's discovery efforts are simply a delay tactic. For example, the motion may be based on incontrovertible facts, involve pure questions of law, or request discovery that relates to immaterial matters.<sup>245</sup>

The no-evidence summary judgment rule specifically provides that a motion for summary judgment can be filed only "[a]fter adequate time for discovery."<sup>246</sup> Nonmovants will argue in their motions for continuance that if they have more time, they will be able to produce enough evidence to defeat the motion. "Whether a non-movant has had adequate time for discovery . . . is 'case specific.'"<sup>247</sup> The factors the courts look to for no-evidence summary judgment continuances, not surprisingly, mirror those articulated for traditional summary judgments. "[T]here is no . . . minimum amount of time that a case must be pending before a trial court may entertain a no-evidence summary judgment motion."<sup>248</sup> "The amount of time necessary to constitute 'adequate time' depends on the facts and circumstances of each case."<sup>249</sup>

Factors that a court may consider include "the amount of time the no-evidence motion has been on file, whether the movant has requested stricter time deadlines for discovery, the amount of discovery that has already taken place, and whether the discovery deadlines that are in place are specific or vague."<sup>250</sup>

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243. *MKC Energy Invs., Inc. v. Sheldon*, 182 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.).

244. *Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

245. *See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus., Inc.*, 907 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex. 1995) (stating that in a contract dispute, "discovery sought by [the plaintiff] is not necessary for the application of the contract to its subject matter, but rather goes to the issue of the parties' interpretation of the 'absolute pollution exclusion'").

246. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

247. *McClure v. Attebury*, 20 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.).

248. *McInnis v. Mallia*, 261 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); *see also* TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

249. *Lucio v. John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found.*, No. 13-08-00077-CV, 2009 WL 1801492, at \*4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 25, 2009, pet. struck); *see also* *Rest. Teams Int'l, Inc. v. MG Sec. Corp.*, 95 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.).

250. *Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua*, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); *see also Lucio*, 2009 WL 1801492, at \*4; *Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

A nonmovant in a no-evidence summary judgment may argue that it is entitled to the entire period allowed by the rule or court-imposed discovery deadlines. Yet, courts have held that the court- or rule-imposed discovery cutoff does not control the decision of whether an adequate time for discovery has elapsed.<sup>251</sup> For traditional summary judgment motions, the discovery deadline generally has no impact on the trial court's decision to grant a summary judgment.<sup>252</sup>

In one mass tort case, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had enjoyed adequate time for discovery when the case had been pending for ten years, and the plaintiffs had had almost a year after the filing of the no-evidence motion to conduct additional discovery.<sup>253</sup> In another case, which included a sixteen-month bankruptcy stay, the court noted that factoring in the bankruptcy stay, a year remained for discovery, and the stay did not prevent the plaintiff from continuing to develop his case for those documents already in his possession.<sup>254</sup> In yet another case, the court held that two years and four months was an adequate time for discovery; the plaintiff had adequate time to conduct discovery on a fraud claim because the evidence necessary to defeat the no-evidence motion—reliance and damages—“is the sort of evidence that should be immediately available to a plaintiff.”<sup>255</sup>

In *Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo*, the supreme court determined that neither affidavits nor a verified motion for continuance were necessary when the trial court refused to allow Ford to conduct *any* discovery.<sup>256</sup> In *Castillo*, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim following a claim of breach of settlement in a products liability case. The supreme court determined that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ford the right to conduct discovery.<sup>257</sup>

If the court grants a continuance, the minimum twenty-one-day period notice requirement for submission or hearing does not begin

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251. See *Branum v. Nw. Tex. Healthcare Sys., Inc.*, 134 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. denied).

252. *Karen Corp. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 107 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (citing *Clemons v. Citizens Med. Ctr.*, 54 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)).

253. *In re Mohawk Rubber Co.*, 982 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding).

254. *McMahan v. Greenwood*, 108 S.W.3d 467, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

255. *Dickson Constr., Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co.*, 5 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).

256. *Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo*, 279 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2009).

257. *Id.* at 659, 663.

again because the twenty-one-day period is measured from the original filing day.<sup>258</sup>

### *I. Hearing*

Notice of a summary judgment hearing must be in writing.<sup>259</sup> While notice of a hearing is required, an oral hearing is not.<sup>260</sup> The day of submission of a motion for summary judgment has the same meaning as the day of hearing.<sup>261</sup> A hearing or submission date must be set because the time limits for responding are keyed to the hearing or submission date. Unless there is a hearing or submission date, the nonmovant cannot calculate its response due date, and its due process rights are violated.<sup>262</sup>

A motion for summary judgment is submitted on written evidence. Thus, a hearing on motion for summary judgment is a review of the written motion, response, reply, if any, and attached evidence.<sup>263</sup>

Ordinarily, no oral testimony will be allowed at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment.<sup>264</sup> Furthermore, the court may not consider, at the hearing, oral objections to summary judgment evidence that are not a part of the properly filed, written summary judgment pleadings.<sup>265</sup> However, the El Paso Court of Appeals considered the reporter's record of the summary judgment hearing to

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258. *Lewis v. Blake*, 876 S.W.2d 314, 315–16 (Tex. 1994) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 4) (discussing the calculation of the twenty-one-day notice requirement); *see also supra* Part 1, I.D (discussing deadlines for filing motions for summary judgment).

259. *Env'tl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry*, 282 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

260. *Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc.*, 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); *Williams v. City of Littlefield*, No. 07-07-0435-CV, 2008 WL 4381326, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.). (“The fact that appellant did not arrive at the courthouse before the completion of the summary judgment hearing is, therefore, irrelevant to the trial court’s decision [to grant the summary judgment].”).

261. *Rorie v. Goodwin*, 171 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.).

262. *See Aguirre v. Phillips Props., Inc.*, 111 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied); *Courtney v. Gelber*, 905 S.W.2d 33, 34–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding that even if all assertions in the motion for summary judgment are true, none justify the trial court’s ruling on the motion without setting a hearing or submission date); *see also Mosser v. Plano Three Venture*, 893 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (“The failure to give adequate notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.”).

263. *Nguyen v. Short, How, Frels & Heitz, P.C.*, 108 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

264. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps*, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 n.4 (Tex. 1992); *Richards v. Allen*, 402 S.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Tex. 1966).

265. *But see Aguilar v. LVDVD, L.C.*, 70 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (suggesting review of reporter’s record would be helpful in ascertaining if a ruling can be implied).

determine that the trial court did not rule on written evidentiary objections.<sup>266</sup>

When a trial court is faced with “overlapping and intermingling” motions for summary judgment and other matters that allow oral testimony, the trial court should conduct separate hearings.<sup>267</sup> At the summary judgment hearing, counsel should strenuously oppose any attempt to use oral testimony to deviate from the written documents on file, and the court should neither permit nor consider such testimony.<sup>268</sup> Parties may restrict or expand the issues “expressly presented” in writing if the change meets the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11.<sup>269</sup> “An oral waiver or agreement made in open court satisfies [R]ule 11 if it is described in the judgment or an order of the court.”<sup>270</sup> In *Clement v. City of Plano*, the court noted that “the order granting the motion for summary judgment [did] not reflect any agreement . . . . Therefore, counsel’s statements at the hearing, standing alone, did not amount to a [R]ule 11 exception and did not constitute a narrowing of the issues.”<sup>271</sup>

The summary judgment hearing generally need not be transcribed. As the court noted in *El Paso Associates, Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co.*, to “permit ‘issues’ to be presented orally would encourage parties to request that a court reporter record summary judgment hearings, a practice neither necessary, nor appropriate to the purposes of such hearing.”<sup>272</sup> Considering the conflicts among the courts of appeals regarding “implied” rulings as summary judgment evidence,<sup>273</sup> it may be appropriate to request a record if the court makes rulings on the evidence or proceedings during the hearing.

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266. *Id.*

267. *Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden*, 805 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, no writ); *see also infra* Part 1, II.H.1 (discussing expert opinion testimony).

268. *See El Paso Assocs., Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co.*, 786 S.W.2d 17, 19–21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, no writ) (affirming the sustaining of an objection to oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing and declaring that no oral testimony was received); *Nash v. Corpus Christi Nat’l Bank*, 692 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concluding that it is improper for a trial court to hear testimony of witness at summary judgment hearing).

269. Rule 11 provides in part: “[N]o agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11; *see City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979).

270. *Clement v. City of Plano*, 26 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.), *overruled on other grounds by Telthorster v. Tennell*, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002).

271. *Id.*

272. *El Paso Assocs., Ltd.*, 786 S.W.2d at 19.

273. *See infra* Part 1, II.A.3.

After the hearing or submission, the next step is for the court to rule on the motion. The court may act as soon as the date of submission or as late as never. There is generally no procedure for a party to compel the court to rule on a pending motion for summary judgment.<sup>274</sup> Mandamus relief is strictly limited. If the trial judge fails to rule, “even though the delay in ruling on the motion causes expense and inconvenience to the litigants, mandamus is not available to compel the trial judge to rule on the pending motion for summary judgment.”<sup>275</sup>

### *J. The Judgment*

The advantage of obtaining an order from the trial court specifying the basis for the summary judgment—usually a fruitless endeavor anyway—has been removed. Formerly, when a summary judgment order stated the specific grounds upon which it was granted, a party appealing from such order need have shown only that the specific grounds to which the order referred were insufficient to support the order.<sup>276</sup> If any theory advanced in a motion for summary judgment supports the granting of summary judgment, a court of appeals may affirm regardless of whether the trial court specified the grounds on which it relied.<sup>277</sup> The court of appeals should consider all the grounds on which the trial court rules and may consider all the grounds the trial court does not rule upon.<sup>278</sup> Nonetheless, numerous opinions continue to recite that their consideration of all issues is based on the fact that the trial court did not specify its reason for its ruling, including opinions issued by the Texas Supreme Court.<sup>279</sup>

To ensure the trial court’s intent to make a judgment final and appealable, the supreme court suggests the inclusion of the following language in the judgment: “This judgment finally disposes of all

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274. *C/S Solutions, Inc. v. Energy Maint. Servs. Group, LLC*, 274 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing *PATTON*, *supra* note 8, § 7.04).

275. *In re Am. Media Consol.*, 121 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (quoting *PATTON*, *supra* note 8, § 7.04).

276. *See Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 896 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995) (finding that “[b]ecause the trial court granted [the defendant’s] motion without specifying the grounds, the summary judgment will be upheld if either of the theories advanced by [the defendant] are meritorious”); *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S. & G.W.*, 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) (holding that if the trial court specifies the reasons for granting judgment, then proving that theory unmeritorious would cause a remand).

277. *Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates*, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996); *see Harwell*, 896 S.W.2d at 173.

278. *Cincinnati Life Ins. Co.*, 927 S.W.2d at 626 (allowing alternative theories would be in the interest of judicial economy).

279. *See, e.g., Western Invs., Inc. v. Urena*, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005); *Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture*, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004).

parties and all claims and is appealable.”<sup>280</sup> The language is not mandatory.

Occasionally, a trial judge will receive a request to file findings of fact and conclusions of law after the granting of a motion for summary judgment.<sup>281</sup> This request should be denied.<sup>282</sup> Neither findings of fact nor conclusions of law are proper on a partial summary judgment even though the court prepares them in the later-tried bench trial. The reason findings of fact and conclusions of law have no place in summary judgment practice is that the judge has no factual disputes to resolve. Unlike findings of fact and conclusions of law requested in proper circumstances, a request for them will *not* extend the appellate timetable in a summary judgment case.<sup>283</sup>

A plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time before the trial court grants a motion for summary judgment.<sup>284</sup> However, as a dispositive motion, a partial summary judgment survives a nonsuit.<sup>285</sup>

### K. Partial Summary Judgments

Motions for partial summary judgment are used to dispose of some claims or some parties. While they present certain opportunities, they also can give rise to problems. One trap arises when a summary judgment granted for one defendant becomes final even though it does not specifically incorporate a partial summary judgment granted in favor of the only other defendant.<sup>286</sup> An order granting summary judgment concerning a claim but not disposing of all issues presented in a counterclaim is interlocutory.<sup>287</sup>

280. *Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001); *see infra* Part 1, V.E. (discussing summary judgment appeals and the requirement of finality of judgment).

281. *See, e.g., W. Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Griffith*, 902 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (noting that the appellant complained that the trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law).

282. *Id.* at 204.

283. *IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp.*, 938 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997); *see Linwood v. NCNB Tex.*, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam). Texas appellate procedure provides that the usual thirty days for perfecting an appeal is extended to ninety days upon the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law, if they are either required by the rules of civil procedure, or if not required, could properly be considered by the appellate court. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(4); *see also infra* Part 1, V (discussing appealing summary judgments).

284. *Cook v. Nacogdoches Anesthesia Group, L.L.P.*, 167 S.W.3d 476, 482 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.).

285. *Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado*, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

286. *Ramones v. Bratteng*, 768 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); *see also infra* Part 1, V.E (discussing summary judgment appeals and the requirement of finality of judgment).

287. *Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay*, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).



A partial judgment should refer to those specific issues addressed by the partial judgment. A partial summary judgment can be made final by requesting a severance of the issues or parties dismissed by the motion for partial summary judgment from those issues or parties remaining.<sup>288</sup> “A severance splits a single suit into two or more independent actions, each action resulting in an appealable final judgment.”<sup>289</sup> “Severance of claims under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”<sup>290</sup>

Severance of a partial summary judgment does not automatically result in a final, appealable order. All of the parties and issues in the severed part of the case must be disposed of. In *Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.*, the severance order stated that the separate action should “proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court.”<sup>291</sup> The supreme court determined the order clearly precluded a final judgment until the later judgment was signed.<sup>292</sup>

A trial court may not withdraw a partial summary judgment after the close of evidence in such a manner that the party is precluded from presenting the issues decided in the partial summary judgment.<sup>293</sup> A partial summary judgment survives a nonsuit.<sup>294</sup> The nonsuit results in a dismissal with prejudice as to the issues decided in the partial summary judgment.<sup>295</sup> On appeal, a partial summary

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(“If a summary judgment does not refer to or mention issues pending in a counterclaim, then those issues remain adjudicated.”).

288. *Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam*, 66 S.W.3d 265, 266 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); see *Hunter v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank*, 857 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (stating that a claim is properly severable when: “(1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted; and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues.” (citing *Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co.*, 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990))).

289. *Van Dyke v. Boswell, O’Toole, Davis & Pickering*, 697 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. 1985).

290. *Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin*, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996).

291. *Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.*, 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).

292. *Id.*; see also *Thompson v. Beyer*, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (“As a rule, a severance of an interlocutory judgment into a severed action makes it final if all claims in the severed action have been disposed of, unless the order of severance indicates further proceedings are to be had in the severed action.”).

293. *Bi-Ed, Ltd. v. Ramsey*, 935 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

294. See *Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand*, 960 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); see also *Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado*, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“To give any force to the partial summary judgment provisions, those judgments must withstand a nonsuit.”).

295. *Newco Drilling Co.*, 960 S.W.2d at 656. But see *Frazier v. Progressive Cos.*, 27 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.).

judgment incorporated into a final judgment is reviewed under the applicable summary judgment standard of review.<sup>296</sup>

#### *L. Motions for Rehearing*

Occasionally, a party in a summary judgment proceeding will file a motion for rehearing or new trial following the granting of a motion for summary judgment.<sup>297</sup> A motion for new trial is unnecessary to preserve complaints directed at the summary judgment “because a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite for an appeal of a summary judgment proceeding.”<sup>298</sup> Unless the movant on rehearing shows that the evidence “could not have been discovered through due diligence prior to the ruling on a summary judgment motion,” additional evidence may not be considered on rehearing.<sup>299</sup>

However, a motion for new trial is necessary to preserve error concerning complaints lost due to physical absence from the summary judgment hearing.<sup>300</sup> Another reason to file a motion for new trial is to extend appellate timetables. Just as for an appeal from a jury trial, a motion for new trial following a grant of summary judgment extends appellate timetables.<sup>301</sup> While not technically a request for a new trial, safe practice is to title a motion for rehearing as a “Request for Rehearing and Motion for New Trial” so that there is no issue concerning whether the pleading is sufficient to extend the timetables.

The *Craddock* rule<sup>302</sup> concerning default judgments does not apply to summary judgment proceedings in so-called default summary judgments where the nonmovant fails to respond to the

296. See, e.g., *Pantaze v. Yudin*, 229 S.W.3d 548, 550–51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dismissed w.o.j.).

297. “A motion for rehearing is equivalent to a motion for new trial.” *Nail v. Thompson*, 806 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ); *Hill v. Bellville Gen. Hosp.*, 735 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).

298. *Lee v. Braeburn Valley W. Civic Ass’n*, 786 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

299. *McMahan v. Greenwood*, 108 S.W.3d 467, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

300. *Lee*, 786 S.W.2d at 262–63.

301. See *Padilla v. LaFrance*, 907 S.W.2d 454, 458–59 (Tex. 1995).

302. Under *Craddock*, the trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a motion for a new trial after a default judgment if the nonmovant establishes:

[1] [T]he failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; . . . [2] the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense[;] and [3] [the motion] is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.

*Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.*, 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).

motion when it had the opportunity to seek a continuance or obtain permission to file a late response.<sup>303</sup> In *Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.*, the supreme court emphasized that it was not deciding whether *Craddock* would apply when the “nonmovant discovers its mistake after the summary-judgment hearing or rendition of judgment.”<sup>304</sup> Then, in *Wheeler v. Green*, the supreme court considered a case in which deemed admissions formed the basis for a summary judgment and were challenged first in a motion for new trial.<sup>305</sup> The court determined that “when a party uses deemed admissions to [attempt] to preclude presentation of the merits of a case, the same due-process concerns arise,” as in merits-preclusive sanctions.<sup>306</sup> The court held that under the facts in that case, the trial court should have granted a motion for new trial and allowed the deemed admissions to be withdrawn.<sup>307</sup>

Additionally, in *Nickerson v. E.I.L. Instruments, Inc.*, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s action in granting the nonmovant’s motion for new trial, immediately reconsidering the motion for summary judgment, and again granting judgment, could not cure a defect in notice of the hearing.<sup>308</sup> Once the motion for new trial was granted, the nonmovant should have been given reasonable notice of the hearing.<sup>309</sup> The court decided that seven days’ notice of the hearing after granting a motion for new trial was reasonable notice.<sup>310</sup>

If a court denies a summary judgment motion, it has the authority to reconsider and grant a motion for summary judgment,<sup>311</sup> or change or modify the original order.<sup>312</sup>

### *M. Sanctions*

A motion for summary judgment asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact is not groundless merely by the filing of

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303. See *id.* at 126; *Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth.*, 979 S.W.2d 795, 798–99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

304. *Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.*, 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002).

305. *Wheeler v. Green*, 157 S.W.3d 439, 441–42 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).

306. *Id.* at 443.

307. *Id.* at 444.

308. *Nickerson v. E.I.L. Instruments, Inc.*, 817 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

309. *Id.*

310. *Id.* (holding that the court should have given “at least seven days notice” of the summary judgment hearing).

311. *Bennett v. State Nat’l Bank*, 623 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

312. *R.I.O. Sys., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp.*, 780 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).

a response that raises an issue of fact.<sup>313</sup> This tenet is true “even if the response was or could have been anticipated by the movant.”<sup>314</sup> Also, denial of a summary judgment alone is not grounds for sanctions.<sup>315</sup>

Rule 166a has its own particular sanctions provision concerning affidavits filed in bad faith. If a trial court concludes that an affidavit submitted with a motion for summary judgment was presented “in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay,” the court may impose sanctions on the party employing the offending affidavits.<sup>316</sup> Such sanctions include the reasonable expenses incurred by the other party, including attorney’s fees, as a result of the filing of the affidavits.<sup>317</sup> Sanctions for submitting affidavits in bad faith may also include holding an offending party or attorney in contempt.<sup>318</sup> The comment to Rule 166a states that no-evidence motions for summary judgment are subject to sanctions provided for under existing law.<sup>319</sup>

## II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

Rule 166a specifies that the following may constitute summary judgment evidence: deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, other discovery responses, pleadings, admissions, affidavits (including sworn or certified papers attached to the affidavits), stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records.

### A. General Principles

The rules of evidence apply equally in trial and summary judgment proceedings.<sup>320</sup> Thus, summary judgment evidence must be presented in a form that would be admissible in a conventional trial proceeding.<sup>321</sup>

Neither the motion for summary judgment, nor the response, even if sworn, is proper summary judgment proof.<sup>322</sup> “When both

313. GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 731 (Tex. 1993).

314. *Id.*

315. *Id.*

316. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(h).

317. *Id.*

318. *Id.*

319. *Id.*; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

320. Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 881–82 (Tex. 2009); United Blood Servs. v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

321. Hou-Tex Printers, Inc. v. Marbach, 862 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing *Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex. 1971)).

322. See *Hidalgo*, 462 S.W.2d at 545 (“[W]e refuse to regard pleadings, even if sworn, as summary judgment evidence.”); see also *Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 833 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); *Keenan v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n*, 754

parties move for summary judgment, the trial court may consider the combined summary-judgment evidence to decide how to rule on the motions.<sup>323</sup> “The proper scope for a trial court’s review of evidence for a summary judgment encompasses all evidence on file at the time of the hearing or filed after the hearing and before judgment with the permission of the court.”<sup>324</sup> Evidence need not be attached to the motion itself, but rather may be attached to the brief in support.<sup>325</sup> The standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s admission of summary judgment evidence is abuse of discretion.<sup>326</sup> “To obtain reversal of a judgment based on error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must show that the trial court’s ruling was in error and that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”<sup>327</sup> Unlike a trial on the merits, “[a] summary judgment cannot be based on an attack of a witness’s credibility.”<sup>328</sup>

An attorney’s explanation of how he or she expects an expert to testify, offered in response to a discovery request, is not competent summary judgment evidence.<sup>329</sup>

1. *Time for Filing.* Summary judgment evidence must be filed by the same deadline as the motion or response it supports.<sup>330</sup> Evidence may be late-filed only with leave of court.<sup>331</sup> If evidence is filed late without leave, that evidence will not be considered as being before the court.<sup>332</sup> “Summary judgment evidence must be submitted, at the latest, by the date the summary judgment was [signed].”<sup>333</sup>

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S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (stating that an affidavit that simply adopts a pleading is insufficient to support a summary judgment motion); *Nicholson v. Mem’l Hosp. Sys.*, 722 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that responses do not constitute summary judgment evidence); *Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Patterson*, 570 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, no writ) (expanding the *Hidalgo* decision to apply to summary judgment motions). For exceptions to this rule, see *infra* Part 1, II.B, discussing pleadings as summary judgment evidence.

323. *Jon Luce Builder, Inc. v. First Gibraltar Bank*, 849 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied) (per curiam).

324. *Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison*, 911 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).

325. *Wilson v. Burford*, 904 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

326. *United Blood Servs. v. Longoria*, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30–31 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

327. *Patrick v. McGowan*, 104 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).

328. *State v. Durham*, 860 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. 1993).

329. *Kiesel v. Rentway*, 245 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. dism’d).

330. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

331. *Benchmark Bank v. Crowder*, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996).

332. *Id.*

333. *Priesmeyer v. Pac. Sw. Bank, F.S.B.*, 917 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (per curiam).

The evidentiary exclusion found in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6,<sup>334</sup> which applies to the exclusion of evidence due to an untimely response to a discovery request, applies to summary judgment proceedings.<sup>335</sup> Thus, the supreme court has upheld the striking of an expert's affidavit because the plaintiff did not timely disclose the expert under the parties' scheduling order.<sup>336</sup> Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, a party may overcome the exclusion by establishing good cause or the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice.<sup>337</sup>

2. *Unfiled Discovery.* The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure no longer require the filing of most discovery with the trial court. The discovery material that is not filed is specified in Rule 191.4(a).<sup>338</sup> Discovery material that must be filed is specified in Rule 191.4(b).<sup>339</sup>

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334. Rule 193.6 provides in part:

(a) *Exclusion of Evidence and Exceptions.* A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response in a timely manner may not introduce in evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed, or offer the testimony of a witness (other than a named party) who was not timely identified, unless the court finds that:

- (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response; or
- (2) the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a).

335. *Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gillenwater*, 285 S.W.3d. 879, 881 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).

336. *Id.* at 881–82 (“The trial court struck the expert’s affidavit and did not consider it in granting the summary judgment.”).

337. *Id.* at 882 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6).

338. Rule 191.4(a) provides:

(a) *Discovery Materials Not to Be Filed.* The following discovery materials must not be filed:

- (1) discovery requests, deposition notices, and subpoenas required to be served only on parties;
- (2) responses and objections to discovery requests and deposition notices, regardless on whom the requests or notices were served;
- (3) documents and tangible things produced in discovery; and
- (4) statements prepared in compliance with Rule 193.3(b) or (d).

TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.4(a).

339. Rule 191.4(b) provides:

(a) *Discovery Materials to Be Filed.* The following discovery materials must be filed:

- (1) discovery requests, deposition notices, and subpoenas required to be served on nonparties;
- (2) motions and responses to motions pertaining to discovery matters; and
- (3) agreements concerning discovery matters, to the extent necessary to comply with Rule 11.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.4(b).

A subsection to the summary judgment rule, Rule 166a(d), requires that a party may either attach the evidence to the motion or response or file a notice containing specific references to the unfiled material to be used, as well as a statement of intent to use the unfiled evidence as summary judgment proof.<sup>340</sup> Specifically, Rule 166a(d) provides:

(d) Appendices, References and Other Use of Discovery Not Otherwise on File. Discovery products not on file with the clerk may be used as summary judgment evidence if copies of the material, appendices containing the evidence, or a notice containing specific references to the discovery or specific references to other instruments, are filed and served on all parties together with a statement of intent to use the specified discovery as summary judgment proofs: (i) at least twenty-one days before the hearing if such proofs are to be used to support the summary judgment; or (ii) at least seven days before the hearing if such proofs are to be used to oppose the summary judgment.<sup>341</sup>

Thus, Rule 166a(d) provides three methods to present unfiled discovery before the trial court in a summary judgment motion or response. A party may file the discovery with the trial court, file an appendix containing the evidence, or simply file a notice with specific references to the unfiled discovery. If the actual documents are before the trial court, the rule does not require that the proponent of the evidence provide specific references to the discovery for the trial court to consider it.<sup>342</sup> Despite the wording of the rule that makes it appear that a “statement of intent” may be sufficient without the actual proof attached, some courts of appeals have refused to consider such proof if the appellate record does not demonstrate that the evidence was filed with the trial court when the motion for summary judgment order was entered.<sup>343</sup>

3. *Objections to Evidence.* Failure to object to evidence at the trial court level waives any defects concerning form (such as hearsay, speculation, and competence).<sup>344</sup> Nonetheless, there are

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340. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(d).

341. *Id.*

342. *Id.*; *Barraza v. Eureka Co.*, 25 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

343. *See, e.g., Gomez v. Tri City Cmty. Hosp., Ltd.*, 4 S.W.3d 281, 283–84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no writ).

344. *See Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics*, 26 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that even when a party does object to the form of evidence during trial, if the party does not secure a ruling on his objection, the objection is waived); *Harris v. Spires Council of Co-Owners*, 981 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); *see also infra* Part 1, IV (discussing responding

inconsistencies among the courts concerning whether certain defects are defects of form or substance. The safest practice is to present all objections in writing.<sup>345</sup>

The objection must be specific.<sup>346</sup> For example, in *Womco, Inc. v. Navistar International Corp.*, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that an individual paragraph of an affidavit that contained unsubstantiated legal conclusions was itself conclusory because it failed to identify which statements in individual paragraphs were objectionable or offer any explanation concerning the precise bases for objection.<sup>347</sup>

To be effective and preserve error for appeal, most courts of appeals have held that an order of a trial court sustaining an objection to summary judgment evidence must be reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and entered of record.<sup>348</sup> A docket sheet entry does not meet this requirement.<sup>349</sup> Absent a proper order sustaining an objection, all of the summary judgment evidence, including any evidence objected to by a party, is proper evidence that will be considered on appeal.<sup>350</sup>

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to a motion for summary judgment).

345. An objection that affidavit testimony is conclusory is an objection to substance that can be raised for the first time on appeal. *Willis v. Nucor Corp.*, 282 S.W.3d 536, 548 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). “[A]ny objections relating to substantive defects (such as lack of relevancy, conclusory) can be raised for the first time on appeal and are not waived by the failure to obtain a ruling from the trial court.” *McMahan v. Greenwood*, 108 S.W.3d 467, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). “A complete absence of authentication is a defect of substance that is not waived by a party failing to object and may be urged for the first time on appeal.” *Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp.*, 74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.).

346. *Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P.*, 156 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); *Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life Ins. Co.*, 859 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, writ denied) (“To preserve error, an objection must state the specific grounds for the requested ruling, if these grounds are not apparent from the context of the objection.”).

347. *Womco, Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Corp.*, 84 S.W.3d 272, 281 n.6 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.).

348. *McFarland v. Citibank (S.D.)*, N.A., No. 10-07-00277-CV, 2009 WL 1693406, at \*4 (Tex. App.—Waco June 17, 2009, no pet.); *Delfino v. Perry Homes*, 223 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); *Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford*, 32 S.W.3d 313, 316–17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.); *Nugent v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.*, 30 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); *Hou-Tex, Inc.*, 26 S.W.3d at 112; *Dolcefino v. Randolph*, 19 S.W.3d 906, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). *Contra Frazier v. Yu*, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (stating that when a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment, it creates an inference that the trial court implicitly reviewed and overruled the nonmovant’s objections to the summary judgment proof); *Blum v. Julian*, 977 S.W.2d 819, 823–24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (stating that when the trial court grants a motion for summary judgment, the trial court impliedly sustains the nonmovant’s objections to the movant’s summary judgment evidence).

349. *Utils. Pipeline Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg.*, 760 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ).

350. *See id.* at 722–23 (holding that where the appellate record did not contain a written and filed order sustaining an objection to a report as summary judgment



An exception to the requirement for a written ruling on an evidentiary objection may occur if there is an implicit ruling on the evidentiary objection.<sup>351</sup> For there to be an implicit ruling, there must be something in the summary judgment order or the record to indicate that the trial court ruled on the objections, other than the mere granting of the summary judgment.<sup>352</sup> There is dispute among the courts of appeals concerning what constitutes an implicit holding, and even disagreement as to the question of whether an objection may be preserved under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 33.1(a)(2)(a) by an implicit ruling.<sup>353</sup> An example of a court holding that a ruling was implicit was where the appellant complained in his motion for new trial following the court's refusal to act on his objections.<sup>354</sup>

Texas Rule of Evidence 802 provides that “[i]nadmissible hearsay admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely because it is hearsay.”<sup>355</sup> As applied to summary judgment evidence, Rule 802 has been held to mean that a hearsay objection is a defect in form that must be raised in a response or reply to a response.<sup>356</sup> Whether an affiant has personal knowledge and is competent are also objections to form and thus must be raised and ruled upon at the trial level.<sup>357</sup>

4. *Attach Evidence to Motion for/Response to Summary Judgment.* Texas Rule of Procedure 166a does not require that evidence be attached to the motion for summary judgment to be considered.<sup>358</sup> The evidence must only be on file at the time of the summary judgment hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court.<sup>359</sup> “Although [the movant]

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evidence, the report was proper evidence included in the record).

351. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).

352. *In re Estate of Schiwetz*, 102 S.W.3d 355, 360–61 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied).

353. See *Sunshine Mining & Ref. Co. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.*, 114 S.W.3d 48, 50–51 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.) (and cases cited therein); see also *Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P.*, 156 S.W.3d 198, 206–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

354. *Alejandro v. Bell*, 84 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

355. TEX. R. EVID. 802.

356. *Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 897 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); *El Paso Assocs., Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co.*, 786 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, no writ) (holding that where an affidavit contained hearsay, but not properly objected to in writing prior to entry of judgment, it became admissible evidence); *Dolenz v. A—B—*, 742 S.W.2d 82, 83–84 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (concluding that where a party did not object to affidavits that contained inadmissible hearsay, the party “waived any complaint as to consideration of inadmissible evidence as part of the summary judgment record”).

357. *Stewart*, 156 S.W.3d at 207; *Rizkallah v. Conner*, 952 S.W.2d 580, 585–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).

358. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

359. *Id.*

bears the burden to prove its summary judgment as a matter of law, on appeal [the nonmovant appellant] bears the burden to bring forward the record of the summary judgment evidence to provide appellate courts with a basis to review his claim of harmful error.”<sup>360</sup> “If the pertinent summary judgment evidence considered by the trial court is not included in the appellate record, an appellate court must presume that the omitted evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.”<sup>361</sup>

### B. Pleadings as Evidence

Generally, factual statements in pleadings, even if verified, do not constitute summary judgment evidence.<sup>362</sup> However, this rule is not as absolute as it appears. A plaintiff may not use its pleadings as “proof” to defeat an otherwise valid motion for summary judgment. However, the defendant may use the plaintiff’s pleadings to obtain a summary judgment when the pleadings affirmatively negate the plaintiff’s claim.<sup>363</sup> Sworn account cases are also an exception to the rule that pleadings are not summary judgment evidence.<sup>364</sup> When the defendant files no proper verified denial of a suit on a sworn account, the pleadings can be the basis for summary judgment.<sup>365</sup> Also, an opponent’s pleadings may constitute summary judgment proof if they contain judicial admissions, which are statements admitting facts or conclusions contrary to a claim or defense.<sup>366</sup> In *Hidalgo v. Surety*

360. *Enter. Leasing Co. v. Barrios*, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); see also *DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.*, 793 S.W.2d 670, 689 (Tex. 1990); *Escontrias v. Apodaca*, 629 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex. 1982); cf. *Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(a)* (stating that only the items listed in Rule 34.5(a) are included in the appellate record absent a request from one of the parties).

361. *Enter. Leasing Co.*, 156 S.W.3d at 550; see also *Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gonzalez*, 820 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); *DeSantis*, 793 S.W.2d at 689.

362. *City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); *Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex. 1971); *Watson v. Frost Nat’l Bank*, 139 S.W.3d 118, 119 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.).

363. *Washington v. City of Houston*, 874 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no writ) (stating that where a party’s pleadings themselves show no cause of action or allege facts that, if proved, establish governmental immunity, the pleadings alone will justify summary judgment); *Saenz v. Family Sec. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 786 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ) (concluding that where a plaintiff pleads facts affirmatively negating his cause of action, he can “plead himself out of court”); *Perser v. City of Arlington*, 738 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ denied) (determining that the appellants effectively pleaded themselves out of court by affirmatively negating their cause of action).

364. See, e.g., *Andrews v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr.—Athens*, 885 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ); see also *infra* Part 1, VII.A.

365. *Id.* at 267; *Enernational Corp. v. Exploitation Eng’rs, Inc.*, 705 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); *Waggoners’ Home Lumber Co. v. Bendix Forest Prods. Corp.*, 639 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1982, no writ).

366. *Lyons v. Lindsey Morden Claims Mgmt., Inc.*, 985 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); *Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison*, 911 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Tex.

*Savings & Loan Ass'n*, the supreme court explained that a summary judgment may be granted on deficiencies in the opposing pleadings.<sup>367</sup>

The court stated:

We are not to be understood as holding that summary judgment may not be rendered, when authorized, *on the pleadings*, as, for example, when suit is on a sworn account under Rule 185, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the account is not denied under oath as therein provided, or when the plaintiff's petition fails to state a legal claim or cause of action. In such cases summary judgment does not rest on proof supplied by pleading, sworn or unsworn, but on deficiencies in the opposing pleading.<sup>368</sup>

The bottom line is that a party may not rely on factual allegations in its motion or response as summary judgment evidence. Those allegations must be supported by separate summary judgment proof. In some instances, it may rely on its opponent's pleadings.

### C. Depositions

If deposition testimony meets the standards for summary judgment evidence, it will support a valid summary judgment.<sup>369</sup> Deposition testimony is subject to the same objections that might have been made to questions and answers if the witness had testified at trial.<sup>370</sup> Depositions only have "the force of an out of court admission and may be contradicted or explained in a summary judgment proceeding."<sup>371</sup> Deposition testimony may be given the same weight as any other summary judgment evidence. Deposition testimony has no controlling effect as compared to an affidavit, even if the deposition is more detailed than the affidavit.<sup>372</sup> If conflicting inferences may be drawn from two

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App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); *see infra* Part 1, VII.A (discussing sworn accounts).

367. *Hidalgo*, 462 S.W.2d at 543 n.1, 544–45.

368. *Id.* at 543 n.1.

369. *Rallings v. Evans*, 930 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ); *Wiley v. City of Lubbock*, 626 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ) (stating that because the deposition testimony was "clear, positive, direct, [and] otherwise free from contradictions and inconsistencies," it met the standards for summary judgment evidence).

370. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(e) (stating that certain objections may be made to questions and answers in a deposition).

371. *Molnar v. Engels, Inc.*, 705 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Combs v. Morrill*, 470 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

372. *Bauer v. Jasso*, 946 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); *Cortez v. Fuselier*, 876 S.W.2d 519, 521–22 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied);

statements made by the same party, one in an affidavit and the other in a deposition, a fact issue is presented.<sup>373</sup> Several courts of appeals have held that a “party cannot file an affidavit that contradicts that party’s own deposition testimony, without explanation, for the purpose of creating a fact issue to avoid summary judgment.”<sup>374</sup> If an affidavit contradicts earlier testimony, the affidavit must explain the reason for the change.<sup>375</sup> Without an explanation, the court assumes that the sole purpose of the affidavit is to avoid summary judgment, and as such, the affidavit “presents merely a ‘sham’ fact issue.”<sup>376</sup> Thus, an affidavit may not be considered as evidence where it conflicts with the earlier sworn testimony.

Deposition excerpts submitted as summary judgment evidence need not be authenticated.<sup>377</sup> Copies of the deposition pages alone are sufficient.<sup>378</sup>

#### *D. Answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions*

1. *Evidentiary Considerations.* To be considered summary judgment proof, answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions must be otherwise admissible into evidence.<sup>379</sup> Interrogatories should be inspected for conclusions, hearsay, and opinion testimony, which must be brought to the attention of the trial court in a responsive pleading. Answers to requests for admissions and interrogatories may be used only against the

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Jones v. Hutchinson County, 615 S.W.2d 927, 930 n.3 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ).

373. Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). See generally David F. Johnson & Joseph P. Regan, *The Competency of the Sham Affidavit as Summary Judgment Proof in Texas*, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 205 (2008).

374. Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.); see also Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5, 10–11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Farroux v. Denny’s Rests., Inc., 962 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

375. Farroux, 962 S.W.2d at 111.

376. *Id.*

377. McConathy v. McConathy, 869 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam); Cobb v. Dallas Fort Worth Med. Ctr.—Grand Prairie, 48 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.).

378. McConathy, 869 S.W.2d at 341–42 (holding that deposition excerpts submitted for summary judgment can be easily verified so that authentication is unnecessary). Any authentication requirement such as that articulated in *Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co.*, 758 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied), which required that the entire deposition be attached to the motion along with the original court reporter’s certificate to authenticate, has been specifically overruled. McConathy, 869 S.W.2d at 342.

379. See Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 919 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ).

party filing them.<sup>380</sup> Because summary judgment evidence must meet general admissibility standards, a party may not use its own answers to interrogatories<sup>381</sup> or its denials to requests for admissions as summary judgment evidence.<sup>382</sup>

2. *Deemed Admissions.* “Deemed admissions are competent summary judgment evidence.”<sup>383</sup> An unanswered admission is automatically deemed admitted.<sup>384</sup> An unanswered admission is deemed admitted without the necessity of a court order, and any matter admitted is conclusively established against the party making the admission unless the court, on motion, allows the withdrawal of the admission.<sup>385</sup> Thus, when a party fails to answer requests for admissions, that party will be precluded from offering summary judgment proof contrary to those admissions.<sup>386</sup> “Admissions, once made or deemed by the court, may not be contradicted by any evidence, whether in the form of live testimony or summary judgment affidavits.”<sup>387</sup> However, to be considered as proper summary judgment evidence, the requests must be on file with the court at the time of the hearing of the motion for summary judgment.<sup>388</sup> Furthermore, the requests must meet the same time constraints as the motion for summary judgment and the response.<sup>389</sup>

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380. TEX. R. CIV. P. 197.3; *Yates v. Fisher*, 988 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); see *Thalman v. Martin*, 635 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. 1982).

381. TEX. R. CIV. P. 197.3; *Morgan v. Anthony*, 27 S.W.3d 928, 929 (Tex. 2000); *Barragan v. Mosler*, 872 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).

382. *Barragan*, 872 S.W.2d at 22; *CKB & Assocs., Inc. v. Moore McCormack Petroleum, Inc.*, 809 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3.

383. *Gellatly v. Unifund CCR Partners*, No. 01-07-00552-CV, 2008 WL 2611894, at \*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2008, no pet.).

384. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.2(c).

385. *Id.*; *Hartman v. Trio Transp., Inc.*, 937 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied); *Wenco of El Paso/Las Cruces, Inc. v. Nazario*, 783 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, no writ) (citing to former TEX. R. CIV. P. 169, 136 Tex. 492 (1941, repealed 1999)).

386. *State v. Carrillo*, 885 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (stating that deemed admissions may not be contradicted by any evidence, including summary judgment affidavits); see *Velchoff v. Campbell*, 710 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

387. *Smith v. Home Indem. Co.*, 683 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ); see also *Henke Grain Co. v. Keenan*, 658 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).

388. *Vaughn v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 784 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989), *rev'd on other grounds*, 792 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); see also *Longoria v. United Blood Servs.*, 907 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995), *rev'd on other grounds*, 938 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

389. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(d) (specifying the time requirements for filing and serving discovery products as summary judgment proof).

A response to a request for admission can only be used against “the party making the admission.”<sup>390</sup> Any matter established under Rule 198 (Requests for Admission) (formerly Rule 169) is conclusively established for the party making the admission unless it is withdrawn by motion or amended with permission of the court.<sup>391</sup> “[T]he standards for withdrawing deemed admissions and for allowing a late summary judgment response are the same. Either is proper upon a showing of (1) good cause, and (2) no undue prejudice.”<sup>392</sup> A motion for new trial may be sufficient to present for the first time a request to withdraw a deemed admission, when the need to do so is not discovered before judgment.<sup>393</sup>

### *E. Documents*

Documents are another type of potential summary judgment proof that is not filed with the clerk of the court during the course of the pretrial proceedings.<sup>394</sup>

1. *Attaching Documents to Summary Judgment Motion and Response.* A motion for summary judgment must be supported by its proof and not by reference to the pleadings.<sup>395</sup> As such, supporting documents should be attached either to the affidavit that refers to the document or to the motion for summary judgment itself.<sup>396</sup> The “nonmovant may use a movant’s own exhibit against the movant to establish the existence of a fact question.”<sup>397</sup>

390. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Goudeau, 272 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2007).

391. Carrillo, 885 S.W.2d at 214; Velchoff, 710 S.W.2d at 614 (explaining that the party never moved to properly reply); Home Indem. Co., 683 S.W.2d at 562 (referring to former TEX. R. CIV. P. 169, 136 Tex. 492 (1941, repealed 1999)).

392. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

393. *Id.*

394. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(d) (describing the use of summary judgment evidence not on file).

395. Cuddihy Corp. v. Plummer, 876 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Trimble v. Gulf Paint & Battery, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).

396. MBank Brenham, N.A. v. Barrera, 721 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Sorrells v. Giberson, 780 S.W.2d 936, 937–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (reversing judgment for holder of a promissory note when the note was not attached to his affidavit and thus, not part of the summary judgment record); Trimble, 728 S.W.2d at 888 (“Verified copies of documents, in order to constitute . . . summary judgment evidence, must be attached to the affidavit.”). *But see* Zarges v. Bevan, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam) (stating that absent controverting summary judgment proof, an affidavit attached to a motion for summary judgment that incorporated by reference a certified copy of a note attached to plaintiff’s first amended petition, was sufficient to prove the movants were owners and holders of the note).

397. Perry v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 902 S.W.2d 544, 547–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dismissed w.o.j.); Keever v. Hall & Northway Adver., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (explaining that “movant’s exhibit can

The importance of attaching all documentation to the motions for summary judgment and to the responses is illustrated in many cases. For example, in *MBank Brenham, N.A. v. Barrera*, the supreme court held that there was no evidence to conflict with movant's summary judgment proof because, in its answer, the nonmovant failed to attach the opponent's abandoned pleadings, which presumably raised fact issues.<sup>398</sup> The court held that copies of the abandoned pleadings, with supporting affidavits or other authentication as required by Rule 166a, should have been attached to the response.<sup>399</sup>

In *Zarges v. Bevan*, the supreme court stated that, absent controverting summary judgment proof, an affidavit attached to a motion for summary judgment that incorporated by reference a certified copy of a note attached to plaintiff's first amended petition, was enough to prove the movants were owners and holders of the note.<sup>400</sup> *Zarges* illustrates again the importance of specifically calling to the court's attention, by appropriate response, defects in the movant's motion.<sup>401</sup>

2. *Evidentiary Considerations.* Documentation relied on to support a summary judgment must be sound in terms of its own evidentiary value. In *Dominguez v. Moreno*, a trespass to try title case, the plaintiff attached to the summary judgment motion a partial deed from the common source to his father.<sup>402</sup> The "deed" contained no signature, no date, and supplied nothing more than a granting clause and a description of the land.<sup>403</sup> The court held, in essence, that the writing was not a deed and was not a type of evidence that would be admissible at a trial on the merits.<sup>404</sup>

When using an affidavit to authenticate business records, the party offering the records must comply with Texas Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(10).<sup>405</sup>

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support a motion for summary judgment or it may create a fact question" if it indicates a contradiction in the movant's argument).

398. *MBank Brenham, N.A.*, 721 S.W.2d at 842.

399. *See id.*

400. *Zarges*, 652 S.W.2d at 369.

401. *Id.* (finding that nonmovant failed to controvert the movants' assertions and to object to the sufficiency of their affidavits); *Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Gar-Dal, Inc.*, 570 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1978) (indicating that properly identified photocopy of note attached to affidavit was proper summary judgment evidence and that defendants waived their right to complain about the form of proof because they failed to object).

402. *Dominguez v. Moreno*, 618 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1981, no writ).

403. *Id.*

404. *Id.*

405. *Norcross v. Conoco, Inc.*, 720 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ) (holding that invoices attached to the affidavit in support of the motion for summary

3. *Authentication of Documents.* Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7 represents a significant departure from the former requirements to authenticate documents. Documents produced by the opposing party need not be authenticated.

a. *Authentication of Producing Party's Documents.* Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7 provides that documents produced by the opposing party in response to written discovery are self-authenticating.<sup>406</sup> Specifically, it provides:

Production of Documents Self-Authenticating.

A party's production of a document in response to written discovery authenticates the document for use against that party in any pretrial proceeding or at trial unless—within ten days or a longer or shorter time ordered by the court, after the producing party has actual notice that the document will be used—the party objects to the authenticity of the document, or any part of it, stating the specific basis for objection. An objection must be either on the record or in writing and must have a good faith factual and legal basis. An objection made to the authenticity of only part of a document does not affect the authenticity of the remainder. If objection is made, the party attempting to use the document should be given a reasonable opportunity to establish its authenticity.<sup>407</sup>

Thus, a document produced in response to written discovery authenticates that document for use against the producing party.<sup>408</sup> Conversely, a party cannot authenticate a document for its own use by merely producing it in response to a discovery request.

It is not necessary to object for failure to authenticate or to obtain a ruling on such an objection because the complete absence of authentication is a defect of substance that is not waived by the failure to object and may be urged for the first time on appeal.<sup>409</sup>

b. *Copies Allowed.* Rule 196.3(b) also allows the producing party to offer a copy of the document unless the authenticity of

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judgment were not competent proof because they were not authenticated as required by Texas Rules of Evidence 803(6), 902(10)). Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for "Records of Regularly Conducted Activity." Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10) allows for self-authentication of "Business Records Accompanied by Affidavit."

406. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.7.

407. *Id.*

408. *Id.*

409. *Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp.*, 74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.).



the document is under scrutiny or because fairness under the circumstances of the case requires production of the original.<sup>410</sup> It provides:

(b) Copies. The responding party may produce copies in lieu of originals unless a question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or in the circumstances it would be unfair to produce copies in lieu of originals. If originals are produced, the responding party is entitled to retain the originals while the requesting party inspects and copies them.<sup>411</sup>

This rule's allowance of the production of copies seems to be "[i]n response to the proliferation of reading rooms and other modern practicalities of documents discovery."<sup>412</sup>

*c. Effect on Summary Judgment Practice.* Self-authentication eliminates the initial burden of authenticating the opposing party's documents used as evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment or response. Such documents are presumed authentic, unless timely argued otherwise by the producing party.<sup>413</sup> The producing party, however, must still prove the document's authenticity if he or she wants to use it.

Because the objection to authenticity must be made within ten days after "actual notice that the document will be used,"<sup>414</sup> and the response to the motion for summary judgment is due seven days before the summary judgment submission,<sup>415</sup> the objection to authenticity may need to be made before filing the response to the motion for summary judgment. Until the appellate courts clarify this issue, the safer course will be to object to lack of authentication within ten days after the motion for summary judgment is filed and not wait until filing the response. The same problem exists for attempts to regain access to documents a party claims were inadvertently disclosed.<sup>416</sup>

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410. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.3(b).

411. *Id.*

412. Nathan L. Hecht & Robert H. Pemberton, A Guide to the 1999 Texas Discovery Rules Revisions G-14 (Nov. 11, 1998), available at <http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/tdr/discle37.pdf>.

413. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.7.

414. *Id.*

415. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

416. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d) ("A party who produces material or information without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim . . . if . . . within ten days . . . the producing party amends the response . . .").

As is true at trial, authentication does not establish admissibility.<sup>417</sup> Authentication is but one condition precedent to admissibility.<sup>418</sup>

4. *Copies.* Copies of original documents are acceptable if accompanied by a properly sworn affidavit that states that the attached documents are “true and correct” copies of the originals.<sup>419</sup> A copy of a letter, which is unauthenticated, unsworn, and unsupported by affidavit, is not proper summary judgment evidence.<sup>420</sup>

In *Norcross v. Conoco, Inc.*, the court reversed a summary judgment on a sworn account because the affiants merely stated that the attached copies of invoices and accounts were correct copies of the original documents.<sup>421</sup> No reference was made concerning the affiant’s personal knowledge of the information contained in the attached invoice records.<sup>422</sup> The affiants did not state that the invoice or accounts were just and true, or correct and accurate.<sup>423</sup> Thus, the court concluded that the invoices were not competent summary judgment proof.<sup>424</sup>

5. *Judicial Notice of Court Records.* A trial court may take judicial notice of its own records in a case involving the same subject matter between the same or nearly identical parties.<sup>425</sup> However, on motion for summary judgment, certified copies of court records from a different case, even if pending in the same court, should be attached to the motion in the second case.<sup>426</sup> The failure of the movant to attach the records precludes summary judgment.<sup>427</sup>

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417. See TEX. R. EVID. 901(a).

418. *Id.*

419. Republic Nat’l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied).

420. *Hall*, 911 S.W.2d at 425.

421. Norcross v. Conoco, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ).

422. *Id.*

423. *Id.*

424. *Id.*

425. Gardner v. Martin, 162 Tex. 156, 158, 345 S.W.2d 274, 276 (1961); Trevino v. Pemberton, 918 S.W.2d 102, 103 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, no writ).

426. See Gardner, 162 Tex. at 159, 345 S.W.2d at 276–77 (indicating that because the records referred to in the affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment were court records of another case, it was reversible error not to attach certified copies of the records to the motion).

427. *Id.* at 277; Chandler v. Carnes Co., 604 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

*F. Affidavits*

Affidavits, which are sworn statements of facts signed by competent witnesses,<sup>428</sup> are the most common form of summary judgment proof. Rule 166a provides that a party may move for summary judgment with or without supporting affidavits.<sup>429</sup> However, before the adoption of the no-evidence summary judgment provision, it was unusual for a summary judgment to be granted without supporting affidavits. Proper no-evidence summary judgment motions do not require supporting evidence.<sup>430</sup> In other types of summary judgments, more often than not, affidavits are the vehicle used to show the court that there are no factual questions. Conversely, they are commonly used by the nonmovant to demonstrate a fact issue in response to either no-evidence motions or traditional summary judgment motions. They also are used to contradict or explain previous testimony.<sup>431</sup>

1. *Form of Affidavits.* Affidavits must be specific. They must contain specific factual bases that are admissible and upon which conclusions are drawn.<sup>432</sup> Statements made in the affidavit need factual specificity concerning time, place, and the exact nature of the alleged facts.<sup>433</sup> The requirements for affidavits under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(f) provide that the affidavit must show affirmatively that it is based on personal knowledge and that the facts sought to be proved would be “admissible in evidence” at a conventional trial.<sup>434</sup>

A verification, attached to the motion or response, that the contents are within the affiant’s knowledge and are both true and correct does not constitute a proper affidavit in support of

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428. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 312.011(1) (Vernon 2005).

429. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a)–(b); see *Kilpatrick v. State Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs*, 610 S.W.2d 867, 871–72 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“There is no requirement under [Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a] making affidavits indispensable to rendition of summary judgment.”); *supra* Part 1, II.C (discussing effect of an affidavit that contradicts earlier deposition testimony).

430. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

431. See *supra* Part 1, II.C.

432. *Southtex 66 Pipeline Co. v. Spoor*, 238 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

433. *All Am. Tel., Inc. v. USLD Commc’ns, Inc.*, 291 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); *Southtex*, 238 S.W.3d at 543.

434. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f); see also *Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood*, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f)); *Humphreys v. Caldwell*, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (“An affidavit which does not positively . . . represent the facts as disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within the affiant’s personal knowledge is legally insufficient.”).

summary judgment under Rule 166a(f).<sup>435</sup> Although frequently used, “magic words” such as “true and correct,” or within “personal knowledge” are not required.<sup>436</sup> The key is whether the affidavit clearly shows the affiant is testifying from personal knowledge. For an affidavit to have probative value, an affiant must swear that the facts presented in the affidavit reflect his or her personal knowledge.<sup>437</sup> The affidavit “must *itself* set forth facts and show the affiant’s competency,” and the allegations contained in the affidavit “must be direct, unequivocal and such that perjury is assignable.”<sup>438</sup>

The requirement of Rule 166a(f) that the affidavit affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters contained in the affidavit is not satisfied by an averment that the affiant is over 21 years of age, of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit, never convicted of a felony, and personally acquainted with the facts herein stated. Rather, the affiant should detail those particular facts that demonstrate that he or she has personal knowledge.<sup>439</sup>

Phrases such as “I believe” or “to the best of my knowledge and belief” should never be used in a supporting affidavit. Statements based upon the “best of his knowledge” have been held insufficient to support a response raising fact issues.<sup>440</sup> Such statements, according to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in *Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust*, are “no evidence at all.”<sup>441</sup>

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435. *Am. Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen*, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. 1994) (citing *Keenan v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n*, 754 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ)) (referring to what was then Rule 166a(e)).

436. *Churchill v. Mayo*, 224 S.W.3d 340, 346–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

437. *In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 136 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. 2004).

438. *Keenan*, 754 S.W.2d at 394.

439. *See Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc.*, 24 S.W.3d 641, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.); *Coleman v. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex.*, 846 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (holding that a sufficient affidavit must show affirmatively how the affiant became personally familiar with the facts); *Fair Woman, Inc. v. Transland Mgmt. Corp.*, 766 S.W.2d 323, 323–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (explaining that summary judgment failed despite the lack of a response because the affiant did not state how she had personal knowledge).

440. *Roberts v. Davis*, 160 S.W.3d 256, 262–63, 262 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (holding the affidavit in a defamation case that was based on information “to the best of my knowledge and belief” insufficient to support summary judgment on the basis of the truth of the statement, but holding it may be evidence that the statement was made without malice); *Shindler v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co.*, 768 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ); *see Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 833 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding that the sworn statement made by the plaintiff’s attorney that all information was true and correct was insufficient as a summary judgment affidavit).

441. *Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust*, 705 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. App.—Fort

The court explained: “A person could testify with impunity that to the best of his knowledge, there are twenty-five hours in a day, eight days in a week, and thirteen months in a year. Such statements do not constitute factual proof in a summary judgment proceeding.”<sup>442</sup>

Conversely, *Moya v. O'Brien* suggests that the requirement that the affiant have personal knowledge does not preclude the use of the words “I believe” in a supporting affidavit, if the content of the entire affidavit shows that the affiant has personal knowledge.<sup>443</sup> The court noted, however, that “when the portions of the affidavits containing hearsay are not considered, the remaining statements in the affidavits contain sufficient factual information to sustain the burden of proving the allegations in the motion for summary judgment.”<sup>444</sup>

In *Grand Prairie Independent School District v. Vaughan*, the supreme court considered a witness’s affidavit in which the words “on or about” were used to refer to a critical date.<sup>445</sup> The court found that “on or about” meant a date of approximate certainty, with a possible variance of a few days, and that the nonmovant never raised an issue of the specific dates.<sup>446</sup>

An affidavit must be in substantially correct form. An affidavit may not be used to authenticate a copy of another affidavit.<sup>447</sup> A purely formal deficiency in an affidavit, however, can be waived if it is not properly raised at the trial level.<sup>448</sup>

It is generally not advisable for the attorney representing the movant to make the affidavit, since the affidavit must be based on personal knowledge and not on information or belief.<sup>449</sup> Plus, it may open the attorney to cross-examination.

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Worth 1986, no writ).

442. *Id.*

443. *Moya v. O'Brien*, 618 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting a close reading of the affidavits left no doubt that the affiants were speaking from personal knowledge); *see also* *Krueger v. Gol*, 787 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (finding a failure to specifically state that an affidavit is based on personal knowledge is not fatal if it is clearly shown that the affiant was speaking from personal knowledge).

444. *Moya*, 618 S.W.2d at 893.

445. *Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vaughan*, 792 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

446. *Id.*

447. *See* *Hall v. Rutherford*, 911 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied).

448. *Sturm Jewelry, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, Franklin*, 593 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no writ) (citing *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn*, 363 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. 1962)).

449. *Wells Fargo Constr. Co. v. Bank of Woodlake*, 645 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1983, no writ); *see infra* Part 1, II.F.4.

2. *Substance of Affidavits.* The affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.<sup>450</sup> It cannot be conclusory.<sup>451</sup> For example, a statement that the affiant is the “owner and holder of the title document and is entitled to possession of this manufactured home” is no more than a legal conclusion insufficient to support a summary judgment.<sup>452</sup> Nor can an affidavit be based on subjective beliefs.<sup>453</sup> The line separating admissible statements of fact and inadmissible opinions or conclusions cannot always be precisely drawn. One of the policy considerations behind the prohibition against conclusory affidavits is that they are not susceptible to being readily controvertible.<sup>454</sup>

*Schultz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.* provides an example of a conclusory affidavit.<sup>455</sup> In *Schultz*, the court held that an affidavit supporting the creditor’s motion for summary judgment merely recited a legal conclusion in stating that certain collateral was disposed of “at public sale in conformity with reasonable commercial practices . . . in a commercially reasonable manner.”<sup>456</sup> Summary judgment was precluded absent facts concerning the sale of the collateral in question.<sup>457</sup>

Texas courts have considered a number of other evidentiary issues for summary judgment affidavits. First, affidavits may not be based on hearsay.<sup>458</sup> But “[i]nadmissible hearsay admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely because it is hearsay.”<sup>459</sup> Next, “affidavits that violate the parol

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450. *Cuellar v. City of San Antonio*, 821 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); *see Aldridge v. De Los Santos*, 878 S.W.2d 288, 296 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ dismissed w.o.j.) (holding affidavits unsupported by facts and consisting of legal conclusions do not establish an issue of fact).

451. *Burrow v. Arce*, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235–36 (Tex. 1999); *In re Am. Home Prods. Corp.*, 985 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Tex. 1998); *Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood*, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (“Conclusory affidavits are not enough to raise fact issues.”).

452. *Almance v. Shipley Bros.*, 247 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.).

453. *Tex. Div.-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza*, 876 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (stating that subjective beliefs are nothing more than conclusions).

454. *Ryland Group*, 924 S.W.2d at 122.

455. *Schultz v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 704 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ).

456. *Id.* (quoting the movant’s affidavit).

457. *Id.*

458. *Einhorn v. LaChance*, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dismissed w.o.j.); *Lopez v. Hink*, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); *Butler v. Hide-A-Way Lake Club, Inc.*, 730 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1987, writ refused n.r.e.).

459. *TEX. R. EVID. 802; see Dolenz v. A\_\_ B\_\_*, 742 S.W.2d 82, 83 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied).

evidence rule are not competent summary judgment evidence.”<sup>460</sup> Third, if the prerequisites of Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6), which sets out the requirements for admitting a business record into evidence, are not met, a business record may not be proper summary judgment proof.<sup>461</sup>

3. *Effect of Improper Affidavits.* Affidavits that do not meet the requirements of Rule 166a will neither sustain nor preclude a summary judgment,<sup>462</sup> and will not be entitled to evidentiary consideration.<sup>463</sup> If a deficiency in an affidavit is substantive, the opponent’s right to argue the deficiency on appeal is not waived by failure to except during the permissible time limits.<sup>464</sup> However, “[d]efects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend.”<sup>465</sup>

The personal knowledge requirement for affidavits is not met by a statement based upon the affiant’s “own personal knowledge and/or knowledge which he has been able to acquire upon inquiry.”<sup>466</sup> Such a statement “provide[s] no representation whatsoever” that the facts contained in the affidavit are true.<sup>467</sup>

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460. *Fimberg v. FDIC*, 880 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied) (citing *Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Lummis*, 596 S.W.2d 916, 923–24 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ)).

461. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6); *see also* *Travelers Constr., Inc. v. Warren Bros. Co.*, 613 S.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (holding an affidavit was defective because it did not satisfy the then-existing requirements for admission of a business record).

462. *See* *Box v. Bates*, 162 Tex. 184, 187, 346 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1961) (rejecting an affidavit as conclusory, but still considering other evidence); *see also* *Aldridge v. De Los Santos*, 878 S.W.2d 288, 296 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ dismissed w.o.j.) (“Affidavits containing conclusory statements unsupported by facts are not competent summary judgment proof.”).

463. *See* *Clendennen v. Williams*, 896 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ) (holding that an unverified statement is not an affidavit and therefore does not constitute competent summary judgment proof); *Kotzur v. Kelly*, 791 S.W.2d 254, 255–56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (finding the evidence was unauthenticated and therefore not summary judgment proof).

464. *Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carway*, 951 S.W.2d 108, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); *Ramirez v. Transcon. Ins. Co.*, 881 S.W.2d 818, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); *Habern v. Commonwealth Nat’l Bank of Dallas*, 479 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, no writ); *see also* *De Los Santos v. Sw. Tex. Methodist Hosp.*, 802 S.W.2d 749, 754–55 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ) (holding that the affidavit signed by an attorney on behalf of the affiant, even with the affiant’s permission, is substantively defective), *overruled per curiam on other grounds by* *Lewis v. Blake*, 876 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994).

465. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (emphasis added); *accord* *Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 833 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f)).

466. *Humphreys v. Caldwell*, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).

467. *Id.* (holding affidavits used in a privilege dispute were defective because they

After objections are made to affidavits (and assuming that the new affidavit would be timely), affidavits may be supplemented.<sup>468</sup>

4. *Affidavits by Counsel.* The personal knowledge requirement of Rule 166a(f) has plagued attorneys signing summary judgment affidavits on behalf of their clients. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 14, “[w]henver it may be necessary or proper for any party to a civil suit or proceeding to make an affidavit, it may be made by either the party or his agent or his attorney.”<sup>469</sup> While this seemingly approves counsel as an appropriate affiant for all purposes, courts have held that the rule does not obviate the need for personal knowledge of the facts in an affidavit.<sup>470</sup> Merely swearing that the affiant is the attorney of record for a party, and that the facts stated in the motion for summary judgment are within his or her personal knowledge and are true and correct, does not meet the personal knowledge test.<sup>471</sup> This type of affidavit is ineffectual to oppose or support a motion for summary judgment on the merits, except concerning attorney’s fees.<sup>472</sup> Unless the summary judgment involves attorney’s fees, the attorney’s affidavit should explicitly state that the attorney has personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit and should recite facts that substantiate the lawyer’s alleged personal knowledge.

If counsel is compelled to file an affidavit on the merits of a client’s cause of action or defense, one court has suggested the proper procedure:

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failed to show they were based on personal knowledge and did not represent that the disclosed facts were true).

468. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f); *see* All Am. Tel., Inc. v. USLD Commc’ns, Inc., 291 S.W.3d 518, 531 n.25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (noting that the movant could have, but failed to amend or supplement the affidavit it relied upon during the eight months that elapsed between the nonmovant’s objection to lack of detail and specificity and the trial court’s sustaining of the objection).

469. TEX. R. CIV. P. 14.

470. *E.g.*, *Cantu v. Holiday Inns, Inc.*, 910 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied) (“A party’s attorney may verify the pleading where he has knowledge of the facts, but does not have authority to verify based merely on his status as counsel.”); *Webster*, 833 S.W.2d at 749; *Soodeen v. Rychel*, 802 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

471. *Webster*, 833 S.W.2d at 749; *Carr v. Hertz Corp.*, 737 S.W.2d 12, 13–14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).

472. *Carr*, 737 S.W.2d at 13–14; *see, e.g.*, *Webster*, 833 S.W.2d at 749; *Soodeen*, 802 S.W.2d at 365 (rejecting attorney’s affidavit because it did not demonstrate attorney’s competence to testify regarding negligent entrustment); *Harkness v. Harkness*, 709 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1986, writ dismissed) (requiring an attorney who makes an affidavit to show personal knowledge of the facts); *Landscape Design & Constr., Inc. v. Warren*, 566 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no writ) (disallowing attorney’s affidavit as not stating personal knowledge of the facts).



While Rule 14 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits an affidavit to be made by a party's attorney or agent, this rule does not obviate the necessity of showing that the attorney has personal knowledge of the facts, as distinguished from information obtained from the client. Ordinarily, an attorney's knowledge of the facts of a case is obtained from the client. Consequently, if the attorney must act as affiant, the better practice is to state explicitly how the information stated in the affidavit was obtained.<sup>473</sup>

However, an attorney may authenticate documents.<sup>474</sup>

### G. Other Evidence

Summary judgment proof is not limited to affidavits and discovery materials. Parties can, and have, introduced a variety of additional forms of proof, including stipulations,<sup>475</sup> photographs,<sup>476</sup> testimony from prior trials,<sup>477</sup> transcripts from administrative hearings,<sup>478</sup> court records from other cases,<sup>479</sup> the statement of facts from an earlier trial (now called the reporter's record),<sup>480</sup> and judicial notice.<sup>481</sup>

In *Martinez v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.*, the court refused to consider as summary judgment evidence statements contained in the defendant's original answer, which was timely amended to include a general denial.<sup>482</sup> The court determined that the statements in the superseded pleadings were not "conclusive and indisputable judicial admissions."<sup>483</sup>

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473. *Landscape Design*, 566 S.W.2d at 67.

474. *Leyva v. Soltero*, 966 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.).

475. *Kinner Transp. & Enters., Inc. v. State*, 614 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1981, no writ).

476. *Langford v. Blackman*, 790 S.W.2d 127, 132–33 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990), *rev'd per curiam on other grounds*, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990).

477. *Murillo v. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 895 S.W.2d 758, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); *Kazmir v. Suburban Homes Realty*, 824 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied).

478. *Vaughn v. Burroughs Corp.*, 705 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).

479. *Murillo*, 895 S.W.2d at 761; *Gilbert v. Jennings*, 890 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied).

480. *Austin Bldg. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 432 S.W.2d 697, 698–99 (Tex. 1968); *Executive Condos., Inc. v. State*, 764 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).

481. *Settlers Vill. Cmty. Improvement Ass'n v. Settlers Vill. 5.6, Ltd.*, 828 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).

482. *Martinez v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.*, 250 S.W.3d 481, 485–86 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.).

483. *Id.* (citing *Sosa v. Cent. Power & Light*, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995)).

### H. *Expert and Interested Witness Testimony*

For many years, Texas courts held that interested or expert witness testimony would not support a summary judgment motion or response.<sup>484</sup> However, the 1978 amendment to Rule 166a specifically permits the granting of a motion for summary judgment based on the uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an expert witness, or of an interested witness, if the trier of fact must be guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts as to a subject matter.<sup>485</sup> The evidence must meet the following criteria: (1) it is clear, positive, and direct; (2) it is otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies; and (3) it could have been readily controverted.<sup>486</sup>

#### 1. *Expert Opinion Testimony*

a. *Requirements for Expert Witness Testimony.* Experts are considered interested witnesses and their testimony is subject to the requirement of being clear, positive, direct, credible, free from contradictions, and susceptible to being readily controverted.<sup>487</sup> An expert's opinion testimony can defeat a claim as a matter of law, even if the expert is an interested witness. Indeed, summary judgment evidence in the form of expert testimony might be necessary to survive a no-evidence summary judgment.<sup>488</sup>

But it is "the basis of the witness's opinion, and not the witness's qualifications or his bare opinions alone, that can settle an issue as a matter of law; a claim will not stand or fall on the mere *ipse dixit* of a credentialed witness."<sup>489</sup>

484. See, e.g., *Lewisville State Bank v. Blanton*, 525 S.W.2d 696, 696 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam) (holding the affidavit of an interested party will not support a summary judgment but may raise a question of fact); *Gibbs v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 450 S.W.2d 827, 828–29 (Tex. 1970) (finding expert testimony by affidavit does not establish facts as a matter of law).

485. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also *Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel*, 949 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that uncontroverted affidavit of an interested witness may be competent summary judgment evidence); *Republic Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler*, 717 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (holding affidavit of interested witness was admissible as proper summary judgment evidence because it was readily controvertible); *Duncan v. Horning*, 587 S.W.2d 471, 472–73 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, no writ) (approving affidavit of interested witness as competent summary judgment evidence under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), effective on January 1, 1978).

486. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Trico Techs. Corp.*, 949 S.W.2d at 310.

487. *Wadewitz v. Montgomery*, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997); *Anderson v. Snider*, 808 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).

488. *F.W. Indus., Inc. v. McKeahan*, 198 S.W.3d 217, 221–22 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, no pet.) (affirming no evidence summary judgment because the nonmovant did not present any expert evidence on causation).

489. *City of San Antonio v. Pollock*, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009) (quoting *Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp.*, 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004)); accord

Expert testimony must be comprised of more than conclusory statements and must be specific.<sup>490</sup> For example, affidavits that recite that the affiant “estimates,” “believes,” or has an understanding of certain facts are not proper summary judgment evidence.<sup>491</sup> “Such language does not positively and unqualifiedly represent that the ‘facts’ disclosed are true.”<sup>492</sup> Likewise, legal conclusions of an expert are not probative to establish proximate cause.<sup>493</sup> “Bare opinions alone” will not suffice to defeat a claim as a matter of law.<sup>494</sup> “It is incumbent on an expert to connect the data relied on and his or her opinion and to show how that data is valid support for the opinion reached.”<sup>495</sup> In one case, an affidavit that did not include the legal basis or reasoning for an attorney’s expert opinion that he did not commit malpractice was “simply a sworn denial of [plaintiff’s] claims.”<sup>496</sup> Because it was conclusory, the court found it to be incompetent summary judgment evidence.<sup>497</sup> Similarly, a conclusory statement by a Maryland doctor that a Texas doctor was entitled to be paid (and therefore not covered by the Good Samaritan statute) was not sufficient to create a fact issue.<sup>498</sup> In another case, the supreme court found an expert’s testimony insufficient to create a fact issue when she opined that the alleged negligent conduct of a hospital caused the plaintiff’s injuries without an explanation of how the conduct was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries.<sup>499</sup> In another example, the Waco Court of Appeals held that an expert’s statement that a ramp was unreasonably dangerous was a conclusory statement and, as such, was insufficient to defeat a summary judgment.<sup>500</sup>

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Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999).

490. See *Wadewitz*, 951 S.W.2d at 466–67; *Lara v. Tri-Coastal Contractors, Inc.*, 925 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).

491. *Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood*, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

492. *Id.* (citing *Brownlee v. Brownlee*, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984)).

493. *Barraza v. Eureka Co.*, 25 S.W.3d 225, 230 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

494. *Burrow*, 997 S.W.2d at 235.

495. See *Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho*, 298 S.W.3d 631, 642 (Tex. 2009).

496. *Anderson v. Snider*, 808 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).

497. *Id.*; see also *Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc.*, 988 S.W.2d 428, 434–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (finding an expert’s affidavit to be “nothing more than speculation” and thus insufficient to constitute summary judgment evidence).

498. *McIntyre v. Ramirez*, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749–50 (Tex. 2003).

499. *IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason*, 143 S.W.3d 794, 803 (Tex. 2004); see also *Hamilton v. Wilson*, 249 S.W.3d 425, 427 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that the expert’s testimony was not based on mere possibilities, speculation, or surmise and thus proper summary judgment evidence).

500. *Alger v. Brinson Ford, Inc.*, 169 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005), *rev’d per curiam on other grounds*, 228 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2007).

The test for admissibility of an expert's testimony is whether the proponent established that the expert possesses knowledge, skill, experience, training or education regarding the specific issue before the court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject.<sup>501</sup> Mere conclusions of a lay witness are not competent evidence for the purpose of controverting expert opinion evidence.<sup>502</sup> For example, the existence of a causal connection between a certain chemical and injury or disease requires specialized expert knowledge and testimony because such matters are not within the common knowledge of lay persons.<sup>503</sup> However, on subject matter in which the fact-finder would not be required to be guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts, lay testimony may be permitted.<sup>504</sup> Lay testimony may be accepted over that of experts.<sup>505</sup> Whether expert testimony is required is a question of law.<sup>506</sup> Thus, in a situation where lay testimony is permitted, it can be sufficient to raise a fact issue.<sup>507</sup> Also, an expert's affidavit that is based on assumed facts that vary from the actual undisputed facts has no probative force.<sup>508</sup>

Concerning legal fees, what constitutes reasonable fees is a question of fact. However, expert testimony that is clear, direct, and uncontroverted may establish fees as a matter of law.<sup>509</sup> "To constitute proper summary judgment evidence . . . an affidavit [supporting attorney's fees] must be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, and show the affiant's competence."<sup>510</sup>

501. *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113, 120–21 (Tex. 2003); *Downing v. Larson*, 153 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004), *rev'd per curiam on other grounds*, 197 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. 2006).

502. *Hernandez v. Lukefahr*, 879 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); *White v. Wah*, 789 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); *Nicholson v. Mem'l Hosp. Sys.*, 722 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

503. *Abraham v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.*, 233 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

504. *See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann*, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).

505. *Id.*

506. *Choice v. Gibbs*, 222 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

507. *See id.*

508. *Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye*, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995).

509. *Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League*, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); *see also infra* Part 1, VI (discussing attorney's fees).

510. *Collins v. Guinn*, 102 S.W.3d 825, 837 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (alteration in original) (quoting *Merchandise Ctr., Inc. v. WNS, Inc.*, 85 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.)); *see infra* Part 1, VI (discussing attorney's fees).

b. *Sufficiency of Expert Opinion.* In *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, the Texas Supreme Court held that an expert's testimony must be based upon a reliable foundation and be relevant.<sup>511</sup>

The genesis of the standards of reliability and relevance concerning expert testimony was the U. S. Supreme Court case of *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.* It held that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial court "must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."<sup>512</sup> In *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, the Supreme Court held that the *Daubert* factors apply to engineers and other experts who are not scientists.<sup>513</sup> The court must determine, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, whether the expert opinion is "scientifically valid," based on factors such as: (1) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (2) the known or potential rate of error of the technique; and (3) whether the theory or technique is "generally accepted" in the scientific community.<sup>514</sup>

Similarly, Texas Rule of Evidence 702 states, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."<sup>515</sup>

The other relevant evidentiary rule, Texas Rule of Evidence 705, provides "[i]f the court determines that the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis for the expert's opinion under Rule 702 or 703, the opinion is inadmissible."<sup>516</sup>

These rules impose a gatekeeping obligation on the trial judge to ensure the reliability of all expert testimony.<sup>517</sup> The trial judge fulfills this obligation by determining as a precondition to admissibility that: (1) the putative expert is qualified as an expert; (2) the expert's testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline; and (3) the testimony is relevant.<sup>518</sup>

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511. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); see also *Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez*, 159 S.W.3d 897, 904–05 (Tex. 2004).

512. *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

513. *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).

514. *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 592–94.

515. TEX. R. EVID. 702.

516. TEX. R. EVID. 705(c).

517. *Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.*, 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998) (quoting *McKendall v. Crown Control Corp.*, 122 F.3d 803, 806 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997)).

518. *Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez*, 159 S.W.3d 897, 904 (Tex. 2004); *E.I. du*

Use of experts in summary judgment practice requires meeting these standards for experts through summary judgment evidence. Many *Daubert/Robinson* battles are causation battles fought at the summary judgment stage. They are a unique mixture of trial and summary judgment practice. Generally, the defendant does one of two things: (1) moves for summary judgment on the grounds that its own expert testimony conclusively disproves causation and the plaintiff's expert testimony does not raise a fact issue on causation because he or she does not pass the *Daubert/Robinson* test; or more simply, (2) moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence of causation because the plaintiff's causation expert testimony does not pass *Daubert/Robinson*. If the movant objects to expert evidence relied upon by the nonmovant based on reliability, the evidence must be both admissible and legally sufficient to withstand a no-evidence challenge.<sup>519</sup>

The possible results of failure to meet the *Daubert/Robinson* tests are demonstrated by *Weiss v. Mechanical Associated Services, Inc.* In *Weiss*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in effectively excluding the plaintiff's expert testimony on causation by granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.<sup>520</sup> The appellate court rejected any evidence by the expert on the grounds that it failed to meet the *Robinson* tests.<sup>521</sup>

This ruling carries the following implications: (1) in a summary judgment proceeding, the movant challenging the expert's testimony need not request a *Robinson* hearing and secure a formal ruling from the trial court; and (2) the granting of the summary judgment, even if the order does not mention the expert challenge, in effect, is a ruling sustaining the movant's expert challenge.<sup>522</sup> Conversely, the El Paso Court of Appeals has held that if a trial court agrees that an expert's testimony is admissible, the expert's opinion constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment.<sup>523</sup> Other courts have implicitly ruled on the reliability of expert testimony at summary judgment.<sup>524</sup>

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Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).

519. Abraham v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 233 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Frias v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 104 S.W.3d 925, 928 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

520. Weiss v. Mech. Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125–26 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).

521. *Id.* at 124–25.

522. *Id.* at 124 n.6.

523. Barraza v. Eureka Co., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

524. See Emmett Props., Inc. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 167 S.W.3d 365, 374

The Texarkana Court of Appeals in *Bray v. Fuselier*, however, refused to rule that the trial court's granting of summary judgment was an implicit ruling on the *Robinson* challenge because the defendant had made numerous other objections to the plaintiff's summary judgment evidence, and it could be argued that the court's granting of summary judgment was an implicit ruling on any one of these other objections.<sup>525</sup>

An expert's opinion that is unsupported and speculative on its face can be challenged for the first time on appeal.<sup>526</sup>

*c. Procedural Issues.* Before the advent of no-evidence motions for summary judgment in state practice, courts did not apply evidentiary sanctions and exclusions for failure to timely designate an expert in a summary judgment proceeding. However, now a party must timely disclose its expert as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 or, absent a showing of good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice, the trial court may properly strike the affidavit.<sup>527</sup>

As a practical matter, a party relying on an expert in either its summary judgment motion or response cannot wait until trial to develop the expert's qualifications. In *United Blood Services v. Longoria*, the Texas Supreme Court required summary judgment proof of an expert's qualifications in support of the response to a motion for summary judgment.<sup>528</sup> Using an abuse of discretion standard, the supreme court upheld the trial court's determination that the expert was not qualified and entered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff who relied on the disqualified expert.<sup>529</sup> The supreme court specifically rejected the approach of waiting for trial.<sup>530</sup>

The proponent of an expert bears the burden of demonstrating an expert's qualifications, reliability, and relevance.<sup>531</sup> "[O]nce a party objects to the expert's testimony, the

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(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment because plaintiffs' expert report was conclusory and failed to consider alternative causes); *Martinez v. City of San Antonio*, 40 S.W.3d 587, 595 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) ("Although causation may be proved by expert testimony, the probability about which the expert testifies must be more than coincidence for the case to reach a jury.").

525. *Bray v. Fuselier*, 107 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).

526. *See Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.*, 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex. 2004).

527. *Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass'n v. Gillenwater*, 285 S.W.3d 879, 881–82 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).

528. *United Blood Servs. v. Longoria*, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

529. *Id.* at 30–31.

530. *Id.* at 30.

531. TEX. R. EVID. 702; *Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft*, 77 S.W.3d 805, 807

party offering the expert . . . has the burden of proof to establish that the testimony is admissible.”<sup>532</sup> For example, in *Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic*, the court found no abuse of discretion in striking an expert’s affidavit.<sup>533</sup> Although the expert’s affidavit provided information that the expert reviewed various records and that certain general principles exist in connection with the use of anesthesia, the affidavit had no information concerning the methodology and the basis underlying the opinion testimony and how they related to the expert’s opinion.<sup>534</sup> Without such information, the court found it impossible to determine the issue of reliability.<sup>535</sup>

The question then becomes how does one qualify an expert and establish reliability and relevance in a summary judgment context? This question is complicated by the significant procedural issues between summary judgment proceedings and expert procedure.

Procedurally, it should be sufficient for a defendant movant to file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment simply challenging the element of causation. The nonmovant would then come forward in its response with its expert testimony establishing causation. Then in its reply, the movant would raise specific challenges to admissibility and legal sufficiency of the expert’s testimony.

Another issue that arises is that underlying procedural differences may complicate the decision of how to deal with experts in summary judgment proceedings.

*i. The Evidence Supporting the Summary Judgment is Evaluated Differently.* In a summary judgment hearing, the trial court assumes that all evidence favorable to the nonmovant is true, and determines if there is a genuine issue of fact.<sup>536</sup> In a *Daubert/Robinson* hearing, once a party objects to the expert’s testimony, the party offering the expert bears the burden of responding to each objection and showing that the testimony is

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(Tex. 2002); *Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. ChoicePoint, Inc.*, 102 S.W.3d 366, 382, 384 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

532. *Barraza v. Eureka Co.*, 25 S.W.3d 225, 230 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (citing *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995)).

533. *Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic*, 22 S.W.3d 614, 622 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied).

534. *Id.*

535. *Id.*

536. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.*, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985).



admissible by a preponderance of the evidence.<sup>537</sup> Then, the trial court evaluates evidence for reliability to determine admissibility.<sup>538</sup>

*ii. The Standard of Review Applied on Appeal is Different.* In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment, the appellate review is de novo.<sup>539</sup> In a *Robinson* review, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard.<sup>540</sup> In the context of a summary judgment, a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.<sup>541</sup>

Although acknowledging that a *Robinson* challenge in the summary judgment context invokes two different standards of review, a Houston court nevertheless concluded that, as a practical matter, any differences could not affect the result on appeal. The court stated:

In the context of a no evidence motion for summary judgment where, as here, expert evidence relied upon by the nonmovant is objected to by the movant based on reliability, the evidence must be both admissible and legally sufficient to withstand the no evidence challenge. Therefore, contrary to the parties' arguments in this regard, there is no issue here of *which* standard of review to apply (abuse of discretion or legal sufficiency) because both must ultimately be satisfied. Moreover, because we cannot, as a practical matter, envision a situation in which expert testimony would be reliable enough to be admissible or legally sufficient, but not the other, we believe that the decision reached on reliability will produce the same disposition, regardless [of] whether it is viewed from the standpoint of admissibility or legal sufficiency.<sup>542</sup>

*iii. In a Summary Judgment Hearing, Oral Argument Is Typically Not Recorded and Is Not Considered as Evidence.* A *Daubert/Robinson* hearing typically is recorded and included in the record on appeal. Conversely, no live testimony may be presented at a summary judgment hearing.<sup>543</sup> In a

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537. *Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d at 557.

538. *See id.* at 557–58.

539. *Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett*, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); *see infra* Part 1, V.F (discussing standard of review).

540. *United Blood Servs. v. Longoria*, 938 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

541. *McIntyre v. Ramirez*, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. 2003).

542. *Frias v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 104 S.W.3d 925, 928 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); *accord Abraham v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.*, 233 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

543. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps*, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 n.4 (Tex. 1992).

*Daubert/Robinson* hearing, however, there is opportunity for live testimony by the expert and his or her cross-examination. This form of evidence is especially important when the outcome of the *Daubert/Robinson* hearing is case determinative.

These differences create a hybrid and seemingly inconsistent approach between expert and summary judgment procedure. Possibilities of how to deal with experts in summary judgment proceedings include:

(a) A *Daubert/Robinson hearing*. The expert's proponent may schedule a *Daubert/Robinson* hearing. In meeting its gatekeeping function, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, including the expert. Summary judgment procedure does not allow for this sort of give and take. Thus, if summary judgment opponents submit conflicting affidavits concerning one side's expert's qualifications, reliability, or relevance, the judge logically cannot apply summary judgment standards. A hearing is appropriate.

The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals has suggested use of a *Daubert/Robinson* hearing to overcome a challenge to an expert's reliability.<sup>544</sup> However, for strategic purposes, an opponent of the expert may not want an evidentiary hearing. Under the logic of *Weiss*, all the opponent must do is file a motion for summary judgment and object to the expert's affidavit when it is attached as summary judgment evidence to the response.<sup>545</sup> If the court grants the summary judgment, there is no error in failing to conduct a *Daubert/Robinson* hearing and through the granting of the summary judgment motion, the expert is inferentially ruled unqualified, unreliable, or irrelevant. Thus, unless a nonmovant is certain the judge will not grant the summary judgment, the wise course of action is to arrange for a *Daubert/Robinson* hearing.

If the *Daubert/Robinson* hearing is conducted at the same time as the summary judgment hearing, do not submit other summary judgment evidence. The case authority is strict that all summary judgment evidence must be in writing and may not be presented at a summary judgment hearing.<sup>546</sup> The wisest course would be to hold the *Daubert/Robinson* hearing in advance of the summary judgment hearing. That way, if the judge strikes the

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544. *Praytor v. Ford Motor Co.*, 97 S.W.3d 237, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1348 (1998)).

545. *See Weiss v. Mech. Associated Servs., Inc.*, 989 S.W.2d 120, 125–26 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).

546. *See Jack B. Anglin Co.*, 842 S.W.2d at 269 & n.4.

expert, the proponent can find another or attempt to bolster that expert.

(b) *Depose own expert.* To make a *Daubert/Robinson* showing, a party may have to depose its own expert extensively about the factual basis for his or her opinions and about the scientific foundation for them. Affidavits may be too unwieldy to cover all the ground necessary to qualify an expert.

(c) *Prepare detailed affidavits.* Written reports from experts, unless sworn to, are not proper summary judgment evidence.<sup>547</sup> If affidavits are used, the affidavits may require publications, articles, or other qualifying material attached to them.

2. *Nonexpert, Interested Witness Testimony.* In addition to expert testimony, nonexpert, interested party testimony may provide a basis for summary judgment.<sup>548</sup> The interested party's testimony must also be "clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible . . . and could have been readily controverted."<sup>549</sup> This determination is made on a case-by-case basis.<sup>550</sup>

An example of competent interested party testimony is provided by *Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza*. In *Carrozza*, the supreme court found that in a retaliatory discharge action under the workers' compensation law, interested party testimony by supervisory and administrative personnel established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge.<sup>551</sup> The court explained that the affidavit testimony could have been readily controverted by facts and circumstances belying the employer's neutral explanation and thereby raising a material issue of fact.<sup>552</sup>

Statements of interested parties, testifying about what they knew or intended, are self-serving and do not meet the standards for summary judgment proof.<sup>553</sup> Issues of intent and knowledge

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547. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f).

548. *E.g.*, *Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel*, 949 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); *Republic Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler*, 717 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); *Danzy v. Rockwood Ins. Co.*, 741 S.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, no writ).

549. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *accord* *McMahan v. Greenwood*, 108 S.W.3d 467, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

550. *Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc.*, 21 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (citing TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND REVIEW § 6.03[9][a] (2d ed. 1995)).

551. *Tex. Div.-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza*, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313–14 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).

552. *Id.* at 313.

553. *Grainger v. W. Cas. Life Ins. Co.*, 930 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); *Clark v. Pruett*, 820 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. App.—

are not susceptible to being readily controverted and, therefore, are not appropriate for summary judgment proof.<sup>554</sup> Nonetheless, the mere fact that summary judgment proof is self-serving does not necessarily make the evidence an improper basis for summary judgment.<sup>555</sup> To meet the competency standard, interested witness testimony “must demonstrate personal knowledge, must positively and unqualifiedly state that the facts represented as true are true, and must not be conclusory.”<sup>556</sup> However, if the affidavits of interested witnesses are detailed and specific, those affidavits may be objective proof sufficient to establish the witnesses’ state of mind as a matter of law.<sup>557</sup>

### III. BURDEN OF PROOF FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

When considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he trial court’s duty is to determine [whether] there are any material fact issues to try, not to weigh the evidence or determine its credibility and try the case on affidavits.”<sup>558</sup> Review of a summary judgment under either a traditional standard or no-evidence standard requires that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.<sup>559</sup> With the advent of no-evidence summary judgments in Texas, the burden of proof on summary judgment is now allocated in the same manner for defendants and plaintiffs in both state and federal court.<sup>560</sup> “[T]he party with the burden of proof at trial will have the same burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding.”<sup>561</sup>

A defendant may move for summary judgment in the following ways:

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Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). *But see infra* Part 1, VII.G.3 (discussing an exception in media defamation cases that allows state of mind testimony as summary judgment evidence).

554. *Clark*, 820 S.W.2d at 906; *Allied Chem. Corp. v. DeHaven*, 752 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

555. *Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel*, 949 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

556. *Evans v. MIPTT, L.L.C.*, No. 01-06-00394-CV, 2007 WL 1716443, at \*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 14, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing *Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood*, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).

557. *See* *Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs*, 759 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1988); *see also infra* Part 1, VII.G (discussing defamation actions).

558. *Richardson v. Parker*, 903 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ); *accord* *Spencer v. City of Dallas*, 819 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ).

559. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez*, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002); *Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.*, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985).

560. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

561. *Barraza v. Eureka Co.*, 25 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

- (1) by establishing that no material issue of fact exists concerning one or more essential elements of the plaintiff's claims;
- (2) by establishing all the elements of its affirmative defense;
- (3) by asserting through a no-evidence summary judgment that the plaintiff lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim; or
- (4) by proving each element of its counterclaim as a matter of law.

A plaintiff may move for summary judgment in the following ways:

- (1) by showing entitlement to prevail as a matter of law on each element of a cause of action, except damages;
- (2) by demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact concerning an affirmative defense; or
- (3) by attacking affirmative defenses through a no-evidence summary judgment.

#### A. *Traditional Summary Judgments*

The standard for determining whether a movant for a traditional motion for summary judgment has met its burden is whether the movant has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment should be granted as a matter of law.<sup>562</sup> The party with the burden of proof must prove it is entitled to judgment by establishing each element of its own claim or defense as a matter of law or by negating an element of the nonmovant's claim or defense as a matter of law.<sup>563</sup>

1. *Defendant as Movant.* A summary judgment is proper for a defendant as movant only if the defendant establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning one or more essential elements of the plaintiff's claims and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.<sup>564</sup> The movant has the burden of proof and all doubts are resolved in favor of the nonmovant.<sup>565</sup>

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562. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).

563. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999).

564. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 748; Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310–11 (Tex. 1984); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972).

565. Roskey v. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. 1982) (per

For example, in *D. Houston, Inc. v. Love*, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of a summary judgment granted to a men's club because it failed to negate as a matter of law the duty to take reasonable care to prevent its employee from driving after she left work.<sup>566</sup> The employee, an exotic dancer, claimed that the club required her to consume alcohol in sufficient amounts to become intoxicated. She also testified that the club made more money if a customer bought her drinks. She testified she consumed only alcohol purchased for her by customers. When asked in her deposition to admit she chose to order alcoholic rather than non-alcoholic beverages, she replied, "I wanted to keep my job."<sup>567</sup> The supreme court held that this testimony, though controverted, raised a fact question regarding the club's control over the dancer's decision to consume sufficient alcohol to become intoxicated. Thus, the club did not disprove as a matter of law that it did not exercise sufficient control over the dancer to create a legal duty.<sup>568</sup>

2. *Plaintiff as Movant on Affirmative Claims.* When the plaintiff moves for traditional summary judgment on affirmative claims it is in much the same position as a defendant. The plaintiff must show entitlement to prevail on each element of the cause of action,<sup>569</sup> except damages. Damages are specifically exempted by Rule 166a(a).<sup>570</sup> The plaintiff meets the burden if he or she produces evidence that would be sufficient to support an instructed verdict at trial.<sup>571</sup> The plaintiff is not under any obligation to negate affirmative defenses.<sup>572</sup> The mere pleading of

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curiam); *Leffler v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 290 S.W.3d 384, 385 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.).

566. *D. Houston, Inc. v. Love*, 92 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex. 2002).

567. *Id.* at 456.

568. *Id.* at 454–56.

569. *See, e.g.*, *Fry v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline*, 979 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); *Green v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm.*, 883 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ); *Brooks v. Sherry Lane Nat'l Bank*, 788 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ); *Bergen, Johnson & Olson v. Verco Mfg. Co.*, 690 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

570. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a). The exception that the plaintiff need not show entitlement to prevail on damages applies only to the amount of unliquidated damages, not to the existence of damages or loss. Unliquidated damages may be proved up at a later date.

571. *FDIC v. Moore*, 846 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); *Ortega-Carter v. Am. Int'l Adjustment Co.*, 834 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied); *Braden v. New Ulm State Bank*, 618 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

572. *See infra* Part 1, III.A.3 (discussing affirmative defenses).

an affirmative defense, without supporting proof, will not defeat an otherwise valid motion for summary judgment.<sup>573</sup>

Where the plaintiff is the movant on its affirmative claims, the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate by summary judgment evidence that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning each element of its claim for relief.<sup>574</sup> If the defendant also has a counterclaim on file, to be entitled to a final summary judgment, the plaintiff must: (1) establish the elements of its cause of action as matter of law; and (2) disprove at least one element of the defendant's counterclaim as a matter of law.<sup>575</sup> Once the movant-defendant conclusively establishes the elements of its affirmative defense, the burden is shifted to the nonmovant-plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>576</sup>

3. *Affirmative Defenses.* The defendant urging summary judgment on an affirmative defense is in much the same position as a plaintiff urging summary judgment on an affirmative claim. The movant-defendant must come forward with summary judgment evidence for each element of the affirmative defense.<sup>577</sup> Unless the movant conclusively establishes the affirmative defense, the nonmovant-plaintiff has no burden to present summary judgment evidence to the contrary.<sup>578</sup> Even so, it is a wise practice to file a response to every summary judgment motion. "[A]n unpleaded affirmative defense may also serve as the basis for a summary judgment when it is raised in the summary judgment motion, and the opposing party does not object to the lack of a [R]ule 94 pleading in either its written response or before the rendition of judgment."<sup>579</sup>

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573. Hammer v. Powers, 819 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

574. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.

575. Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Adams v. Tri-Cont'l Leasing Corp., 713 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

576. Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. 1974).

577. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999); Am. Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. 1994); Nichols, 507 S.W.2d at 520 ("[T]he pleading of an affirmative defense will not, in itself, defeat a motion for summary judgment by a plaintiff whose proof conclusively establishes his right to an instructed verdict if no proof were offered by his adversary in a conventional trial on the merits.").

578. Torres v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. 1970) (finding that while the plaintiff would suffer a directed verdict at a trial based on the record for failing to carry the burden of proof, the plaintiff has no such burden on defendant's motion for summary judgment); see also Deer Creek Ltd. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 792 S.W.2d 198, 200–01 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ) (noting when the mortgage company sufficiently pleaded and proved release, the burden shifted to the debtor to raise a fact issue concerning a legal justification for setting aside the release).

579. Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991). Texas

Defendants seeking summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, an affirmative defense, face a dual burden.<sup>580</sup> In *Burns v. Thomas*, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a summary judgment on the basis of limitations must prove when the cause of action accrued.<sup>581</sup> The defendant must also negate the discovery rule by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact about when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the nature of the injury.<sup>582</sup> Thus, when the nonmovant interposes a suspension statute, the burden is on the movant to negate the applicability of the tolling statute.<sup>583</sup> This burden does not apply to a party seeking to negate the discovery rule when the nonmovant has not pleaded or otherwise raised the discovery rule.<sup>584</sup>

A plaintiff who has conclusively established the absence of disputed fact issues in its claim for relief will not be prevented from obtaining summary judgment because the defendant merely pleaded an affirmative defense.<sup>585</sup> An affirmative defense will prevent the granting of a summary judgment only if the defendant supports each element of the affirmative defense by summary judgment evidence.<sup>586</sup>

A party raising an affirmative defense in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must either: (1) present a

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Rule of Civil Procedure 94 concerns affirmative defenses. In relevant part, it provides:

In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 94.

580. See *infra* Part 1, VII.C (discussing statutes of limitations and statutes of repose).

581. *Burns v. Thomas*, 786 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. 1990).

582. *Id.* The discovery rule essentially states that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of the wrong or until the plaintiff acquires knowledge that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, would lead to the discovery of the wrong. See *id.*; see also *Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc.*, 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990); *Gaddis v. Smith*, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1967).

583. *Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum*, 520 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam) (finding the burden was on the movant to prove the affirmative defense of limitations by conclusively establishing lack of diligence and the inapplicability of the tolling statute).

584. *In re Estate of Matejek*, 960 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

585. *Kirby Exploration Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp.*, 701 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Clark v. Dedina*, 658 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dismissed).

586. See *Brownlee v. Brownlee*, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984) (holding that an affidavit supporting an affirmative defense was conclusory, and therefore, not sufficient summary judgment evidence).



disputed fact issue on the opposing party's failure to satisfy his or her own burden; or (2) establish at least the existence of a fact issue on each element of his or her own affirmative defense by summary judgment proof.<sup>587</sup>

4. *Counterclaims.* A defendant seeking summary judgment on a counterclaim has the same burden as a plaintiff. It must prove each element of its counterclaim as a matter of law.<sup>588</sup>

#### *B. No-Evidence Summary Judgments*

Under the no-evidence summary judgment rule, a party without the burden of proof at trial may move for summary judgment on the basis that the nonmovant lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim or affirmative defense.<sup>589</sup> A party may never properly urge a no-evidence summary judgment on the claims or defenses on which it has the burden of proof.<sup>590</sup>

The thrust of the no-evidence summary judgment rule is to require evidence from the nonmovant.<sup>591</sup>

A no-evidence summary judgment will be upheld if the summary judgment record reveals no evidence of a challenged element. Specifically, if:

- (1) there is a complete absence of evidence concerning the challenged element;
- (2) the evidence offered to prove a challenged element is no more than a scintilla;
- (3) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the challenge element; or
- (4) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove the challenged element.<sup>592</sup>

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587. See "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936–37 (Tex. 1972).

588. See Daniell v. Citizens Bank, 754 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).

589. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).

590. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004); Wortham v. Dow Chem. Co., 179 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Keszler v. Mem'l Med. Ctr. of E. Tex., 105 S.W.3d 122, 125 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); see Barraza v. Eureka Co., 25 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

591. See Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

592. See Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient

Potentially, a no-evidence motion for summary judgment could be two pages long and the response two feet thick. The movant need not produce any evidence in support of its no-evidence claim.<sup>593</sup> Instead, “[t]he mere filing of [a proper] motion shifts the burden to the [nonmovant] to come forward with enough evidence to take the case to a jury.”<sup>594</sup> If the nonmovant does not come forward with such evidence, the court must grant the motion.<sup>595</sup>

A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict.<sup>596</sup> The amount of evidence required to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment parallels the directed verdict and the no-evidence standard on appeal of jury trials.<sup>597</sup> Thus, if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence, that will be sufficient to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.<sup>598</sup>

A plaintiff attacking affirmative defenses by way of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment must state the elements of the affirmative defense for which there is no evidence.<sup>599</sup> Thus, the plaintiff must plead with specificity the elements of each affirmative defense that it claims lack evidence.<sup>600</sup>

1. *“Reasonable Juror” Test Applied to No-Evidence Summary Judgments.* In determining a “no-evidence” issue, the courts review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.<sup>601</sup> An appellate court reviewing a summary judgment must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ

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*Evidence” Points of Error*, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1960)).

593. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

594. *Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc.*, 111 S.W.3d 719, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (quoting Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1356 (1998)).

595. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

596. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009); *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez*, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tex. 2006); *Jimenez v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co.*, 169 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.); see also *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (comparing summary judgment standard to directed verdict standard in the federal context).

597. *King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman*, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003).

598. *Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway*, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

599. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

600. *Ebner v. First State Bank of Smithville*, 27 S.W.3d 287, 305 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied).

601. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).

in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented.<sup>602</sup> In *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates*, the court noted that it reviewed summary judgments for evidence that “would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.”<sup>603</sup> In *Spates*, the court upheld a no-evidence summary judgment on the basis that a reasonable juror could not have found that a Wal-Mart employee had constructive notice of a plastic ring over which a plaintiff had tripped, because the only evidence was that the ring was behind an employee’s back for 30 to 45 seconds. The court explained: “Had there been evidence it had been on the floor for an extended period of time, reasonable jurors might assume that the employee should have seen it unless she sidled into the aisle or never took her eyes off the shelves. But on this record, that would be pure speculation.”<sup>604</sup> Thus, the court found that there was no evidence that Wal-Mart should have discovered the six-pack ring that the plaintiff alleged was hazardous.<sup>605</sup>

The supreme court reaffirmed the applicability of the “reasonable juror” test to no-evidence summary judgment review in *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez*.<sup>606</sup> The court held that the plaintiff’s expert testimony on the cause of a post-accident fire in a truck accident case had been properly excluded and, therefore, the no-evidence summary judgment had been correctly granted on causation grounds.<sup>607</sup> Specifically, the court referred to reviewing the evidence presented in the no-evidence motion and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant’s position (i.e., the movant’s proof) unless a reasonable juror could not disregard that evidence.<sup>608</sup> Thus, the opinion presupposes that the movant for a no-evidence summary judgment may support its motion with proof that cannot be disregarded on appeal.

In another example, the Texas Supreme Court determined that no reasonable juror could find that an employee acted in the course and scope of his employment at the time of an accident despite evidence that the employee received workers’ compensation benefits.<sup>609</sup>

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602. *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes*, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).

603. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates*, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006) (citing *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822–23 (Tex. 2005)).

604. *Id.*

605. *Id.*

606. *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez*, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006).

607. *Id.* at 575–77.

608. *Id.* at 582.

609. *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes*, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757–58 (Tex. 2007).

One commentator analyzed these cases to conclude:

Thus, in no-evidence summary judgment litigation where the movant has filed proof in support of its motion, the movant will generally want the core issue(s) and related proof to fall into one or more of the contextual, competency, consciousness or circumstantial evidence categories. In contrast, the non-movant will want the case to fall into the credibility of witnesses, conflicting evidence, or conflicting inferences categories. If the evidence falls into one of the movant's categories, then it must be considered on appeal whereas if it falls into one of the non-movant's categories, it cannot be considered by the appellate court.<sup>610</sup>

2. *Historical Development.* Until 1997, summary judgment in federal court differed significantly from summary judgment in Texas state court.<sup>611</sup> The Supreme Court of Texas discussed the difference in *Casso v. Brand*.<sup>612</sup> In *Casso*, the supreme court noted the following:

Summary judgments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes, than summary judgments in Texas. In the federal system, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’”<sup>613</sup>

The Supreme Court of Texas explained that “federal courts place responsibilities on both movants and non-movants in the summary judgment process.”<sup>614</sup> The supreme court specifically refused to adopt the federal approach to summary judgments. The court explained: “While some commentators have urged us to adopt the current federal approach to summary judgments generally, we believe our own procedure eliminates patently unmeritorious cases while giving due regard for the right to a jury determination of disputed fact questions.”<sup>615</sup>

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610. Tim Patton, Standard and Scope of Review Spotlight: “No-Evidence” Summary Judgments 15, Paper Presented at the 17th Annual Conference on State & Federal Appeals, University of Texas (May 31–June 1, 2007).

611. See generally Sheila A. Leute, Comment, *The Effective Use of Summary Judgment: A Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards*, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 617, 618–19 (1988) (highlighting the differences in practice, despite the relative similarity in language of the two rules).

612. *Casso v. Brand*, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989).

613. *Id.* at 555–56 (quoting *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)).

614. *Id.* at 556.

615. *Id.* at 556–57 (citation omitted) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato,

At the time of *Casso*, the fundamental difference between state and federal summary judgment practice was the showing required by the movant before summary judgment would be granted. The court distinguished the two rules, stating:

While the language of our rule is similar, our interpretation of that language is not. We use summary judgments merely “to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses,” and we never shift the burden of proof to the non-movant unless and until the movant has “establish[ed] his entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law.”<sup>616</sup>

In federal court, when the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, that party alone has the burden of presenting competent evidence to avoid summary judgment.<sup>617</sup> Since 1997, this is also the state practice.

On September 1, 1997, Texas experienced a major change in summary judgment practice with the advent of no-evidence summary judgments.<sup>618</sup> In other words, the party without the

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*Summary Judgments in Texas*, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 303–05 (1989)).

616. *Id.* at 556 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting *City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 & n.5 (Tex. 1979)).

617. *See Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322.

618. On August 15, 1997, the Texas Supreme Court approved an amendment to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, which took effect on Sept. 1, 1997. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. The amendment added a new sub-section (i) to Rule 166a. It reads as follows:

(i) No-Evidence Motion. After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence. The court must grant the motion unless the [nonmovant] produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

Part of that August 15, 1997 order approving the rule change reads that “[t]he comment appended to these changes, unlike other notes and comments in the rules, is intended to inform the construction and application of the rule.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a historical note. Thus, in effect, the comment has the force of the rule. It reads:

This comment is intended to inform the construction and application of the rule. Paragraph (i) authorizes a motion for summary judgment based on the assertion that, after adequate opportunity for discovery, there is no evidence to support one or more specified elements of an adverse party’s claim or defense. A discovery period set by pretrial order should be adequate opportunity for discovery unless there is a showing to the contrary, and ordinarily a motion under paragraph (i) would be permitted after the period but not before. The motion must be specific in challenging the evidentiary support for an element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not authorize conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponent’s case. Paragraph (i) does not apply to ordinary motions for summary judgment under paragraphs (a) or (b), in

burden of proof at trial (usually the defendant), without having to produce any evidence, may move for summary judgment on the basis that the nonmovant (usually the plaintiff) has no evidence to support an element of its claim (or defense).<sup>619</sup> Since then, there has been considerable case law addressing no-evidence summary judgments.

### C. *Both Parties as Movants*

Both parties may move for summary judgment.<sup>620</sup> When both parties move for summary judgment, each party must carry its own burden, and neither can prevail because of the failure of the other to discharge its burden.<sup>621</sup>

When both parties move for summary judgment and one motion is granted and the other is overruled, all questions presented to the trial court may be presented for consideration on appeal, including whether the losing party's motion should have been overruled.<sup>622</sup> On appeal, the party appealing the denial of the motion for summary judgment must properly preserve this error by raising as a point of error or issue presented the failure of the trial court to grant the appellant's motion.<sup>623</sup> If the appellant complains only that the trial court erred in granting the other side's motion for summary judgment and fails to complain that the court denied its own motions, it fails to

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which the movant must prove it is entitled to judgment by establishing each element of its own claim or defense as a matter of law or by negating an element of the [nonmovant's] claim or defense as a matter of law. To defeat a motion made under paragraph (i), the [nonmovant] is not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements. The existing rules continue to govern the general requirements of summary judgment practice. A motion under paragraph (i) is subject to sanctions provided by existing law (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 9.001–10.006) and rules (TEX. R. CIV. P. 13). The denial of a motion under paragraph (i) is no more reviewable by appeal or mandamus than the denial of a motion under paragraph (c).

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

619. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

620. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a)–(b).

621. See *Guynes v. Galveston County*, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993); *Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Finlan*, 27 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

622. *Comm'r's Court of Titus County v. Agan*, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997); *Jones v. Strauss*, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); *Tobin v. Garcia*, 159 Tex. 58, 64, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400–01 (1958); see *infra* Part 1, V (discussing appealing a summary judgment).

623. *Truck Ins. Exch. v. E.H. Martin, Inc.*, 876 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied); see also *Buckner Glass & Mirror Inc. v. T.A. Pritchard Co.*, 697 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); *Holmquist v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal.*, 536 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

preserve error on this issue and, if the appellate court reverses, it cannot render but can only remand the entire case.<sup>624</sup>

The appeal should be taken from the summary judgment granted.<sup>625</sup> In *Adams v. Parker Square Bank*, both parties moved for summary judgment. The appellant limited his appeal to the denial of his own summary judgment, rather than appealing from the granting of his opponent's summary judgment. The court held that the appellant should have appealed from the order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment because an appeal does not lie solely from an order overruling a motion for summary judgment.<sup>626</sup>

In the absence of cross-motions for summary judgment, an appellate court may not reverse an improperly granted summary judgment and render summary judgment for the nonmoving party.<sup>627</sup> Cross-motions should be considered by the responding party, when appropriate, to secure on appeal a final resolution of the entire case (i.e., "reversed and rendered" rather than "reversed and remanded").<sup>628</sup>

The case of *Hall v. Mockingbird AMC/Jeep, Inc.* illustrates the advantage of filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. In *Hall*, the trial court granted a summary judgment for the plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant. The supreme court reversed and remanded the cause, stating that judgment could not be rendered for the defendant because the defendant did not move for summary judgment.<sup>629</sup>

#### IV. RESPONDING TO AND OPPOSING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The most important development in summary judgment procedure was the Texas Supreme Court's 1979 decision in *City*

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624. *Henderson v. Nitschke*, 470 S.W.2d 410, 414–15 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

625. *Adams v. Parker Square Bank*, 610 S.W.2d 250, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1980, no writ); see *infra* Part 1, V.A (discussing an exception to appealability of denial of summary judgment when both sides file motions for summary judgment).

626. *Adams*, 610 S.W.2d at 250–51.

627. *Herald-Post Publ'g Co. v. Hill*, 891 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam); *CRA, Inc. v. Bullock*, 615 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam); *City of W. Tawakoni v. Williams*, 742 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied).

628. See *Hall v. Mockingbird AMC/Jeep, Inc.*, 592 S.W.2d 913, 913–14 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam).

629. *Id.* at 913–14; see *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Simon*, 813 S.W.2d 491, 491 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the court of appeals erred in rendering judgment for a plaintiff who did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment).

of *Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority*.<sup>630</sup> In that case, the supreme court held that “both the reasons for the summary judgment and the objections to it must be in writing and before the trial judge at the hearing.”<sup>631</sup> In so holding, the court considered Rule 166a(c), which states in part: “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by *written* motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”<sup>632</sup> The court also considered the 1978 addition to Rule 166a, which provides: “Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend.”<sup>633</sup>

The necessity for a response is much more dramatic when the movant has filed a proper no-evidence motion for summary judgment. If the nonmovant fails to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the court must grant the motion.<sup>634</sup> In other words, if the motion meets the requirements for a no-evidence summary judgment, the nonmovant *must* file a response.<sup>635</sup>

#### A. Responding: General Principles

The nonmovant must expressly present to the trial court any reasons for avoiding the movant’s right to a summary judgment.<sup>636</sup> In the absence of a response raising such reasons, these matters may not be raised for the first time on appeal.<sup>637</sup> This requirement applies even if the constitutionality of a statute is being challenged.<sup>638</sup>

630. *City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).

631. *Id.* at 677; *see also* Cent. Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8–9 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (reaffirming *Clear Creek Basin Authority* and holding that the court of appeals improperly reversed summary judgment on grounds not properly before the court).

632. *Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d at 676 (emphasis added) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)).

633. *Id.* at 677 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f)).

634. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

635. *Evans v. MIPTT, L.L.C.*, No. 01-06-00394-CV, 2007 WL 1716443, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 14, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1303, 1356 (1998)).

636. *McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993).

637. *State Bd. of Ins. v. Westland Film Indus.*, 705 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); *Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc.*, 701 S.W.2d 238, 238 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).

638. *City of San Antonio v. Schautteet*, 706 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that the constitutionality of a city ordinance not raised in the trial court could not be considered on appeal).



Defendants are not required to guess what unpleaded claims might apply and then negate them.<sup>639</sup> They are required only to meet the plaintiff's case as pleaded.<sup>640</sup> However, failure to object that an issue was raised for the first time in a response will result in trying the issue by consent in the summary judgment proceeding.<sup>641</sup>

If the movant's grounds are unclear or ambiguous, the nonmovant should specially except and assert that the grounds relied upon by the movant are unclear or ambiguous.<sup>642</sup> The party filing special exemptions should ask for a signed order overruling or sustaining the special exceptions at or before the hearing.<sup>643</sup> A court will not infer a ruling on the special exception from the disposition of the summary judgment alone.<sup>644</sup>

#### *B. Responding to a Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment*

For a traditional motion for summary judgment, it is not absolutely necessary, in theory, to file a response to a motion for summary judgment filed by a party with the burden of proof.<sup>645</sup> Nonetheless, failing to file a response is not lying behind a log, but laying down your arms. Once the movant with the burden of proof has established the right to a summary judgment on the issues presented, the nonmovant's response should present to the trial court a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.<sup>646</sup> Failure to file a response does not authorize summary judgment by default.<sup>647</sup> As a matter of practice, however, the nonmovant who receives a motion for summary judgment should always file a written response, even

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639. *Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co.*, 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006).

640. *SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe*, 903 S.W.2d 347, 355 (Tex. 1995).

641. *Via Net*, 211 S.W.3d at 313 (citing *Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc.*, 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991)).

642. *McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 858 S.W.2d 337, 342–43 (Tex. 1993) (stating that the failure to specially except runs the risk of having the appellate court find another basis for summary judgment in the vague motion); *see supra* Part 1, I.B.3.a (discussing special exceptions).

643. *See McConnell*, 858 S.W.2d at 343 n.7.

644. *See Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n*, 154 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); *Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford*, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.).

645. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

646. *Abdel-Fattah v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 948 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

647. *Wheeler v. Green*, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); *Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel*, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222–23 (Tex. 1999); *Cotton v. Ratholes, Inc.*, 699 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (reasoning that *Clear Creek Basin Authority* did not shift the burden of proof and, thus, the trial court cannot grant summary judgment by default).

though technically no response to a traditional summary judgment motion may be necessary when the movant's summary judgment evidence is legally insufficient.<sup>648</sup>

### C. Responding to a No-Evidence Summary Judgment Motion

Responding to a no-evidence summary judgment is virtually mandatory.<sup>649</sup> A nonmovant must respond to a no-evidence summary judgment motion by producing summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>650</sup> If the nonmovant fails to file a response and produce evidence, it is restricted to arguing on appeal that the no-evidence summary judgment is insufficient as a matter of law.<sup>651</sup> The trial court is required to grant summary judgment if the nonmovant produces no summary judgment evidence in response to the summary judgment motion.<sup>652</sup> The nonmovant must present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion.<sup>653</sup> The same principles used to evaluate the evidence for a directed verdict<sup>654</sup> or for the "no-evidence" standard applied to a jury verdict are used to evaluate the evidence presented in response to a no-evidence summary judgment.<sup>655</sup> The nonmovant raises a genuine issue of material fact by producing "more than a scintilla of evidence" establishing the challenged elements' existence and may use both direct and circumstantial evidence in doing so.<sup>656</sup> More than a scintilla exists when the evidence is such that it "would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions."<sup>657</sup> Appellate

648. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Wilrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Cove Invs., Inc. v. Manges, 602 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. 1980).

649. Lee v. Palacios, No. 14-06-00428-CV, 2007 WL 2990277, at \*1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 488 (2006)).

650. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

651. Viasana v. Ward County, 296 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); see also Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

652. Watson v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 139 S.W.3d 118, 119 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.).

653. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581–82 (Tex. 2006).

654. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009).

655. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003); see Universal Servs. Co. v. Ung, 904 S.W.2d 638, 640–42 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to reverse the trial court's judgment on jury verdict because there was no evidence to support it); W. Wendell Hall, *Standards of Review in Texas*, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 159–63 (2002) (discussing the no-evidence standard of review).

656. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600–01 (Tex. 2004).

657. *Id.* at 601 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711

courts review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if a reasonable jury could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.<sup>658</sup>

Preexisting summary judgment law applies to evaluate evidence presented in response to a no-evidence summary judgment. If the nonmovant's evidence provides a basis for conflicting inferences, a fact issue will arise.<sup>659</sup> Also, the presumption applies equally for no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment that evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true, every reasonable inference will be indulged in favor of the nonmovant, and any doubts will be resolved in the nonmovant's favor.<sup>660</sup>

The comment to Rule 166a(i) provides: "To defeat a motion made under paragraph (i), the [nonmovant] is not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements."<sup>661</sup> "To marshal one's evidence is to arrange *all of the evidence* in the order that it will be presented at trial."<sup>662</sup> A party is not required to present or arrange all of its evidence in response to a summary judgment motion; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.<sup>663</sup> Determining how much evidence is sufficient to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment may involve significant strategic decisions. However, "Rule 166a(i) explicitly provides that, in response to a no-evidence summary judgment motion, the [nonmovant] must present *some summary judgment evidence* raising a genuine issue of material fact on the element attacked, or the motion must be granted."<sup>664</sup> Appellate courts review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.<sup>665</sup>

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(Tex. 1997)).

658. *Timpte Indus.*, 286 S.W.3d at 310; *Mack Trucks*, 206 S.W.3d at 582 (citing *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

659. *Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co.*, 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).

660. *Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.*, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985).

661. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997; *accord Johnson v. Brewer & Prichard, P.C.*, 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002).

662. *In re Mohawk Rubber Co.*, 982 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding).

663. *Hamilton v. Wilson*, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).

664. *In re Mohawk Rubber*, 982 S.W.2d at 498.

665. *Hamilton*, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (citing *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)).

The nonmovant must come forward with evidence that would qualify as “summary judgment evidence,” which is evidence that meets the technical requirements for summary judgment proof.<sup>666</sup> The nonmovant may respond with deposition excerpts, affidavits, the opponent’s answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, stipulations, certified public records, authenticated documents, and/or other evidence that cases hold is proper summary judgment evidence.<sup>667</sup> Non-summary judgment evidence, such as unsworn witness statements, expert’s reports, or unauthenticated documents (except those produced by the opposing party), is not proper summary judgment evidence and cannot defeat a no-evidence summary judgment motion.<sup>668</sup>

A nonmovant retains the right to nonsuit even after a hearing on a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, so long as the trial court has not ruled.<sup>669</sup>

#### D. Inadequate Responses

Neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the duty to sift through the summary judgment record to see if there are other issues of law or fact that could have been raised by the nonmovant, but were not.<sup>670</sup> For example, a response that merely asserts that depositions on file and other exhibits “effectively illustrate the presence of contested material fact[s]” will not preclude summary judgment.<sup>671</sup> Further, a motion for summary judgment is not defeated by the presence of an immaterial fact issue,<sup>672</sup> nor does suspicion raise a question of fact.<sup>673</sup> Generally, an amended answer by itself will not suffice as a response to a motion for summary judgment.<sup>674</sup>

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666. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

667. See *Llopa, Inc. v. Nagel*, 956 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied); see *supra* Part 1, II (discussing summary judgment evidence).

668. *Llopa*, 956 S.W.2d at 87.

669. *Pace Concerts, Ltd. v. Resendez*, 72 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).

670. *Walton v. City of Midland*, 24 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); *Holmes v. Dallas Int’l Bank*, 718 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); *Wooldridge v. Groos Nat’l Bank*, 603 S.W.2d 335, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no writ); *Lee v. Palacios*, No. 14-06-00428-CV, 2007 WL 2990277, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

671. *I.P. Farms v. Exxon Pipeline Co.*, 646 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (quoting the defendant’s response to the motion for summary judgment).

672. *Marshall v. Sackett*, 907 S.W.2d 925, 936 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); *Austin v. Hale*, 711 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, no writ); *Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp.*, 679 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

673. *Johnson v. Brewer & Prichard, P.C.*, 73 S.W.3d 193, 210 (Tex. 2002).

674. *Hitchcock v. Garvin*, 738 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ);

Absent a written response to a motion for summary judgment, prior pleadings raising laches and the statute of limitations are insufficient to preserve those issues for appeal.<sup>675</sup>

## V. APPEALING SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

By their nature, summary judgments are frequently appealed.<sup>676</sup> Generally, an order granting a summary judgment is appealable; an order denying a summary judgment is not.<sup>677</sup> Interlocutory orders are not appealable unless explicitly made so by statute.<sup>678</sup> The denial of a no-evidence summary judgment under section (i) is no more reviewable by appeal or mandamus than the denial of other motions for summary judgment.<sup>679</sup> Thus, the general rule is that they are not appealable.<sup>680</sup> The only exceptions are: (1) when both parties file a motion for summary judgment and one is granted;<sup>681</sup> (2) when the denial of a summary judgment is based on official immunity;<sup>682</sup> (3) when the denial is of a media defendant's motion summary judgment in a defamation

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Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Prop. Mgmt. Co., 635 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

675. See Johnson v. Levy, 725 S.W.2d 473, 476–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (“Where the non-movant fails to respond [to the movant’s motion for summary judgment], the sole issue on appeal is whether the movant’s summary judgment proof was sufficient as a matter of law.”); Barnett v. Houston Natural Gas Co., 617 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that when the nonmovant files no response to a motion for summary judgment, only the legal sufficiency of the grounds expressly raised by the movant’s motion can be attacked on appeal).

676. Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, *Reasons for Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals*, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 445 (2003).

677. See Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. 1980) (explaining that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order and thus not appealable); Huffines v. Swor Sand & Gravel Co., 750 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ). In addition to the exception that an order denying a summary judgment may be appealed when both parties file motions and one is granted and one is denied, another exception is made for orders denying a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon 2008). Another exception is an appeal of the denial of a summary judgment filed by a media defendant in a defamation case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon 2008); see *infra* Part 1, V.B (discussing appeals in sovereign immunity and media cases).

678. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998); William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Coleman, 291 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).

679. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt.—1997.

680. Hines v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 28 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).

681. See *infra* Part 1, V.A (discussing appeals when both parties file motions for summary judgment).

682. See *infra* Part 1, V.B (discussing appeals in sovereign immunity cases).

case;<sup>683</sup> and (4) for a permissive appeal when the court of appeals agrees to accept a case and upon agreement of the parties.<sup>684</sup>

A. *Exception: Both Parties File Motions for Summary Judgment*

An exception to the rule that an order denying a summary judgment is not appealable arises when *both* parties file motions for summary judgment, and the court grants one of the motions and overrules the other.<sup>685</sup> When both parties file motions for summary judgment and one is granted and the other overruled, the appellate court considers the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if the appellate court determines that the trial court erred, renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered.<sup>686</sup> A party appealing the denial of a summary judgment, however, must properly preserve this issue on appeal by raising the failure to grant the motion in the brief.<sup>687</sup> On appeal, the appellate court should render judgment on the motion that should have been granted.<sup>688</sup> However, before a court of appeals may reverse a summary judgment for the other party, both parties must ordinarily have sought final relief in their cross-motions for summary judgment.<sup>689</sup>

In *Cincinnati Life Insurance Co. v. Cates*, the supreme court expanded the ability of the courts of appeals to consider denials of summary judgment motions.<sup>690</sup> In that case, the court directed courts of appeals to consider all summary judgment grounds the trial court rules on, including those on which it denied the summary judgment, and allowed the court of appeals to consider grounds which were urged and preserved for review but on which the court did not rule.<sup>691</sup>

683. See *infra* Part 1, V.B (discussing appeals in media defamation cases).

684. See *infra* Part 1, V.C (discussing permissive appeals).

685. *Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex.*, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007); *Tobin v. Garcia*, 159 Tex. 58, 64, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400 (1958) (overruling *Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co.*, 157 Tex. 304, 302 S.W.2d 938 (1957), which held only the granted motion could be appealed in this scenario); see *supra* Part 1, III.C (discussing burden of proof when both parties move for summary judgment).

686. *Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett*, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); *Bradley v. State ex rel. White*, 990 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1999).

687. *Truck Ins. Exch. v. E.H. Martin, Inc.*, 876 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied); *Buckner Glass & Mirror Inc. v. T.A. Pritchard Co.*, 697 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).

688. *Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hermann Hosp.*, 664 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1984); *Cadle Co. v. Butler*, 951 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).

689. *CU Lloyd's of Tex. v. Feldman*, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).

690. *Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates*, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625–26 (Tex. 1996).

691. *Id.* at 626.

Even though both parties appeal cross motions for summary judgment, if the appellate court reverses one, it does not necessarily grant the other. If neither party is entitled to summary judgment, the appellate court must remand to the trial court.<sup>692</sup>

*B. Exception: Government Immunity; Media Defendants*

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the appeal of an order denying a summary judgment in immunity cases. Section 51.014(a)(5) provides:

(a) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that:

....

(5) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state . . . .<sup>693</sup>

This section permits interlocutory appeals filed by individual governmental employees.<sup>694</sup> “Immunity” as used in this section refers to “official immunity.”<sup>695</sup> Official immunity is an affirmative defense rendering individual officials immune from liability.<sup>696</sup> In such an interlocutory appeal, the appellate court will only consider those portions of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment that relate to “official or quasi-judicial” immunity.<sup>697</sup> If a governmental entity contends only that it is not liable because of *sovereign* immunity, no appeal may be taken from the denial of a summary judgment.<sup>698</sup> A governmental unit’s motion for summary judgment challenging a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is appealable under Section 51.014(a)(8)<sup>699</sup> even though the section refers only to appeals from an order granting or denying a “plea” to the jurisdiction.<sup>700</sup> The Texas

692. See *Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Gordon*, 209 S.W.3d 913, 917 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.).

693. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon 2008).

694. *Id.*

695. *City of Houston v. Kilburn*, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 n.1 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); *Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Hernandez*, 208 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

696. *Kassen v. Hatley*, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994).

697. *Aldridge v. De Los Santos*, 878 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ dismissed w.o.j.).

698. See *Kilburn*, 849 S.W.2d at 811–12 (discussing interlocutory appeals from an order denying a motion for summary judgment based on the assertion of *qualified* immunity).

699. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 2008).

700. *Thomas v. Long*, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006).

Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from summary judgments denying government immunity unless there is a dissent in the court of appeals or there is conflicts jurisdiction.<sup>701</sup>

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code also allows an appeal from a denial of a summary judgment based on a claim against the media arising under the free speech or free press clauses of the U.S. or Texas Constitutions.<sup>702</sup> Summary judgment is reviewed in public figure or public official defamation cases under the same standard as in other cases.<sup>703</sup> This rule does not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider a libel plaintiff's cross-point of error.<sup>704</sup> An appeal in a media defendant summary judgment case does not necessarily stay the trial court proceedings.<sup>705</sup>

Despite the fact that it is an appeal from an interlocutory order, which is usually final at the court of appeals, the legislature has given the supreme court jurisdiction over an order that:

denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media, acting in such capacity, or a person whose communication appears in or is published by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73 . . . .<sup>706</sup>

### C. *Exception: Permissive Appeal*

Although seldom used, if the parties agree, the appellate courts may accept jurisdiction over an interlocutory order.<sup>707</sup> Specifically, an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a summary judgment (or other interlocutory order) may be taken if the trial

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701. See *Collins v. Ison-Newsome*, 73 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Tex. 2001); *Gonzalez v. Avalos*, 907 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

702. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon 2008); see *Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co.*, 19 S.W.3d 413, 419–20 (Tex. 2000); *Rogers v. Cassidy*, 946 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).

703. *Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Penick*, 219 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (citing *Huckabee*, 19 S.W.3d at 423).

704. *Evans v. Dolcefino*, 986 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

705. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon 2008) (providing for stays in interlocutory appeals under other exceptions, but not defamation).

706. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon 2008).

707. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (Vernon 2008).



court signs a written order for which: “(1) the parties agree that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation; and (3) the parties agree to the order.”<sup>708</sup> This procedure may be useful in a summary judgment context when the parties seek resolution of a determinative issue in a case.<sup>709</sup>

#### D. *Likelihood of Reversal*

During a one-year period, according to a study of appellate court opinions, more appeals were taken from summary judgments than any other type of judgment.<sup>710</sup> Conventional wisdom is that summary judgments are frequently reversed. However, that number is not as frequent as many believe.<sup>711</sup> The statewide reversal rate for summary judgments was 33%, although the rates varied significantly by court of appeals.<sup>712</sup> This compared with the reversal rate of 25% for judgments on jury verdicts<sup>713</sup> and an overall reversal rate for all civil appeals of 33%.<sup>714</sup>

Broken down by substance, 41% of all summary judgments in contracts cases were reversed, 29% of those granted for tort defendants, 22% for personal injury defendants, and 24% for employers.<sup>715</sup> Texas courts of appeals reversed 58% of the time because they found a fact issue or some evidence to defeat the summary judgment, 31% because the trial judge made an error of law, and 11% for some procedural defect.<sup>716</sup>

#### E. *Finality of Judgment*

An appeal may be prosecuted only from a final judgment.<sup>717</sup> Generally, to be final, a judgment must dispose of all parties and

708. *Id.*

709. See generally Warren W. Harris & Lynne Liberato, *State Court Jurisdiction Expanded to Allow for Permissive Appeals*, 65 TEX. B.J. 31 (2002).

710. Liberato & Rutter, *supra* note 676, at 432–33, 445–46.

711. *Id.* at 439.

712. *Id.* at 471 app. B, fig.10.

713. *Id.* at 463 app. B, fig.2.

714. *Id.* at 462 app. B, fig.1.

715. *Id.* at 473 app. B, fig.12.

716. *Id.* at 474 app. B, fig.13.

717. *De Los Santos v. Occidental Chem. Corp.*, 925 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996), *rev'd on other grounds*, 933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996); *Tingley v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co.*, 712 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no writ) (per curiam). *But see* TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1)–(11) (Vernon 2008) (providing eleven exceptions to the final judgment rule); *cf. supra* Part 1, V.A–C (discussing exceptions to

issues in the case.<sup>718</sup> In *North East Independent School District v. Aldridge*, the Texas Supreme Court articulated the following presumption of finality rule:

When a judgment, not intrinsically interlocutory in character, is rendered and entered in a case regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits, . . . it will be presumed for appeal purposes that the Court intended to, and did, dispose of all parties legally before it and of all issues made by the pleadings between such parties.<sup>719</sup>

The rule applicable to summary judgments is different. The presumption of finality rule, as discussed in *Aldridge*, does not apply to summary judgment cases.<sup>720</sup> A summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and is not appealable unless the trial court orders a severance of that phase of the case.<sup>721</sup> In the absence of an order of severance, a party against whom an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered does not have a right of appeal until the partial judgment is merged into a final judgment, disposing of the whole case.<sup>722</sup>

In *Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, the Texas Supreme Court modified the procedure for determining whether a judgment is final.<sup>723</sup> That procedure, which had caused a great deal of confusion, had been set out in *Mafrige v. Ross*.<sup>724</sup> Under *Mafrige*, the “Mother Hubbard” provision in a judgment order, stating “all relief not expressly granted [herein] is denied,” was sufficient to make an otherwise partial summary judgment final and

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general rule that appeals may only be taken following final judgment).

718. *Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross*, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); *N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge*, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966); *De Los Santos*, 925 S.W.2d at 64; cf. *John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc.*, 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (holding presumption that a judgment rendered after a conventional trial is final was not rebutted because the plaintiff tried his case only against certain defendants, expecting settlement with the others, which did not come to fruition).

719. *N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 400 S.W.2d at 897–98.

720. *Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals*, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).

721. See *Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp.*, 761 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides that “[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 41. “A claim may be properly severed if it is part of a controversy which involves more than one cause of action, and the trial judge is given broad discretion in the manner of severance . . .” *Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause*, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982).

722. See *Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo*, 909 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1995); *Mafrige v. Ross*, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. 1993), *overruled on other grounds by Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001); see also *supra* Part 1, I.K (discussing partial summary judgments).

723. *Lehmann*, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93.

724. *Mafrige*, 866 S.W.2d at 590–92.

appealable.<sup>725</sup> If the judgment granted more relief than requested, it was reversed and remanded but not dismissed.<sup>726</sup> Thus, if the summary judgment on claims raised in the motion was proper, the court of appeals was to affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part because only a partial summary judgment should have been rendered. The court was then to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.<sup>727</sup> This process caused considerable confusion and sometimes led to unjust results.

In *Lehmann*, the court overruled *Mafrige* to the extent it states that “Mother Hubbard” clauses indicate “that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal.”<sup>728</sup> The court of appeals is to look to the record in the case to determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties.<sup>729</sup> In *In re Granite Shop*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief to order the trial court to rule on the petitioner’s partial summary judgment motions after the appellate court reviewed the record to determine that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion because an earlier summary judgment did not dispose of all the parties and thus was not final.<sup>730</sup>

In *Lehman*, the Texas Supreme Court also suggested the following language in a judgment to clearly show the trial court’s intention that the judgment be final and appealable: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable.”<sup>731</sup> Nonetheless, there is no magic language required to determine whether a judgment is final. Instead, finality is determined from the language and record.<sup>732</sup> The court also noted that an order “must be read in light of the importance of

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725. *Id.* at 590 & n.1, 592.

726. *Id.* at 592.

727. *See id.*

728. *Lehmann*, 39 S.W.3d at 203–04; *see also* *Braeswood Harbor Partners v. Harris County Appraisal Dist.*, 69 S.W.3d 251, 252 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

729. *Lehmann*, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06; *see also* *Nash v. Harris County*, 63 S.W.3d 415, 415–16 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (examining complaint, docket sheet, and orders to determine that summary judgment had been granted to individual defendants but not institutional defendants).

730. *In re Granite Shop*, No. 2-08-410-CV, 2009 WL 485696, at \*2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 24, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).

731. *Lehmann*, 39 S.W.3d at 206.

732. *In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc.*, 167 S.W.3d 827, 830–31 (Tex. 2005); *Waite v. Woodard, Hall & Primm, P.C.*, 137 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Regardless of language, a judgment that actually disposes of all parties and claims is final. *In re Burlington Coat Factory*, 167 S.W.3d at 830.

preserving a party's right to appeal."<sup>733</sup> It expressly provided that the appellate court could abate the appeal to permit clarification by the trial court if it is uncertain about the intent of the order.<sup>734</sup> This ruling is consistent with the court's philosophy that form should not be elevated over substance.

Relying on *Lehmann*, the supreme court remanded a case in which a judgment had not disposed of a claim for attorney's fees, but had awarded costs.<sup>735</sup> The court held that the summary judgment was not final because a party could move for a partial summary judgment and there is no presumption that a motion for summary judgment addresses all of the movant's claims. It also noted that awarding costs did not make a judgment final.<sup>736</sup>

A defendant (or plaintiff on an affirmative defense) is not entitled to summary judgment on the entire case unless the defendant files a summary judgment that challenges the evidentiary support for every theory of liability alleged.<sup>737</sup> Thus, "the motion for summary judgment . . . must be analyzed in light of the pleadings to ensure that the motion effectively defeats every cause of action raised in the petition."<sup>738</sup> The summary judgment order, however, need not itemize each element of damages pleaded nor need it break down that ruling for each element of duty, breach, and causation.<sup>739</sup> To complain on appeal about failure of the motion for summary judgment to address all causes of action alleged, the nonmovant appellant should specifically assign that failure as error.<sup>740</sup> The fact that an unserved defendant is not disposed of by the order granting summary judgment does not mean that the order is interlocutory and not appealable. If an examination of the record establishes that the plaintiff did not expect to serve the unserved defendant and all parties appear to have treated the order as final, then the summary judgment is final for purposes of appeal.<sup>741</sup>

Determining whether a summary judgment is final may especially be a problem with multi-party litigation.<sup>742</sup> A summary

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733. *Lehmann*, 39 S.W.3d at 206.

734. *Id.*

735. *McNally v. Guevara*, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).

736. *Id.*

737. *See Yancy v. City of Tyler*, 836 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied).

738. *Id.*

739. *Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co.*, 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).

740. *Uribe v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co.*, 849 S.W.2d 447, 450 n.3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no writ).

741. *M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape*, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).

742. *See, e.g., Schlipf v. Exxon Corp.*, 644 S.W.2d 453, 454–55 (Tex. 1982) (per

judgment granted for one defendant is final even though it does not specifically incorporate a previous partial summary judgment granted in favor of the only other defendant.<sup>743</sup> Upon nonsuit of any remaining claims, an interlocutory summary judgment order instantly becomes final and appealable.<sup>744</sup>

Additionally, failure to dispose of or sever a counterclaim results in an interlocutory partial summary judgment, and thus, an appeal from such judgment is not proper.<sup>745</sup> An order granting summary judgment for one claim, but not referring to issues presented in a counterclaim, is an interlocutory judgment.<sup>746</sup> By assuming jurisdiction over a summary judgment that fails to dispose of a counterclaim, the court of appeals commits fundamental error.<sup>747</sup> The supreme court will notice and correct such error even though neither party asserts it.<sup>748</sup> However, relying on *Lehmann*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals determined that the trial court implicitly denied the appellant's breach of contract counterclaim, which directly conflicted with the trial court's declaratory judgment ruling that the appellees had not breached the contract.<sup>749</sup>

The filing of a cross-action does not, in and of itself, preclude the trial court from granting a summary judgment on all or part of another party's case.<sup>750</sup> A severance would be appropriate in such an instance.<sup>751</sup>

While a severance frequently will be the appropriate method to convert an interlocutory summary judgment into a final appealable summary judgment, severance may not always be proper.

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curiam) (affirming properly granted summary judgment in a suit involving multiple plaintiffs, defendants, and intervenors).

743. *Ramones v. Bratteng*, 768 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); *see Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand*, 960 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a party with a prior partial summary judgment has a right to appeal that summary judgment when the remainder of the case is disposed of).

744. *Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co.*, 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

745. *Tingley v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co.*, 712 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no writ) (per curiam).

746. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay*, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

747. *N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez*, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

748. *Id.*

749. *Karen Corp. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 107 S.W.3d 118, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

750. *C.S.R., Inc. v. Mobile Crane, Inc.*, 671 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

751. *See Waite v. BancTexas-Houston, N.A.*, 792 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (affirming severance of cross-claims after summary judgment granted for plaintiff); *C.S.R.*, 671 S.W.2d at 643–44 (same).

For a severance to be proper, more than one cause of action must be involved in the controversy, the severed cause must be one that can be asserted independently, and the severed action must not be so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve identical facts and issues or, in certain instances, relate to the same subject matter.<sup>752</sup>

The supreme court has set out a specific test for finality in probate appeals:

If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory. For appellate purposes, it may be made final by a severance order, if it meets the severance criteria . . . . In setting this standard, we are mindful of our policy to avoid constructions that defeat bona fide attempts to appeal.<sup>753</sup>

#### *F. Standard of Review*

When a party moves for summary judgment on both a no-evidence and a traditional motion for summary judgment, the appellate courts first review the judgment under no-evidence standards.<sup>754</sup> If the appellant has failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence under no-evidence standards, the court has no need to address whether the appellee's summary judgment proof satisfied the burden under traditional summary judgment standards.<sup>755</sup>

In an appeal from a trial on the merits, the standard of review and presumptions run in favor of the judgment.<sup>756</sup> The propriety of a summary judgment is a question of law. Thus appellate review is de novo.<sup>757</sup> In contrast to an appeal from a

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752. *Weaver v. Jock*, 717 S.W.2d 654, 662 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *accord* *Nicor Exploration Co. v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co.*, 911 S.W.2d 479, 481–82 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied); *S.O.C. Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Sachse*, 741 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).

753. *Crowson v. Wakeham*, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).

754. *Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway*, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

755. *Id.*; *All Am. Tel., Inc. v. USLD Commc'ns, Inc.*, 291 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).

756. *See* *Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Martin*, 882 S.W.2d 476, 482–83 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, no writ).

757. *Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett*, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); *Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott*, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); *Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.*, 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994).

trial on the merits, in an appeal from a summary judgment, the standard of review and presumptions run against the judgment.<sup>758</sup>

The Texas Supreme Court's decision in *Gibbs v. General Motors Corp.* sets out the standard of appellate review for traditional summary judgments.<sup>759</sup> In *Gibbs*, the supreme court stated:

[T]he question on appeal, as well as in the trial court, is *not* whether the summary judgment proof *raises fact issues* with reference to the essential elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action, but is whether the summary judgment proof *establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact* as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action.<sup>760</sup>

When reviewing a no evidence summary judgment, appellate courts "review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not."<sup>761</sup>

Since the supreme court issued *City of Keller v. Wilson*,<sup>762</sup> courts of appeals continue to rely on *Keller's* "reasonable jury" standard and "scintilla of evidence" standard.<sup>763</sup> Less than a scintilla of evidence exists "[w]hen the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence . . . in legal effect, [it] is no evidence."<sup>764</sup> More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions" concerning existence of the vital fact.<sup>765</sup>

758. See *Borrego v. City of El Paso*, 964 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied) ("Unlike other final judgments reviewed on appeal, we do not review the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court.").

759. *Gibbs v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970).

760. *Id.*; see also *Phan Son Van v. Peña*, 990 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1999) (noting that once a movant proves it is entitled to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence that raises a fact issue).

761. *Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish*, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (quoting *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez*, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)); see also *supra* Part 1, III.B.1.

762. *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).

763. See, e.g., *Rivers v. Charlie Thomas Ford, Ltd.*, 289 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

764. *Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway*, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (quoting *Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc.*, 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).

765. *Id.* at 601 (quoting *Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner*, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711

When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, the courts generally apply the same legal sufficiency standard applied in reviewing a directed verdict.<sup>766</sup>

The supreme court further set out the rules to be followed by an appellate court in reviewing a summary judgment record in *Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.*<sup>767</sup> The court enumerated the rule as follows:

- (1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- (2) In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.
- (3) Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.<sup>768</sup>

For those occasions when a summary judgment denial is appealable, the standard of review is the same.<sup>769</sup> The appellate court will not consider evidence that favors the movant's position unless it is uncontroverted.<sup>770</sup>

The standard of review for whether there has been an adequate time for discovery is abuse of discretion.<sup>771</sup> Rulings concerning the admission or exclusion of summary judgment evidence are also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.<sup>772</sup> The decision to grant sanctions is a matter of discretion.<sup>773</sup>

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(Tex. 1997)).

766. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581–82 (Tex. 2006).

767. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985).

768. *Id.* (citing *Montgomery v. Kennedy*, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310–11 (Tex. 1984)); *Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ. of San Antonio, Inc.*, 531 S.W.2d 589, 592–93 (Tex. 1975)); *see also* *Binur v. Jacobo*, 135 S.W.3d 646, 657 (Tex. 2004) (accepting evidence favorable to nonmovant as true); *Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle*, 96 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Tex. 2002).

769. *Ervin v. James*, 874 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

770. *Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co.*, 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965); *Corp. Leasing Int'l, Inc. v. Groves*, 925 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

771. *Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua*, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); *see supra* Part 1, I.C (discussing time for filing).

772. *Patrick v. McGowan*, 104 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); *Barraza v. Eureka Co.*, 25 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

773. *Chapman v. Hootman*, 999 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).



*G. Appellate Record*

The appellate court may consider only the evidence that is on file before the trial court at the time of the hearing or, with permission of the court, is filed after the hearing but before judgment.<sup>774</sup> Documents attached to briefs that are not part of the summary judgment record cannot be considered in an appeal.<sup>775</sup> When the summary judgment record is incomplete, any omitted documents are presumed to support the trial court's judgment.<sup>776</sup> Although the movant bears the burden to prove its summary judgment as a matter of law, on appeal the nonmovant bears the burden to bring forward the record of the summary judgment evidence to provide appellate courts with a basis to review its claim of harmful error.<sup>777</sup>

In *DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.*, the only proof offered by the movant was an affidavit that was not included in the appellate record. The court upheld the summary judgment for the movant because the burden was on the nonmovant challenging the summary judgment to bring forward the record from the summary judgment proceeding in order to prove harmful error.<sup>778</sup> In *DeBell v. Texas General Realty, Inc.*, it was clear that the trial court considered at least one deposition that was not brought forward on appeal.<sup>779</sup> The appellate court presumed that the missing deposition would have supported the summary judgment granted by the trial court.<sup>780</sup>

*H. Appellate Briefs*

The appellee in a summary judgment case is in a very different posture on appeal than an appellee in a case that was tried on its merits. Summary judgment review is de novo.<sup>781</sup> The

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774. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); *Wilson v. Thomason Funeral Home, Inc.*, No.03-02-00774-CV, 2003 WL 21706065, at \*5 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, *Summary Judgments in Texas*, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 82 (2002)).

775. *K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago*, 75 S.W.3d 91, 96–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

776. *DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.*, 793 S.W.2d 670, 689 (Tex. 1990); *Tate v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 954 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

777. *Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios*, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2004).

778. *DeSantis*, 793 S.W.2d at 689.

779. *DeBell v. Tex. Gen. Realty, Inc.*, 609 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).

780. *Id.*; see also *Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge*, 663 S.W.2d 561, 561–62 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983, no writ); *Castillo v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 663 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

781. *Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott*, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); see

appellate court reviews the evidence in a summary judgment case in a light most favorable to the nonmovant appellant.<sup>782</sup> Because the appellate court will be reviewing the summary judgment with all presumptions in favor of the appellant,<sup>783</sup> it is not enough for the appellee to rest on the decision of the trial court. An appellee in a summary judgment appeal must thoroughly and carefully brief the case. The appellee should not simply refute the appellant's arguments, but should aggressively present to the appellate court the express reasons why the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment.<sup>784</sup>

The appellate rules allow an appellant the option of including points of error or questions presented.<sup>785</sup> For appellants choosing points of error, the supreme court has approved the following single, broad point of error on appeal: "The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment."<sup>786</sup> This wording will allow argument concerning all the possible grounds upon which summary judgment should have been denied.<sup>787</sup> Nonetheless, the appellant must attack each basis on which the summary judgment could have been granted.<sup>788</sup> If it does not make a specific challenge to a ground, whether proper or improper, the summary judgment concerning that ground will be affirmed.<sup>789</sup> Similarly, if the appellant fails to negate each ground

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*also supra* Part 1, V.F (discussing appealing summary judgments and the standard of review for summary judgments).

782. *Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.*, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985).

783. *See id.*

784. *See Dubois v. Harris County*, 866 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).

785. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(e).

786. *Malooly Bros. v. Napier*, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970); *see also Plexchem Int'l, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist.*, 922 S.W.2d 930, 930–31 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); *Cassingham v. Lutheran Sunburst Health Serv.*, 748 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (approving general assignment of error by appellant to allow argument of all possible grounds). *But see A.C. Collins Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 807 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied) (criticizing *Malooly Brothers*). Other, more specific points may be used, but the judgment must be affirmed if there is another possible ground on which the judgment could have been entered. *Dubow v. Dragon*, 746 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ).

787. *Malooly Bros.*, 461 S.W.2d at 121. *But see Rodriguez v. Morgan*, 584 S.W.2d 558, 558–59 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limiting appellant's point of error to one ground for granting summary judgment, despite general point of error against summary judgment). Given the *Rodriguez* court's discussion of the lack of briefing on other grounds, this case demonstrates the need to adequately brief each issue raised by the summary judgment, rather than the requirement of separate points of error. *See id.* at 559.

788. *Nabors Corporate Servs., Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co.*, 132 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

789. *Leffler v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 290 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); *Broesche v. Jacobson*, 218 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

on which the judgment may have been rendered, the appellate court must uphold the summary judgment.<sup>790</sup>

Issues not expressly presented to the trial court may not be considered at the appellate level, either as grounds for reversal or as other grounds in support of a summary judgment.<sup>791</sup> If the motion fails to address a claim, the movant is not entitled to summary judgment on that claim and judgment will be reversed and remanded to the trial court if it is based on that claim.<sup>792</sup> In *Combs v. Fantastic Homes, Inc.*, the court defined “issue” within the context of Rule 166a as follows:

[A] summary judgment cannot be attacked on appeal on a question not presented to the trial court, either as a specific ground stated in the motion or as a fact issue presented by the opposing party in a written answer or other response. Accordingly, we hold that the opposing party, without filing an answer or other response, may raise for consideration on appeal the insufficiency of the summary-judgment proof to support the specific grounds stated in the motion, but that he may not, in the absence of such an answer or other response, raise any other “genuine issue of material fact” as a ground for reversal. In other words, the opposing party may challenge the grounds asserted by the movant, but he may not assert the existence of “issues” not presented to the trial court by either party.<sup>793</sup>

Cases disposed of by summary judgment often have voluminous clerk’s records.<sup>794</sup> The importance of meeting the briefing requirements, such as referencing the page of the record

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Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); *Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P.*, 156 S.W.3d 198, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

790. *Leffler*, 290 S.W.3d at 386.

791. *Bell v. Showa Denko K.K.*, 899 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied); *W.R. Grace Co. v. Scotch Corp.*, 753 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, writ denied); *Dickey v. Jansen*, 731 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also *supra* Part 1, I.A (discussing the procedure for summary judgments).

792. *Jacobs v. Satterwhite*, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); *Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez*, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997).

793. *Combs v. Fantastic Homes, Inc.*, 584 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see *Dhillon v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.*, 789 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (“The judgment of the trial court cannot be affirmed on any grounds not specifically presented in the motion for summary judgment.”).

794. See, e.g., *Montgomery v. Kennedy*, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. 1984) (noting the summary judgment record contained over fifteen depositions and other transcripts); *Martin v. Martin*, 840 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied) (describing the fourteen-volume summary judgment record); *A.C. Collins Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 807 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied) (questioning the *Malooly* rule where summary judgment record contained a 1700 page transcript, 1200 page deposition, and 28 exhibits).

where the matter complained of may be easily found, cannot be overemphasized.<sup>795</sup> Appellate courts will not search the record, with no guidance from an appellant, to determine if a material fact issue was raised by the record. “Thus, an inadequately briefed issue may be waived on appeal.”<sup>796</sup>

### *I. Judgment on Appeal*

An appellate court should consider all summary judgment grounds the trial court rules upon and the movant preserves for appellate review that are necessary for final disposition of the appeal.<sup>797</sup> It now makes no difference whether the trial court specifies the reason in its order for granting the motion for summary judgment.<sup>798</sup> When properly preserved for appeal, the court of appeals should review the grounds upon which the trial court granted the summary judgment and those upon which it denied the summary judgment.<sup>799</sup> In other words, the court of appeals must consider all grounds on which the trial court rules and may consider grounds on which it does not rule “in the interest of judicial economy.”<sup>800</sup> Under the rules of appellate procedure, which require each party challenging the judgment to file an independent notice of appeal, it may be necessary to file a separate notice of appeal to properly preserve the claim that the summary judgment could be sustained on a point overruled or not ruled upon by the trial court.<sup>801</sup>

If a summary judgment is reversed, the parties are not limited to the theories asserted in the original summary judgment at a later trial on the merits.<sup>802</sup> Also, the court of appeals may affirm the liability part of the summary judgment and reverse the damages portion of the summary judgment.<sup>803</sup>

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795. See, e.g., *Jimenez v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co.*, 169 S.W.3d 423, 425–26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding appellants waived both issues on appeal due to inadequate briefing). See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1–.2 (outlining the requirements of appellate briefs).

796. *Trebesch v. Morris*, 118 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

797. *Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates*, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996).

798. See *id.*

799. See *id.*

800. *Id.*

801. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c) (“The appellate court may not grant a party who does not file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause.”).

802. *Hudson v. Wakefield*, 711 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. 1986); *Creative Thinking Sources, Inc. v. Creative Thinking, Inc.*, 74 S.W.3d 504, 511–12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

803. See, e.g., *St. Paul Cos. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 798 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. App.—

Penalties have been assessed for bringing an appeal that the appellate court held to be taken for delay and without sufficient cause.<sup>804</sup>

If a party unsuccessfully moves for summary judgment and later loses in a conventional trial on the merits, an interlocutory order overruling the summary judgment motion is not reviewable on appeal.<sup>805</sup>

### *J. Bills of Review*

A bill of review is an equitable proceeding by a party to a former action who seeks to set aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial.<sup>806</sup> A petitioner must ordinarily plead and prove: (1) a meritorious claim or defense; (2) that he was unable to assert due to the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of his opponent; and (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own.<sup>807</sup> A summary judgment may be appropriate to challenge whether a party bringing a bill of review has adequately established these requirements.<sup>808</sup>

## VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES

The amount of an award of attorney's fees "rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be reversed without showing that the court abused its discretion."<sup>809</sup> For a claim for attorney's fees under Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "[t]he court may take judicial notice of the usual and customary attorney's fees" and the case file contents without further evidence being presented.<sup>810</sup>

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Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ diss'd by agr.).

804. See, e.g., *Triland Inv. Group v. Tiseo Paving Co.*, 748 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (noting appellate courts may award damages for an appeal taken for delay, up to 10% of the total damages award).

805. *Pennington v. Gurkoff*, 899 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ denied); *Jones v. Hutchinson County*, 615 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ).

806. *Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe*, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987).

807. *Id.* at 407–08; *Baker v. Goldsmith*, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406–07 (Tex. 1979); *Boaz v. Boaz*, 221 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

808. See, e.g., *Ortega v. First RepublicBank Fort Worth, N.A.*, 792 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1990); *Clerendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Thompson*, 199 S.W.3d 482, 487–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); *Caldwell v. Barnes*, 941 S.W.2d 182, 186–87 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996), *rev'd on other grounds*, 975 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1998); *Blum v. Mott*, 664 S.W.2d 741, 744–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).

809. *Reintsma v. Greater Austin Apartment Maint.*, 549 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1977, writ diss'd); see also *Max Duncan Family Invs., Ltd. v. NTFN Inc.*, 267 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

810. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 2008); see also *Flint &*

An appeals court cannot set aside an award of attorney's fees merely because it would have allowed more or less than the trial court.<sup>811</sup> However, it does have authority, by examining the entire record, to determine whether a particular award is excessive.<sup>812</sup> Appellate court justices may draw upon their knowledge as judges and lawyers and determine the matter in light of the testimony, the record, and the amount in controversy.<sup>813</sup>

Attorney's fees must be specifically plead to be recovered. Failure to specifically request attorney's fees in the appellate court would not prevent the court from authorizing such an award.<sup>814</sup> When a movant includes attorney's fees in a summary judgment motion, in effect, the movant has added another cause of action. A challenge to attorney's fees should be raised in a separate ground in the summary judgment motion.<sup>815</sup> Pleadings alone, even if sworn to, are insufficient as summary judgment proof on fees.<sup>816</sup> Unless the court has taken judicial notice under section 38.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, such that no further evidence is necessary, this cause of action in a summary judgment case is measured by the same standard used for summary judgment proof.<sup>817</sup> If attorney's fees are recoverable under section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,<sup>818</sup>

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*Assocs. v. Intercont'l Pipe & Steel, Inc.*, 739 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (noting that the trial court properly took judicial notice of all claims that had been filed in the case in determining attorney's fees).

811. *Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc.*, 853 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied); *City of Houston v. Blackbird*, 658 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dismissed); *Espinoza v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.*, 572 S.W.2d 816, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ refused n.r.e.).

812. *Giles v. Cardenas*, 697 S.W.2d 422, 429 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ refused n.r.e.).

813. *Id.*; *Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward*, 568 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1978, writ refused n.r.e.) (citing *Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Norton*, 5 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved)).

814. *See Superior Ironworks, Inc. v. Roll Form Prods., Inc.*, 789 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (“[A] prayer in a petition for reasonable attorney's fees is sufficient to authorize an award of fees for services in a higher court.”).

815. *See Trebesch v. Morris*, 118 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, petition denied).

816. *Bakery Equip. & Serv. Co. v. Aztec Equip. Co.*, 582 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1979, no writ).

817. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 2008); *see, e.g.*, *Freeman Fin. Inv. Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, 109 S.W.3d 29, 35–36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, petition denied); *Bakery Equip. & Serv. Co.*, 582 S.W.2d at 873; *Lindley v. Smith*, 524 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).

818. Section 38.001 provides:

A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for:

in addition to the other summary judgment requirements, the time and notice requirements of Section 38.002 must be met to support an award of attorney's fees.<sup>819</sup>

An affidavit by the movant's attorney that includes his or her opinion on reasonable attorney's fees and the factual basis for that opinion should be added to the motion for summary judgment.<sup>820</sup> Such an affidavit is expert opinion testimony that may be considered regarding reasonable attorney's fees.<sup>821</sup> Additionally, the attorney for the nonmovant may file an affidavit contesting the reasonableness of the movant's attorney's affidavit in support of attorney's fees, thus creating a fact issue.<sup>822</sup>

In *Karen Corp. v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.*, the Fort Worth court contrasted an effective attorney affidavit in support of a request for attorney's fees with an ineffective affidavit in opposition.<sup>823</sup> The movant's attorney's affidavit contained qualifications, rates, specific facts relating to the representation, and itemized billing. The inadequate affidavit

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- (1) rendered services;
  - (2) performed labor;
  - (3) furnished material;
  - (4) freight or express overcharges;
  - (5) lost or damaged freight or express;
  - (6) killed or injured stock;
  - (7) a sworn account; or
  - (8) an oral or written contract.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2008).

819. Section 38.002 provides:

To recover attorney's fees under this chapter:

- (1) the claimant must be represented by an attorney;
- (2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party; and
- (3) payment for the just amount owed must not have been tendered before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim is presented.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2008).

820. See *Grimes v. Corpus Christi Transmission Co.*, 829 S.W.2d 335, 340 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); *Gensco, Inc. v. Transformaciones Metalurgicas Especiales, S.A.*, 666 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dismissed).

821. *Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C.*, 714 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); see *supra* Part 1, II.H.1 (discussing expert witness testimony); see also *Gensco*, 666 S.W.2d at 554 (holding that the uncontroverted affidavit of attorney was sufficient to prove no material issue as to the reasonableness of the fees); *Sunbelt Constr. Corp. v. S&D Mech. Contractors, Inc.*, 668 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ refused n.r.e.) (same).

822. *Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc.*, 754 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); *Nguyen Ngoc Giao*, 714 S.W.2d at 148; *Gen. Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat'l Bank—Houston*, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).

823. *Karen Corp. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 107 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

in opposition claimed the other attorney's fees "appear excessive."<sup>824</sup> The court determined that his opposition affidavit was conclusory, and when he qualified his opinion, he showed that he "lacked the needed personal knowledge to base a legally sufficient opinion on."<sup>825</sup>

#### A. Fixed Percentage Fees

Promissory notes may provide for attorney's fees in a fixed percentage clause that requires the payment of a stipulated percentage of the unpaid balance upon default.<sup>826</sup> In a summary judgment proceeding when the note includes a stipulated percentage of the unpaid balance as attorney's fees, proof concerning the reasonableness of the fixed percentage fee is not required unless the pleadings and proof challenge the reasonableness of that amount.<sup>827</sup> Thus, where a nonmovant offers no summary judgment evidence to indicate that the stipulated amount was unreasonable, the trial court's award of attorney's fees is proper.<sup>828</sup>

#### B. Reasonable Percentage Fees

The reasonableness of attorney's fees generally is an issue for the trier of fact.<sup>829</sup> An exception to this rule is where "the testimony of an interested witness is not contradicted by any other witness, or attendant circumstances, and . . . is clear, direct and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon."<sup>830</sup> Promissory notes may provide for attorney's fees in a *reasonable* percentage clause that requires the maker to pay a reasonable fee upon default.<sup>831</sup> Although this type of clause requires opinion evidence, an attorney's affidavit is admissible.<sup>832</sup> Thus, a summary

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824. *Id.*

825. *Id.*

826. *See Kuper v. Schmidt*, 338 S.W.2d 948, 950–51 (Tex. 1960) (discussing the collection of attorney's fees upon default).

827. *Highlands Cable Television, Inc. v. Wong*, 547 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *see also Kuper*, 338 S.W.2d at 950–51 (allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees by the plaintiff when "no issue of reasonableness is raised by the defendants").

828. *Houston Furniture Distribs., Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, N.A.*, 562 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).

829. *Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust*, 296 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Tex. 2009).

830. *Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League*, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

831. *See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla Equip. Co.*, 528 S.W.2d 568, 570–71 (Tex. 1975) (involving two notes which provided for reasonable attorney's fees).

832. *See supra* Part 1, II.F.4 (discussing affidavits by counsel).



judgment based upon the affidavit testimony of the movant's attorney can be an appropriate vehicle for recovery of such attorney's fees.<sup>833</sup> Whenever the word "reasonable" appears in connection with the recovery of, or entitlement to, attorney's fees, an affidavit in support of such fees should be included in the motion for summary judgment.<sup>834</sup>

## VII. TYPES OF CASES AMENABLE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Some types of cases particularly lend themselves to summary judgment disposition; other categories of cases are not appropriate for summary judgment disposition.<sup>835</sup>

### A. *Sworn Accounts*

Motions for summary judgment often are used in suits on sworn accounts.<sup>836</sup> Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 185 provides that a suit on a sworn account may be proper in the following instances:

When any action or defense is founded upon an open account or other claim for goods, wares and merchandise, including any claim for a liquidated money demand based upon written contract or founded on business dealings between the parties, or is for personal service rendered, or labor done or labor or materials furnished, on which a systematic record has been kept . . . .<sup>837</sup>

An action brought under Rule 185 is one of procedure, not of substantive law, with regard to the evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of the right to recover.<sup>838</sup> In a suit on

833. *Cap Rock Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co.*, 874 S.W.2d 92, 101 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ).

834. *See Corporate Funding, Inc. v. City of Houston*, 686 S.W.2d 630, 631–32 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reversing an award of attorney's fees because no proof was offered that the awarded fee was reasonable).

835. Juvenile matters usually are not a proper subject for summary judgment. *See State v. L.J.B.*, 561 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. C.L.B. v. State*, 567 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).

836. *See, e.g., Wright v. Christian & Smith*, 950 S.W.2d 411, 412–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (reversing summary judgment in favor of plaintiff due to an issue of material fact regarding the existence of an enforceable agreement between the parties, an essential element of a cause of action to collect on a sworn account); *Jeff Robinson Bldg. Co. v. Scott Floors, Inc.*, 630 S.W.2d 779, 781–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reversing summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for failure to establish a *prima facie* sworn account case against the defendants individually).

837. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

838. *Rizk v. Fin. Guardian Ins. Agency, Inc.*, 584 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1979); *Meaders v. Biskamp*, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. 1958); *Hou-Tex Printers, Inc. v. Marbach*, 862 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); *see also Achimon v.*

a sworn account, a litigant whose opponent has not filed a proper answer under Rule 185 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(10)<sup>839</sup> may secure what is essentially a summary judgment on the pleadings. In effect, noncompliance with these rules concedes that there is no defense.<sup>840</sup>

If the defendant in a suit on a sworn account fails to file a written denial under oath, that party will not be permitted at trial “to dispute receipt of the items or services or the correctness of the stated charges.”<sup>841</sup> As a general rule, a sworn account is prima facie evidence of a debt, and the account need not be formally introduced into evidence unless the account’s existence or correctness has been denied in writing under oath.<sup>842</sup>

1. *Requirements for Petition.* A sworn account petition should be supported by an affidavit that the claim is “within the knowledge of affiant, just and true.”<sup>843</sup> Unless the trial court sustains special exceptions to the pleadings, no particularization or description of the nature of the component parts of the account or claim is necessary.<sup>844</sup> If special exceptions are filed and sustained, the account (invoice or statement account) should show the nature of the item sold, the date, and the charge.<sup>845</sup> In addition, if they are challenged by special exceptions, technical and unexplained abbreviations, code numbers, and the like are insufficient to identify items and terms and must be explained.<sup>846</sup> Also, if special exceptions are sustained, the language used in the account must have a common meaning and must not be of the sort understood only in the industry in which it is used.<sup>847</sup> If invoicing

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J.I. Case Credit Corp., 715 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that assignee of retail installment contract failed to state a sworn account).

839. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(10) (requiring a denial of an account be verified by affidavit).

840. *Enernational Corp. v. Exploitation Eng’rs, Inc.*, 705 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see *Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 462 S.W.2d 540, 543 n.1 (Tex. 1971); *Waggoners’ Home Lumber Co. v. Bendix Forest Prods. Corp.*, 639 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1982, no writ); see also *supra* Part 1, II.B (discussing pleadings as evidence).

841. *Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Mktg., Inc.*, 566 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam); see also *Vance v. Holloway*, 689 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 185); *Murphy v. Cintas Corp.*, 923 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied).

842. See *Airborne Freight Corp.*, 566 S.W.2d at 575.

843. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

844. *Enernational Corp.*, 705 S.W.2d at 750 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 185).

845. *Hassler v. Tex. Gypsum Co.*, 525 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1975, no writ).

846. See *id.* (holding the abbreviated product description on the invoices failed to identify the goods sold with reasonable clarity).

847. See *id.*

and billing is done with only computer numbers or abbreviations, a key to this “business shorthand” should be attached to the pleadings or be readily available if repleading is necessary.<sup>848</sup>

2. *Answer/Denial.* The answer must consist of a written denial supported by an affidavit denying the account.<sup>849</sup> When a party suing on a sworn account files a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the nonmovant’s pleading is insufficient under Rule 93(10) because no proper sworn denial is filed, the nonmovant may still amend and file a proper sworn denial.<sup>850</sup> The nonmovant is not precluded from amending and filing a proper sworn denial *to the suit itself* at any time allowed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63.<sup>851</sup>

In *Brightwell v. Barlow, Gardner, Tucker & Garsek*, the court considered whether it was proper for the verified denial to appear only in the affidavit in response to the motion for summary judgment but not in the defendant’s answer.<sup>852</sup> The court stated that Rules 185 and 93(k) (now Rule 93(10)), when read together and applied to suits on sworn accounts, mandate that the language needed to “effectively deny . . . the plaintiff’s sworn account *must appear in a pleading of equal dignity* with the plaintiff’s petition, and therefore must appear in the defendant’s answer.”<sup>853</sup>

848. See *Price v. Pratt*, 647 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).

849. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(10) (requiring an affidavit for “[a] denial of an account which is the foundation of the plaintiff’s action”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 185 (requiring that a party who resists a suit on account must file a written denial under oath); see also *Huddleston v. Case Power & Equip. Co.*, 748 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ). In *Huddleston*, the court held that “a sworn general denial is insufficient to rebut the evidentiary effect of a proper affidavit in support of a suit on account.” *Id.* at 103–04. Further, the court held that the “written denial, under oath” mandated under Rule 185 must conform to Rule 93(10), which requires the plaintiff’s claim to be put at issue through a special verified denial of the account. *Id.* at 103.

850. *Requipco, Inc. v. Am-Tex Tank & Equip., Inc.*, 738 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); *Magnolia Fruit & Produce Co. v. Unicom Corp. of Tex.*, 649 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1983, writ dismissed). But see *Bruce v. McAdoo*, 531 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1975, no writ) (holding that an “amended answer . . . presented more than four years after the original answer and more than a year after the first amended answer” was not timely and was therefore improper).

851. See *Magnolia Fruit & Produce Co.*, 649 S.W.2d at 797–98.

852. *Brightwell v. Barlow, Gardner, Tucker & Garsek*, 619 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ).

853. *Id.* at 253 (quoting *Zemaco, Inc. v. Navarro*, 580 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ dismissed w.o.j.)) (emphasis added); see *Notgrass v. Equilease Corp.*, 666 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (requiring the denial to be present in an answer).

The filing of a proper, verified denial overcomes the evidentiary effect of a sworn account and forces the plaintiff to offer proof of the claim.<sup>854</sup>

3. *Summary Judgment.* There are two distinct grounds upon which a party may move for summary judgment in a suit on a sworn account: (1) the failure of the defendant to file an adequate answer; and (2) the elements of the suit are proved as a matter of law. In the first instance, the basis for the motion for summary judgment is that the defendant's answer was not a timely filed sworn pleading verified by an affidavit denying the account that is the foundation of the plaintiff's cause of action. In the second, the grounds are that the summary judgment evidence establishes the common law elements of an action.

Sworn accounts are an exception to the general rule that pleadings are not summary judgment proof. "When a defendant fails to file a verified denial to a sworn account, the sworn account is received as prima facie evidence of the debt and the plaintiff as summary judgment movant is entitled to summary judgment on the pleadings."<sup>855</sup> Rule 185 also provides that a systematic record, properly verified, "shall be taken as prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall file a written denial, under oath."<sup>856</sup> Thus, if the affidavit supporting the sworn account petition tracks the language of Rule 185 and meets the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 166a(f), it generally has been considered proper summary judgment proof in the absence of a sufficient answer to the original petition.<sup>857</sup>

If a defendant files a verified denial, the plaintiff must submit common law proof of its case.<sup>858</sup> The necessary common law elements of an action are: "(1) that there was a sale and delivery of merchandise, (2) that the amount of the account is just, that is, that the prices are charged in accordance with an agreement, they are the usual, customary and reasonable prices for that merchandise, and (3) that the amount is unpaid."<sup>859</sup> If the resisting

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854. Rizk v. Fin. Guardian Ins. Agency, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1979); Norcross v. Conoco, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ).

855. Loc Thi Nguyen v. Short, How, Frels & Heitz, P.C., 108 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

856. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

857. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (requiring affidavits to be made on personal knowledge). Although specifically authorized to make an affidavit under Rule 185, attorneys should do so only if they possess personal knowledge of the facts set forth in the affidavit. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

858. See Pat Womack, Inc. v. Weslaco Aviation, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).

859. *Id.*; see also Worley v. Butler, 809 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

party does not support its claim with an affidavit, the movant is not forced to put on proof of its claim in a summary judgment proceeding and is entitled to summary judgment on the pleadings.<sup>860</sup>

A second affidavit in addition to that attached to the plaintiff's petition may be advisable to support a motion for summary judgment on a sworn account. This second affidavit should set forth, once again, the allegations of the sworn account petition. Strictly speaking, this additional affidavit is unnecessary if the answer on file is insufficient under Rules 185 and 93(10).<sup>861</sup> If the answer is sufficient under these rules, summary judgment is not precluded, but a second affidavit must be filed substantiating the account as a business record under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6).<sup>862</sup>

The attorney opposing a summary judgment in a suit based on a sworn account should immediately determine if a sworn denial in accordance with Rules 93(10) and 185 is already on file. If not, he or she should file one. It is sufficient to file a sworn answer denying the account that is the "foundation of the plaintiff's action."<sup>863</sup> The filing of an answer in strict compliance with Rules 93(10) and 185 does not, however, preclude the need to also file a written response to a motion for summary judgment.<sup>864</sup> As a matter of practice, attorneys should *always* file a written response to all motions for summary judgment.<sup>865</sup>

According to one commentator: "Motions for summary judgment will help ferret out those who file answers to buy time from those with genuine defenses and are also great discovery tools. Well drawn summary judgments often require the debtors' attorneys to have serious talks with their clients about fees, resulting in serious settlement negotiations."<sup>866</sup>

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1990, no writ) (applying these elements in a suit for attorney's fees).

860. *Cespedes v. Am. Express-CA*, No. 13-05-385-CV, 2007 WL 1365441, at \*5-6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 10, 2007, no pet.).

861. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(10); *Special Marine Prods., Inc. v. Weeks Welding & Constr., Inc.*, 625 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (noting that the state of the pleadings and the defendant's failure to file a sufficient sworn denial under Rule 185 provide the basis for summary judgment, not the plaintiff's additional sworn affidavit under Rule 166a).

862. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6).

863. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(10); *see also* TEX. R. CIV. P. 185 (allowing the filing of a written denial that states each and every item that constitutes the foundation of any action or defense as either just and true or unjust and untrue).

864. *See supra* Part 1, VII.A.3 (discussing responding to and opposing a motion for summary judgment).

865. *See supra* Part 1, I.A.1-2 (discussing the general requirements and strategy involved in moving for and opposing summary judgment).

866. Donna Brown, *Anatomy of the Collection Process: An Overview with Efficiency Tips from a Seasoned Collections Lawyer*, State Bar of Texas Continuing

*B. Suits on Written Instruments*

Suits on written instruments such as contracts, promissory notes, and leases are commonly the subjects of motions for summary judgment.

A summary judgment is proper in cases involving the interpretation of a writing that is determined to be unambiguous.<sup>867</sup> “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide.”<sup>868</sup> If a contract is worded in such a manner that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, then it is not ambiguous.<sup>869</sup> Words used in an unambiguous contract are given their plain and ordinary meaning unless the instrument shows that the parties used the words in a technical or different sense.<sup>870</sup> Because ambiguity is a legal question, a court may hold that an agreement is ambiguous even though both parties contend the contract is unambiguous.<sup>871</sup> An ambiguity in a contract may be either patent or latent.<sup>872</sup> When the writing contains an ambiguity, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is improper because the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.<sup>873</sup>

In a suit on a guaranty instrument, a court may grant a summary judgment only if the right to it is established in the record as a matter of law.<sup>874</sup> “If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or

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Legal Education Program, Nuts & Bolts of Collections and Creditors’ Rights Course 8 (2008).

867. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see also R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. 1980) (“The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is one of law for the court.”).

868. Lopez v. Muñoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2000).

869. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).

870. Consol. Petroleum Partners, I, LLC v. Tindle, 168 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.).

871. J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 231.

872. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282–83 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (distinguishing a patent ambiguity as one that is “evident on the face of the contract” and a latent ambiguity as one that exists not on the face of the contract but in the contract’s failure “by reason of some collateral matter when it is applied to the subject matter with which it deals”).

873. Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1979); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Donahue v. Bowles, Troy, Donahue, Johnson, Inc., 949 S.W.2d 746, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied).

874. W. Bank-Downtown v. Carline, 757 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law.”<sup>875</sup>

In promissory note cases, the motion for summary judgment and supporting evidence should establish (1) the note was executed by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) the plaintiff gave value for the note to the defendant; (3) the plaintiff was the holder and owner of the note; (4) the note matured; (5) the defendant defaulted; and (6) the amount due.<sup>876</sup> The supporting affidavits generally are provided by the owner and holder of the note, such as a corporate or bank officer.<sup>877</sup> An example of such a case is *Batis v. Taylor Made Fats, Inc.*, in which the court found the plaintiff's summary judgment proof consisting of an affidavit by the business records custodian sufficient to support a summary judgment.<sup>878</sup> Failure to attach a copy of the promissory note in a summary judgment motion in a suit on that note is fatal to the summary judgment.<sup>879</sup> A photocopy of a note attached to the affidavit of the holder who swears that it is a true and correct copy of the note is sufficient as a matter of law to prove the status of owner and holder of the note absent controverting summary judgment evidence.<sup>880</sup>

In a suit on a promissory note, the plaintiff must establish the amount due on the note.<sup>881</sup> Generally, an affidavit that sets forth the balance due on a note is sufficient to sustain a summary judgment.<sup>882</sup> Detailed proof of the balance is not required.<sup>883</sup> However, the summary judgment evidence must establish the amount due on the note.<sup>884</sup> “[W]here an affidavit

875. *Coker v. Coker*, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).

876. 2 STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS COLLECTIONS MANUAL 12-46, Form 12-11 (2d prtng. 2005); see also *Batis v. Taylor Made Fats, Inc.*, 626 S.W.2d 605, 606–07 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying the elements to a suit involving a promissory note).

877. See, e.g., *Jackson T. Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.*, 649 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (referring to an affidavit of the vice president of a title company that stated the company was the holder of the note); *Batis*, 626 S.W.2d at 606–07.

878. *Batis*, 626 S.W.2d at 606–07.

879. *Sorrells v. Giberson*, 780 S.W.2d 936, 937–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (holding that the note could not serve as the basis for summary judgment because the appellee failed to attach a copy of it to the affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment).

880. *Zarges v. Bevan*, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam).

881. See, e.g., *Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.*, 99 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

882. *Martin v. First Republic Bank, Fort Worth, N.S.*, 799 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).

883. *Hudspeth v. Investor Collection Servs. Ltd. P'ship.*, 985 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

884. See *Bailey, Vaught, Robertson & Co. v. Remington Invs., Inc.*, 888 S.W.2d 860,

submitted in support of summary judgment lumps the amounts due under multiple notes with varying terms and provisions, an ambiguity can arise as to the balance due,” precluding a summary judgment.<sup>885</sup>

1. *Application of the Parol Evidence Rule.* In cases based on written instruments, a common defense both at trial and on motions for summary judgment is an allegation of contemporaneous representations (parol evidence) that would entitle the defendant to modify the written terms of the note or contract.<sup>886</sup> The parol evidence rule generally intends to keep out extrinsic evidence of oral statements or representations relative to the making of a contractual agreement when that agreement is valid and complete on its face.<sup>887</sup> In general, a written instrument that is clear and express in its terms cannot be varied by parol evidence.<sup>888</sup>

2. *Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule.* An important exception to the parol evidence rule permits extrinsic evidence to show fraud in the inducement of a written contract.<sup>889</sup> The Texas Supreme Court addressed this problem in *Town North National*

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867 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (holding that summary judgment evidence failed to establish the applicable rate of interest on a promissory note and therefore failed to establish the total amount due).

885. FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see also Gen. Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat’l Bank—Houston, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding that an affidavit stating a lump sum balance due for seven promissory notes created an ambiguity and precluded summary judgment).

886. See, e.g., Carter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the existence of an oral agreement created a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment); Hallmark v. Port/Cooper–T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 907 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (“The parol evidence rule does not preclude enforcement of prior contemporaneous agreements which are collateral to, not inconsistent with, and do not vary or contradict the express or implied terms or obligations thereof.”).

887. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Vernon 2009). See generally Hon. Randy Wilson, *Parol Evidence in Breach of Contract Cases*, ADVOCATE, Summer 2007, at 44, available at [http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/39\\_Contracts\\_Sum07.pdf](http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/39_Contracts_Sum07.pdf).

888. See Wilson, *supra* note 887, at 44–46 (analyzing the admissibility of parol evidence); see also Pan Am. Bank of Brownsville v. Nowland, 650 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (providing standards for the admissibility of parol evidence).

889. Town N. Nat’l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1978) (stating that parol evidence is admissible to show that the maker of a note was induced by fraud); Friday v. Grant Plaza Huntsville Assocs., 713 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (stating that a successful prima facie showing of fraud in the inducement is an exception to the parol evidence rule); Albritton Dev. Co. v. Glendon Invs., Inc., 700 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that the terms of a negotiable instrument cannot be varied by parol evidence without a showing of a fraudulent scheme or trickery).



*Bank v. Broaddus*.<sup>890</sup> In that case, three parties signed a note as obligors.<sup>891</sup> After default, the bank brought suit against the obligors.<sup>892</sup> The bank then moved for summary judgment against two of the co-obligors; the other party had filed for bankruptcy and was dismissed.<sup>893</sup> Defendants alleged that a bank officer told them that they would not be held liable on the note.<sup>894</sup> This misrepresentation, they argued, created fraud in the inducement.<sup>895</sup> The defendants argued that this alleged fraud raised a question of fact precluding a grant of summary judgment.<sup>896</sup> The court held that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show fraud in the inducement of a note only if, in addition to the showing that the payee represented to the maker he would not be liable on such note, there is a showing of some type of “trickery, artifice, or device employed by the payee.”<sup>897</sup> In upholding the summary judgment for the bank, the Texas Supreme Court stated that “a negotiable instrument which is clear and express in its terms cannot be varied by parol agreements or representations of a payee that a maker or surety will not be liable thereon.”<sup>898</sup>

### C. Statute of Limitations / Statutes of Repose

Summary judgment may be proper in cases where the statute of limitations<sup>899</sup> is pleaded as a bar to recovery.<sup>900</sup> The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense for which the defendant must establish all the elements as a matter of law.<sup>901</sup> The movant for a summary judgment on the basis of the running

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890. *Town N. Nat'l Bank*, 569 S.W.2d at 491.

891. *Id.* at 490.

892. *Id.*

893. *Id.*

894. *See id.* at 490–91 (illustrating how the bank officer indicated the dismissed third party would be responsible for the note).

895. *Id.*

896. *Id.* at 491.

897. *Id.* at 494.

898. *Id.* at 491.

899. *See supra* Part 1, III.A.3 (discussing affirmative defenses).

900. *See, e.g.,* *Hall v. Stephenson*, 919 S.W.2d 454, 464–65 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (holding that summary judgment was proper when the suit was filed outside the statute of limitations); *Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc.*, 754 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (stating that a party “by moving for summary judgment on the basis of the running of limitations, assumed the burden of showing as a matter of law that limitations barred the suit”).

901. *Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio*, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005); *KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp.*, 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).

of the statute of limitations assumes the burden of showing as a matter of law that the suit is barred by limitations.<sup>902</sup>

[T]he defendant must (1) conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2) negate the discovery rule, if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised, by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact about when the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the nature of its injury.<sup>903</sup>

The discovery rule must be negated by the defendant movant only if it is raised.<sup>904</sup> However, if the plaintiff does not plead it, but raises the discovery rule for the first time in his or her summary judgment response, the defendant's failure to object will result in trying the issue by consent.<sup>905</sup>

Fraudulent concealment tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations.<sup>906</sup> A party asserting fraudulent concealment as an affirmative defense to limitations must raise the issue and come forward with summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on each element.<sup>907</sup>

Any of the plaintiff's claims or defenses pled in response to the defendant's affirmative defense on which the plaintiff would have the burden of proof at trial, including the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, or tolling suspension provision may be properly challenged by a no-evidence summary judgment motion.

"If the movant establishes that the statute of limitations bars the action, the nonmovant must then adduce summary judgment proof raising a fact issue in avoidance of the statute of limitations."<sup>908</sup> The relation back doctrine may save certain claims. The doctrine of relation back prevents a successful statute of limitations claim if the amended petitions relate back to a timely filed claim that does not arise from a wholly different transaction.<sup>909</sup> The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

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902. *Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd*, 956 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); *Delgado v. Burns*, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam).

903. *KPMG Peat Marwick*, 988 S.W.2d at 748; see also *Diversicare*, 185 S.W.3d at 846; *Jennings v. Burgess*, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); *Burns v. Thomas*, 786 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. 1990); *Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.*, 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 n.2 (Tex. 1988); *McMahan v. Greenwood*, 108 S.W.3d 467, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

904. *In re Estate of Matejek*, 960 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).

905. *Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co.*, 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

906. *Winn v. Martin Homebuilders, Inc.*, 153 S.W.3d 553, 557–58 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).

907. *KPMG Peat Marwick*, 988 S.W.2d at 749.

908. *Diversicare*, 185 S.W.3d at 846 (citing *KPMG Peat Marwick*, 988 S.W.2d at 748).

909. *Long v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 828 S.W.2d 125, 127–28 (Tex. App.—

provides that new facts or claims raised in a later pleading relate back to a timely filed pleading and are not barred unless the amendment or supplemental pleading “is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.”<sup>910</sup> Thus, an original pleading tolls the limitations period for claims asserted in a later, amended pleading if the amended pleading does not allege a wholly new, distinct, or different transaction.<sup>911</sup> A “transaction” is defined as a set of facts that gives rise to the cause of action on which it is premised.<sup>912</sup>

Defective pleadings that are not excepted to may satisfy the statute of limitations.<sup>913</sup> “To obtain summary judgment on the grounds that an action was not served within the applicable limitations period, the movant must show that, as a matter of law, diligence was not used to effectuate service.”<sup>914</sup> Existence of due diligence in effecting service is usually a fact issue.<sup>915</sup>

Summary judgment may also be appropriate in a case barred by a statute of repose.<sup>916</sup> A statute of repose differs from a traditional statute of limitations. A traditional statute of limitations runs from the time that a cause of action accrues, which is not later than when the party first sustains or discovers an injury or damage.<sup>917</sup> With a statute of repose, the period begins running when the improvement is substantially completed rather than when a cause of action accrues.<sup>918</sup> Statutes of repose typically provide a definitive date beyond which an action cannot be filed.<sup>919</sup> Therefore, a statute of repose can cut off a right of action before an injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or injury.<sup>920</sup>

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Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 1986)).

910. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 2008).

911. *Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc.*, 146 S.W.3d 113, 121 (Tex. 2004).

912. *Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc.*, 219 S.W.3d 563, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied).

913. *Sullivan v. Hoover*, 782 S.W.2d 305, 306–07 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ) (stating that a petition advising the defendant of the nature of the cause of action against him is all that is needed to arrest the statute of limitations).

914. *Gant v. DeLeon*, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

915. *Taylor v. Rellas*, 69 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.); *Keeton v. Carrasco*, 53 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

916. *See, e.g., Zaragosa v. Chemetron Invs., Inc.*, 122 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (concluding that summary judgment was proper where the statute of repose barred the plaintiff's products liability claim).

917. *Lambert v. Wansbrough*, 783 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).

918. *Tumminello v. U.S. Home Corp.*, 801 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

919. *Holubec v. Brandenberger*, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003).

920. *See Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha*, 290 S.W.3d 863, 866 (Tex.

The Texas statute of repose does not, however, bar an action based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment in connection with the performance of the construction or repair.<sup>921</sup> Thus, if the statute of repose period has expired, the nonmovant having an affirmative defense of fraudulent concealment must present enough proof to raise a fact issue; otherwise, summary judgment will be held proper.<sup>922</sup>

#### *D. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel*

Summary judgment is also proper in a case barred by res judicata.<sup>923</sup> A partial summary judgment may be proper on an issue precluded by collateral estoppel.<sup>924</sup> “A partial summary judgment that is interlocutory and non-appealable is not final and cannot support a plea of res judicata.”<sup>925</sup>

The “transactional approach” applies to res judicata.<sup>926</sup> In other words, a later suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit and, through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in an earlier suit.<sup>927</sup> Issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, as distinguished from res judicata, applies to “any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.”<sup>928</sup> The court in *Acker v. City of Huntsville* stated, “The seminal test for finality sufficient to justify issue

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2009) (“Repose then differs from limitations in that repose not only cuts off rights of action after they accrue, but can cut off rights of action before they accrue.”).

921. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(e)(3) (Vernon 2002); *see also* Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 121–22 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that the statute of repose applied because a witness’s affidavit did not raise a fact issue as to the defendant’s possible willful and intentional misconduct).

922. *See Ryland Group, Inc.*, 924 S.W.2d at 121–22.

923. *See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav.*, 837 S.W.2d 627, 627–28 (Tex. 1992) (stating that res judicata prevents the relitigation of a claim or a cause of action that has been finally adjudicated and may invoke a motion for summary judgment).

924. *See id.* at 628 (“Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit.”).

925. *Mower v. Boyer*, 811 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1991) (noting that the interlocutory partial summary judgment was not final because expressly leaving open the issue of consideration did not have a res judicata effect).

926. *Barr*, 837 S.W.2d at 631 (holding that the scope of res judicata can extend to causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter litigated in the first suit); *see also* *Compania Financiera Libano, S.A. v. Simmons*, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).

927. *Barr*, 837 S.W.2d at 631.

928. *Acker v. City of Huntsville*, 787 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982)); *see also* *Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer*, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990) (explaining the rule of collateral estoppel in the context of due process).

preclusion is whether the decision in the prior case is procedurally definite—was it adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment already entered.”<sup>929</sup>

Relitigation of an issue will be barred by collateral estoppel if: “(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the first action were fully and fairly litigated in the prior action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.”<sup>930</sup> Findings by a federal court beyond those necessary to make a decision are not “actually litigated” or “necessary to the outcome” so as to form the basis for collateral estoppel or res judicata.<sup>931</sup>

When filing or answering a motion for summary judgment based on res judicata or collateral estoppel, the earlier judgment should be attached to the motion.<sup>932</sup>

### *E. Equitable Actions*

In a case governed by equitable principles, summary judgment presents more potential difficulties than in the usual summary judgment case because there are no clear guidelines for determining what is a material fact.<sup>933</sup> The main guiding principle in equitable actions is that an unfair or unjust result should be prevented.<sup>934</sup> While summary judgment may occasionally be appropriate in equity cases, it is not appropriate “where the summary judgment record does not fully develop the facts on which the trial court’s equitable discretion must be exercised, and where the facts that are developed, though uncontroverted, can give rise to more than one reasonable inference.”<sup>935</sup>

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929. *Acker*, 787 S.W.2d at 82.

930. *Eagle Props., Ltd.*, 807 S.W.2d at 721 (quoting *Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp.*, 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984)); see also *Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell*, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994).

931. *Shell Pipeline Corp. v. Coastal States Trading, Inc.*, 788 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); see also *Allen v. Port Drum Co.*, 777 S.W.2d 776, 777–78 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, writ denied) (stating the federal requirements to barring earlier judgments under the doctrine of res judicata); *Flippin v. Wilson State Bank*, 780 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, writ denied) (discussing the elements of res judicata under federal law).

932. *Anders v. Mallard & Mallard, Inc.*, 817 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); *Chandler v. Carnes Co.*, 604 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that a certified copy of a prior judgment must be attached to a motion for summary judgment to be properly based on the doctrine of res judicata).

933. *Fleetwood v. Med Ctr. Bank*, 786 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, writ denied).

934. See *Johnson v. Cherry*, 726 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1987) (“The equitable power of the court exists to do fairness . . .”).

935. *Fleetwood*, 786 S.W.2d at 557.

### F. Medical Malpractice

Summary judgments find their use primarily in two defenses to medical malpractice: (1) using expert testimony to negate breach of duty and proximate cause; and (2) urging the tolling of the statute of limitations.<sup>936</sup>

1. *Negation of Elements of Medical Malpractice.* In the past, the defendant physician in a malpractice case would file a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by detailed affidavits from an expert witness or from the defendant that conclusively negated two elements of the plaintiff's malpractice cause of action: breach of duty and proximate cause.<sup>937</sup> In a medical malpractice cause of action, the plaintiff "must prove, by competent testimony, that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."<sup>938</sup> To do so, the plaintiff must prove four elements: "(1) a duty by the physician to act according to a certain standard; (2) a breach of the applicable standard of care; (3) an injury; and (4) a causal connection between the breach of care and the injury."<sup>939</sup> Now, under no-evidence summary judgment practice, a defendant doctor may move for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has no evidence to support one or more of the elements.<sup>940</sup> "To raise a fact issue sufficient to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment . . . the controverting expert evidence must identify the standard of care, establish the expert's familiarity with that standard, and explain why the treatment rendered by the doctor breached the applicable standard of care."<sup>941</sup> The threshold question in a

936. See, e.g., *Jennings v. Burgess*, 917 S.W.2d 790, 792–94 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting the use of the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution to override the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case); *Pinckley v. Gallegos*, 740 S.W.2d 529, 531–32 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, writ denied) (upholding summary judgment based on expert testimony negating breach of duty and causation).

937. E.g., *Pinckley*, 740 S.W.2d at 532 (accepting two expert affidavits as summary judgment evidence sufficient to negate the elements of breach of duty and proximate causation).

938. *Duff v. Yelin*, 751 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1988); see also *Hart v. Van Zandt*, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965) (stating that expert opinion speculating on the possibility that the injury might have occurred from the doctor's negligence and from other causes not the fault of the doctor was insufficient evidence).

939. *LeNotre v. Cohen*, 979 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also *Pinckley*, 740 S.W.2d at 531; *Wheeler v. Aldama-Luebbert*, 707 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).

940. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see, e.g., *Gomez v. Tri City Cmty. Hosp., Ltd.*, 4 S.W.3d 281, 283–85 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).

941. *Downing v. Larson*, 153 S.W.3d 248, 251 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004), *rev'd on other grounds per curiam*, 197 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. 2006); see also *Bryan v. Sherick*, 279 S.W.3d 731, 732–33 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.); *Silvas v. Ghiatas*, 954 S.W.2d 50,

medical malpractice case is the medical standard of care.<sup>942</sup> That standard must be established so the fact finder can determine whether the doctor's act or omission deviated from the standard of care to the extent that it constituted negligence or malpractice.<sup>943</sup> The standard of care by which physicians' acts or omissions are measured is that degree of care that a physician of ordinary prudence and skill, practicing in the same or a similar community, would have exercised in the same or similar circumstances.<sup>944</sup> In *Hamilton v. Wilson*, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a no-evidence summary judgment because it determined that the plaintiff's expert opinion was based on factual evidence relating to the defendant doctor's standard of care and, in conjunction with the defendant doctor's testimony and the medical records, created a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>945</sup> The supreme court made note of the statement by the court of appeals that the plaintiff's expert testimony was "not evidence that proves the questioned fact."<sup>946</sup> The supreme court pointed out that, contrary to the implication of the statement by the court of appeals, the plaintiff was not required to prove facts as she alleged them.<sup>947</sup> "Rather, she was only required to provide evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions."<sup>948</sup>

If proceeding under a traditional motion for summary judgment, a movant must take care in preparing the physician's affidavit. The medical standard of care must be established.<sup>949</sup> Mere conclusory statements are not sufficient.<sup>950</sup> Affidavits that do not thoroughly set out the standard of care applicable to the procedure involved at the time of the complained of incident and that fail to thoroughly explain how the standard was met or

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53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).

942. *Rodriguez v. Reeves*, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

943. *Id.*

944. *Chambers v. Conaway*, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. 1993); *James v. Brown*, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. 1982) ("A psychiatrist owes a duty to his patient to exercise that degree of skill ordinarily employed under similar circumstances by similar specialists in the field."); *Rodriguez*, 730 S.W.2d at 21.

945. *Hamilton v. Wilson*, 249 S.W.3d 425, 427–28 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

946. *Id.* at 426.

947. *Id.*

948. *Id.*

949. *Rodriguez*, 730 S.W.2d at 21.

950. *See Snow v. Bond*, 438 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1969) ("An expert witness can and should give information about these standards without summarizing, qualifying or embellishing his evidence with expressions of opinion as to the conduct that might be expected of a hypothetical doctor similarly situated."); *Alvarado v. Old Republic Ins. Co.*, 951 S.W.2d 254, 262 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).

excluded are not sufficient summary judgment evidence.<sup>951</sup> In *Hammonds v. Thomas*, the affidavit of a defendant physician was deemed insufficient to establish the applicable standard of care in the community when it merely stated that the doctor was familiar with the standard of care and that the treatment was within that standard.<sup>952</sup> The affidavit must state the standard.<sup>953</sup>

In response, to maintain a cause of action against a doctor for malpractice, the plaintiff patient must prove by a doctor of the same school of practice as the defendant (or with knowledge of the specific issue which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that subject) that the diagnosis or treatment complained of was such that it constitutes negligence and that it was a proximate cause of the plaintiff patient's injuries.<sup>954</sup> Finally, in a medical malpractice case, a party cannot use an expert report as summary judgment proof when the report was originally used for complying with the procedural requirements of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.<sup>955</sup>

A layperson with no medical background may not use his or her own affidavit in an attempt to raise a fact issue.<sup>956</sup> Mere

951. *Hammonds v. Thomas*, 770 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no writ).

952. *Id.* (stating that medical experts can express their opinions on whether conduct amounts to negligence and proximate cause but that there still must be specific evidence as to the medical standard of care).

953. *Id.*

954. *See Broders v. Heise*, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996) (excluding testimony from a doctor not qualified by knowledge or experience to give an expert opinion on the specific practices alleged to be negligent); *Hart v. Van Zandt*, 399 S.W.2d 791, 797–98 (Tex. 1965) (reversing a judgment based on a witness's lack of qualification where expertise was common to several schools of practice); *Shook v. Herman*, 759 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed to controvert defendant doctor's affidavit with evidence from a doctor of the same field that the actions were negligent and a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries).

955. Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140, § 13.01(k), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 985, 986–87 (former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(k) (Vernon 2000)), repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(k) (Vernon 2005)). Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires a plaintiff to file an expert report within a certain period after the lawsuit is filed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon 2005); *see Garcia v. Willman*, 4 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (upholding the trial court's decision to strike a physician's affidavit due to its creation for the purpose of complying with former Article 4590i).

956. *Nicholson v. Mem'l Hosp. Sys.*, 722 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *see also Hart*, 399 S.W.2d at 792 (“In determining negligence in a [medical malpractice] case . . . which concerns the highly specialized art of treating disease, the court and jury must be dependent on expert testimony.”); *Lopez v. Carrillo*, 940 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (“If a defendant-movant in a medical malpractice action negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action by competent summary judgment proof (i.e., expert testimony), the non-movant plaintiff is required to present expert testimony in order to raise a fact issue.”).



conclusions of a lay witness are not usually competent to controvert expert medical opinion. For that reason, Texas courts have uniformly rejected the argument in medical malpractice appeals that the opinions and conclusions of the plaintiff–affiant raised a fact issue to rebut the summary judgment proof presented by the defendant physician.<sup>957</sup>

2. *Statute of Limitations.* A defendant is entitled to a summary judgment if he or she conclusively establishes that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.<sup>958</sup> Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, section 74.251(a) codifies article 4590i, section 10.01. It establishes an absolute two-year statute of limitations for health care liability claims.<sup>959</sup> The Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that:

Section 4.01(a) of article 4590i [now Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.051(a)] requires any person asserting a health care liability claim to give written notice of the claim to each physician and health care provider at least sixty days before filing suit. Notice given in accordance with section 4.01(a) tolls the applicable statute of limitations for seventy-five days, effectively creating a two-year-and-seventy-five-day statute of limitations.<sup>960</sup>

The limitations period for medical negligence claims is measured from one of three dates: “(1) the occurrence of the breach or tort, (2) the last date of the relevant course of treatment, or (3) the last date of the relevant hospitalization.”<sup>961</sup> A plaintiff “may not choose the most favorable date that falls within section 10.01’s three categories.”<sup>962</sup> Rather, the limitations period must begin on the date the alleged tort occurred if that date is ascertainable.<sup>963</sup> Thus, if the date is ascertainable, further

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957. See, e.g., *Garza v. Levin*, 769 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); *Shook*, 759 S.W.2d at 747; *Nicholson*, 722 S.W.2d at 751.

958. See *Diaz v. Westphal*, 941 S.W.2d 96, 101 (Tex. 1997) (dismissing a derivative wrongful death claim because the plaintiff's decedent failed to timely file a malpractice claim); *Delgado v. Burns*, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam) (remanding the case for trial where the defendant failed to establish when the limitations period began to run).

959. *Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio*, 185 S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex. 2005) (quoting former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon 2000), *repealed by* Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251 (Vernon 2005))).

960. *Gilbert v. Bartel*, 144 S.W.3d 136, 140 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (footnote omitted).

961. *Shah v. Moss*, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex. 2001) (citing predecessor statute article 4590i, section 10.01, which is identical to the codified version found in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (Vernon 2005)).

962. *Id.*

963. *Id.*; see also *Rogers v. United Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc.*, 109 S.W.3d 47, 50

inquiry into the second and third categories is unnecessary.<sup>964</sup> A defendant who fails to show conclusively that the limitations period has run under applicable limitations periods is not entitled to summary judgment. The plaintiff must raise the fact that he could not have discovered and filed suit within the two-year period in order to challenge the absolute two-year statute of limitations under the “open courts” provision of the Texas Constitution.<sup>965</sup>

The Texas Supreme Court, in *Borderlon v. Peck*, held that in a medical malpractice case, article 4590i, section 10.01 (now Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.051(a)) did not abolish fraudulent concealment as a basis for extending limitations in health care liability actions.<sup>966</sup> Fraudulent concealment is a type of equitable estoppel doctrine.<sup>967</sup> “The plaintiff must show the health-care provider actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong, and did conceal the wrong from the patient.”<sup>968</sup>

The estoppel effect of fraudulent concealment terminates when the patient learns of facts, conditions, or circumstances that would cause a reasonably prudent person to make an inquiry that, if pursued, would lead to discovery of the concealed cause of action.<sup>969</sup> Knowledge of these facts is equivalent to knowledge of the cause of action for the purposes of tolling the statute.<sup>970</sup>

### G. Defamation Actions

Defamation actions are often resolved by summary judgment, not only because of the strong constitutional protections that apply, but also because many of the issues that determine whether summary judgment disposition is proper have been held to be matters of law. Understanding the elements and

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(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); *Karley v. Bell*, 24 S.W.3d 516, 520 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

964. *Shah*, 67 S.W.3d at 841.

965. See *Desiga v. Scheffey*, 874 S.W.2d 244, 250–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (reviewing the situations where the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution has applied).

966. *Borderlon v. Peck*, 661 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. 1983) (stating that the estoppel effect of concealment ends when the plaintiff knew or should have known the cause of action had accrued); see also *Shah*, 67 S.W.3d at 841 (“Fraudulent concealment in medical-negligence cases estops a health-care provider from relying on limitations to bar a plaintiff’s claim.”).

967. See *Shah*, 67 S.W.3d at 841.

968. *Id.*

969. *Borderlon*, 661 S.W.2d at 909.

970. *Id.*

fundamentals of defamation law is necessary to summary judgment analysis of these cases.

Unlike most summary judgment actions, Texas law allows an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a summary judgment based on a claim against the media arising under the free speech or free press clauses of the U.S. or Texas Constitutions.<sup>971</sup> The standards for reviewing summary judgments in defamation actions are the same as for traditional summary judgments.<sup>972</sup>

1. *Applicable Law.* In Texas, libel is a defamatory statement in written form, published to one or more third persons, tending to injure a living person's reputation and, as a result, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or causing financial injury.<sup>973</sup> Where the plaintiff is a public figure, the U.S. Constitution requires more than simple negligence; to prevail, a libel plaintiff must prove "actual malice," in the constitutional sense.<sup>974</sup>

To publish with actual malice, the defendant must have circulated the defamatory statement knowing that it was false or with "reckless disregard" as to its falsity.<sup>975</sup> "Reckless disregard" is not negligence. It is "a high degree of awareness of probable falsity" and requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."<sup>976</sup> Failure to investigate or failure to act

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971. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon 2008) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment based on a claim against or defense by a member of the media); see also *KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes*, 981 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ("The legislature has enacted [§ 51.014(a)(6)] to eliminate the chilling effect that the threat of extended litigation has upon the exercise of the protections secured by the First Amendment."); *supra* Part 1, V.B (discussing appealing summary judgments and the exceptions for government immunity and media defendants).

972. *Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Penick*, 219 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied); *Carabajal v. UTV of San Antonio, Inc.*, 961 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (citing *Casso v. Brand*, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989)).

973. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005); *Hill v. Herald-Post Publ'g Co.*, 877 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam*, 891 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1994).

974. See *Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (stating that given the protections of the First Amendment, public officials can recover for libel only when they can prove deliberate falsehood or reckless publication); *N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (explaining that public officials must prove actual malice to recover for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct).

975. *Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 279–80.

976. *Carr v. Brasher*, 776 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. 1989) (quoting *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).

reasonably before publishing the statement is distinct from actual malice.<sup>977</sup> These requirements are designed to protect freedom of speech and freedom of the press.<sup>978</sup>

2. *Questions of Law.* Whether a statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning initially is a question of law for the court.<sup>979</sup> An allegedly libelous statement should be construed as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering “how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the entire statement.”<sup>980</sup> Only if the language is ambiguous or of doubtful import should a jury determine a statement’s meaning and its effect on the mind of an ordinary reader.<sup>981</sup> Whether a plaintiff is a public figure is an issue of law for the court to decide.<sup>982</sup>

3. *Plaintiff’s Burden of Showing Actual Malice.* Public figures cannot recover on a claim for defamation absent proof of actual malice.<sup>983</sup> Actual malice must exist within the mind of the defendant at the time the publication is made.<sup>984</sup> A libel defendant is entitled to summary judgment if he or she can negate actual malice as a matter of law.<sup>985</sup> Thus, even though the author’s subjective state of mind is at issue, a summary judgment may be properly granted.

In *Casso v. Brand*, the Texas Supreme Court first held that an interested party can negate actual malice as a matter of law through his or her affidavit concerning state of mind and lack of

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977. See *St. Amant*, 390 U.S. at 731 (“[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.”).

978. For a discussion of the historical precedents protecting these constitutional guarantees, especially the Founding Fathers’ views, see *Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 269–76.

979. *New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks*, 146 S.W.3d 144, 155 (Tex. 2004); *Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc.*, 723 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. 1987); *Harvest House Publishers v. Local Church*, 190 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

980. *Musser*, 723 S.W.2d at 655.

981. *Id.*

982. See *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 328, 352 (1974) (upholding ruling that plaintiff was not a public figure before sending the case to the jury); *Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc.*, 541 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. 1976) (reviewing the appeals court’s determination that plaintiff was both a public official and a public figure).

983. *Isaacks*, 146 S.W.3d at 161.

984. See *Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson*, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995) (holding that employer’s qualified privilege to discuss employee wrongdoing is defeated if motivated by actual malice at the time of publication).

985. *Freedom Newspapers of Tex. v. Cantu*, 168 S.W.3d 847, 853 (Tex. 2005); *Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm’t Co.*, 19 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. 2000).

actual malice.<sup>986</sup> This decision specifically overruled earlier decisions to the contrary.<sup>987</sup>

In *Carr v. Brasher*, decided the same day as *Casso*, the Texas Supreme Court again affirmed summary judgment for libel defendants in a case where the defendants negated actual malice with their own affidavits.<sup>988</sup> Thus, through affidavits of interested witnesses, such as the publisher, editor, or reporter, the media defendant may negate actual malice as a matter of law.<sup>989</sup> A libel plaintiff must ordinarily produce independent evidence of actual malice in order to refute the defendant's denial.<sup>990</sup> Therefore, summary judgment is proper where a defendant denies actual malice and the plaintiff is unable to offer proof that actual malice exists.<sup>991</sup>

4. *Qualified Privilege*. "A qualified privilege extends to statements made in good faith on a subject in which the maker has an interest or duty, to another person having a corresponding interest or duty."<sup>992</sup> Qualified privilege is an affirmative defense.<sup>993</sup> Thus, a defendant bears the burden to conclusively establish each element of the privilege to prevail on its summary judgment motion.<sup>994</sup>

The affirmative defense of qualified privilege requires a defendant to show that the alleged defamatory statement: "(1) was made without malice; (2) concerned a subject matter of sufficient interest to the author or was in reference to a duty owed by the author; and (3) was communicated to another party with a corresponding interest or duty."<sup>995</sup>

As noted, when a defendant in a defamation suit moves for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the

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986. *Casso v. Brand*, 776 S.W.2d 551, 559 (Tex. 1989); *see also* *Hearst Corp. v. Skeen*, 159 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. 2005) (finding libel defendant's affidavit stating his belief that the article was true negated actual malice).

987. *Casso*, 776 S.W.2d at 557–59.

988. *Carr v. Brasher*, 776 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. 1989).

989. *Freedom Newspapers of Tex.*, 168 S.W.3d at 853.

990. *Id.*; *Casso*, 776 S.W.2d at 558–59; *Carr*, 776 S.W.2d at 571.

991. *Casso*, 776 S.W.2d at 558; *Carr*, 776 S.W.2d at 571; *Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Penick*, 219 S.W.3d 425, 445–46 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied).

992. *Roberts v. Davis*, 160 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied); *see also* *Dixon v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.*, 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980).

993. *Saudi v. Brieven*, 176 S.W.3d 108, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); *Gonzales v. Levy Strauss & Co.*, 70 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

994. *See Gonzales*, 70 S.W.3d at 282.

995. *Bryant v. Lucent Techs., Inc.*, 175 S.W.3d 845, 851 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied).

defendant has the burden of conclusively proving that the statements were not made with malice.<sup>996</sup> “A good faith belief in the truth of a statement may be evidence that the statement was made without malice, but it is not sufficient . . . to prove that the statement is actually true.”<sup>997</sup>

#### *H. Governmental Immunity*

Governmental immunity may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction or in a motion for summary judgment.<sup>998</sup> Official immunity is an affirmative defense.<sup>999</sup> “Thus, the burden is on the defendant to establish all elements of the defense.”<sup>1000</sup> A government official is entitled to the benefit of official immunity so long as the official is: (1) acting within the course and scope of his or her authority; (2) performing discretionary functions; and (3) acting in good faith.<sup>1001</sup>

To prove good faith, a government official must show that his or her acts were within the realm of what a reasonably prudent government official could have believed was appropriate at the time.<sup>1002</sup> This standard is met when the government official shows that the reasonably prudent government official, under the same or similar circumstances, would have believed that the benefit to the community from the activity in question substantially outweighed the risk of harm from the activity.<sup>1003</sup> To controvert the government official’s summary judgment proof on good faith, “the plaintiff must show that ‘no reasonable person in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.’”<sup>1004</sup> Unlike most other denials of motions for summary judgment, summary judgment denials in governmental immunity cases may be appealed.<sup>1005</sup>

996. *Martin v. Sw. Elec. Power Co.*, 860 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

997. *Roberts*, 160 S.W.3d at 262 n.1.

998. *See Harris County v. Sykes*, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

999. *Univ. of Houston v. Clark*, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); *City of Lancaster v. Chambers*, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).

1000. *Chambers*, 883 S.W.2d at 653.

1001. *Telthorster v. Tennell*, 92 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. 2002); *Gidvani v. Aldrich*, 99 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

1002. *Chambers*, 883 S.W.2d at 656–57.

1003. *Id.* at 656.

1004. *Id.* at 657 (quoting *Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale*, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993), *modified per curiam*, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994)).

1005. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon 2008); *see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas v. Margulis*, 11 S.W.3d 186, 187–88 (Tex. 2000) (*per curiam*); *Hays County v. Hays County Water Planning P’ship*, 69 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (“The statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is strictly

### *I. Family Law Cases*<sup>1006</sup>

Even though family law cases are necessarily fact driven, summary judgment disposition can be an effective way to partially or fully resolve some family law matters. The following are the most common.

1. *Enforceability of Premarital and Marital Property Agreements.* The enforceability of premarital and marital property agreements may be determined by summary judgment disposition.<sup>1007</sup> If a movant seeks to enforce the agreement, he or she may move for summary judgment relying only on the agreement itself.<sup>1008</sup> The agreement itself is sufficient evidence on which to move for summary judgment because, under Family Code Section 4.006, there is a rebuttable presumption that the agreement is enforceable.<sup>1009</sup> The party challenging the agreement as unenforceable has the burden to prove the agreement is unenforceable.<sup>1010</sup> Upon the filing of the motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with enough evidence to raise a fact issue on whether the agreement is unenforceable.<sup>1011</sup>

If the defendant is relying on an involuntary execution defense, the plaintiff may consider filing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.<sup>1012</sup> To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must present enough evidence to raise a fact issue concerning whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily.<sup>1013</sup>

Whether the agreement was unconscionable when it was signed is a matter of law to be decided by the court.<sup>1014</sup> The

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construed because it is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment is appealable.”); *see supra* Part 1, V.B (discussing appealing summary judgments and the governmental immunity exception).

1006. The Authors acknowledge and thank Kate David, J.D., University of Texas, 2004, for her assistance in preparation of this Section.

1007. *See Beck v. Beck*, 814 S.W.2d 745, 746, 749 (Tex. 1991) (holding premarital agreements constitutional).

1008. *See Grossman v. Grossman*, 799 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).

1009. *See* TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (Vernon 2006).

1010. *Grossman*, 799 S.W.2d at 513 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.46, *repealed by* Act of Mar. 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, § 3, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 8, 43 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (Vernon 2006))).

1011. *Id.*

1012. *See, e.g., Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff*, 172 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (upholding partial summary judgment in favor of the party seeking to enforce a marital property agreement after determining that the nonmovant failed to raise a fact issue regarding involuntary execution).

1013. *See id.* at 691–92, 699–700.

1014. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.006(b), 4.105(b) (Vernon 2006).

Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that an early determination of unconscionability is a better practice than waiting for submission of the case to a jury.<sup>1015</sup> Summary judgment may be one way for the trial court to make this determination early in the proceedings.

2. *Interpretation of Divorce Decrees.* To resolve a dispute over property, a motion for summary judgment may be proper to ask the court to interpret a divorce decree. If the divorce decree, when read as a whole, is unambiguous concerning the property's disposition, the court may grant a summary judgment to effectuate the order in light of the literal language used.<sup>1016</sup> Thus, even when a divorce decree does not contain express language disposing of a certain piece of property (such as the house your client inherited in the hypothetical), the court may still grant a summary judgment if the decree indicates the divorce court's decision to award the property solely to one spouse.<sup>1017</sup>

A motion for summary judgment may also be used to dispose of disputes that are barred by an agreement incident to divorce that a party would not re-open the divorce and that had been incorporated into the divorce decree.<sup>1018</sup>

3. *Interpretation or Application of Law.* A motion for summary judgment is also appropriate when the resolution of a question involving the interpretation or application of law will resolve a family law issue. The courts have determined the following through summary judgment disposition:

- A court cannot divide military benefits as community property in a former spouse's partition suit if the final divorce decree, issued before June 25, 1981, does not divide the benefits or reserve jurisdiction to divide those benefits.<sup>1019</sup>
- An employer may not be held liable for failing to prevent two employees from engaging in extramarital relations.<sup>1020</sup>

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1015. *Blonstein v. Blonstein*, 831 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

1016. *Wilde v. Murchie*, 949 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (citing *Acosta v. Acosta*, 836 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied)); *Lohse v. Cheatham*, 705 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ dismissed).

1017. *Wilde*, 949 S.W.2d at 333.

1018. *See, e.g., Smith v. Ferguson*, 160 S.W.3d 115, 120, 123–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (holding husband's claim barred by release provision in an agreement incident to divorce that stated he would not "reopen" the divorce case).

1019. *Havlen v. McDougall*, 22 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex. 2000).

1020. *Helena Labs. Corp. v. Snyder*, 886 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).



- An employer does not have a duty to voluntarily disclose the existence and nature of an employee's benefits to the employee's spouse.<sup>1021</sup>
- The United States may not be ordered to pay a former spouse directly her portion of her ex-spouse's military retirement benefits based on sovereign immunity.<sup>1022</sup>
- An agreement concerning the support of a non-disabled child over 18 is not enforceable when the agreed order incorporating the agreement does not expressly provide that the agreement's terms are enforceable as contract terms.<sup>1023</sup>

4. *Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel.* Another situation that may call for summary judgment disposition is when a family law issue has previously been litigated either in Texas or in another state. *Res judicata* and *collateral estoppel* precepts also apply in family law cases.<sup>1024</sup> For example, in *Mossler v. Shields*, a woman was estopped from bringing an action seeking to establish the existence of a common law marriage because a divorce action, making the same claim, had been dismissed with prejudice by another Texas court.<sup>1025</sup> Likewise, summary judgment has been used to dispose of an action that was already litigated to final judgment in another state. In *Purcell v. Bellinger*, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment barring a paternity action in Texas after the issue had been litigated to final judgment in New York.<sup>1026</sup>

5. *Characterization of Property.* Property possessed by either spouse is presumed to be community property.<sup>1027</sup> However, traditional summary judgment may be used in some instances to establish the separate nature of such property. Partial summary judgment is available if you can present uncontroverted evidence that your client owned the property before the marriage and,

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1021. *Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust*, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981).

1022. *United States v. Stelter*, 567 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. 1978) (reversing the trial court's summary judgment that allowed garnishment of a husband's military benefits and dismissed the proceedings).

1023. *Elfeldt v. Elfeldt*, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. 1987).

1024. *See, e.g., Purcell v. Bellinger*, 940 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that *res judicata* barred a subsequent paternity suit in Texas brought by the mother after her initial petition for paternity was dismissed with prejudice in New York).

1025. *Mossler v. Shields*, 818 S.W.2d 752, 753–54 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).

1026. *Purcell*, 940 S.W.2d at 600–02.

1027. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 2006).

without interruption, throughout the marriage.<sup>1028</sup> Partial summary judgment may also be appropriate to present uncontroverted evidence that a bank account is separate property and that the interest earned on the account (which is community property) was not commingled with the account.<sup>1029</sup>

6. *Existence of the Marital Relationship.* An informal (“common law”) marriage claim may also be disposed of by summary judgment. A party that alleges an informal marriage must prove that: (1) the parties agreed to be married; (2) after the agreement they lived in Texas together as husband and wife; and (3) they represented to others that they were married.<sup>1030</sup> Also, both parties must possess the legal capacity to marry.<sup>1031</sup> The informal marriage can be challenged by summary judgment either by the movant disproving one of the elements or by filing a no-evidence motion claiming that the nonmovant has no evidence to support one or more of the elements. For example, summary judgment has been used to dismiss a divorce action where one of the parties to the alleged informal marriage was under the age of eighteen and there was no evidence that the legal requirements for written or judicial consent under the Family Code were met.<sup>1032</sup>

## PART 2

### FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE

#### I. PROCEDURE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs the procedural requirements for summary judgment motions in federal court. It states summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”<sup>1033</sup>

1028. See *Dawson-Austin v. Austin*, 920 S.W.2d 776, 791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996) (holding entire value of corporation to be husband’s separate property because the husband acquired the shares before marriage and never acquired additional shares or divested himself of any shares during the marriage), *rev’d on other grounds*, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998).

1029. *Pace v. Pace*, 160 S.W.3d 706, 714–15 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied).

1030. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (Vernon 2006).

1031. *Kingery v. Hintz*, 124 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing *Villegas v. Griffin Indus.*, 975 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied)).

1032. *Id.* at 878–79.

1033. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); see *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); *Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co.*, 563 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 2009); Cont’l

Federal law also governs other procedural issues concerning summary judgment motions, such as the rules of evidence,<sup>1034</sup> the sufficiency of affidavits,<sup>1035</sup> and the timing and form of motions.<sup>1036</sup> In federal question cases, federal law and procedure are used to administer the entire case.<sup>1037</sup> Whereas in diversity cases, the applicable state law governs substantive issues and the federal rules regulate procedure.<sup>1038</sup>

#### A. *Timing*

Under Rule 56, a party may move for summary judgment at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery.<sup>1039</sup> But it is important to note that local rules or scheduling orders may impose different deadlines for filing motions.<sup>1040</sup> Furthermore, if the respondent has not had an adequate time for discovery, summary judgment may be premature.<sup>1041</sup>

#### B. *Notice and Hearing*

Recent amendments to the Federal Rules have displaced the old ten-day rule. Rule 56 no longer mandates that “[t]he motion must be served at least 10 days before the day set for the hearing.”<sup>1042</sup> Rather, the new rule neither mentions “hearing” nor provides for a specific time by which the motion must be served upon the opposing party.<sup>1043</sup>

Moreover, federal courts rarely hold oral hearings on summary judgment because an oral hearing is not required.<sup>1044</sup> Therefore, in federal court, motions are typically ruled on by submission. Thus, attorneys seeking an oral hearing should check local rules and the judge’s procedures manual and file a

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Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 555 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2009).

1034. FED. R. EVID. 101.

1035. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

1036. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)–(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b).

1037. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

1038. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Aubris Res. LP v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2009).

1039. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)–(c)(1)(A).

1040. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(1).

1041. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986); see *supra* Part 1, I.C (discussing grounds for a continuance available to the nonmovant in a summary judgment proceeding for the purpose of conducting further discovery).

1042. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2008) (amended 2009).

1043. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

1044. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996)); Hamman v. Sw. Gas Pipeline, Inc., 721 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1983).

motion specifically requesting an oral hearing.<sup>1045</sup> Generally the district court is not required to inform the respondent that the motion will be considered on a certain date.<sup>1046</sup>

Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) will be treated as one for summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.<sup>1047</sup> The court need not, however, specifically notify the parties that the court will consider the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.<sup>1048</sup> Thus, counsel should remain aware that, although such notice is often given, it is not required.

Finally, a district court may enter summary judgment *sua sponte*.<sup>1049</sup> But in that instance, the court “must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond akin to that required by FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).”<sup>1050</sup> The district court’s failure to give such notice may be harmless error if the respondent has no additional evidence or if all of the respondent’s additional evidence is

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1045. *Sw. Bell Tel. Co.*, 346 F.3d at 545–46 (holding the district court was not required to give the parties ten days notice prior to taking their summary judgment motions under consideration as long as the nonmovant was afforded ten days to respond to the original motion).

1046. *Henderson v. Johnson*, 201 F. App’x 284, 286 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[N]othing in [Rule 56] requires a district court to give the parties explicit notice before taking a summary-judgment motion under consideration.”).

1047. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); *see infra* Part 2, V (discussing Rule 12(b)(6) motions the court considers as Rule 56 motions). The inverse of this rule is also true: “[W]here a motion for summary judgment is solely based on the pleadings or only challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings, then such a motion should be evaluated in much the same way as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson*, 224 F.3d 425, 440 (5th Cir. 2000).

1048. *Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 901 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting *Clark v. Tarrant County, Tex.*, 798 F.2d 736, 746 (5th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the nonmovant only is entitled to ten days notice after the court accepts for consideration matters outside the pleadings. *Id.* (citing *Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 186, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1988)).

1049. *See OXY USA, Inc. v. Holden*, 306 F. App’x 69, 72 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); *Shepherd v. Gulf Coast Cmty. Servs.*, 221 F. App’x 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); *Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.*, 343 F.3d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is well-settled that a district court may grant summary judgment *sua sponte* . . .” (quoting *Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters.*, 230 F.3d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original)); *St. Paul*, 224 F.3d at 435.

1050. *Mannesman Demag Corp. v. M/V Concert Express*, 225 F.3d 587, 595 (5th Cir. 2000); *St. Paul*, 224 F.3d at 435. “[A] district court may not grant summary judgment *sua sponte* on grounds not requested by the moving party.” *Baker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 364 F.3d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting *John Deere Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank*, 809 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1987)). However, there is an exception “when the district court gives a party ten days notice; in those situations a court may grant summary judgment *sua sponte* on grounds not urged in a pending motion.” *Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB*, 489 F.3d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 2007). In contrast, an appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any grounds, including grounds other than those provided by the district court. *Izen v. Catalina*, 398 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2005).

reviewed on appeal and does not present a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>1051</sup> If the party against whom summary judgment was entered had a potentially valid defense that it was not on notice to raise, harm may be present and the district court's order may be reversed on appeal.<sup>1052</sup>

### C. Deadline to Respond

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states, "A party opposing the motion must file a response within 21 days after the motion is served or a responsive pleading is due, whichever is later."<sup>1053</sup> Local rules, however, may specify or alter the date by which responses must be filed. For example, in the Southern District of Texas the response must be filed within twenty-one days of the filing of the motion.<sup>1054</sup> In the Northern District of Texas, the response is also due twenty-one days from filing.<sup>1055</sup> But in the Eastern District of Texas, the response is due twelve days from service of the motion;<sup>1056</sup> and in the Western District of Texas, the response is due eleven days from service of the motion.<sup>1057</sup> Failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment will be taken as a statement of no opposition<sup>1058</sup> and may lead to entry of summary judgment against the non-responding party.<sup>1059</sup>

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1051. O'Hara v. Gen. Motors Corp., 508 F.3d 753, 764 (5th Cir. 2007); see Simmons v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 310 F.3d 865, 869 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating the failure to provide the required notice is rectified if the nonmovant is afforded an opportunity to present evidence supporting its arguments in a motion for reconsideration); Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 923 (5th Cir. 2000) (ruling the sua sponte grant of summary judgment was harmless error where the district court's post-summary judgment consideration and rulings cured any procedural defect); Love, 230 F.3d at 771 (finding the trial court did not plainly err by ruling sua sponte on the motion for summary judgment); St. Paul, 224 F.3d at 435–36 (determining the district court's grant of summary judgment sua sponte was not harmless because the plaintiff had evidence that could have created a genuine issue of material fact).

1052. See, e.g., Mannesman Demag Corp., 225 F.3d at 595 (reversing the grant of summary judgment when the third-party defendant had a potentially valid defense that it was not able to raise due to the sua sponte grant of summary judgment).

1053. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

1054. S. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.3.

1055. N. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.1(e).

1056. E. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7(e).

1057. W. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7(d).

1058. S. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.4. However, summary judgment may not be awarded by default. Yowman v. Jefferson County Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep't, 370 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581 (E.D. Tex. 2005); see also Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918–19 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) ("We have recognized the power of district courts to adopt local rules requiring parties who oppose motions to file statements of opposition. But we have not approved the automatic grant, upon failure to comply with such rules, of motions that are dispositive of the litigation." (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)).

1059. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); see also Buckley v. Donohue Indus. Inc., 100 F. App'x

*D. Discovery*

Pursuant to Rule 56(f), a court may deny a summary judgment motion, order a continuance, or order any other appropriate relief where an adequate time for discovery has not passed to allow the respondent to present fact issues to preclude summary judgment.<sup>1060</sup> If the respondent to a motion for summary judgment believes disposition of the case is premature, he or she should file a Rule 56(f) motion with the proper supporting affidavit.<sup>1061</sup> Failure to seek this relief may result in the consideration and entry of summary judgment<sup>1062</sup> as well as waiver of the prematurity argument on appeal.<sup>1063</sup>

The Fifth Circuit has made clear that “a continuance of a motion for summary judgment for purposes of discovery should

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275, 278 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (indicating the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension of time to file a response to summary judgment after the plaintiff failed to timely respond).

1060. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f); *Six Flags, Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co.*, 565 F.3d 948, 963 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Although ‘a continuance of a motion for summary judgment for purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a matter of a course,’ the party seeking additional discovery must first demonstrate ‘how that discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.’” (citation omitted)); *Wichita Falls Office Assocs. v. Banc One Corp.*, 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1992). The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, stated that a sufficient time for discovery must have elapsed before a summary judgment is appropriate. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). In *Celotex*, the summary judgment motion was filed one year after the lawsuit commenced, which the Court found to be adequate time for discovery. *Id.* By contrast, when a motion for summary judgment was filed “shortly after the . . . answer to the complaint and . . . neither party ha[d] conducted any discovery,” the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment on the grounds that sufficient time had not elapsed. *Fano v. O’Neill*, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987).

1061. *United States v. Bloom*, 112 F.3d 200, 205 n.17 (5th Cir. 1997); *Wichita Falls Office Assocs.*, 978 F.2d at 919 (“The purpose of Rule 56(f) is to provide non-movants with a much needed tool to keep open the doors of discovery in order to adequately combat a summary judgment motion.”); *Bernhardt ex rel. Bernhardt v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 892 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Rule 56(f) authorizes the opponent of a summary judgment motion to seek a continuance to obtain controverting affidavits or necessary discovery.”). Under *Wichita Falls* and *International Shortstop*, there are four elements a nonmovant must satisfy before a court will grant a continuance of summary judgment: (1) request extended discovery before the court rules on the summary judgment; (2) put the court on notice that further discovery relating to the summary judgment motion is being sought; (3) show the requested discovery relates to the summary judgment motion; and (4) act diligently such that the nonmovant was not placed in the current position through his own inaction. *Wichita Falls Office Assocs.*, 978 F.2d at 919; *Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.*, 939 F.2d 1257, 1266–68 (5th Cir. 1991).

1062. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).

1063. *Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.*, 98 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding a party who does not make a Rule 56(f) motion is foreclosed from arguing inadequate time for discovery on appeal); see also *Fanning v. Metro. Transit Auth.*, 141 F. App’x 311, 314–15 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (indicating a party cannot complain about an inadequate time for discovery to defend against summary judgment when the party did not seek Rule 56(f) relief prior to the court’s ruling).

be granted almost as a matter of course.”<sup>1064</sup> As a practical matter, the respondent seeking a continuance to conduct further discovery under Rule 56(f) must convince the court that the requested discovery is more than a fishing expedition, is likely to lead to controverting evidence, and was not reasonably available despite the respondent’s diligence.<sup>1065</sup> The burden to show that extended discovery is necessary and likely to produce such results squarely is on the party seeking the discovery.<sup>1066</sup> The court may be more inclined to grant a continuance if the respondent files discovery requests concurrently with Rule 56(f) declarations.

The Fifth Circuit has held, “A plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a summary judgment motion may be cut off when, within the trial court’s discretion, the record indicates that further discovery will not likely produce facts necessary to defeat the motion.”<sup>1067</sup> In response, the party opposing the continuance for further discovery—the movant for summary judgment—should attempt to convince the court that the respondent’s discovery requests are simply a delay tactic. For example, the Rule 56(f) motion may be based on incontrovertible facts, may involve pure questions of law, or may request discovery that relates to immaterial issues.<sup>1068</sup>

The decision to grant the continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be sustained unless the court acts arbitrarily or in a clearly unreasonable manner.<sup>1069</sup> “If [the movant] has not diligently pursued discovery, however, she is not entitled to relief under rule 56(f).”<sup>1070</sup> For example, the Fifth Circuit

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1064. *Six Flags, Inc.*, 565 F.3d at 963 (quoting *Int’l Shortstop*, 939 F.2d at 1267).

1065. *Id.* (“[T]he party seeking additional discovery must first demonstrate ‘how that discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.’” (quoting *Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist.*, 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir. 2001))).

1066. *Freeman v. United States*, 556 F.3d 326, 341 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing its necessity.”).

1067. *Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.*, 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); see also *Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara*, 364 F.3d 274, 305 (5th Cir. 2004); *Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 361 F.3d 875, 881 (5th Cir. 2004); *Bauer v. Albemarle Corp.*, 169 F.3d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1999); *Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.*, 694 F.2d 1017, 1030 (5th Cir. 1983) (“A ‘bare assertion’ that the evidence supporting a plaintiff’s allegation is in the hands of the defendant is insufficient to justify a denial of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(f).” (quoting *Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981))).

1068. See *Beattie*, 254 F.3d at 606 (“[Movant] must show (1) why she needs additional discovery and (2) how that discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.”).

1069. *Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell*, 66 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1995); *Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc.*, 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993); *Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 893 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1990); *Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.*, 780 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1986).

1070. *Beattie*, 254 F.3d at 606.

upheld the denial of a continuance when the plaintiff had ample time for discovery and the plaintiff's request was conclusory in nature.<sup>1071</sup> Moreover, the Fifth Circuit also has found that as little as nine months after the time the action was filed may constitute sufficient time for discovery.<sup>1072</sup> In another case, the Fifth Circuit upheld a summary judgment granted fourteen months after the commencement of the case even though the plaintiff's discovery efforts had been considerably frustrated.<sup>1073</sup> The court reasoned the plaintiff should have filed a motion requesting a continuance for further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f).<sup>1074</sup>

## II. STANDARDS OF PROOF FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS<sup>1075</sup>

### A. *When the Movant Bears the Burden of Proof*<sup>1076</sup>

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permit the party bearing the burden of proof to move for summary judgment on its claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim.<sup>1077</sup> To obtain summary judgment in its favor, a claimant must demonstrate affirmatively by admissible evidence that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning each element of its claim for relief.<sup>1078</sup> In addition, if the defendant has asserted an affirmative defense, the plaintiff must identify the lack of a genuine issue of any material fact concerning those defenses.<sup>1079</sup> Because the defendant has the burden of proof on affirmative defenses, the plaintiff need only demonstrate the absence of evidence on the affirmative defense.<sup>1080</sup>

### B. *When the Movant Does Not Bear the Burden of Proof*

1. *Movant's Initial Burden.* When a movant seeks summary judgment on a claim upon which it does not bear the

1071. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 714 (5th Cir. 1994).

1072. *Transamerica Ins. Co.*, 66 F.3d at 721 (upholding summary judgment when nonmovants made no attempt whatsoever to conduct discovery during the pendency of the case).

1073. *Fontenot*, 780 F.2d at 1192–94.

1074. *Id.* at 1194.

1075. Cross-motions for summary judgment “must be considered separately” because each movant bears its burden independent of the other. *Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc.*, 395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004).

1076. The burden of proof at trial is determined by the pleadings. *See, e.g., United States v. MMR Corp. (LA)*, 907 F.2d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting the burden of proving an affirmative defense is on the defendant).

1077. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c).

1078. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

1079. *See id.* at 322–23.

1080. *See id.*



burden of proof, it bears an initial burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the adverse party's claim.<sup>1081</sup> The movant cannot rely on a conclusory statement that the respondent has not presented evidence on an essential element of its claim.<sup>1082</sup> Rather, the moving party must point out to the court specifically the absence of evidence showing a genuine dispute.<sup>1083</sup>

The more difficult question is how to make this showing.<sup>1084</sup> The movant must identify the specific issue or issues on which it

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1081. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); *Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co.*, 402 F.3d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 2005) ("On summary judgment, the moving party is not required to present evidence proving the absence of a material fact issue; rather, the moving party may meet its burden by simply 'pointing to an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'" (quoting *Armstrong v. Am. Home Shield Corp.*, 333 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2003))); *Najera v. M/V Clipper Lis*, Civ. A. No. H-06-1003, 2009 WL 211780, at \*2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2009).

1082. *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson*, 224 F.3d 425, 440 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing when a defending party moves for summary judgment, it may not rely on a conclusory statement that the other party has no evidence; rather, the moving party must demonstrate that there are no factual issues warranting trial); *Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc.*, 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding the movant may bear its burden by highlighting a lack of proof concerning an essential element of the respondent's case), *abrogated on other grounds per curiam* by *Little v. Liquid Air Corp.*, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

1083. *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 322–25; *Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 186, 198 (5th Cir. 1988). "Moreover, the nonmoving party's burden is not affected by the type of case; summary judgment is appropriate in *any* case 'where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant.'" *Liquid Air Corp.*, 37 F.3d at 1075–76 (quoting *Armstrong v. City of Dallas*, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993)).

1084. An interesting twist occurs when a party does not raise an issue until its reply brief. For example, in *Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais*, the movant raised an issue for the first time in his reply brief. *Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais*, 383 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2004). When objecting on appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated, as long as the nonmovant had an adequate opportunity to respond prior to the trial court's ruling on summary judgment, it cannot complain on appeal that the issue was not timely raised. *Id.* But it appears, in the Fifth Circuit at least, there must be some indication in the record that the nonmovant requested an opportunity to respond or that the court invited or allowed the nonmovant to respond or the granting of summary judgment will be reversible. *See United States v. \$92,203.00 in U.S. Currency*, 537 F.3d 504, 507 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (refusing to consider evidence submitted post-briefing where the nonmovant was not provided an opportunity to respond). As the Fifth Circuit stated in *Gillaspy v. Dallas Independent School District*:

[T]here is no indication that [nonmovant] requested an opportunity to respond [to evidence proffered in a reply brief], nor any indication that the district court invited or allowed [nonmovant] an opportunity to file supplemental briefing. Because our jurisprudence is less than clear, we think it prudent to reverse the summary judgment . . . and remand the case to the district court to allow [nonmovant] to respond and offer additional argument and evidence if she has any.

*Gillaspy v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 278 F. App'x 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Other courts appear to have adopted this approach. *See, e.g., Hughes v. Astrue*, 277 F. App'x 646, 646–47 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (allowing the district court to consider

claims the respondent has no supporting evidence and demonstrate the absence of such evidence.<sup>1085</sup> In so doing, the movant may:

- demonstrate the absence of evidence on a crucial element of the opposing party's case (e.g., plaintiff was asked to identify all companies who manufactured the product and did not list the defendant);<sup>1086</sup>
- present evidence that disproves some essential element of the opposing party's case (e.g., admissions);<sup>1087</sup> or
- rely on the complete absence of proof of an essential element of the respondent's case.<sup>1088</sup>

The Fifth Circuit discussed this burden in *St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Williamson*.<sup>1089</sup> There, a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim argued the defendants did not meet their initial burden of pointing out the absence of a triable issue.<sup>1090</sup> The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating the defendants "did proffer evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment. In addition to pointing out the lack of evidence supporting [plaintiff's] claims, they offered affidavits, depositions, and other relevant documentary evidence."<sup>1091</sup> Although the defendants' evidence admittedly related to the "pattern of racketeering" issue, rather than the pertinent "investment in a RICO enterprise" inquiry, the Fifth Circuit found plaintiffs satisfied Rule 56(c).<sup>1092</sup>

2. *Respondent's Burden.* The respondent to a summary judgment motion must come forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>1093</sup> Summary

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evidence submitted in a reply brief as long as the opposing party has an opportunity to respond); *Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns*, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 21 (D.D.C. 2007) (considering evidence submitted post-briefing on the ground that the opposing party had an opportunity to and did respond).

1085. *Little v. Liquid Air Corp.*, 952 F.2d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1992), *aff'd on reh'g per curiam*, 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); *see also* *Hughes v. City of Garland*, 204 F.3d 223, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating the propriety of summary judgment centered around the plaintiff's alleged failure to produce evidence with respect to one element of her cause of action).

1086. *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 319–20.

1087. *Id.* at 322–23.

1088. *Id.* at 325.

1089. *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson*, 224 F.3d 425, 440 (5th Cir. 2000).

1090. *Id.*

1091. *Id.*

1092. *Id.*

1093. *FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)*; *First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford*, 555 F.3d 177, 180

judgment in the movant's favor is appropriate if the respondent fails to make this showing.<sup>1094</sup> The burden to show there is a genuine issue of material fact is on the party who seeks to avoid a summary judgment.<sup>1095</sup> If no response is filed, Rule 56(e) provides that the court, if appropriate, should grant the motion for summary judgment.<sup>1096</sup> The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that a district court may not grant a summary judgment motion simply because the opposing party failed to respond even if the failure to oppose the motion violates a local rule.<sup>1097</sup>

### III. RESPONDING TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

#### A. Supreme Court Precedent

The seminal case on summary judgments in federal court is *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*.<sup>1098</sup> There, a widow sued an asbestos manufacturer for the asbestos-related death of her husband.<sup>1099</sup> The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the widow's failure to produce evidence that her husband had been exposed to its products.<sup>1100</sup> The defendant argued the widow's response consisted of inadmissible hearsay.<sup>1101</sup> The U.S. Supreme Court found summary judgment would be mandated if the plaintiff failed, after adequate time for discovery, to present evidence of matters on which she had the burden of proof.<sup>1102</sup> It

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(5th Cir. 2009); *Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co.*, 436 F.3d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 2006); *DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson*, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005); *Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States*, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004).

1094. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); see *Hughes v. City of Garland*, 204 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2000); *Gunaca v. Texas*, 65 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1995).

1095. See *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 324; *Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 240 F.3d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A trial must sort out these assertions of fact.”); *Prejean v. Foster*, 227 F.3d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing grant of summary judgment where fact issue remained regarding voting district configurations).

1096. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).

1097. *Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima*, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanding because the court could not determine if the trial court had granted the motion on the merits rather than on the respondent's failure to oppose the motion); see also *Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.*, 50 F.3d 360, 362 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1995); *Kelley v. Price-Macemon, Inc.*, 992 F.2d 1408, 1411–12 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding summary judgment despite nonmovant's failure to respond where the trial court decided the motion on the merits rather than the lack of timely response); *Eversley v. MBank Dallas*, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988).

1098. *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. 317.

1099. *Id.* at 319.

1100. *Id.* at 319–20.

1101. *Id.* at 320.

1102. *Id.* at 322–23.

remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was sufficient to defeat summary judgment.<sup>1103</sup> The Court's ruling illustrates it was not the defendant's burden to negate such issues.<sup>1104</sup> Rather, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact to be heard at trial.<sup>1105</sup>

In addition to *Celotex*, practitioners should be familiar with *Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*<sup>1106</sup> and *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*<sup>1107</sup> In those cases the Court expounded upon the meaning of the term "genuine issue of material fact." *Liberty Lobby* is instructive on what evidence raises a "genuine issue" sufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment.<sup>1108</sup> At issue in *Liberty Lobby* was the question whether, in a suit for libel in a "New York Times case,"<sup>1109</sup> the heightened evidentiary requirements applicable to proof of actual malice (i.e., the standard of clear and convincing evidence) must be considered for purposes of a summary judgment motion.<sup>1110</sup> Answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled the trial judge "must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability."<sup>1111</sup> When evaluating the evidence presented by the respondent, "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."<sup>1112</sup> There is no genuine issue for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the respondent.<sup>1113</sup>

*Liberty Lobby* also discussed the "materiality" element, stating, "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."<sup>1114</sup> The Court explained that the materiality determination rests upon the substantive law, and

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1103. *Id.* at 327–28.

1104. *Id.* at 323.

1105. *Id.* at 324.

1106. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

1107. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

1108. *Id.* at 249–50.

1109. In *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, the Supreme Court held, in a libel suit brought by a public official, that the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the alleged defamatory statement. *N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).

1110. *Liberty Lobby*, 477 U.S. at 247.

1111. *Id.* at 254.

1112. *Id.*

1113. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see *Love v. Nat'l Med. Enters.*, 230 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 2000).

1114. *Liberty Lobby*, 477 U.S. at 248.

the substantive law identifies which facts are critical versus which facts are irrelevant.<sup>1115</sup> The Court clarified that materiality is only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in relation to the legal elements of the claim.<sup>1116</sup>

*Matsushita* considered what evidence was required to preclude entry of summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.<sup>1117</sup> Under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, to survive a properly supported summary judgment motion by the defendants, the plaintiffs must present evidence that excluded the possibility the alleged conspirators acted independently.<sup>1118</sup> The Supreme Court thus turned to the applicable substantive law to analyze what facts would be material and, hence, crucial to the plaintiffs to withstand summary judgment.<sup>1119</sup>

A genuine issue of material fact does not exist if the respondent's evidence merely shows "there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."<sup>1120</sup> Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only "when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."<sup>1121</sup> Moreover, there is an inverse relationship between the quality of the evidence the respondent must present and the overall plausibility of the respondent's claims.<sup>1122</sup> If the claims of the party bearing the burden of proof appear "implausible," that party must respond to the motion for summary judgment with more persuasive evidence to support its claim than would otherwise be required.<sup>1123</sup>

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1115. *Id.*

1116. *Id.*

1117. *Matsushita*, 475 U.S. at 585–87.

1118. *Id.* at 588.

1119. *Id.* at 588–90 (discussing which facts would be necessary to prove a predatory pricing scheme).

1120. *Id.* at 586; see *Evans v. City of Houston*, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001). In *Evans*, the plaintiff sued the City of Houston for race and age discrimination and retaliation. *Evans*, 246 F.3d at 347. The Fifth Circuit stated, "Merely disputing [an employer's] assessment of [a plaintiff's] work performance will not necessarily support an inference of pretext." *Id.* at 355 (alterations in original). A plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit (utilizing the burden-shifting scheme under *McDonnell Douglas*) cannot survive summary judgment merely because she disagrees with the employer's characterization of her work history. *Id.* Rather, the issue is whether the employer's perception of the employee's performance, accurate or not, was the true reason for the adverse employment action. *Id.* "[T]he only question on summary judgment is whether the evidence of retaliation, in its totality, supports an inference of retaliation." *Id.* (quoting *Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP*, 190 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 1999)).

1121. *Singh v. Holder*, 568 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.*, 537 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2008)).

1122. *Matsushita*, 475 U.S. at 587.

1123. *Id.*

*B. Items in Response*

The respondent cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact by relying upon the allegations in her pleadings.<sup>1124</sup> To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must respond by affidavit, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.<sup>1125</sup> The response may include:

- (1) admissible summary judgment evidence;<sup>1126</sup>
- (2) a memorandum of points and authorities;<sup>1127</sup>
- (3) any objections to the movant's evidence;<sup>1128</sup> and
- (4) a request for more time for discovery, when appropriate.<sup>1129</sup>

The court views all the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent and draws "[a]ny reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the non-moving party."<sup>1130</sup> The respondent need not

1124. *Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal*, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000); *Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi*, 202 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2000); *Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, Inc.*, 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); *see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.*, 780 F.2d 1190, 1195–96 (5th Cir. 1986) (indicating there is no reason for a trial when there is no evidence to support the pleadings).

1125. *FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)*; *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); *Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States*, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004); *Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr.*, 245 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting plaintiff may demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact through direct or circumstantial evidence).

1126. *FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)*; *Okoye*, 245 F.3d at 510 n.5 (stating hearsay statements are not competent summary judgment evidence).

1127. *See, e.g., S. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.1(B)* (requiring opposed motions "[i]nclude or be accompanied by authority").

1128. *See, e.g., FDIC v. N.H. Ins. Co.*, 953 F.2d 478, 484–85 (9th Cir. 1991); *Eguia v. Tompkins*, 756 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Documents presented in support of a motion for summary judgment may be considered even though they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 56 if there is no objection to their use.").

1129. *FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)*.

1130. *Chieftain Int'l (U.S.), Inc. v. Se. Offshore, Inc.*, 553 F.3d 817, 819 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Robinson v. Orient Marine Co.*, 505 F.3d 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2007)); *see First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford*, 555 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2009). However, "[a] court is not required to draw legal inferences in the non-movant's favor on summary judgment review." *Crowell v. Shell Oil Co.*, 541 F.3d 295, 309 (5th Cir. 2008). And the factual controversy will be resolved in the nonmovant's favor only "when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." *Alexander v. Eeds*, 392 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting *Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston*, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, at summary judgment, credibility determinations are resolved in favor of the respondent. *Armour v. Knowles*, 512 F.3d 147, 155 n.16 (5th Cir. 2007). "Summary judgment is not appropriate when 'questions about the credibility of key witnesses loom . . . large' and the evidence could permit the trier-of-fact to treat their testimony with 'skeptical scrutiny.'" *Deville v. Marcantel*, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.*, 233 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2000)). "The court's role at the summary judgment stage is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

necessarily present his or her own summary judgment evidence. Instead, if the respondent believes evidence already submitted by the movant indicates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the respondent may direct the court's attention to that evidence and rely on it without submitting additional evidence.<sup>1131</sup> In any event, the respondent must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.<sup>1132</sup> It is not enough simply to rely on evidence in the record to avoid summary judgment without specifically referring to the precise evidence that supports the respondent's claim.<sup>1133</sup> The respondent must "articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim."<sup>1134</sup> Moreover, even when evidence exists in the record that would tend to support the respondent's claim, if the respondent fails to refer to it, that evidence is not properly before the court.<sup>1135</sup> It is not the function of the court to search the record on the nonmovant's behalf for evidence that may raise a fact issue.<sup>1136</sup>

#### IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

##### A. *Declarations and Affidavits*

Declarations or affidavits submitted in connection with summary judgment proceedings must:

- (1) be based on personal knowledge;<sup>1137</sup>

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the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." *Campo v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 562 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

As an interesting aside, in a qualified immunity case, the Fifth Circuit explained that where "facts are disputed and significant factual gaps remain that require the court to draw several plaintiff-favorable inferences . . . [the court] must consider what a factfinder could reasonably conclude in filling these gaps and then assume the conclusion most favorable to the plaintiff." *Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex.*, 560 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 2009).

1131. *Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States*, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004) (directing the nonmovant to point out "the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim"); *Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 186, 199–200 (5th Cir. 1988).

1132. *Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp.*, 325 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2003); *see also* *Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc.*, 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1996); *C.F. Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 836 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating "[a]ppellant had the opportunity to raise [an] issue by way of affidavit or other evidence in response" to the motion for summary judgment but elected to rely solely on legal argument).

1133. *CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co.*, 565 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 2009).

1134. *Id.* (quoting *Smith*, 391 F.3d at 625).

1135. *Id.* In *CQ, Inc.*, the Fifth Circuit found that the respondent sufficiently referred to evidence in the record by cross-citing its own motion for summary judgment. *Id.* at 274.

1136. *Topalian v. Ehrman*, 954 F.2d 1125, 1137 & n.30 (5th Cir. 1992).

1137. *FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden*, 420 F.3d 521, 529–30 (5th

- (2) state facts as would be admissible in evidence (i.e., evidentiary facts, not conclusions),<sup>1138</sup> and
- (3) affirmatively demonstrate the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.<sup>1139</sup>

Unsupported affidavits setting forth conclusions of law “are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”<sup>1140</sup> A party cannot create an issue of fact merely by presenting testimony through a declaration that contradicts previous sworn testimony, such as deposition testimony.<sup>1141</sup> From a practical standpoint, failure to produce opposing affidavits frequently will doom an otherwise meritorious response.<sup>1142</sup>

### B. Documents

Sworn or certified copies of all documents or parts of documents referred to in a declaration must be attached to the

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Cir. 2005) (explaining that a summary judgment affidavit need not explicitly state that it is based on personal knowledge and stating “there is no requirement for a set of magic words”); *see also* *De la O v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, Tex.*, 417 F.3d 495, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting affidavit as based on speculation rather than personal knowledge); *FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc.*, 973 F.2d 1249, 1254 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992); *Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc.*, 831 F.2d 77, 80–81 (5th Cir. 1987).

1138. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1); *First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford*, 555 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A] summary assertion made in an affidavit is simply not enough proof to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”); *De la O*, 417 F.3d at 502 (“Statements made on information and belief do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence under rule 56(e).”); *Crescent Towing & Salvage Co. v. M/V Anax*, 40 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding mere conclusions and statements that a document exists are insufficient for summary judgment); *Salas v. Carpenter*, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that conclusory assertions are not admissible as summary judgment evidence); *Walker v. SBC Servs., Inc.*, 375 F. Supp. 2d 524, 535 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (“Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence.”); *see also* *Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr.*, 245 F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting the employee’s statement in a Title VII discrimination suit was unsworn and, therefore, was not competent summary judgment evidence); *Wisner Distrib. Co. v. Brink’s Inc.*, Civ.A. No. H-03-5897, 2005 WL 1840149, at \*6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005) (“Affidavits supporting or opposing summary judgment must ‘set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e))).

1139. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1); *see, e.g.*, *Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc.*, 948 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an affidavit that gave “no indication that [the affiant was] qualified to render opinions on such matters”).

1140. *Shaboon v. Duncan*, 252 F.3d 722, 736 (5th Cir. 2001).

1141. *See First Colony Life Ins. Co.*, 555 F.3d at 181 (“[A] summary assertion made in an affidavit is simply not enough proof to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). *Compare* *Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 952 F.2d 128, 136 n.23 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the use of an affidavit to contradict the affiant’s previous sworn deposition testimony), *with* *Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co.*, 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (“[I]f conflicting inferences may be drawn from a deposition and from an affidavit filed by the same party . . . , a fact issue is presented.”).

1142. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e) (allowing entry of summary judgment once the movant has met its burden and the nonmovant fails to adequately respond).



declaration or served concurrently.<sup>1143</sup> Documents should be properly authenticated; mere attachment to a declaration does not make them admissible.<sup>1144</sup>

### C. *Discovery Products*

Summary judgment evidence may also consist of deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, or admissions.<sup>1145</sup> As with other documentary evidence, these discovery documents must be properly authenticated (for example, by affidavit or declaration establishing the accuracy of the attached copy).<sup>1146</sup> A party must serve and file the discovery responses with appropriate authentication, usually by attaching them as exhibits to an attorney's declaration.<sup>1147</sup> Only those portions of deposition testimony otherwise admissible at trial are proper summary judgment proof.<sup>1148</sup>

The party submitting deposition testimony transcripts as summary judgment evidence must identify the precise sections of the testimony that support the party's position. It is important to note that "Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment."<sup>1149</sup> Consequently, the district court likely will not search through voluminous transcripts to find the testimony that allegedly raises a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>1150</sup>

Admissions made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 are conclusive as to the matters admitted.<sup>1151</sup> These admissions "cannot be overcome at the summary judgment stage

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1143. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); *Okoye*, 245 F.3d at 515 (rejecting an unsworn statement).

1144. *See, e.g.*, *Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc.*, 302 F.3d 531, 544 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting unsworn state court pleadings are not proper summary judgment evidence); *Meserole v. M/V Fina Belgique*, 736 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (stating an unsworn letter from an expert is inadmissible as summary judgment evidence).

1145. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1).

1146. *Id.*

1147. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e).

1148. *See, e.g.*, *Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc.*, 555 F.3d 383, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The admissibility of evidence 'is governed by the same rules, whether at trial or on summary judgment.'" (quoting *First United Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 96 F.3d 135, 136–37 (5th Cir. 1996))).

1149. *Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.*, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.*, 953 F.2d 909, 915 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).

1150. *Cf. United States v. Dunkel*, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.").

1151. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); *Armour v. Knowles*, 512 F.3d 147, 154 n.13 (5th Cir. 2007); *In re Carney*, 258 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001).

by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary judgment record.”<sup>1152</sup> Rather, if a party seeks to avoid the consequences of failing to timely respond to Rule 36 requests for admissions, he or she should move to amend or withdraw the admissions in accordance with Rule 36(b).<sup>1153</sup>

#### D. Pleadings

In federal court, verified pleadings may be treated as affidavits if they meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e),<sup>1154</sup> which requires the facts asserted be within the pleader’s personal knowledge and be otherwise admissible evidence.<sup>1155</sup> Admissions by respondents in their pleadings, even if unverified, are competent summary judgment evidence.<sup>1156</sup>

As a practical matter, the use of cross-references to pleadings should be kept to a minimum in summary judgment practice. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides that “statement[s] in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion,”<sup>1157</sup> counsel’s use of this tactic should be utilized sparingly—especially in cases with numerous pleadings. In *CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co.*, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a respondent to a summary judgment motion adequately referred to evidence in the record sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by simply cross-citing its own motion for summary judgment.<sup>1158</sup> In that case, although the court “decline[d] to endorse a bright-line rule,” it found the respondent’s “targeted cross-citation to [its] own motion” sufficiently referred to evidence in the record to support its notion that a genuine issue of material fact existed in the case.<sup>1159</sup> Nevertheless, the better approach for practitioners is to attach all pertinent exhibits to the motion currently pending before the court and “articulate the precise manner in which the submitted . . . evidence supports [the] claim.”<sup>1160</sup> More importantly,

1152. *In re Carney*, 258 F.3d at 420.

1153. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); *In re Carney*, 258 F.3d at 420.

1154. *Compare* *Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 186, 194 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the use of verified pleadings if the requirements of Rule 56(e) are met), *with* *City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.*, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) (stating that, in Texas practice, pleadings themselves do not constitute summary judgment proof).

1155. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1).

1156. *Isquith*, 847 F.2d at 195 (allowing defendants to rely upon the factual allegations of the complaint as admissions or stipulations for the purpose of summary judgment).

1157. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).

1158. *CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co.*, 565 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2009).

1159. *Id.*

1160. *Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States*, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004).

local rules may require that summary judgment evidence be included in an appendix attached to the motion.<sup>1161</sup>

### *E. Expert Testimony*

An expert's testimony must be relevant and reliable in order to be considered competent summary judgment evidence.<sup>1162</sup> The trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases on admissibility of expert testimony regarding "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"<sup>1163</sup>—*Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*,<sup>1164</sup> *General Electric Co. v. Joiner*,<sup>1165</sup> and *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*<sup>1166</sup>—sets out the standards by which federal trial courts must evaluate expert testimony.<sup>1167</sup>

*Daubert* mandates that trial judges, in accordance with Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 702, act in a gatekeeping role by excluding unreliable scientific evidence.<sup>1168</sup> In performing this function, the district court must determine whether the proffered scientific testimony is grounded in the methods and procedures of science by examining a non-exhaustive list of factors.<sup>1169</sup> Those factors include: (1) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) the degree of acceptance within the scientific community.<sup>1170</sup>

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1161. See, e.g., N. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.1(i) ("A party who relies on documentary . . . or non-documentary evidence to support or oppose a motion must include such evidence in an appendix."); S. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.7 ("If a motion or response requires consideration of facts not appearing of record, proof by affidavit or other documentary evidence must be filed with the motion or response.").

1162. *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). "The proponent of an expert's testimony need not prove the testimony is factually correct, but rather need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence the testimony is reliable." *Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc.*, 555 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2009). In addition, a party should timely designate its experts in order to avoid a motion to strike by the opposition. See, e.g., *Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 361 F.3d 875, 882–84 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by barring expert due to untimely designation per Rule 26(a)(2)(A)).

1163. FED. R. EVID. 702.

1164. *Daubert*, 509 U.S. 579.

1165. *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

1166. *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

1167. For an excellent discussion of these three cases, see Margaret A. Berger, *The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony*, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000).

1168. *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 597.

1169. *Id.* at 592–93.

1170. *Id.* at 593–94.

In *Joiner*, the Supreme Court considered the standard of review to apply in reviewing a district court's exclusion of expert testimony under *Daubert*.<sup>1171</sup> The district court in *Joiner* excluded the opinions of the plaintiff's expert under *Daubert* and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.<sup>1172</sup> The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating the Federal Rules of Evidence displayed a preference for admissibility of expert testimony that warranted a particularly stringent standard of review.<sup>1173</sup> The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the appropriate standard of review for the appellate courts in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under *Daubert*.<sup>1174</sup> The Court held the abuse of discretion standard was appropriate, rather than the more stringent standard suggested by the Eleventh Circuit.<sup>1175</sup>

In *Kumho Tire*, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve confusion in the lower courts regarding whether *Daubert*'s standards related only to scientific evidence (often referred to as "hard science"), or whether the gatekeeping function also applied to "technical, or other specialized knowledge" categories of evidence (often referred to as "soft science").<sup>1176</sup> The Court held that trial courts should apply the *Daubert* analysis to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.<sup>1177</sup> The "trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that *Daubert* mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability."<sup>1178</sup> The Court reiterated that the test of reliability is "flexible" and the *Daubert* factors will not necessarily apply to all experts in every case,<sup>1179</sup> a point often overlooked by practitioners who attempt to exclude all experts identified in their opponent's case.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs expert testimony, was amended in 2000 in response to *Daubert* and its progeny.<sup>1180</sup> Rule 702 now reads:

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1171. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138–39 (1997).

1172. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326–27 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

1173. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529, 534 (11th Cir. 1996).

1174. *Joiner*, 522 U.S. at 138–39.

1175. *Id.* at 141–43.

1176. *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1999). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 refers to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," FED. R. EVID. 702, but *Daubert*'s holding was limited by its facts to admissibility of scientific evidence. *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).

1177. *Kumho Tire Co.*, 526 U.S. at 141.

1178. *Id.*

1179. *Id.* at 141–42.

1180. FED. R. EVID. 702; *Notes of Advisory Committee on 2000 Amendments*, in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 104–09 (2004).

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.<sup>1181</sup>

In federal court, the party seeking to proffer expert testimony must establish the relevancy and reliability of its expert's testimony—or risk the trial court's exclusion of the testimony pursuant to *Daubert*. These rules also implicate Texas summary judgment practice. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i),<sup>1182</sup> the respondent to a “no-evidence” motion must be able to overcome a challenge pursuant to *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*<sup>1183</sup> and *Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.*<sup>1184</sup>—the corollaries to *Daubert* and *Kumho* in Texas state court—when relying upon expert testimony to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment motion.<sup>1185</sup> Accordingly, neither the movant nor the respondent can wait until trial to develop an expert's qualifications, given the potentially serious ramifications of exclusion of the expert's testimony at the dispositive motion stage.<sup>1186</sup>

As a practice point, counsel should consider filing a motion to exclude an expert together with its motion for summary judgment. If the respondent's case is dependent upon the admissibility of the expert's testimony, the district court may grant summary judgment contemporaneously with or shortly

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1181. FED. R. EVID. 702. Former Rule 702 provided: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (1999) (amended 2000).

1182. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(a)(i) (“After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”).

1183. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549, 555–58 (Tex. 1995).

1184. *Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.*, 972 S.W.2d 713, 720–26 (Tex. 1998).

1185. Further, in *United Blood Services v. Longoria*, the Texas Supreme Court required summary judgment proof of an expert's qualifications in support of the response to a summary judgment motion. *United Blood Servs. v. Longoria*, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). The court, using an abuse of discretion standard (similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in *Joiner*), upheld the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony. *Id.* at 31.

1186. See, e.g., *id.* at 30–31.

after excluding the expert's testimony. For example, in *Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, the district court excluded expert testimony because it was inadmissible under *Daubert*.<sup>1187</sup> After striking the experts, the court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor.<sup>1188</sup> On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the expert's testimony under *Daubert* because the proposed testimony consisted of "unsupported speculation" and thus was unreliable.<sup>1189</sup> The Fifth Circuit further affirmed the grant of summary judgment, noting, after striking the expert testimony, the plaintiffs failed to provide any further summary judgment evidence in support of their claims.<sup>1190</sup>

Additionally, in *Michaels v. Avitech, Inc.*, a negligence action arising from the crash of a private plane, the Fifth Circuit indirectly considered the impact of *Daubert* expert testimony in the context of a summary judgment motion.<sup>1191</sup> The district court struck the expert's reports for violations of discovery disclosure requirements.<sup>1192</sup> The Fifth Circuit ruled the district court erred in striking the reports yet stated, "It remains to determine whether the plaintiff can withstand summary judgment, even considering all of his experts and reports."<sup>1193</sup> The court noted the theory of the plaintiff's expert "would likely have been inadmissible at trial under *Daubert*," and it was "perhaps remiss to attempt a *Daubert* inquiry at the appellate level when the district court did not perform one."<sup>1194</sup> Nevertheless, to determine whether the plaintiff provided sufficient and competent summary judgment evidence in his response, "it would be equally remiss for [the court] to ignore the fact that a plaintiff's expert evidence lacks any rational probative value."<sup>1195</sup> On summary judgment, if the evidence gives rise to numerous inferences that are equally plausible, yet only one inference is consistent with the plaintiff's theory, the plaintiff does not satisfy his summary judgment burden, "absent at least some evidence that excludes the other potential [proximate] causes."<sup>1196</sup> Because the plaintiff's expert made no attempt to rule out other sources of proximate cause, the court held his testimony was not "significantly probative" as

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1187. *Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 95 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 1996).

1188. *Id.* at 383.

1189. *Id.* at 382 (quoting *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).

1190. *Id.* at 383.

1191. *Michaels v. Avitech, Inc.*, 202 F.3d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 2000).

1192. *Id.*

1193. *Id.* at 750–51 (citing *In re TMI Litig.*, 193 F.3d 613, 716 (3d Cir. 1999)).

1194. *Id.* at 753.

1195. *Id.*

1196. *Id.*

to the issue of negligence and, thus, was insufficient to preclude summary judgment.<sup>1197</sup>

#### *F. Objections to Evidence*

In federal practice, objections to summary judgment evidence must be raised either orally or in writing at or before the hearing; otherwise, objections are ordinarily deemed waived.<sup>1198</sup> The party contesting an affidavit has the burden to object to its inadmissible portions.<sup>1199</sup> Failure to object allows the district court to consider the entire affidavit.

### V. RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS TREATED AS RULE 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Where matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the court to treat the motion as one for summary judgment and to dispose of it as required by Rule 56.<sup>1200</sup> If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has been converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the summary judgment rule governs the standard of review.<sup>1201</sup> In this manner, the respondent is entitled to the procedural safeguards of the summary judgment rule.<sup>1202</sup>

Under Rule 56, the district court is not required to provide parties notice beyond its decision to treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment.<sup>1203</sup> The standard is whether the

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1197. *Id.* at 754.

1198. *See, e.g.,* Branton v. City of Moss Point, 261 F. App'x 659, 661 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding any argument regarding the untimely production of an affidavit was waived due to the objecting party's failure to raise the issue in the district court); Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 650 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing McCloud River R.R. Co. v. Sabine River Forest Prods., Inc., 735 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1984)).

1199. *McCloud River R.R. Co.*, 735 F.2d at 882 ("Sabine neither moved to strike the affidavit nor raised an objection to consideration of the affidavit. Thus, it has waived its right to raise the untimeliness issue on appeal."); *see also* FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (stating the adverse party must state specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial).

1200. *Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc.*, 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004); *Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd.*, 139 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1998); *Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 901 F.2d 1281, 1283-84 (5th Cir. 1990); *see also* FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing a party, by motion, to assert as a defense that the opposing party has in its pleadings "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").

1201. *Songbyrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc.*, 104 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the review would be de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court); *Washington*, 901 F.2d at 1284 (explaining that the appeals court may apply a summary judgment standard of review despite the trial court's mislabeling it as a 12(b)(6) motion).

1202. *Washington*, 901 F.2d at 1284.

1203. *Id.* at 1284 (quoting *Clark v. Tarrant County, Tex.*, 798 F.2d 736, 746 (5th Cir.

opposing party had notice after the court accepted for consideration matters outside the pleadings.<sup>1204</sup> The notice required is only that the district court *could* treat the motion as one for summary judgment, not that the court would in fact do so.<sup>1205</sup>

*Washington v. Allstate Insurance Co.* provides an example of this principle.<sup>1206</sup> In *Washington*, the defendant attached a copy of a statute to its motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff attached a copy of the repair estimates to his response.<sup>1207</sup> After twenty days passed, the court treated the defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion.<sup>1208</sup> The court determined the plaintiff was on notice that the trial court could treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment because the parties attached documents to both the motion to dismiss and the response; therefore, the notice provisions of Rule 12(b) and Rule 56 were not violated.<sup>1209</sup>

When a 12(b)(6) motion is converted to a summary judgment motion, the disposition of the motion does not turn on whether the complaint states a claim.<sup>1210</sup> Rather, disposition depends on whether the plaintiff raised an issue of material fact which, if proved, would entitle him to relief as a matter of law.<sup>1211</sup> For example, in *Bossard v. Exxon Corp.*, the district court granted the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after considering information outside the pleadings.<sup>1212</sup> The plaintiff appealed, arguing it stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.<sup>1213</sup> The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that once a court considers evidence outside the pleadings, a 12(b)(6) motion is then treated as a motion for summary judgment requiring the nonmovant to show a genuine issue of material fact.<sup>1214</sup>

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1986)).

1204. *Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n*, 987 F.2d 278, 283 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that even if summary judgment is granted sua sponte, the ten-day notice and opportunity to respond requirement of Rule 56 still governs).

1205. *Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 186, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1988).

1206. *Washington*, 901 F.2d 1281.

1207. *Id.* at 1284.

1208. *Id.*

1209. *Id.* (noting district courts have the authority to enter summary judgment sua sponte as long as the nonmoving party was on notice to come forward with all evidence).

1210. *Bossard v. Exxon Corp.*, 559 F.2d 1040, 1041 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).

1211. *Id.*

1212. *Id.*

1213. *Id.*

1214. *Id.*



## VI. APPEALING SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

A. *When Summary Judgments Are Appealable*

If the trial court grants summary judgment and disposes of all claims, the judgment is appealable.<sup>1215</sup> But when the district court denies summary judgment, appeal is usually unavailable.<sup>1216</sup> In this situation, the court's decision constitutes an interlocutory order from which the right to appeal is unavailable until entry of judgment following a trial on the merits.<sup>1217</sup> Exceptions to this rule exist in situations such as the denial of qualified immunity.<sup>1218</sup> Further, upon certification, the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment may be reviewed by permissive interlocutory appeal,<sup>1219</sup> but such certification is relatively rare.

Similarly, a grant of summary judgment in favor of one of several defendants is an unappealable interlocutory order.<sup>1220</sup> Yet one Fifth Circuit case stated that when a grant of summary judgment in favor of one defendant near the time of trial will prejudice the trial preparation of another defendant, the district court should continue the trial in order to allow an interlocutory appeal.<sup>1221</sup>

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1215. See *Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Estate*, 547 F.3d 273, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding appellant's notice of appeal of partial summary judgment premature because the judgment "neither disposed of the claims against all the defendants nor was it certified as a final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)"); *Samaad v. City of Dallas*, 940 F.2d 925, 940 (5th Cir. 1991) ("As a general rule, only a final judgment of the district court is appealable."). Caution must be taken in determining what is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. The pendency of a motion for attorney's fees, for example, does not prevent the running of time for filing a notice of appeal on the merits. *Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*, 486 U.S. 196, 199–203 (1988); *Treuter v. Kaufman County, Tex.*, 864 F.2d 1139, 1142–43 (5th Cir. 1989).

1216. See *Skelton v. Camp*, 234 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 2000) ("A denial of summary judgment is not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.").

1217. See *Ozee v. Am. Council on Gift Annuities, Inc.*, 110 F.3d 1082, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997), *vacated sub nom.* *Am. Council on Gift Annuities, Inc. v. Richie*, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997) (mem.); *Samaad*, 940 F.2d at 940 (explaining the "collateral order doctrine" exception to the general rule that a court's denial of summary judgment is unappealable).

1218. See, e.g., *Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch*, 566 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2009); *Tarver v. City of Edna*, 410 F.3d 745, 749 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005). Interestingly, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable only when it is based on a conclusion of law, while a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not immediately appealable if it is based on a factual dispute. *Thibodeaux v. Harris Co., Tex.*, 215 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

1219. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006); see *Doré Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co.*, 570 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the district court certified for interlocutory review a partial summary judgment award pursuant to § 1292(b)).

1220. See *Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc.*, 95 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (5th Cir. 1996).

1221. *Id.* (finding the timing of summary judgment did not warrant reversal and that

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit “normally declines to review a ‘district court’s denial of motions for summary judgment when the case comes to [the appellate court] on the movant’s appeal following adverse judgment after full trial on the merits.’”<sup>1222</sup> In *Becker v. Tidewater, Inc.*, however, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in determining that “denial of summary judgment is appealable after a trial on the merits when there was a ruling by the district court on an issue of law.”<sup>1223</sup> In that case, the district court denied defendants’ summary judgment motions on the validity of a reciprocal indemnity agreement in an admiralty case.<sup>1224</sup> Following an adverse outcome in a bench trial, the defendants appealed, among other things, the earlier denial of summary judgment.<sup>1225</sup> The Fifth Circuit determined it was appropriate to review the district court’s denial of appellants’ summary judgment motion because “the case was a bench trial,” and the appellants “appeal[ed] the district court’s *legal conclusions in denying summary judgment*.”<sup>1226</sup>

### B. Standard of Review on Appeal

In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court applies the same standards that govern the district court.<sup>1227</sup> Therefore, the appellate court will not affirm a summary judgment ruling unless, after de novo review,<sup>1228</sup> the record reflects “there is no genuine issue as to any

prejudice had not occurred in this case).

1222. *Becker v. Tidewater, Inc.*, 586 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Black v. J.I. Case Co.*, 22 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994)).

1223. *Id.* (citing *Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers’ Trust Funds for S. Cal.*, 382 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 2004)).

1224. *Id.* at 363.

1225. *Id.*

1226. *Id.* at 365 n.4 (emphasis added).

1227. *See Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2010 WL 60901, at \*9 (5th Cir. 2010); *Allen v. McWane, Inc.*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2010 WL 47919, at \*2 (5th Cir. 2010); *Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co.*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2010 WL 6903 (5th Cir. 2010); *Aubris Res. LP v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 566 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the same legal standards as the district court”). Moreover, this same standard applies to the appellate court’s review of the district court’s judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment. *Trinity Universal*, 2010 WL 6903, at \*2; *First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford*, 555 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2009). However, “[o]n cross-motions for summary judgment, [the appellate court] review[s] each party’s motions independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Trinity Universal*, 2010 WL 6903, at \*2 (quoting *Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp.*, 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001)).

1228. *Doré Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co.*, 570 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2009); *Connors v. Graves*, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2008); *Chacko v. Sabre, Inc.*, 473 F.3d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 2006); *Alexander v. Eeds*, 392 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 2004).

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”<sup>1229</sup>

The Fifth Circuit has stated, “When a district court denies summary judgment on the basis that genuine issues of material fact exist, it has made two distinct legal conclusions: that there are ‘genuine’ issues of fact in dispute, and that these issues are ‘material.’”<sup>1230</sup> The appellate court may review a district court’s legal conclusion that issues are “material.”<sup>1231</sup> However, it may not review a district court’s conclusion that issues of fact are “genuine.”<sup>1232</sup>

Following this standard, the appellate court must “review the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”<sup>1233</sup> The court only considers admissible materials in the pretrial record.<sup>1234</sup> In contrast, the appellate court will decide questions of law in the same manner as it decides questions of law outside the summary judgment context—by *de novo* review.<sup>1235</sup> In diversity actions, the appellate court will review *de novo* the district court’s application of state law.<sup>1236</sup> The appellate court may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record—even grounds other than those stated by the trial court.<sup>1237</sup> While, generally, the

1229. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); *Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc.*, 398 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 2005).

1230. *Reyes v. City of Richmond, Tex.*, 287 F.3d 346, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2002).

1231. *Id.* at 351 (citing *Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County*, 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001)).

1232. *Id.* (citing *Behrens v. Pelletier*, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996)).

1233. *Fraire v. City of Arlington*, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting *Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Jacobs Constructors, Inc.*, 804 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); see also *Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.*, 223 F.3d 286, 288, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing the grant of summary judgment when “reasonable and fair-minded persons” could conclude from the summary judgment evidence that the defendant was liable under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty).

1234. *Michaels v. Avitech, Inc.*, 202 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled . . . that the scope of appellate review on a summary judgment order is limited to matters presented to the district court.” *Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc.*, 407 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2005).

1235. *Michaels*, 202 F.3d at 751.

1236. *Moore v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 556 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2009); *Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.*, 354 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 2004) (“This court reviews *de novo* a district court’s choice of law determination.”); *DeLeon v. Lloyd’s London, Certain Underwriters*, 259 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (reviewing “*de novo* the district court’s interpretation of state law” in a diversity action).

1237. *CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co.*, 565 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment ‘on any ground presented to the district court for consideration, even though it may not have formed the basis for the district court’s decision.’” (quoting *Gulf Island, IV v. Blue Streak Marine, Inc.*, 940 F.2d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1991))); *Arthur W. Tifford, PA v. Tandem Energy Corp.*, 562 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” (quoting *Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns*

appellate court may not affirm a summary judgment on grounds not raised to the trial court, “affirmance on such a ground is proper where the lack of notice to the nonmovant is harmless, such as where ‘the [unraised] issues were implicit or included in those raised below or the evidence in support thereof, or . . . the record appears to be adequately developed in respect thereto.’”<sup>1238</sup> However, as a general principle in the Fifth Circuit, if a party does not raise an issue on summary judgment at the district court, the party waives that issue on appeal.<sup>1239</sup>

### C. *The District Court’s Order on Summary Judgment*

The prevailing movant should seek an order from the court with a specific finding that the movant carried his burden of proof and there is no genuine issue of material fact. This prevents the appellate court from having to “scour the entire record while it ponders the possible explanations” for the entry of summary judgment.<sup>1240</sup> Although Rule 56 *technically* does not require the trial court to state its reasons for granting a motion for summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit has stated that a detailed discussion is of great importance.<sup>1241</sup> In all but the simplest case, a statement of the reasons for granting summary judgment usually proves “not only helpful but essential.”<sup>1242</sup> The movant should therefore submit a proposed order with reasons for granting the motion rather than a form order merely stating the motion is granted.<sup>1243</sup>

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Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001)); *LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev.*, 480 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e may only affirm an order granting summary judgment on a basis that was presented to the district court.”); *Izen v. Catalina*, 398 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2005) (“We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on grounds other than those offered by the district court.”).

1238. *McIntosh v. Partridge*, 540 F.3d 315, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting *FDIC v. Lee*, 130 F.3d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1997)).

1239. See *Cox v. DeSoto County, Miss.*, 564 F.3d 745, 749 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (precluding plaintiff from relying upon mixed-motive theory on appeal where it was not raised in the district court); *Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 559 F.3d 341, 344 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009); *Keelan*, 407 F.3d at 339; *Ondimar Transportes Maritimos v. Beatty St. Props., Inc.*, 555 F.3d 184, 189–90 (5th Cir. 2009).

1240. *Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.*, 537 F.3d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Jot-Em-Down Store (JEDS) Inc. v. Cotter & Co.*, 651 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).

1241. *McIncrow v. Harris County*, 878 F.2d 835, 835–36 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting *Heller v. Namer*, 666 F.2d 905, 911 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982)).

1242. *Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc.*, 897 F.2d 826, 829 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting *Jot-Em-Down Store*, 651 F.2d at 247).

1243. This is true for most motions, particularly dispositive ones, in federal court. In contrast, Texas state courts may, and typically do, grant an order for summary judgment without expressing their reasons.

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#### CONCLUSION

While following the technically complex summary judgment procedures detailed in this Article is fundamental, it does not ensure successful prosecution of, or defense against, a motion for summary judgment. Effective advocacy in summary judgment practice depends on strategic timing decisions, development and use of evidence, written persuasion, and an understanding of the particular judge and his or her procedures. These factors, combined with technical correctness, ultimately determine success in summary judgment practice.